# PRAGER

> District Court, D. New Jersey · June 30, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366452

## Case

- **Full name:** Carolyn Prager v. Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** June 30, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAROLYN PRAGER,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 23-23413 (MAS) (JBD)
. MEMORANDUM OPINION
LABORATORY CORPORATION OF
AMERICA HOLDINGS, et ai,
Defendants.

SHIPP, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant Laboratory Corporation of America
Holdings’s (“Defendant” or “Labcorp”) Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 48.) Plaintiff
Carolyn Prager (‘“Plaintiff’ or “Prager”) opposed (ECF No. 52), and Defendant replied (ECE
No. 55). The Court has carefully considered the parties’ submissions and reaches its decision
without oral argument under Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons below, Defendant’s motion
is granted in part and denied in part.
1 BACKGROUND
The Court recites only the uncontested facts necessary to contextualize the present motion.
A. Factual Background
dL. Plaintiff’s Early Employment with Defendant
On June 27, 2005, Labcorp hired Plaintiff as a Physician Marketing Representative in its
New Jersey Sales Division. (Def.’s Statement of Facts (“DSOF”’) 41, ECF No. 48-1; PL’s
Response to Def.’s Statement of Facts (““PRSOF”) 1, ECF No, 52.) “Plaintiff was responsible for
selling Labcorp’s clinical laboratory testing and diagnostic tests to new and existing clients

(i.c., physicians, clinics, and hospitals) and servicing existing clients, in Essex County.” (DSOF
{ 2; PRSOF 2.) In 2009, Plaintiff's position changed to Senior Marketing Executive (“SME”),
but her job duties remained the same. (DSOF 4 5, 6; PRSOF ff 5, 6.)
2 Plaintiff’s Relocation and Transfer to the Philadelphia Sales Division
In 2017, Plaintiff relocated and joined the Philadelphia Sales Division, which was headed
at the time by Kenneth Ryker (“Ryker”), Regional Manager of Business Development. (DSOF
7, 8; PRSOF 47, 8.) The Philadelphia Sales Division was divided into two territories: North
and South. (DSOF 4 11; PRSOF 4 11.) After relocating, Plaintiff was assigned to the then-vacant
North territory, which had previously been covered by a male SME. (DSOF ff 12, 13; PRSOF
4 12, 13.) In her role, Plaintiff “traveled to New Jersey less than once per month to meet with
Ryker.” (DSOF { 18; PRSOF { 18.)
At the time, Plaintiff worked with her peer Jackie Stella (“Stella”), a female SME who
covered the South territory and had no supervisory authority over Plaintiff. (DSOF {] 14, 15;
PRSOF 4 14, 15.) In 2018, Stella was promoted out of her SME role. (DSOF § 19; PRSOF 19.)
Plaintiff requested to take over the South territory, but Ryker kept Plaintiff in her existing territory
and assigned the South territory to Paul Kiein (“Klein”). (DSOF ff 20, 21; PRSOF 4] 20, 21.)
Klein had previously “worked for Labcorp as a Key Account Executive ((KAE’) in the
Philadelphia Sales Division, servicing both territories.” (DSOF § 22; PRSOF 4 22.) KAE was
considered a more entry-level position in comparison to the SME position, as “SMEs were
primarily responsible for seeking out new business for Labcorp, [but] KAEs were primarily
responsible for maintaining and servicing existing business.” (DSOF ff 23, 24; PRSOF 4 23, 24.)

3. Plaintiff’s Contplaints about her Territory Assignment
Plaintiff complained to Ryker that she was assigned less favorable accounts and territories.
(DSOF § 25; PRSOF 425.) Ryker, who did not have unilateral authority to alter territories,’
testified that he “informed Plaintiff that he would ‘look at the analysis and get some further
information and also some further direction from [his] supervisor and [NSA].’”? (DSOF ff 26, 27
(alterations in original); PRSOF § 26, 27.) Ryker raised Plaintiff's concerns to his supervisor,
Michael Schooley, Vice President of Business Development. (DSOF 428; PRSOF { 28.)
Plaintiff's territory had fewer total accounts compared to the South territory, and Plaintiff was told
that NSA had conducted an analysis of the territories and that a determination was made that “the
North territory had the second most opportunity when compared to Plaintiff's counterparts in the
Northeast Sales Division.” (DSOF ff 30, 31; PRSOF { 30 (admitting that “Plaintiff was told that
NSA had conducted an analysis of the territories” but stating that “[Stephanie Hanshaw
(‘Hanshaw’)] testified that she (not NSA) made the determination” (emphasis omitted)), 4] 31.)
4. Haushaw Becomes Plaintiff’s Supervisor
In May 2020, Ryker was promoted to Associate Vice President, and Hanshaw filled
Ryker’s position and became Plaintiffs supervisor. (DSOF JJ 37, 38; PROSF 9% 37, 38.) On
August 11, 2020, Hanshaw sent e-mail correspondence to Plaintiff with the subject line “Missed
Opportunities.” (DSOF 940; PRSOF 440.) The e-mail correspondence identified such

Labcorp’s sales territories are, at least in part, established by Labcorp’s National Sales
Administration Department (the “NSA”). (DSOF § 10; PRSOF 10 (implicitly acknowledging
that NSA is involved in establishing sales territories by noting “[i]n addition to NSA, managers
are also involved in establishing sales territories”’).)
* Plaintiff does not dispute the testimony that Ryker gave but disputes this statement, and other
statements from Ryker, because “Ryker’s credibility has been called into question by multiple fact
disputes... .” (PRSOF 4 27.)

opportunities that Plaintiff missed. (DSOF 4 41 (citing Ex. 5 to Barbatsuly Decl., ECF No. 49-1);
PRSOF 941 (disputing Defendant’s characterization that “the items addressed in Hanshaw’s
e[-|mail [correspondence] constituted ‘failures’ on Plaintiffs part[,]” but not denying contents of
items listed in correspondence).)}
5. Plaintiff Declines Opportunity to Take Time Off
“On February 1, 2021, Plaintiff had a cail with Hanshaw and Ryker in which she discussed
that she recently experienced a bad episode of vertigo.”? (DSOF J 42; PRSOF § 42.) Plaintiff had
not previously requested an accommodation for her disability and instead, prior to February 2021,
had used vacation time. (DSOF 944; PRSOF 944.) That same day, Hanshaw sent e-mail
correspondence to Plaintiff stating, “health is very important and we want to do everything we can
do [to] assist you in any way.” (DSOF 445 (citing Ex. 8 to Barbatsuly Decl., ECF No. 48-11);
PRSOF 4 45 (not disputing statement in correspondence as that “document speaks for itself[,]” but
disputing fact “to the extent that this statement seeks to imply that Defendant{] did not have a
discriminatory animus against disabled employees”).) Hanshaw also gave Plaintiff the name of
ReedGroup, “a third-party administrator that Labcorp engages to handle leave and accommodation
requests.” (DSOF 946; PRSOF 446.) Plaintiff did not contact ReedGroup to request any
disability-related accommodation in February 2021. (DSOF { 47; PRSOF 4 47.)
In March 2021, Plaintiff informed Hanshaw that her father was unwell. (DSOF ¥ 48;
PRSOF 4 48.) Hanshaw spoke with Plaintiff in April 2021 about Plaintiff's expectations moving
forward and communication regarding “any time off that [Plaintiff] need[s] to take.” (DSOF 4 53;
PRSOF 453 (admitting that “Hanshaw and Plaintiff spoke on April 26, 2021[,] and

> According to Plaintiff, she was diagnosed with vertigo in 2000, but the condition worsened
around 2018. (DSOF {] 43; PRSOF 4 43.)
4

Defendant] was] aware of Plaintiff's leaves of absence in April 2021”); Ex. 9 to Barbatsuly Decl.,
ECF No. 48-12).) Plaintiff testified that she subsequently reached back out to ReedGroup, but
ReedGroup informed her “that she needed to know her father’s plan for discharge from the hospital
before ReedGroup could approve time off to care for her father.” (DSOF 56; PRSOF { 56.)
Plaintiff was therefore advised to reach back out to ReedGroup upon learning of her father’s
discharge plans. (DSOF 957; PRSOF 457.) Plaintiff did not reach back out to ReedGroup,
however, and instead “used her paid time off whenever she needed to take time off to care for her
father, which was always approved.” (DSOF § 58; PRSOF 4 58 (noting that it is “undisputed that
Plaintiff testified as described’”).) During this time, clients lodged complaints about Plaintiff's
responsiveness, (DSOF 59 (first citing Ex. 10 to Barbatsuly Decl., ECF No. 49-4; then citing
Ex. 7 to Barbatsuly Decl., ECF No. 49-3; and then citing Ex. 2 to Hanshaw Decl., ECF No. 49-13);
PRSOF 4 59 (not denying existence of complaints, but disputing the fact to the extent that: (1) it
“suggests that Hanshaw documented performance coaching for Plaintiff prior to placing Plaintiff
on a [Performance Improvement Plan (‘PIP’)]”; (2) “these criticisms were legitimate”; and (3) the
criticisms “led Defendant] to believe, at the time, that Plaintiff had ‘performance deficiencies’”’).)
6. Plaintiff Misses Sales Quotas
Plaintiff also repeatedly missed her sales quotas in 2021.4 (DSOF § 61; PRSOF 61 (noting
that it is “[uJndisputed that Plaintiff along with nearly every other SME missed sales quotas in
2021”).) Hanshaw met with Plaintiff on November 8, 2021, where “Hanshaw noted that Plaintiff
had fallen short of her $8,000 quota for three of the four most recent months (June, August, and
September) for which sales data was then available.” (DSOF 4/f 64, 65; PRSOF {f 64, 65.) During

4 Throughout Plaintiff’s employment, SMEs in the Northeast Sales Division had an $8,000 per
month new sales revenue quota. (DSOF { 62; PRSOP 4 62.)

the meeting, Hanshaw also discussed “coming up with a target list of potential new revenue sources
to help Plaintiff meet her goals.” (DSOF § 66; PRSOF 466.) Ryker testified that “[i]t was
Labcorp’s practice in the Northeast Sales Division that any SME who missed their revenue quota
for three consecutive months would receive a pre-PIP discussion[,]” and if a fourth month was
missed, “the SME’s manager would prepare a PIP in consultation with Labcorp’s Employee
Relations Department (‘Employee Relations’).” (DSOF 99 68, 69; PRSOF 4 68, 69 (admitting
that Ryker testified to this but calling into question his credibility).)
In December 2021, Labcorp announced that it was changing the criteria by which all SMEs
in the Northeast Sales Division were measured. (DSOF § 72; PRSOF 4 72.) While SMEs were
previously “evaluated on both their existing book of business (attainment) and new revenue (new
sales)[,]” moving forward, “SMEs would only be assessed on their new revenue growth (with a[n]
$8,000 monthly quota).” (DSOF {9 73, 74; PRSOF $9 73, 74.) Moreover, SMEs were also now
required to “submit call-ins to Salesforce for the upcoming month by the last day of the past
month.” (DSOF § 76; PRSOF 4 76.) Plaintiff, however, did not timely submit her call-ins for
December 2021 or January 2022. (DSOF 977; PRSOF 4 77 (‘Undisputed that Plaintiff delayed
submission of her call-ins because of pending questions regarding the new performance metrics
and need for clarification from Hanshaw.”).)
7. Plaintiff's PIP
In January 2022, Plaintiff was placed on a PIP. (DSOF {J 79, 80; PRSOF q 79 (disputing
fact regarding “who was involved with the decision to place Plaintiff on a PIP[,]” but not disputing
that Plaintiff was placed on a PIP), { 80.) The PIP was scheduled to last ninety days. (DSOF { 81;
PRSOF 4 81 (disputing when the PIP started, but not that it would last for ninety days).) The PIP
required Plaintiff to:

(1) develop and execute a comprehensive 30-60-90 day marketing
plan; (2) hit her monthly new sales quota of $8,000 per month for
each month of the PIP; (3) demonstrate knowledge of, and ability to
use, technology, such as Salesforce; (4) comply with administrative
requirements, including logging all client facing sales visits daily
and responding to all client emails/calls within 24 hours; and
(5) attend a minimum of five calls with Hanshaw/Ryker in the first
30-day period and five additional calls in the next 30 day period.
(DSOF 4 82 (citing Ex. 15 to Barbatsuly Decl., ECF No. 48-18); PRSOF € 82 (admitting that PIP
“listled] these requirements” but disputing “that these requirements were reasonable, fair, or
previously mandated’’).) Hanshaw explained that “Plaintiff's employment would be terminated if
she failed to achieve the goals of the PIP.” (DSOF 4 83; PRSOF 4 83.)
8. Plaintiff Contacts Employee Relations and Takes Leave
On February 14, 2022, Plaintiff contacted Judi Ahrikenchikh (“Ahrikenchikh”) regarding
her concerns, stating that she felt “undervalued.” (DSOF 4 84 (quoting Ex. 16 to Barbatsuly Decl.,
ECF No. 48-19); PRSOF ¢ 84 (admitting that Plaintiff sent the mentioned e-mail correspondence
complain of discrimination as described”).) Plaintiff then spoke with Ahrikenchikh on
February 16, 2022, and sent two follow-up e-mail correspondences later that evening. (DSOF 4 85;
PRSOF 485.) At 5:17 p.m. that evening, Plaintiff emailed Ahrikenchikh regarding her
performance, mentioning that she felt “targeted” and inquiring about the “other underperforming
SMEs” in this subdivision? and noting that Ryker gave the Philadelphia SME position to a male
KAE even though Plaintiff asked if she could apply for the position. (DSOF 4 86, 87 (citing Ex.
17 to Barbatsuly Decl., ECF No. 49-8); PRSOF {ff 86, 87 (not disputing that Plaintiff sent the
email).) In her second email to Ahrikenchikh, Plaintiff referenced “discussions she had with Ryker

° The “other underperforming SMEs” that Plaintiff identified included both male and female
colleagues. (DSOF 88; PRSOF { 88.)

in 2019 regarding her request that Ryker add additional zip codes to her sales territory.” (DSOF
89 (citing Ex. 18 to Barbatsuly Decl., ECF No. 48-21); PRSOF § 89.)
Plaintiff subsequently requested a leave of absence for her own medical condition pursuant
to the Family and Medical Leave Act (the “FMLA”), and was on leave from February 17, 2022,
to May 9, 2022. (DSOF 4§§ 95, 96; PRSOF 4 95, 96.) “Plaintiff testified that she was not
hospitalized during this leave period but saw physicians for her various medical conditions as she
was ‘finally taking care of fher]self and taking care of [her] disabilities.’” (DSOF 9 97; PRSOF
197.)
9, Plaintiff Returned to Work
On May 9, 2022, Plaintiff returned to work. (DSOF 4 98; PRSOF § 98.) Sometime after
she returned to work, her PIP was restarted. (DSOF 4 99; PRSOF 4 99 (disputing timing of when
PIP restarted, but admitting that “[a] second PIP document, signed by Plaintiff on September 6,
2022, was backdated to July 1, 2022”).) Meanwhile, on June 1, 2022, Hanshaw began maternity
leave. (DSOF 7102; PROSF § 102.) During Hanshaw’s maternity leave, Plaintiff reported to
Ryker. (DSOF § 102; PRSOF © 102.)
On August 17, 2022, Ryker sent Plaintiff e-mail correspondence noting that Plaintiffs July
new sales revenue was -$185 and that Plaintiff had not logged any cails in Salesforce since June.
(DSOF § 107 (citing Ex. 20 to Barbatsuly Decl., ECF No. 49-10); PRSOF { 107 (not disputing
contents of the e-mail correspondence, but disputing “any implication that the goals of the PIP,
including the new sales revenue quota, were nondiscriminatory and/or nonretaliatory, realistic to
achieve, and accurately reflected the expected job responsibilities for SMEs”).} Around this time,
Klein voluntarily resigned from his position, leaving the South territory vacant. (DSOF { 108;

PRSOF 7 108.) Sometime thereafter, David Marshall (“Marshall”) was hired to replace Klein as
SME in the Philadelphia Sales Division covering the South territory. (DSOF 4 131; PRSOF 131.)
In late July 2022, Plaintiff met with Carl Epple® (“Epple”) at his office in New Castle,
Delaware. (DSOF 111; PRSOF 4 111.) Plaintiff testified that in that meeting she reiterated that
the PIP was “targeted, unfair[,] and unattainable.” (DSOF 112; PRSOF 112.) Following the
meeting, Epple sent e-mail correspondence to Ahrikenchikh regarding the meeting. (DSOF 4 117
(citing Ex. 21 to Barbatsuly Decl., ECF No. 49-11); PRSOF {117 (disputing characterization of
e-mail correspondence, but not the fact that Epple sent such correspondence).) Thereafter,
Plaintiff's July and August 2022 new sales revenue was again well below the $8,000 requirement.
(DSOF 119 (citing Ex. 11 to Hanshaw Decl., ECF No. 48-50); PRSOF 4119 (disputing “any
implication that the new sales revenue generated in July and August 2022 is an accurate reflection
of her performance and ability to generate revenue” but not disputing the underlying fact).)
Moreover, Plaintiff: (1) did not submit a single travel and expense report during the PIP; (2) only
logged two Salesforce visits in August, and none in either July or September; and (3) failed to
timely respond to clients. (DSOF § 124; PRSOF 4 124 (not disputing the underlying facts
regarding Plaintiffs actions or inactions).)
10. Plaintiff's Termination
In September 2022, Hanshaw reached out to Mark Musser (“Musser”) in Employee
Relations to discuss terminating Plaintiff. (DSOF 4 125; PRSOF 4] 125.) Hanshaw’s termination
request was approved on November 17, 2022. (DSOF { 126 (citing Ex. 34 to Barbatsuly Decl.,
ECF No. 48-37); PRSOF 4 126.) In the meantime, in late September, Plaintiff requested a second

6 While the DSOF and PRSOF do not detail Epple’s role, the Second Amended Complaint (the
“SAC”) alleges that Epple was the “Vice President Southern Subdivision.” (SAC 739, ECF
No. 19.)

leave of absence, which was later approved by ReedGroup as of November 1, 2022. (DSOF {| 127,
128; PRSOF 4§ 127, 128.) Labcorp communicated the termination decision to Plaintiff on January
4, 2023, the day Plaintiff returned from her leave. (DSOF 129; PRSOF 7 129.)
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff initially filed suit in December 2023. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) After the named
defendants filed a motion to dismiss (Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9), Plaintiff filed an Amended
Complaint (Am. Compl., ECF No. 13). Thereafter, Plaintiff sought leave to file the SAC (Pi.’s
Mot. for Leave to File SAC, ECF No. 17), which this Court granted (Apr. 29, 2024, Text Order,
ECF No, 18). On April 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative SAC alleging violations of: (1) Title
VIL of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VIP’) (“Count One”); (2) the Americans with Disabilities Act
(the “ADA”) (“Count Two”); (3) the FMLA (“Count Three”); (4) the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination (the “NJLAD”) (“Count Four”); (5) the New Jersey Family Leave Act (the
“NJFLA”) (Count Five’); (6) the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (the “PHRA”) (Count
Six”); and (7) the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance (“PFPO”) (“Count Seven”). (See generally
SAC.) On May 28, 2024, Labcorp’ answered the SAC. (Answer, ECF No. 22.)
After the parties completed discovery, Labcorp filed the instant motion for summary
judgment, asking this Court to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint in its entirety with prejudice. (See
generally Def.’s Moving Br.) Plaintiff opposed the instant motion (see generally Pl.’s Opp’n Br.,
ECF No, 52), and Defendant replied (see generally Def.’s Reply Br., ECF No. 55).

7 The Court notes that, although the SAC named “Labcorp” and “Lab. Cor. of America Holdings”
as defendants (see generally SAC), Defendant has represented that “[t]here are no legal entities
with those names as pled” (Def.’s Moving Br. 1, ECF No. 48-2). As a result, the Court treats
Defendant as the sole defendant in this matter.
10

IE. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a)® provides that summary judgment is appropriate
where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson y. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); Kreschollek y. S. Stevedoring Co., 223 F.3d 202, 204 Gd Cir.
2000). A material fact raises a genuine dispute “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the non[-]moving party.” Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458,
459 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). In deciding a summary judgment motion,
a court must construe all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
See Boyle v. County of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998). The moving party bears the
burden of establishing that no genuine dispute of material fact remains. See Celofex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S, 317, 322-23 (1986).
Once the moving party has met its threshold burden, the non-moving party “must do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The opposing party must present
actual evidence that creates a genuine dispute as to a material fact for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
247-48; see also Fed, R. Civ. P. 56(c) (setting forth types of evidence on which the nonmoving
party must rely to support its assertion that genuine disputes of material fact exist), If the
non-moving party fails to come forward with the requisite showing to establish “the existence of
an element essential to that party’s case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trialf,]” then “there can be ‘no genuine [dispute] of material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element of the non[-]moving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

8 Any reference to “Rule” or “Rules” hereinafter refers to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
il

immaterial.” Katz v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 972 F.2d 53, 55 n.5 Gd Cir. 1992) (quoting Ce/ofex,
477 U.S, at 322-23).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court’s role is not to evaluate the evidence
and decide the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine dispute for trial.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. Credibility determinations are the province of the fact finder. See
Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 Gd Civ. 1992). The summary
judgment standard, however, does not operate in a vacuum. “[I]n ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive
evidentiary burden.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254.
Ill. DISCUSSION
Defendant moves for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs Complaint against
Defendant should be dismissed in its entirety. (See generally Def.’s Moving Br.) The Court
addresses each Count in turn.
A, Count One (Title VID
Plaintiff brings discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment claims under Title
VII alleging that a less qualified male employee (Klein) was promoted over her and that she was
placed on a PIP and terminated on the basis of her sex. (See SAC ff 44-57, 83, 88, 89, 121, 142-43.)
The Court first turns to Plaintiff's Title VII discrimination claim.
i. Discrimination
Plaintiffs Title VII discrimination claim is analyzed pursuant to the AdeDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting test. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 80205 (1983); see
also Tourtellotte v. Eli Lilly & Co., 636 F. App’x 831, 842 Gd Cir. 2016) (applying burden-shifting
framework to Title VIE discrimination claim). First, Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of

12

discrimination. MécDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. To make a prima facie case of discrimination
under Title VII, Plaintiff must show that: “(1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was
qualified for the position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) members of the
opposite sex were treated more favorably.” Burton v. Teleflex Ine., 707 F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir.
2013) (citing Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Fam. YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005)). “The burden
to establish a prima facie case is ‘not onerous.’” Wills v. CulinArt Grp., 814 F. Supp. 3d 535, 545
(D.N.J. 2026) (quoting Tex. Dep't of Cnty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S, 245, 253 (1981)). “Its
requirements are flexible, and courts ‘must be sensitive to the myriad of ways’ an inference of
unlawful discrimination can arise,” /d. (quoting £.E.O.C. v. Metal Serv. Co., 892 F.2d 341, 347-48
(3d Cir, 1990)).
If Plaintiff establishes her prima facie case, then the burden shifts to Labcorp, as the
employer, to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.”
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If Defendant meets this burden, then Plaintiff must “provide
evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably infer that [Labcorp’s] proffered justification is
merely a pretext for discrimination.” Burton, 707 F.3d at 426 (citation omitted).
a. Plaintiff Establishes a Prima Facie Case
Here, Defendant only takes issue with the fourth prima facie element, arguing that:
(1) “Plaintiff does not identify any similarly situated male employees who were treated more
favorably than she was”; and (2) “after Plaintiff's employment was terminated in January 2023,
Plaintiff's counterpart in the Philadelphia Sales Division, Marshall, took over Plaintiffs former
sales territory and a female employee, Lisa O’Brien (‘O’Brien’), was promoted from KAE to SME
to fill the vacancy that Plaintiff's termination caused” which “further negat[es] any inference of
discrimination.” (Def.’s Moving Br. 20-21 (citations omitted),) Plaintiff, however, relies on

13

various pieces of evidence to show that her lack of promotion, termination, and/or placement on a
PIP? occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of sex discrimination including that:
(1) there were no females in Ryker’s direct reporting structure (P1,’s Statement of Additional Facts
(“PSOF”) 47, ECF No. 52; Def.’s Response to Pl.’s Statement of Additional Facts (DRSOP’”)
417, ECF No. 55-7); (2) Ryker promoted Klein, a male individual with less than a year of
experience with Labcorp, to fill a vacancy that Plaintiff had asked Ryker if she could apply for
(PSOF ff 11,12; DRSOF 11, 12); and (3) upon Plaintiffs termination, Marshall, a male
employee, was given the choice to (and did) select Plaintiffs former territory or to remain in his
coverage of Klein’s former territory'’ (PSOF □□□ 177, 178; DRSOF §] 177, 178). (See Pl.’s Opp’n
Br. 10-11.) The Court finds that Plaintiff has identified facts that a reasonable juror could find
show circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination, and thus has met her “not onerous”
burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Wills, 814 F. Supp. 3d at 545, 547-48.
b. A Reasonable Jury Could Find Defendant’s Proffered Reason for
the Termination to be Pretext
Because Plaintiff has established her prima facie case, the burden now shifts to Defendant
to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. MfcDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Here,
Defendant states that it “terminated Plaintiffs employment for the legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason that Plaintiff failed to meet the requirements for continued employment stated in her PIP.”
(Def.’s Moving Br. 22, 23.)

The Court notes that, from its review of the SAC, Plaintiff alleges discrimination stemming from
these various events. (See SAC Jf] 44-57, 83, 88, 89, 121, 142-43.)
The Court notes that Plaintiff was directly replaced by a male, Marshail, after her termination.
(See PSOF 9178; DRSOF 4 178.) This alone may establish an inference of discrimination, see
Johnson vy. Keebler-Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 214 F. App’x 239, 242 3d Cir. 2007), as a subsequent
hiring decision (i.e., hiring O’Brien to fill a vacancy created from Marshall’s shift to cover
Plaintiff’s old territory) “cannot retroactively sanitize an earlier discrimination termination[,]”
Wills, 814 F. Supp. 3d at 545,
14

As a result, the burden then shifts back to Plaintiff to “point to some evidence, direct or
circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably either[:] (1) disbelieve [Defendant’s]
articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more
likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of [Defendant’s] action.’” Burton, 707 F.3d at
426 (quoting Fuentes v, Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir, 1994)), If Plaintiff “has pointed to
evidence sufficiently to discredit... [DJefendant’s proffered reasons, .. . [P]laintiff need not also
come forward with additional evidence of discrimination beyond . .. her prima facie case.”
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 (citations omitted)).
Here, Plaintiff has identified conflicting testimony from Defendant’s employees regarding
who was involved with the decision to terminate Plaintiff and who was involved in the decision to
implement the second backdated PIP, as well as conflicting evidence about the timing of the second

. PIP. (See PSOF 44 115-16, 118-19, 121-23, 162-64, 166; DRSOF 9 115-16, 118-19, 121-23,
162-64, 166.) Such “[s|hifting explanations for an empioyment action is one of the strongest types
of evidence of pretext.” Arpajian v. Prop. Sols., Inc., No. 03-4666, 2005 WL 2000172, at *10
(D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2005) (citing Waddell v. Small Tube Prods., Inc., 799 F.2d 69, 73 3d Cir. 1986)).
Moreover, Plaintiff presented evidence that by at least some metric, she was not objectively
the worst SME during the relevant timeframe, and yet other SMEs were not placed on a PIP. (PSOF
{| 66, 67; DRSOF □ 66, 67.) Additionally, Plaintiff presented evidence that during the three-year
period leading up to Plaintiffs termination, Ryker testified that he did not recall any other sales
representatives reporting to him being placed on a PIP. (PSOF § 175; DRSOF 4 175.) Given that
the “evidence shows the sort of weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or
contradictions in [Labcorp’s] proffered legitimate reasons for its action[, the Court finds] that a
reasonable factfinder could rationally find [Labcorp] unworthy of credence.” Cullen v. Select Med.

15

Corp., 779 F. App’x 929, 932 (3d Cir. 2019) (emphasis in original) (quotation marks omitted)
(quoting fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765).
The Court, accordingly, denies Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's
Title VII discrimination claim.
2. Retaliation
The Court next turns to Plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim, which is also subject to the
MeDonnell Douglas framework. See Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 340-42 (Gd Cir.
2006).
To establish a Title VII prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff “must show that: (1)... she
engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer took an adverse employment action after or
contemporaneous with the protected activity; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected
activity and the adverse action.” Wills, 814 F. Supp. 3d at 550 (quoting Perry v. Harvey, 332 F.
App’x 728, 732 (3d Cir. 2009)). “The Third Circuit has made clear that a ‘general complaint of
unfair treatment is insufficient to establish protected activity under Title VI.’” /d@ (quoting
(Curay-Cramer vy, Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 135 (Gd Cir. 2006)).
Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not shown that she has engaged in protected
activity or that a causal link exists between her protected activity and the adverse action. (See
Def.’s Moving Br. 27-30.) As Defendant contends (see id. at 29), and the Court agrees, the
February 2022 e-mail correspondence with Ahrikenchikh that Plaintiff identified in her SAC only
vaguely mentions that Ryker denied Plaintiff the opportunity for the requested Philadelphia SME
territory because “[hle said he already chose the replacement and he gave the position to a male
KAE who had only been with the company less than 6 months.” (Exs. 17, 18 to Barbatsuly Decl.)
The e-mail correspondence otherwise contains no complaints of sex discrimination. (See id.)

16

Plaintiff argues in opposition, though, that she “was not required to make a complaint using
the words ‘sex discrimination’ .. . with ‘any heightened level of specificity’, or refer to ‘magic
words.’” (Pl.’s Opp’n Br. 18-19 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).) Rather, Plaintiff points
to, without citing directly to any of the evidence in the record: (1) “[rJepeated complaints about
territory imbalances and less favorable treatment compared to male employees” from 2019 to
2021; complaint in November 2021 to Hanshaw “about being assigned less lucrative accounts
and territories than Klein”; (3) complaints to Ahrikenchikh from February 2022 about “sex
discrimination, unfair PIP, Ryker’s failure to promote her, [and] failure to address territory
complaints” as well as a February 16, 2022 e-mail correspondence to Ahrikenchikh “citing lack of
uniform process, discriminatory evaluation of her quota, [and] feeling ‘targeted’; (4) a May 2022
complaint that “Ryker was disclosing her confidential complaints and PIP status, retaliating against
her”; (5) a May 31, 2022, complaint to Epple “about discrimination and retaliation”; and (6) June
6, 2022, “written complaints to Ahrikenchikh and Epple documenting discrimination, retaliation,
and bullying.” (PL.’s Opp’n Br. 19.)
“It is not the Court’s responsibility to sift through the record—let alone a voluminous
record like the one here—to find evidence supporting Plaintiff's position.” Dor v. TD Bank,
No, 21-18955, 2023 WL 9017558, at *10 (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2023) (citations omitted); see also
Doeblers’ Pa. Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 820 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Judges are not like
pigs, hunting for truffles buried in the record.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)); United
States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., No. 12-7199, 2016 WL 1403991, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2016) (“In
reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court may consider any materials in the record but
is not required to look beyond those materials cited by the parties.” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(3))). Here, Plaintiff's vague arguments relating {o various “complaints” are not supported by

17

citations to the record, and as such, the Court cannot substantiate Plaintiff's arguments, '! The Court
also finds that the two e-mail correspondences to Ahrikenchikh containing general complaints (see
Exs. 17, 18 to Barbatsuly Decl.) do not constitute protected activity, see Wills, 814 F, Supp. 3d at
550 (noting that “a ‘general complaint of unfair treatment is insufficient to establish protected
activity under Title VII’” (quoting Curay-Cramer, 450 F.3d at 135),
The Court, therefore, grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's
Title VIE retaliation claim. Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim is dismissed with prejudice.
3. Hostile Work Environment
The Court next turns to Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim brought pursuant to
Title VII.
“To succeed on a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, ... [Plaintiff must
establish that: (1)... she suffered intentional discrimination because of... her sex; (2) the
discrimination was severe or pervasive; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected .. . [P]laintiff;
(4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like circumstances; and
(5) the existence of respondeat superior liability.” Wilfs, 814 F. Supp. 3d at 550 (citing Mandel v.
M & O Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (Gd Cir. 2013)). “To determine whether an
environment is hostile, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether’ □□ is physically threatening or

From what the Court can discern without citations from Plaintiff indicating the factual evidence
her argument relies upon, though, the complaints that Plaintiff generally lists do not include
complaints of sex discrimination. For example, Plaintiff’s: (1) complaint in November 2021 to
Hanshaw “about being assigned less lucrative accounts and territories than Klein” appears to solely
be about the fact that her territory had lower revenue, and not about sex discrimination (see PSOF
13-16); and (2) May 31, 2022, complaint to Epple “about discrimination and retaliation” related
to a complaint that the PIP was generally “targeted, unfair and unattainable[,|” but Plaintiff did not
otherwise tie the complaints about her PIP to feelings of gender discrimination (id. § 105).
18

humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee’s work performance.” Nitkin v. Main Line Health, 67 F.4th 565, 570 (3d Cir, 2023)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “For discrimination to constitute severe or pervasive
behavior, it must ‘alter the conditions of [the plaintiff's] employment and create an abusive
working environment.’” /d. (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB vy, Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
“The Supreme Court has emphasized that ‘conduct must be extreme’ to satisfy this standard, so
‘simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)’ are
inadequate.” /d. (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, $24 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not met her burden in showing that her work
environment was hostile. (Def.’s Moving Br. 34-35.) In opposition, Plaintiff contends that: (1) □□□□
reasonable jury could... conclude that Plaintiff suffered intentional discrimination and that the
totality of the circumstances constitute severe or pervasive harassment”; (2) the evidence in the
record shows that Plaintiff, “a disabled female who had complained of discrimination and
retaliation” was the only employee to be placed on a PIP and terminated; and (3) after Plaintiff
was terminated, the evidence shows that “Defendant]| treated a male, non-disabled, and
non-complaining employee more favorably[.]” (PL.’s Opp’n 31-32.)
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim under Title VII fails
because there are no facts in the record to show the required “severe or pervasive” conduct to
establish that the workplace was “permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult,’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment
and create an abusive working environment].]’” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,21 (1993)
(citations omitted), Rather, the Court notes that Plaintiff testified that Ryker “rule{d] by fearj,]”
and that Ryker’s conduct was directed to all of his direct reports. Ud. at 35 (citing DSOF { 9); see

19

also, e.g., Ex. 2 to Barbatsuly Decl. 230:10-15 (“Q. All right. But, that just wasn’t directed to you,
that was directed to .. . all of his direct reports, right? A. Correct. The only reason . . . I included
it is because I was telling her about the fear instilled.”), ECF No. 48-5); see Connell v. Nicholson,
318 F. App’x 75, 78 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Even the incidents in which [the named employee] harassed
only men fail to show that she harassed them on the basis of their sex. [The employee’s] behavior,
while clearly inappropriate, was apparently motivated by nothing more than difficult relationships
and a generally hostile disposition towards coworkers, without regard to gender.”).
Moreover, the only other conduct that Plaintiff identifies in opposition to Defendant’s
motion relates to the decision to place Plaintiff on a PIP and ultimately terminate her. (See □□□□□
Opp’n Br. 31-32 (citing PSOF 96-101, 171-76, 178).) Plaintiff otherwise does not identify any
other physically threatening, humiliating, or abusive conduct that could meet the threshold
required. (See generally id.); see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (“The[] standards for judging
hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VI does not become a ‘general civility
code.’”); MfcKinnon vy. Gonzales, 642 F. Supp. 2d 410, 421-22 (D.N.J. 2009) (“An unpleasant
workplace does not constitute a hostile work environment . . . if the difficult conditions result from
something other than discrimination based upon a characteristic or activity protected by Title
... The critical inquiry . . . is therefore whether [p]laintiff was subjected to pervasively
abusive conditions ....” (emphasis added)). Here, Plaintiff files to cite sufficient record evidence
to satisfy the “severe or pervasive” standard.
The Court, therefore, grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's
Title VII hostile work environment claim. Plaintiff's Title VII hostile work environment claim is
dismissed with prejudice.

20

B, Count Two (ADA)
Plaintiff brings discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment claims under the
ADA alleging that Plaintiff was placed on a PIP and terminated because of her disability. (See
SAC ff 62-65, 83, 115, 117, 121, 126-27, 131, 133, 142-43.) The Court first turns to Plaintiff's
ADA discrimination claim.
I, Discrimination
Plaintiffs ADA discrimination claim is also subject to the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting test. Fowler v. AT&T, Inc., 19 F.4th 292, 298-99 (3d Cir. 2021) (applying
burden-shifting framework to ADA discrimination claim). Under step one, Plaintiff “must show
that she: (1) has a disability[;} (2) is a qualified individual[;] and (3) has suffered an adverse
employment action because of that disability.” Fiorentini v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 665 F. App’x
229, 236-37 (3d Cir. 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
a. Plaintiff Establishes a Prima Facie Case
Here, Labcorp argues that “even assuming . . . that Plaintiff had a disability under the ADA
and was otherwise qualified to perform her job duties, her prima facie case still fails because she
cannot show that she suffered an adverse employment action ‘because of” her disability ~ the third
element of her prima facie case.” (Def.’s Moving Br. 22 (emphasis omitted).) Plaintiff opposes,
arguing that certain undisputed record evidence “easily supplies a logical inference of disability
discrimination{,]” including: (1) Plaintiffs own testimony, which Defendant disputes, that “[p]rior
to disclosing her disabilities to Defendant[], Plaintiff received [fifteen] years’ worth of positive
performance reviews and glowing feedback on her performance” (PSOF 45; DRSOF 45);
(2) Plaintiff's own testimony that “Ryker had complained to her about disabled employes,
‘badmouthing’ another employee’s diagnosis, complaining about how the employee was always

21

out on FMLA [leave], and was a ‘weak link’” (PSOF 4 31; DRSOF 4 31); (3) the day Plaintiff
returned from medical leave related to her disabilities, she was terminated (PSOF § 158; DRSOF
{ 158); and (4) Ahrikenchikh testified that she “was not aware of any accommodations that
Defendant{] considered for Plaintiff, including moving her to a different position at Defendant[]
in lieu of termination” despite Defendant being aware of Plaintiffs health issues (PSOF 140,
142; DRSOF 140, 142). (PL’s Opp’n Br. 6-10.)
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that based on the facts in the record, “a reasonable jury
could conclude that Defendant{] viewed Plaintiff as a ‘weak link’ because of her disabilities, set
her up to fail by issuing unreasonable PIPs that did not account for her medical leave, and
terminated her because of her disability.”!? (id. at 10 (emphasis added).) As such, the Court finds
that Plaintiff has satisfied her “not onerous” burden for establishing the prima facie case for her
ADA claim. Fitzgerald v. Glenn Ins., Inc., No. 20-14891, 2023 WL 2728818, at *8 (D.N.J. Mar.
31, 2023); see also Jackson v. Trump Ent. Resorts, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 502, 510 (D.N.J. 2015)
(“Given the timing of [plaintiffs] termination relative to his request for an ultimately unapproved
accommodation, the temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse action is
‘unusually suggestive’ and is sufficient standing alone to create an inference of causality and defeat
summary judgment,”); Boles v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 12-1762, 2014 WL 1266216, at *13
(D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2014) (noting that summary judgment was not appropriate where “there [were]
genuine [disputes] of material fact as to whether [p]laintiff was terminated because of his
disability”).

2 The Court notes that it will not address the first two factors of the test (i.e., whether Plaintiff has
disability under the ADA and whether Plaintiff was otherwise qualified to perform her job duties),
as Defendant does not argue that Plaintiff cannot meet those two prongs. (See generally Def.’s
Moving Br.)
22

b. A Reasonable Jury Could Find Defendant's Proffered Reason for
the Termination to be Pretext
Because Plaintiff has established her prima facie case, the burden now shifts to Defendant
to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Here,
as already noted above, Defendant states that it “terminated Plaintiff's employment for the
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason that Plaintiff failed to meet the requirements for continued
employment stated in her PIP.” (Def.’s Moving Br. 22-23.)
As this Court has already analyzed with respect to Plaintiff's Title VU claim, Plaintiff has
identified facts in the record, including conflicting testimony about Plaintiffs PIP, evidence that
by at least some metric she was not the worst SME, and a lack of history of placing other SMEs
that reported to Ryker on a PIP. (See, e.g, PSOF Jf 66, 67, 115-16, 118-19, 121-23, 162-64, 166,
175; DRSOF 9 66, 67, 115-16, 118-19, 121-23, 162-64, 166, 175.) This is enough to create a
genuine dispute of material fact that precludes summary judgment on Plaintiff's ADA
discrimination claim. See, e.g., Arpajian, 2005 WL 2000172, at *10 (“Shifting explanations for an
employment action is one of the strongest types of evidence of pretext.” (citation omitted)); Cullen,
779 F. App’x at 932 (Because “evidence shows the sort of weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in [defendant’s] proffered legitimate reasons for
its action[, the Court finds] that a reasonable factfinder cou/d rationally find [defendant] unworthy
of credence,” (emphasis in original) (quotation marks and citation omitted)).
The Court, accordingly, denies Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's
ADA discrimination claim.
a Retaliation
The Court next turns to Plaintiff's ADA retaliation claim, which is also subject to the
McDonnell Douglas framework. See Canada v. Samuel Grossi & Sons, Inc., 49 F.4th 340, 346 Gd

23

Cir. 2022). As a result, Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing that she: (1) engaged
in a protected activity; (2) the employer took an adverse action after or contemporaneous with that
activity; and (3) there is a causal connection between the two. /d.
In the context of her ADA retaliation claim, Plaintiff argues that “[i}t is undisputed that
Plaintiff engaged in protected activity by requesting medical leave to attend doctors’ appointments
and treatments in connection with her disabilities[.]” (P1.’s Opp’n Br. 18 (citing PSOF 142-47).)
Here, the record shows that Plaintiff took FMLA leave and was terminated immediately upon
returning from that leave. (See DSOF ¢ 129; PRSOF 129); Wright v. Providence Care Ctr, LLC,
822 F. App’x 85, 95 (3d Cir. 2020) (noting that plaintiff's “closest-in-time protected activity to
her termination was her FMLA leave”), The proximity of the leave and Plaintiff's termination is
sufficient for Plaintiff to meet her burden of establishing the causal connection, and thus
establishing a prima facie case here. See, e.g., Wright, 822 F. App’x at 94 (“In certain narrow
circumstances, an unusually suggestive proximity in time between the protected activity and the
adverse action may be sufficient, on its own, to establish the requisite causal connection.”
(quotation marks omitted) (quoting Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth. , 497 F.3d 286, 302 Gd Cir. 2007)).
As noted above in the context of the Court’s analysis on Plaintiff's Title VIE and ADA
discrimination claims, although Defendant has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason,
Plaintiff has presented evidence that “paint{s] [Defendant’s articulated reasons] as weak,
implausible, contradictory, or incoherent.” Canada, 49 F.4th at 347 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Because Plaintiff “makes this showing, summary judgment is improper
because... [P]laintiff has raised ‘a factual [dispute] regarding the employer's true motivation for
discharge.’” /d. (citation omitted).

24

The Court, accordingly, denies Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs
ADA retaliation claim.
3. Hostile Work Environment
Much like the standard for a hostile work environment claim
outlined above in connection with Title VIL, “[t]o succeed on a claim
for... hostile work environment under the ADA .. . , a plaintiff
must show... that ‘the harassment was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and to create
an abusive working environment.”
Cuevas v. Camden Iron & Metal, Inc., No. 23-20830, 2025 WL 2490544, at *8 (D.N.J. Aug. 29,
2025) (first alteration in original) (quoting Vanhook v. Cooper Health Sys., No. 21-2213, 2022 WL
990220, at *4 (3d Cir. Mar. 31, 2022)).
For the reasons discussed above in the context of Plaintiff's Title VIT hostile work
environment claim, Plaintiff's ADA hostile work environment claim also fails. Specifically, there
are no facts in the record to show the required “severe or pervasive” conduct to establish that the
workplace was “permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,’ that is
‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an
abusive working environment[.])’” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (citations omitted). Rather, Plaintiffs
own testimony acknowledged that Ryker’s conduct was directed to all direct reports, and not just
her, and the only other conduct Plaintiff identified was Defendant’s decision to place her on a PIP
and ultimately terminate her. (Ex. 2 to Barbatsuly Decl. 230:10-15; Pl.’s Opp’n Br. 31-32 (citing
PSOF 4 96-101, 171-76, 178).) This is insufficient to establish the physically threatening,
humiliating, or abusive conduct required to sustain a hostile work environment claim. See Connell,
318 F. App’x at 78; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; McKinnon, 642 F. Supp. 2d at 421-22,

25

The Court, therefore, grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's
ADA hostile work environment claim. Plaintiff's ADA hostile work environment claim is
dismissed with prejudice.
Cc. Count Three (FMLA)
Plaintiff brings her FMLA claim alleging discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work
environment.!? The Court notes that the “A¢eDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies
to FMLA discrimination [and retaliation] claims.” Fitzgerald v. Shore Mem. Hosp., 92 ¥. Supp.
3d 214, 232 (D.N.J. 2015) (citations omitted). Once again, Plaintiff must first establish her prima
facie case of discrimination or retaliation, which requires in the FMLA context that Plaintiff show
that: “(1) she availed herself of a protected right under the FMLA; (2) she was subject to an adverse
employment decision; and (3) there is a causal link between the protected activity and the
subsequent adverse job action.” Jd. (citing Hodgens v. Gen, Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 161
(1st Cir. 1998)).
Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's FMLA claim
because Plaintiff “cannot demonstrate that her termination was causally related to her FMLA
leave—the third element of her prima facie case[,]” in part because: (1) “Plaintiff was placed ona
PIP before she took FMLA leave between February 17 and May 9, 2022”; (2) following her icave,
Defendant “afforded [Plaintiff] more than seven weeks to re-acclimate to her position before
re-starting the PIP, effective July 1, 2022”; and (3) “even after being given a fresh opportunity to

13 Although Plaintiff’s SAC initially raised a hostile work environment claim pursuant to FMLA,
such a claim is not recognized. See, e.g., Hilton v. Home Depot, Inc., No. 20-5145, 2022 WL
837207, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2022); (“{F]ederal courts have not recognized a FMLA cause of
action based on a hostile work environment.” (collecting cases)); Sturgis v. Diamond Hosp. Servs.
LLC, No. 24-241, 2026 WL 906745, at *8 n.5 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 2026) (noting that “the FMLA
does not provide for a ‘hostile work environment’ cause of action” (citation omitted)). Plaintiff's
FMLA-based hostile work environment claim is, therefore, dismissed with prejudice.
26

meet the requirements of the PIP, [Plaintiff] fell far short of her sales quota and failed to log a
single sales call into Labcorp’s sales tracking software.” (Def.’s Moving Br. 30-31 (citing DSOF
80, 86, 91, 99, 104, 119-24).) Here, however, there is a dispute of fact as to when the PIP was
restarted (see, e.g., DSOF J 99; PRSOF § 99), but the parties agree that Plaintiff requested FMLA
leave on September 22, 2022, which was subsequently approved on October 29, 2022 (see PSOF
DRSOF § 147). Moreover, Hanshaw contacted Musser on September 30, 2022, after
Plaintiffs FMLA request, to discuss Plaintiffs PIP. (See PSOF § 153; DRSOF 4 153.) The
decision to terminate Plaintiff was then made on November 17, 2022, which was less than two
months after Plaintiff requested leave. (See PSOF 4 154; DROSF { 154.)
The Court finds that a dispute of fact remains as to the reinstatement of the PIP, and that
the timing of these events creates enough of an inference, for the purpose of summary judgment,
that Plaintiff's termination could be discriminatory or retaliatory in nature. See, e.g., Sanfosuosso
v. NovaCare Rehab., 462 F. Supp. 2d 590, 598 (D.N.J. 2006) (denying summary judgment on
plaintiffs FMLA claim and noting that temporal proximity of “a little more than a
month... creates an inference, for the purpose of deciding a motion for summary judgment, that
her demotion, transfer, and termination could be retaliatory in nature”). Because Plaintiff has met
her burden of establishing a prima facie case, and for the reasons discussed above regarding the
remainder of the test under the MfcDonnel!l Douglas framework, Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment as to Plaintiff's FMLA claim premised on discrimination and retaliation is denied.
D. Counts Four through Seven (State Law Claims)
Plaintiff's SAC asserts claims under the NJLAD and NJFLA, as well as claims under the
PHRA and PFPO pleaded in the alternative. (See SAC {| 190-220.)

27

L Counts Four and Five (NIJLAD and NJFLA)
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's New Jersey state law claims “must be dismissed as a
matter of law because Plaintiff was a Pennsylvania employee who lived, worked, and served
clients in Pennsylvania.” (Def.’s Moving Br. 36.) The Court agrees with Defendant for the reasons
stated below.
An out-of-state individual who does not work in New Jersey may assert a cause of action
under New Jersey state law “if the plaintiff can demonstrate that New Jersey has the ‘most
significant relationship’ to... her claim.” Chinchilla v. Geodis Am., Inc., No. 23-1995, 2024 WL
943424, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2024) (citing Calabotta v. Phibro Animal Health Corp., 213 A.2d
210, 214, 219-21 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019)). Under this analysis and to decide which State’s
law to apply, the Court must first consider whether a conflict exists between the two sets of law.
See id. Here, there are “critical differences between NJLAD and PHRAYJ, including}: (1) NJLAD
does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies before bringing suit, whereas PHRA does;
(2) NILAD allows for punitive damages, whereas PHRA does not; and (3) NJLAD allows for jury
trials, whereas PHRA does not.” /d. (citing Martin v. Port Auth. Trans. Corp., No. 09-3165, 2010
WL 1257730, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2010)). “As such, a conflict is present because the application
of [NJLAD and PHRAJ could result in different outcomes.” Jd. (citing Donovan v. WLR. Berkley
Corp., 566 F. Supp, 3d 224, 231 (D.N.J. 2021)). Moreover, as the parties recognize, a conflict
exists between New Jersey law and Pennsylvania law because New Jersey provides for a cause of
action under the NJFLA, but Pennsylvania law does not offer such an equivalent. (See Def.’s
Moving Br. 37; Pl.’s Opp’n Br. 32.)
Because a conflict between the state laws exists, the Court must turn to “the next step of
the analysis and [should] consider[] how the Restatement’s choice-of-law principles under

28

Sections 6, 145, and 146 inform the ‘most-significant relationship test.’” Chinchilla, 2024 WL
943424, at *7 (first citing Donovan, 566 F. Supp. 3d at 233; and then citing Calabotta, 213 A.3d
at 219). Section 146 of the Restatement provides that “the local law of the state where the injury
occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, .. . some other state has a more
significant relationship ., ..”” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 146 (1971). Pursuant to
Section 6, factors relevant to the choice of the applicable law include:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems[;]
(b) the relevant policies of the forum{;]
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular
issue]; ]
(d) the protection of justified expectations[;]
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law[;]
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result[;] and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.
Id. § 6. Moreover, contacts “taken into account in applying the principles of [Section] 6” include:
(1) the place of injury; (2) the place of the conduct causing the injury; (3) domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation, and place of residence of the parties; and (4) the place where
the parties’ relationship is centered. Id. § 145.
Here, Plaintiff argues that “[t]here is a [genuine] dispute as to the extent of Plaintiffs
service of New Jersey customers.” (P1.’s Opp’n Br. 33 (citing PRSOF §f 7, 16, 17).) The record,
however, shows that Plaintiff's claims are based upon conduct that occurred after she relocated
and joined the Philadelphia sales division in 2017 (DSOF 47; PRSOF § 7 (admitting Plaintiff
joined the Philadelphia sales division in 2017).) Plaintiff claims that “she traveled to New Jersey
for work reasons, specifically to meet with Ryker” (PRSOF § 16), but admitted that “fs]he traveled
to New Jersey less than once per month to meet with Ryker” (DSOF 4] 18; PRSOF § 18). Moreover,
while Plaintiff denies that “[s]he did not service clients in New Jersey[,]” (DSOF { 17; PRSOF

29

{ 17), she does not present any evidence to rebut that fact, and admitted in her deposition that she
resided in Pennsylvania and did not have any New Jersey clients (Ex. 2 to Barbatsuly Decl. 89:3-5
(“Q. At that point, your house was, physically, in Philadelphia, right? A. Mm-hmm.”), 89:6-17
(“Q.... Did you ever go to any patient service centers in New Jersey to perform any of your job
duties? A... . I mean, I never had any job responsibilities there. . . .”’)).
The Court, therefore, finds that Plaintiff has merely incidental connections to New Jersey,
which do not rise to the level of contact required to sustain Plaintiff's claims brought under New
Jersey law. See, e.g., Peikin v. Kimmel & Silverman, P.C., 576 F. Supp. 2d 654, 658 (D.N.J. 2008)
(finding NILAD does not apply where Pennsylvania was the state of employment, even though
plaintiff “worked on cases for New Jersey clients and frequently traveled to New Jersey” as she
was based out of her Pennsylvania office); Donovan, 566 F. Supp. 3d at 236 (“That [plaintiff
worked in New Jersey on a ‘semi-regular’ basis does not outweigh the interest of New York to his
claims. . . . fand] the interests of the parties favor the application of New York law as .. . [p]laintiff
was employed in New York, worked in [d]efendants’ New York Office, and resided in New
York.”). Rather, Pennsylvania has the most significant relationship to the claims, and therefore,
Pennsylvania law applies. See Chinchilla, 2024 WL 943424, at *8 (noting plaintiff “cannot access
relief through NJLAD” where “the application of the relevant Restatement factors demonstrates
that Pennsylvania has the most significant relationship to this matter”),
The Court, therefore, grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's
NJLAD and NJFLA claims. Plaintiff's NJLAD and NJFLA claims are dismissed with prejudice,
2 Counts Six and Seven (PHRA and PFPO)
Because the Court has determined that Pennsylvania law applies, it now turns to Plaintiffs
PHRA and PFPO claims.

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a. PHRA
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's PHRA claim" fails as a matter of law for the same reasons
that Plaintiff's sex and disability discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment claims
under Title VIE or the ADA fail. (Def.’s Moving Br. 39.)
PHRA claims are analyzed under the same burden-shifting framework as Title VII and
ADA claims. See Jones v. Sch, Dist. of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 413 415 Gd Cir. 1999)
(analyzing discrimination and retaliation claims pursuant to Title VII and PHRA under same
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework); Morgan vy. Allison Crane & Rigging LLC, 114
214, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2024) (analyzing ADA and PHRA claims under same framework). As
a result, and for the reasons discussed above in the context of those claims, Defendant’s motion
for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's PHRA claim based on: (1) sex discrimination; and
(2) disability discrimination and retaliation is denied.
b. PFPO
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's PFPO claim fails because “[t]he Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has made clear that the City of Philadelphia lacks authority to apply its ordinances beyond
its city limits” and “[w]hile Plaintiff's employment was based in Philadelphia, her managers who
made the challenged employment decisions were all based outside of Philadelphia.” (Def.’s
Moving Br. 39-40 (citations omitted).) The Court agrees.
Here, the undisputed facts show that incidents related to Plaintiff's claims arose outside of
Philadelphia. (See, e.g., DSOF 4 18 (“[Plaintiff] traveled to New Jersey less than once per month

'4 Plaintiff alleges a claim pursuant to PHRA for “acts of discrimination and retaliation against
Plaintiff’ because “Plaintiff's sex, disability, and/or protected activity were motivating and/or
determinative factors in the adverse actions taken against Plaintiff.” (SAC {J 207-08.)
'S The Court also notes that Plaintiff did not substantively dispute Defendant’s arguments
pertaining to the PFPO claim. (See generally Pl.’s Qpp’n Br.)
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to meet with Ryker.”); PRSOF § 18; DSOF 4 103 (“On June 28, 2022, Ryker met with Plaintiff at
Labcorp’s facility in Bristol, Pennsylvania ... .”); PRSOF § 103 (admitting occurrence and
location of meeting}; DSOF 4 111 (‘On July 29, 2022, Plaintiff met with Epple at his office in
New Castle, Delaware.”); PRSOF 9111 (admitting occurrence and location of meeting).) As
“felxtra-territorial enforcement of the [PFPO] is precluded by the First Class Cities Home Rule
Act, which bars cities of the first class, i.e., Philadelphia, from ‘exercis{ing] any powers or
authority beyond the city limits[,]” the Court finds that enforcement of the PFPO for purposes of
Plaintiff's claims is not permissible here. See Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. City of Philadelphia, 101
A.3d 79, 89 (Pa. 2014) (third alteration in original); see also id. (noting that the court is not aware
of “any statute remotely suggesting the [PFPO] is viable outside of Philadelphia”).
The Court, therefore, grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's
PFPO claim. Plaintiff's PFPO claim is dismissed with prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s motion.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: June 2D 026

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366452. Public record. Not legal advice.