# Opinion

> District Court, S.D. California · March 19, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366547

## Case

- **Full name:** Walter Sayles v. Department of Correction, Chief Warden, AW Warden, CDCR ISU
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. California
- **Decided:** March 19, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 WALTER SAYLES, Case No.: 3:25-CV-910-JLS-DEB
CDCR #AL-4784,
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ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTION
Plaintiff,
13 TO PROCEED IN FORMA
vs. PAUPERIS AND
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15 (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR
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CHIEF WARDEN, AW WARDEN, CDCR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
17 ISU, PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.
18 Defendants. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 1915A(b)

19 (ECF No. 8)
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21 INTRODUCTION
22 Walter Sayles (“Sayles” or “Plaintiff”) is a state inmate proceeding pro se with a
23 civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 ECF No. 1. On May 5, 2025, the
24 Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) and dismissed the
25 action without prejudice because Plaintiff’s IFP lacked a copy of his trust account statement
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1 The case was originally filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California,
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1 or prison certificate as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). See ECF No. 7. The Court
2 gave Sayles 45 days, or until June 19, 2025, to have his case reopened by either paying the
3 filing fee or submitting a properly supported IFP motion. Id. at 3. The Court also notified
4 Sayles that failure to respond by the deadline would result in his case remaining dismissed
5 without prejudice. Id.
6 On December 15, 2025, Sayles filed an IFP Motion.2 ECF No. 8. While the motion
7 was filed over five months after the due date, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and
8 appears to have been unaware his case was transferred to this district, the Court accepts the
9 late filing and reopens the case in the interest of justice and resolving the case on the merits.
10 For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP motion and
11 dismisses the action without prejudice.
12 IFP MOTION
13 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the
14 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of
15 $405.3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a failure to pay the entire
16 fee at the time of filing only if the court grants the Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP pursuant
17 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007);
18 cf. Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[W]here [an]
19 IFP application is denied altogether, Plaintiff’s case [cannot] proceed unless and until the
20 fee[s] [a]re paid.”).
21 / / /
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2 It appears Plaintiff initially sent the IFP Motion to the United States District Court for the Eastern District
25 of California, where it was received on December 1, 2025, and that Court forwarded the motion here. See
ECF No. 8 at 1, 10.
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3 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. See
27 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff.
Dec. 1, 2023). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed
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1 To proceed IFP, prisoners must “submit[] an affidavit that includes a statement of
2 all assets [they] possess[,]” as well as “a “certified copy of the[ir] trust fund account
3 statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period immediately preceding
4 the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), (2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,
5 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). Using this financial information, the court “assess[es] and when
6 funds exist, collect[s], … an initial partial filing fee,” which is “calculated based on ‘the
7 average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account’ or ‘the average monthly balance in the
8 prisoner’s account’ over a 6-month term; the remainder of the fee is to be paid in ‘monthly
9 payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s
10 account.” Hymas, 73 F.4th at 767 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2)). In short, while
11 prisoners may qualify to proceed IFP without having to pay the full statutory filing upfront,
12 they remain obligated to pay the full amount due in monthly payments. See Bruce v.
13 Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281
14 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).
15 In support of his IFP Motion, Sayles has provided a signed copy of his prison
16 certificate which reflects an average monthly balance of $76.05, average monthly deposits
17 of $67.50, and an available account balance of $0.01. ECF No. 8 at 3. Accordingly, the
18 Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP motion. Because the initial partial filing fee would exceed
19 the balance in Plaintiff’s account, the Court assesses no initial partial filing fee. See 28
20 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from
21 bringing a civil action or appealing a civil or criminal judgment for the reason that the
22 prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee”). The
23 facility where Plaintiff is detained must collect the full balance of the $350 fee owed and
24 forward payments to the Clerk of the Court as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
25 SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)
26 A. Standard of Review
27 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b), the Court must screen a
28 prisoner’s IFP complaint and sua sponte dismiss it to the extent that it is frivolous,
1 malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See
2 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Rhodes v. Robinson,
3 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010). “The standard for determining whether [Plaintiff]
4 has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
5 same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.”
6 Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires that a
7 complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is plausible
8 on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
9 While detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements
10 of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a
11 claim. Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-
12 harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.
13 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations
14 In his Complaint, Sayles alleges officers with the Investigative Services Unit
15 (“ISU”) and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) have
16 been “telling inmates that [Plaintiff] told on officers that [were] bring[ing] . . . drugs and
17 phones” into the prison. ECF No. 1 at 3. He states he is a “protective custody” inmate, but
18 he is being held in a “general population” prison. Id. Sayles further alleges that ISU
19 officers at R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”), where he is currently confined,
20 “work for the Mexican Mafia” and he has been put in danger because he “told on ISU.”
21 Id. at 3. He fears for his life. Id.
22 Sayles, who is Black, also states is being discriminated against because officers at
23 RJD are associated with the “Mexican Mafia.” Id. at 4. While not entirely clear, Plaintiff
24 appears to allege that he should be in “protective custody,” but officers have told him he is
25 not “active” and therefore he must eat his meals with the general population. Id.
26 Sayles further alleges that officers are “trying to get other inmate[s] to get [him]
27 killed” for “telling” that ISU officers were bringing drugs and phones into the RJD and
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1 Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”). Id. at 5. Officers are retaliating against him for
2 reporting “the drug ring the officers [have] been running in prison for years.” Id.
3 C. Discussion
4 In his Complaint, Sayles names four Defendants: (1) CDCR4 (1) “Chief Warden,”
5 (3) “AW Warden,” and “CDCR ISU.” ECF No. 1 at 1. Sayles raises claims under 42
6 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging cruel and unusual punishment, discrimination based on race, and
7 retaliation. Id. at 3–5. He seeks $10 million in money damages. Id. at 6.
8 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a right secured
9 by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) the alleged violation
10 was committed by “a person” acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
11 42, 48 (1988).
12 1. State Agency Defendants
13 To the extent Sayles seeks to sue the CDCR and “CDCR ISU” he cannot state a
14 claim. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits § 1983 suits against a state or its agencies in
15 federal court unless the State waives its immunity. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491
16 U.S. 58, 70 (1989). “California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with
17 respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal court.” Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr.,
18 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, the CDCR, as an agency of the State, and
19 “CDCR ISU” as a sub-department of that agency, are not proper Defendants as to
20 Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, whether sued for money damages or for injunctive relief. See
21 Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co-op., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The
22 Eleventh Amendment’s jurisdictional bar covers suits naming state agencies and
23 departments as defendants, and applies whether the relief sought is legal or equitable in
24 nature.”); see also Dragasits v. California, No. 16-CV-1998-BEN-JLB, 2016 WL
25 6804947, at *3 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (“The State of California’s Department of Corrections and
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4 Specifically, Plaintiff names “Department of Correction,” which the Court construes as a reference to
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1 Rehabilitation and any state prison, correctional agency, sub-division, or department under
2 its jurisdiction, are not ‘persons’ subject to suit under § 1983.”). The Court therefore
3 DISMISSES Defendants “Department of Corrections” and “CDCR ISU.” See 28 U.S.C.
4 §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b).
5 2. Warden Defendants
6 Sayles also names “Chief Warden” and “AW Warden” as Defendants. Id. at 1.
7 While not entirely clear, the Court presumes Plaintiff is referencing the head warden and
8 assistant warden of RJD, where he is confined. But Plaintiff fails to allege any specific
9 facts as to what these Defendants are alleged to have done or how they were personally
10 involved in the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
11 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show a causal connection or link
12 between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by
13 the plaintiff. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 373–75 (1976). Liability may not be
14 imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of their subordinates under
15 the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77. Supervisors may be held
16 liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and
17 failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Here,
18 Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts suggesting personal involvement on the part of RJD’s
19 Warden or Assistant Warden, as to any of his claims. See Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740,
20 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted) (“A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a
21 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act,
22 participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally
23 required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”). Therefore, the
24 Court DISMISSES Defendants Chief Warden and AW Warden. See 28 U.S.C. §§
25 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77.
26 3. Plaintiff’s Claims and Legal Standards
27 While the Complaint must be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend
28 for failure to state a claim against any Defendant, the Court provides the following
1 standards for Plaintiff to consider if he seeks to amend his pleading. As noted above,
2 Plaintiff identifies three counts (1) cruel and unusual punishment, (2) discrimination based
3 on race and (3) staff misconduct and retaliation. ECF No. 1 at 3–5.
4 First, to the extent Sayles seeks to allege he has been subject to cruel and unusual
5 punishment stemming from prison officials labeling him a “rat,” and failing to put him in
6 “protective custody,” see id. at 3, the Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take
7 reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
8 825, 832 (1994). In particular, prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from
9 violence at the hands of other prisoners. Id. at 833; Cortez v. Skol, 776 F.3d 1046, 1050
10 (9th Cir. 2015). Failure of prison officials to protect inmates from attacks by other inmates
11 or from dangerous conditions at the prison violates the Eighth Amendment only when two
12 requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively, sufficiently serious; and
13 (2) the prison official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to inmate health or safety.
14 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows of and
15 disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety by failing to take reasonable steps
16 to abate it. Id. at 837. Neither negligence nor gross negligence warrant liability under the
17 Eighth Amendment. Id. at 835–36, n.4.
18 Next, Sayles alleges he has been discriminated against based on race. ECF No. 1 at
19 4. “Prisoners are protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
20 Amendment from invidious discrimination based on race.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
21 539, 556 (1974) (citation omitted). To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff first must
22 show that he “has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated . . .
23 .” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). To allege an equal
24 protection violation based on race or other protected status, the plaintiff “must show that
25 the defendant acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against him based upon his
26 membership in a protected class.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003).
27 “Intentional discrimination means that a defendant acted at least in part because of a
28 plaintiff’s protected status.” Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F.3d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir.
1 1994).
2 Finally, to the extent Sayles alleges “retaliation,” ECF No. 1 at 5, the First
3 Amendment protects against officials retaliating against a prisoner for his protected speech
4 activities. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison
5 context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An
6 assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3)
7 that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of
8 his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate
9 correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2005).
10 D. Leave to Amend
11 As noted above, given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court grants him leave to amend.
12 See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district court should not
13 dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend [pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
14 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint
15 could not be cured by amendment.’”) (quoting Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th
16 Cir. 2012)). In amending his pleading, Plaintiff should consider the legal standards
17 applicable to his claims, as discussed above. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448
18 (9th Cir. 1987), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in, Lopez, 203 F.3d at
19 1130 (stating a court should briefly explain a pro se litigant’s pleading deficiencies when
20 dismissing claims with leave to amend).
21 CONCLUSION
22 Accordingly, the Court:
23 1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)
24 (ECF No. 8).
25 2. ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect the $350
26 filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount
27 equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to
28 the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with
1 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). All payments must clearly identify the name and case number
2 || assigned to this action.
3 3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Jeff
4 || Macomber, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001, by
5 ||U.S. Mail, or by forwarding an electronic copy to trusthelpdesk@cdcr.ca.gov.
6 4. DISMISSES the Complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim against
7 Defendant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)Gt) & 1915A(b)(1).
8 5. GRANTS Plaintiff sixty (60) days leave from the date of this Order in which
9 file a First Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of pleading noted in this
10 || Order. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his
11 || original Complaint. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner
12 || & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the
13 || original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims
14 || dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be
15 ||‘‘considered waived if not repled.”).
16 If Plaintiff fails to timely file a First Amended Complaint, the Court will enter a final
17 || Order dismissing this civil action based both on failure to state a claim upon which relief
18 || can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1), and failure to
19 || prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427
20 || F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of the opportunity
21 fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the complaint into
22 || dismissal of the entire action.’’).
23 IT IS SO ORDERED.
24 || Dated: March 19, 2026 ft
26 United States District Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366547. Public record. Not legal advice.