# Muhammad

> District Court, N.D. California · February 23, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366530

## Case

- **Full name:** Kwesi Muhammad v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. California
- **Decided:** February 23, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
8
9 KWESI MUHAMMAD, Case No. 23-cv-02242-AMO (PR)

10 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND
11 v. SETTING NEW BRIEFING
SCHEDULE
12 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND Re: Dkt. No. 30
13 REHABILITATION,
Defendant.
14

15 I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Kwesi Muhammad brings the instant action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, representing
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himself, stemming from alleged violations at the Correctional Training Facility (“CTF”). He
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alleges federal causes of action under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section
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504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”).1 Dkt. 1 at 5-7. In his complaint,
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Muhammad names only the CDCR. Id. at 2.2 He seeks monetary damages. Id. at 11.
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Before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 30. Defendant
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moves for summary judgment on the ground that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
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because Muhammad failed to properly exhaust all available administrative remedies as required by
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1 Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C.§ 12101 et seq., and Section 504, as amended and codified in 29
U.S.C. § 794(a), prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability in the programs, services or
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activities of a public entity.

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2 Page number citations refer to those assigned by the Court’s electronic case management filing
1 the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). Id. at 1. Muhammad filed an opposition to
2 Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and Defendant filed a reply. Dkts. 36, 37.
3 This Order assumes familiarity with the Court’s June 14, 2024 Order, which provided the
4 case’s background and noted that, when liberally construed, the complaint appeared to state a
5 cognizable claim against the CDCR for violating Muhammad’s rights under the ADA and Section
6 504. See Dkt. 18 at 1-2.3
7 Having read and considered the parties’ papers, as well as the relevant legal authority, the
8 Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
9 II. BACKGROUND
10 A. Factual Summary of Claims from Complaint
11 Muhammad claims that he is an individual with qualifying disabilities because of a
12 claimed “failed left knee medial meniscus tear repair and left foot hammertoe correction.” Dkt. 1
13 at 6. Muhammad alleges that in April 2021, when the CDCR discontinued a practice where
14 certain individuals with disabilities had the exclusive ability to shower during specified times, it
15 discriminated against individuals in violation of the ADA and Section 504. Id. at 9-10. Four
16 months later, around September 2021, the CDCR returned to the shower practice that existed
17 before its April 2021 change. Id. at 8.
18 On January 17, 2023, Muhammad filed this lawsuit asserting claims under the ADA and
19 Section 504 relating to him not being given special shower time from April 21, 2021 to August 27,
20 2021. Id. Muhammad avers he was not given special shower time “in retaliation for Inmate
21 Jenkins filing a grievance” against a correctional officer. Id. at 9.
22 B. Factual Summary Relating to Exhaustion
23 On May 19, 2021, Muhammad submitted a grievance to the Office of Grievances at CTF,
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3 Also in its June 14, 2024 Order, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to strike Muhammad’s
first amended complaint (“FAC”) upon determining that Muhammad did not intend to file the
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FAC here because “the FAC ha[d] in its caption the case number of his case proceeding in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, and because its allegation d[id]
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not relate to the claims at bar in this suit.” Dkt. 18 at 3 (citing Dkt. 12 at 1; Def.’s Req. for Jud.
1 which was designated Grievance No. 119967. Id. at 8. According to Muhammad, Grievance No.
2 119967 is the grievance relevant to this lawsuit. Id.
3 The grievance alleges that it had been a long-term practice for ADA-designated inmates
4 with ground-floor housing restrictions to be permitted to shower after the completion of the 5:00
5 p.m. inmate count. See Georgely Decl., Ex. B (hereinafter “Muhammad Dep.”) at 53:18–54:4;
6 Georgely Decl., Ex. C at 3 (Grievance No. 119967). It states that Muhammad participated in this
7 special shower time. Georgely Decl., Ex. C at 1, 3. The grievance states that, on April 21, 2021, a
8 non-party correctional officer informed Muhammad that Muhammad and other ADA-designated
9 inmates were no longer going to be given special shower time. Id. Muhammad claims he could
10 not safely shower with other inmates because of his disability. Id. at 3.
11 On June 27, 2021, the Office of Grievances issued its decision on Grievance No. 119967.
12 See Barss Decl., Ex. B. The Office of Grievances “disapproved” the grievance and stated that if
13 Muhammad was dissatisfied with the decision, he could file an appeal with the Office of Appeals.
14 Id. at 2. According to the decision, prison officials investigated Muhammad’s grievance. Id. at 1.
15 The investigation revealed that Muhammad refused to use the first-floor shower, because the
16 showers were used by inmates of another race—not because Muhammad was denied equal access
17 to the showers. Id.
18 According to Defendant, the Office of Appeals did not receive an appeal of Grievance No.
19 119967. See Moseley Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. A. However, Muhammad claims that he completed the
20 form to appeal Grievance No. 119967, signed the appeal, and addressed the envelope to the Office
21 of Appeals. Muhammad Dep. at 50:17-20. Specifically, Muhammad asserts that, on July 8, 2021,
22 he handed the envelope containing his appeal to a third-watch correctional officer in his housing
23 unit for processing as confidential mail. Id. at 49:15-16, 50:17-20; Dkt. 36 at 3.
24 On July 18, 2022, the Office of Appeals received a letter from Muhammad dated July 12,
25 2022, inquiring into the status of his appeal of Grievance No. 119967. Moseley Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. E.
26 Muhammad did not enclose a copy of his appeal. Id. Muhammad enclosed in the letter a copy of
27 his outgoing legal mail log for June and July 2021. Id. at 5. The Office of Appeals received the
III. DISCUSSION
1
A. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a party may move for summary judgment
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on some or all of the claims or defenses presented in an action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)(1). “The
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court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
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material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.; see Anderson v.
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Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party has the burden of
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establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
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317, 323 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (requiring citation to “particular parts of materials in
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the record”). If the moving party meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non-
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moving party to present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex,
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477 U.S. at 324; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87
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(1986). The court is only concerned with disputes over material facts and “[f]actual disputes that
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are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The nonmoving
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party has the burden of identifying, with reasonable particularity, the evidence that precludes
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summary judgment. Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). It is not the court’s
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task to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact. Id. If the nonmoving party
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fails to make the requisite showing, “the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
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law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
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The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that must be raised
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in a motion for summary judgment. See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en
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banc) abrogated in part on other grounds by Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460, 475 (2025). The
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defendant has the initial burden to prove “that there was an available administrative remedy, and
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that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. If the
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defendant carries that burden, “the burden shifts to the prisoner to come forward with evidence
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showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally
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available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Id. The ultimate burden of
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proof remains with the defendant, however. Id. “If material facts are disputed, summary
1 judgment should be denied, and the district judge rather than a jury should determine the facts.”
2 Id. at 1166.
3 A district court may only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary
4 judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Orr v. Bank of Am., 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). In
5 support of the motion for summary judgment, Defendant has filed a declaration and exhibits from
6 its attorney, Deputy Attorney General Christian Michael Georgely, as well as declarations and
7 exhibits from Associate Director of the Office of Appeals Howard E. Moseley, CTF Correctional
8 Counselor II M. Barss, and CTF Correctional Officer N. Gomez. See Dkt. 30-1 – 30-15.
9 Muhammad has filed his opposition and declaration, which are verified as he signed both under
10 penalty of perjury. Dkt. 35 at 3; Dkt. 36 at 5-6. The complaint is also verified, see Dkt. 1 at 7-8,
11 and thus the Court will construe it as well as the verified opposition and declaration as opposing
12 affidavits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, insofar as they are based on personal
13 knowledge and set forth specific facts admissible in evidence, see Schroeder v. McDonald, 55
14 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995).
15 B. Analysis
16 The PLRA amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with
17 respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
18 confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are
19 available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Section 1997e(a) requires “proper exhaustion” of
20 available administrative remedies. Ngo, 548 U.S. at 93. A prisoner not only must pursue every
21 available step of the prison appeal process but also must adhere to “deadlines and other critical
22 procedural rules” of that process. Id. at 90.
23 Compliance with prison grievance procedures is all that is required by the PLRA to
24 “properly exhaust.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 217-18 (2007). The level of detail necessary in
25 a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to
26 claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper
27 exhaustion. Id. at 218. In California, the regulation requires the prisoner “to lodge his
1 requested.’” Morton v. Hall, 599 F.3d 942, 946 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting former Cal. Code Regs.
2 tit. 15 § 3084.2(a)).
3 A prisoner must “exhaust his administrative remedies prior to sending his complaint to the
4 district court.” Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). The
5 prisoner cannot comply with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement “by exhausting available
6 remedies during the course of the litigation.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 2012)
7 (citation omitted).
8 The CDCR provides its inmates and parolees the right to administratively grieve and
9 appeal any “policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by the Department or departmental
10 staff that causes some measurable harm to their health, safety, or welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit.
11 15, § 3481(a).4
12 Under the regulations effective June 1, 2020, there are two levels of review for non-health-
13 care appeals by inmates, referred to as a grievance and an appeal. At the first level, the inmate
14 submits a form CDCR 602-1 to the Institutional Office of Grievances at the prison or other facility
15 where he is housed. See Id. at § 3482(a), (c) (repealed eff. June 1, 2020). “In response, a claimant
16 shall receive a written decision” from the Institutional Office of Grievances “clearly explaining the
17 reasoning for the Reviewing Authority’s decision as to each claim.” Id. at § 3481(a) (repealed eff.
18 June 1, 2020). At the second level, an inmate dissatisfied with the Institutional Office of
19 Grievances’ decision at first level submits a form CDCR 602-2 to the CDCR’s Office of Appeals
20 in Sacramento. Id. at §§ 3481(a), 3485(a) (repealed eff. June 1, 2020).
21 Prisoners also may file complaints regarding healthcare policies, decision, actions,
22 conditions, or omissions using a form CDCR 602 HC. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3999.226(a),
23 3999.227. Such complaints are subject to two levels of review – an institutional level of review
24 and a headquarters level of review. Id.
25

26 4 The regulations that set out the features of the administrative remedies process for California
prisoners underwent a substantial restructuring in 2020. On March 25, 2020, and effective June 1,
27 2020, California Code of Regulations Title 15, sections 3084 through 3084.9 were repealed and
1 A grievance should include sufficient information “to allow prison officials to take
2 appropriate responsive measures.” Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation
3 and internal quotation omitted). To initiate the grievance process, an inmate must submit a CDCR
4 Form 602 within thirty calendar days of the event or decision being appealed. See Cal. Code
5 Regs. tit. 15, § 3482(b)-(d). The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement cannot be satisfied “by filing an
6 untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal.” Ngo, 548 U.S.
7 at 84.
8 There are “three kinds of circumstances in which an administrative remedy, although
9 officially on the books, is not capable of use to obtain relief.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643
10 (2016). First, “an administrative procedure is unavailable when (despite what regulations or
11 guidance materials may promise) it operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or
12 consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates.” Id. Second, “an administrative
13 scheme might be so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use.” Id. Third, an
14 administrative remedy is not available “when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking
15 advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at
16 644.
17 A prisoner must provide evidence, not just make conclusory allegations, to meet their
18 burden to show that existing and generally available administrative remedies were effectively
19 unavailable. See Draper v. Rosario, 836 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2016). A prisoner’s
20 “unsupported allegations” regarding impediments to exhaustion are insufficient to create a triable
21 issue of fact. Id.
22 Here, Defendant argues as follows:

23 The undisputed material facts establish that Muhammad did not
exhaust administrative remedies for the claims he asserts in this
24 lawsuit. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-91
(“Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines
25 and other critical procedural rules.”). Under CDCR’s regulations, a
grievance is not exhausted until the Office of Appeals issues a
26 qualifying decision in response to an inmate’s appeal of their
grievance decision. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3486(m). Muhammad
27 identified Grievance No. 119967 as the grievance relevant to this
Muhammad concedes facts that establish he did not exhaust
1 Grievance No. 119967 through the final level of review. (See
Georgely Decl. Ex. B [Muhammad Dep. Tr. 51:15-20].) It is
2 undisputed that the Office of Appeals did not issue a decision on
Grievance No. 119967 and that Muhammad did not receive a
3 response from the Office of Appeals regarding Grievance No.
119967. (Georgely Decl. Ex. B [Muhammad Dep. Tr. 51:15-20].)
4 The Office of Appeals never received an appeal of Grievance No.
119967. (Moseley Decl. ¶ 10.) Muhammad, therefore, did not
5 exhaust his shower grievance, Grievance No. 119967, through the
final level of review. See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3486(m).
6
Dkt. 30 at 16. Defendant’s evidence meets the initial burden of proving that there was an
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available administrative remedy that Muhammad failed to properly exhaust in connection with his
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claim against Defendant before filing this action. See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172.
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Accordingly, the burden shifts to Muhammad to show that “there is something particular in
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his case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively
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unavailable to him by ‘showing that the local remedies were ineffective, unobtainable, unduly
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prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile.’” See Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th
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Cir. 2015). Muhammad declares, under penalty of perjury, that he attempted to exhaust his
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administrative remedies by filing an appeal of Grievance No. 119967 on July 8, 2021. See
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Muhammad Dep. at 50:17-20; Dkt. 36 at 3. Specifically, Muhammad claims that he handed the
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envelope containing his appeal of Grievance No. 119967 to a third-watch correctional officer in
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his housing unit for processing as confidential mail. Id. at 49:15-16, 50:17-20. However, the
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Office of Appeals did not receive an appeal of Grievance No. 119967. See Moseley Decl. ¶ 10,
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Ex. A. In Muhammad’s opposition, he argues as follows:
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Defendant’s statement that [Muhammad’s] appeal was not received
21 by the Office of Appeals does not refute [his] showing that he
submitted his appeal in the manner prescribed by regulation. Indeed,
22 prison officials’ failure to process or respond to a properly submitted
grievance renders the administrative process “unavailable” under
23 Ross, 578 U.S. at 644.
24 Dkt. 36 at 4. Muhammad claims that an appeal was “effectively unavailable” because the faulty
25 mail delivery system at the prison thwarted his efforts to successfully mail his appeal. Id. (citing
26 Paramo, 775 F.3d at 1191). Muhammad’s assertions ring true: the record shows that his outgoing
27 legal mail log for June and July 2021 includes a July 8, 2021 entry of a mailing to the Office of
1 favorable to Muhammad, as the nonmoving party, it finds that Muhammad has sufficiently
2 demonstrated that the prison’s administrative remedies were “effectively unavailable” to him
3 because his efforts to appeal were thwarted due to the faulty mail delivery system, which then
4 rendered the prison appeals process “ineffective.” See Paramo, 775 F.3d at 1191.
5 Moreover, the absence of Muhammad’s appeal of Grievance No. 119967 is insufficient to
6 carry Defendant’s ultimate burden of proof in light of Muhammad’s verified factual allegations.
7 See id. at 1192 (finding that the declaration submitted by defendant did “nothing to rebut [the
8 plaintiff]’s evidence that administrative remedies were not available to her at the time she tried to
9 file the relevant grievance and appeal in this case”). Muhammad’s evidence is sufficient to defeat
10 Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. See Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir.
11 2010).
12 Defendant also argues that “[t]o the extent that [the] Court finds a factual issue precludes
13 summary judgment,” then it should hold a hearing pursuant to Albino to resolve any factual
14 disputes. Dkt. 30 at 19. However, Defendant has failed to meet its ultimate burden to show
15 Muhammad’s claims were unexhausted, and thus no hearing is necessary. See Albino, 747 F.3d at
16 1172 (“the ultimate burden of proof remains with the defendant”). Defendant does not dispute
17 Muhammad’s claim that he handed the envelope containing his appeal of Grievance No. 119967
18 to a third-watch correctional officer in his housing unit for processing as confidential mail to the
19 Office of Appeals. See Muhammad Dep. at 49:15-16, 50:17-20; see also Moseley Decl. ¶ 11, Ex.
20 E. Instead, Defendant argues that such an appeal was never received by the Office of Appeals,
21 which is insufficient to create a dispute of material fact. Ultimately, Defendant did not meet its
22 burden and failed to demonstrate that Muhammad failed to exhaust his claims. Thus, an Albino
23 hearing is not warranted to determine the facts.
24 Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment based on the failure to
25 exhaust administrative remedies at this time, and their motion is DENIED.
26 IV. CONCLUSION
27 For the reasons outlined above, the Court orders as follows:
1 Albino hearing is not warranted to resolve any factual disputes. Dkt. 30.
2 2. The parties shall abide by the following briefing schedule:
3 a. No later than sixty (60) days from the date of this Order, the defendant shall
4 file a motion for summary judgment on the merits or other dispositive motion. The motion must
5 be supported by adequate factual documentation, must conform in all respects to Federal Rule of
6 Civil Procedure 56, and must include as exhibits all records and incident reports stemming from
7 the events at issue. A motion for summary judgment also must be accompanied by a Rand5 notice
8 so that the plaintiff will have fair, timely and adequate notice of what is required of him in order to
9 oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 935 (9th Cir. 2012) (notice requirement set out
10 in Rand must be served concurrently with motion for summary judgment). A motion to dismiss
11 for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies must be accompanied by a similar notice.
12 However, the Court notes that under the new law of the circuit, in the rare event that a failure to
13 exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint, the defendant may move for dismissal under Rule
14 12(b)(6) as opposed to the previous practice of moving under an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion.
15 Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166 (overruling Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003),
16 which held that failure to exhaust available administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation
17 Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), should be raised by a defendant as an unenumerated Rule
18 12(b) motion). Otherwise if a failure to exhaust is not clear on the face of the complaint, the
19 defendant must produce evidence proving failure to exhaust in a motion for summary judgment
20 under Rule 56. Id. If undisputed evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
21 shows a failure to exhaust, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56. Id. But
22 if material facts are disputed, summary judgment should be denied and the district judge rather
23 than a jury should determine the facts in a preliminary proceeding. Id. at 1168.
24 If the defendant is of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment,
25 the defendant shall so inform the Court prior to the date the summary judgment motion is due. All
26 papers filed with the Court shall be promptly served on the plaintiff.
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1 b. The plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the
2 Court and served on the defendant no later than twenty-eight (28) days after the date on which the
3 defendant’s motion is filed.
4 c. The plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56
5 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you
6 must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must
7 be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact—that is, if there is no real dispute about
8 any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is
9 entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing
10 makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn
11 testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out
12 specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents,
13 as provided in Rule 56(c), that contradicts the facts shown in the defendant’s declarations and
14 documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit
15 your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you.
16 If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand, 154
17 F.3d at 962-63.
18 The notice above does not excuse the defendant’s obligation to serve similar notices again
19 concurrently with a motion for summary judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 935.
20 d. The defendant shall file a reply brief no later than fourteen (14) days after
21 the date the plaintiff’s opposition is filed.
22 3. If Defendant decides not to file a motion for summary judgment on the merits or a
23 dispositive motion on the merits, the Northern District of California has established a Pro Se
24 Prisoner Settlement Program. Certain prisoner civil rights cases may be referred to a Magistrate
25 Judge for a settlement conference. The Court finds that a referral would be in order as to
26 Muhammad’s claims. Thus, this case will then be REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Robert M.
27 Illman for a settlement conference after the sixty day deadline for the dispositive motion has
] soon thereafter as is convenient to the Magistrate Judge’s calendar. Magistrate Judge Illman shall
2 || coordinate a time and date for the conference with all interested parties and/or their representatives
3 and, within ten (10) days after the conclusion of the conference, file with the Court a report of the
4 |} result of the conference. If this matter does not settle, then this case will proceed to trial. The
5 Clerk of the Court shall provide a copy of this Order to Magistrate Judge Illman.
6 4. This Order terminates Docket No. 30.
7 IT IS SO ORDERED.
8 || Dated: February 23, 2026

9 Cnacek Pid □
ARACELI MARTINEZ-OLGUIN
10 United States District Judge
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366530. Public record. Not legal advice.