# CARATOZZOLO

> District Court, D. New Jersey · June 30, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366389

## Case

- **Full name:** Theresa Caratozzolo v. Gloucester Township Public Schools, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** June 30, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
THERESA CARATOZZOLO, : HONORABLE KAREN M. WILLIAMS
Plaintiff, '
v. Civil Action
1 No. 1:23-cv-03476-KMW-EAP
GLOUCESTER TOWNSHIP PUBLIC
SCHOOLS, et al.,
Defendants. OPINION
Michael S. Di Croce, Esq. Amelia Mauriello Lolli, Esq.
DI CROCE LAW OFFICE PC Michael S. Mikulski, Esq.
17 Stony Creek Court CONNOR WEBER & OBERLIES
Indian Mills, NJ 08088 304 Harper Drive, Suite 201
Moorestown, NJ 08057
Counsel for Plaintiff Steven B. Baglivo Counsel for Defendants Gloucester Township
Public Schools and Gloucester Township
Board of Education

WILLIAMS, District Judge:
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Theresa Caratozzolo (‘Plaintiff’) is a former special-education teacher with the
Gloucester Township School District. She brings this action against Gloucester Township Public
Schools and the Gloucester Township Board of Education (collectively, the “District”), alleging
that it failed to accommodate her disability and unlawfully subjected her to other adverse treatment
during her employment.

Presently before the Court is the District’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which Plaintiff has opposed. For the reasons set forth below,
the District’s motion is granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND □
This litigation arises from a series of disputes concerning Plaintiff's employment with the
District and its handling of her asserted disability-related needs. For purposes of this Opinion, the
Court recounts only those undisputed facts necessary to resolve the District’s Motion.!
Before joining the District in 2012, Plaintiff worked for approximately eleven years as a
special-education teacher at an elementary school in another district. (ECF No. 61 at 19, § 1.) She
alleges that during her time at that school, she was repeatedly subjected to physical abuse by one
particular child, including grabbing, hitting, spitting, and throwing objects at her. (ECF No. 1-1 at
7.) According to Plaintiff, those experiences caused significant psychological trauma and
ultimately led her to resign in June 2011. After seeking treatment from a psychiatrist later that
October, she was diagnosed with complex post-traumatic stress disorder, or “CPTSD.”
The following year in August 2012, Plaintiff interviewed for and obtained a special-
education teaching position at Anne Mullen Middle School in the Gloucester Township School
District. (ECF No. 61 at 6, J] 3-4.) Plaintiff alleges that, during her interview, she disclosed her
prior trauma to then-Principal Joanne Acerba and explained that her CPTSD prevented her from
working with elementary-school-age students. (ECF No. | 4 20.) She further alleges that Acerba

' Plaintiff has neither responded to the District’s statement of material facts nor offered a factual account of the
record of her own. Accordingly, the Court deems undisputed the facts set forth in the District’s moving papers. See L.
Civ. R. 56.1(a) (“[A]ny material fact not disputed shall be deemed undisputed for purposes of the summary judgment
motion.”); Kachur v. Wme Mortg. Corp., No. 18-cv-15111, 2020 WL 4282732, at *2 (D.N.J. July 27, 2020) (deeming
statement of material facts undisputed where plaintiff failed to file a responsive statement).

assured her that she would not be assigned to an elementary school, though the District denies that
any such assurance was made. (/d. J 21.)
In the ensuing six years, Plaintiff successfully worked at two middle schools within the
District—first at Anne Mullen during the 2012-2013 school year, and then at Glen Landing Middle
School from 2013 through 2018. During that period, Plaintiff's condition reportedly remained in
“long-term, sustained remission,” with no significant symptoms impairing her ability to function.
(ECF No. 1-1 at 7.)
The circumstances changed in May 2018, when the District notified Plaintiff that, as part
of a broader reallocation of teaching staff, she would be transferred to Glendora Elementary School
for the following school year. Plaintiff maintained that returning to an elementary-school setting
would trigger a recurrence of CPTSD symptoms related to her prior teaching experience. She
therefore submitted a written request for a disability accommodation on May 29, 2018, asking the
District to allow her to remain in a middle-school environment. In support of that request, Plaintiff
provided a note from her psychiatrist stating that Plaintiff had been deeply traumatized by physical
abuse at her prior job and that the prospect of returning to an elementary school had already
triggered “traumatic re-experiencing, flashbacks, and acute anxiety/panic attacks.” (ECF No. 61-
17.) She therefore recommended that Plaintiff “remain in the middle school setting, preferably in
the same classroom or school building.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 7.)
The District denied her request to rescind the transfer, but invited Plaintiff to engage in the
interactive process to explore other reasonable accommodations (ECF No. 61-8.) On August 23,
2018, the parties convened an interactive-process meeting during which Plaintiff requested two
alternative accommodations, specifically a classroom with windows and a procedure for how to
obtain immediate assistance if she ever encountered an unruly child. (ECF No. 61-9.) The District

agreed to those measures. Plaintiff had the opportunity to view her assigned classroom in advance
and found the same acceptable. To address her second request, the District posted next to the
classroom telephone a list of the direct extensions for the Principal and Head Teacher, whom the
District determined would be available at any given time to assist in the event Plaintiff required
assistance. On these terms, Plaintiff accepted her transfer.
Plaintiff successfully worked at Glendora Elementary without incident between 2018 and
2020. Though, she alleges that the stress of being in an elementary-school setting eventually forced
her to request intermittent FMLA leave, which the District approved for the period of January 31,
2020, through January 30, 2021. (ECF Nos. 1 at 9] 50-51; 61-6.) However, by March 2020, all
New Jersey public schools were closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. That same month, the
District gave Plaintiff an opportunity to transfer back to the middle-school setting, offering her a
position at C.W. Lewis Middle School for the 2020-2021 school year. Plaintiff accepted the
assignment and completed her remaining time at Glendora Elementary.
For reasons that are not entirely clear from the record, Plaintiff failed to appear for work at
C.W. Lewis for the first three days of September 2020.” The District consequently issued Plaintiff
a “Rice notice,” and the Board of Education was subsequently advised of her absences during an
executive session on September 22, 2020.° (ECF Nos. 1-1 at 17; 61-5.) The Board took no action

? The record shows that the evening before she was supposed to report to the middle school, she emailed the principal
of C.W. Lewis explaining that she had driven to Virginia to pick her daughter up earlier that day, and inquired as to
whether she was required to quarantine. (ECF No. 1-1 at 15.) The principal responded the following morning stating
that, given the short duration of the trip, he did not believe Plaintiff was required to quarantine. (/d.) Nevertheless, □
Plaintiff did not report to work that day and for two additional days thereafter. The record does not supply a consistent
explanation for those absences. At times, Plaintiff has maintained that the District misinterpreted the New Jersey
Governor’s quarantine directive in place at the time, and that she unilaterally elected to “honor” that directive by
staying at home. (ECF No. 1 at J 55.) Elsewhere, she has attributed the absences to her mental health, as evidenced
by a psychiatrist’s note submitted to the District on September 24, 2020, stating that Plaintiff's absences earlier that
month were “approved.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 20.)
3 A “Rice notice” refers to advance notice given to a public employee that a New Jersey public entity intends to
discuss a personnel matter in closed session that could adversely affect the employee. See Rice v. Union Cnty. Reg’l

against Plaintiff, and there is no evidence that the District ever disciplined her, reduced her
compensation, issued an adverse evaluation, or imposed any other tangible employment action as
a result.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff maintains that the District’s response to her absences caused her
significant emotional distress. Despite having returned to a middle-school setting, Plaintiff claims
that the “stress of the workplace” caused a resurgence of her CPTSD symptoms, forcing her to
take a medical leave of absence the week of September 21, enter a mental health treatment program
on September 29, transition to full-time FMLA leave from October 5 through December 27, 2020.
(ECF Nos. 1; 61-5.)
In anticipation of returning to work in January 2021, Plaintiff submitted another formal
written request for accommodations on December 23, 2020. (ECF No. 61-8.) In her request,
Plaintiff described difficulties she had previously experienced during the few days she had worked
at C.W. Lewis prior to taking leave. Those difficulties principally involved navigating the building
and understanding the practices and procedures of a new school. She attributed those difficulties
to her CPTSD, as well as to a newly disclosed ADHD diagnosis. Plaintiff then set out an extensive
list of detailed demands, threatening litigation if the District did not acquiesce. Among other
things, she sought the assignment of a designated teacher “buddy” to help orient her to the school,
and also changes to her colleagues’ work practices, including a requirement that they complete all
lesson plans by Friday.
The District denied Plaintiff’s request. Dr. Violet Martin, the District’s director of special
services, explained by email that the District had already accommodated Plaintiff on several

High Sch. Bd. of Ed., 382 A.2d 386 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977). Its purpose to allow the employee to decide
whether to request that the discussion occur publicly under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-12(b)(8). See Kean Fed’n of Tchrs.
v. Morell, 187 A.3d 153, 157 (N.J. 2018).

occasions and that further accommodations could have district-wide consequences, including
adversely affecting the delivery of individualized education programs to students with disabilities.
(ECF No. 61-9.)
The record reflects additional events that bear on claims the Court does not address in this
opinion. For purposes of telling a coherent story, the Court notes that Plaintiff returned from leave
in January 2021 and continued working at C.W. Lewis Middle School through 2022. Her final day
of teaching was September 8, 2022, after which she took FMLA leave from September 23 through
December 16, 2022. The District subsequently advised Plaintiff that she could not return to
teaching without appropriate psychiatric clearance. The District maintains that Plaintiff never
obtained the required clearance, although it continued to hold her position open. Plaintiff thereafter
pursued disability retirement. (ECF Nos. 61-12, 61-13.) Ultimately, the Board of Trustees of the
Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund determined that Plaintiff was permanently disabled and
granted her disability retirement, effective March 1, 2024. (ECF No. 61-16.)
LEGAL STANDARD
A court may grant summary judgment when the materials of record “show| | that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Lang v. New York Life Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 118, 119 (3d Cir.
1983). “A fact is ‘material’ under Rule 56 if its existence or nonexistence might impact the
outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law.” Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416
(3d Cir. 2015) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)); see also MS.
by & through Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 969 F.3d 120, 125 (d Cir. 2020) (“A fact is
material if—taken as true—it would affect the outcome of the case under governing law.’’).

Moreover, “[a] dispute over a material fact is ‘genuine’ if ‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.’” Santini, 795 F.3d at 416 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
“The moving party bears the burden of identifying specific portions of the record that
establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Jd. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). If satisfied, the burden then “shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond
the pleadings and come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). To survive a motion for summary
judgment, the non-moving party must identify specific facts and affirmative evidence that
contradict those offered by the moving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57. “A non-moving
party may not ‘rest upon mere allegations, general denials or . . . vague statements[.]’” Trap Rock
Indus., Inc. v. local 825, Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 982 F.2d 884, 890 (3d Cir. 1992)
(quoting Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir. 1991)). In evaluating a summary
judgment motion, the court “must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party,” and make every reasonable inference in that party’s favor. Hugh v. Butler Cty. Family
YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005).
IV. DISCUSSION
As previously indicated, this action involves a broad array of disputes concerning
Plaintiffs employment with the District, and are the predicates of various state-law claims ranging
from breach of contract to defamation. Despite the breadth of those allegations, Plaintiff asserts
only one claim arising under federal law, specifically under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”). Because that claim provides the sole basis for the Court’s original jurisdiction, and
because its disposition may bear on whether the Court should continue to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, the Court begins its analysis there.

A. ADA Claim
The ADA makes it unlawful for covered employers to “discriminate against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a). That prohibition includes failing to
make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability,” unless doing so “would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the [employer’s] business.” Jd. § 12112(a). “Reasonable accommodations” are
defined to include “[m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or
circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable an
individual with a disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position.” 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(0)(1)(ii).
To establish a claim under the ADA based on a failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must
show: (1) he was disabled and his employer knew it; (2) he requested an accommodation or
assistance; (3) his employer did not make a good faith effort to assist; and (4) he could have been
reasonably accommodated but for the employer’s lack of good faith. See Capps v. Mondelez Glob.,
LLC, 847 F.3d 144, 157 (3d Cir. 2017); Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 320 (3d
Cir. 1999),
Plaintiff asserts two violations of the ADA. First, she contends that the District failed to
accommodate her CPTSD in 2018 by denying her request to remain in a middle-school setting
rather than transferring her to Glendora Elementary School. She also alleges the District violated
the ADA in 2020 insofar as it failed to invite or initiate and interactive process in response to her
request for additional accommodations.’ The District seeks summary judgment on both theories,

* The Court is not convinced that Plaintiff has pled a separate ADA claim based on the District’s handling of her
2020 request. Count I expressly alleges an ADA violation arising from the District’s initial denial of Plaintiff's 2018
request to remain in a middle-school setting. Although the Complaint also several facts regarding Plaintiff's 2020

arguing that Plaintiff cannot establish her prima facie case. For purposes of the Motion, it does not
dispute that Plaintiff was disabled or that she requested accommodations. The dispute instead
concerns the third and fourth prongs of her burden: whether the District failed to make a good faith
effort to assist, and whether Plaintiff could have been reasonably accommodated but for the
employer’s lack of good faith. See Capps, 847 F.3d at 157.
Plaintiff, for her part, offers little assistance in resolving the District’s motion. Her
opposition brief is as truncated as it is skeletal: it does not engage with the governing elements of
her claim, identify any record evidence to support her theories, or develop any argument explaining
how a reasonable jury could return a verdict in her favor. Instead, Plaintiff's discussion of her
ADA claims consists only of a handful of generalized assertions by counsel, unsupported by
citation to either the summary-judgment record or the governing law. This is insufficient to create
any genuine dispute of material fact. See Fla. v. Georgia, 585 U.S. 803, 872 (2018) (“[S]tatements
in briefs are not evidence.”’); see also Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d
Cir. 2006) (“[S]ummary judgment is essentially ‘put up or shut up’ time for the non-moving party:
the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on
assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.”).
The Court is not required to scour the record for evidence Plaintiff has not identified, credit
factual assertions not supported with record evidence, or construct arguments on her behalf.
Evaluating Plaintiff's ADA claims against the undisputed material facts, the Court concludes that
the District is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

request, it does not clearly identify those facts as a distinct, independently actionable ADA violation. Compare Compl.
76-78, with Jf 116-24. Nevertheless, because the District’s motion addresses both the 2018 and 2020 theories, the
Court will, for purposes of resolving the motion, treat both claims as if they have been adequately pled.

First, to the extent Plaintiff relies on the District’s denial of her specific request to remain
in a middle-school setting in 2018, her claim fails. “The ADA does not [] require an employer to
provide a disabled employee with the accommodation of her choosing.” Diaz v. City of
Philadelphia, 565 F. App’x 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2014). Rather, it requires the employer to “make a
good faith effort to engage in an interactive process to determine a reasonable accommodation”
that would enable them to perform the essential functions of the job. Williams v. Pinnacle Health
Fam. Care Middletown, 852 F. App’x 678, 680 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp.,
602 F.3d 495, 507 (3d Cir. 2010); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0)(1)(ii). “Employers can show
their good faith in a number of ways, such as taking steps like the following: meet with the
employee who requests an accommodation, request information about the condition and what
limitations the employee has, ask the employee what he or she specifically wants, show some sign
of having considered employee’s request, and offer and discuss available alternatives when the
request is too burdensome.” Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 317 (3d Cir. 1999).
Here, the undisputed record establishes that the District satisfied that obligation. The
District met with Plaintiff, considered the limitations she identified, and explored measures that
might address them. During that process, Plaintiff proposed two alternative accommodations: a
classroom with windows and a means of obtaining prompt assistance. With Plaintiffs blessing,
the District implemented both. On these facts, no reasonable jury could find that the District denied
Plaintiff a reasonable accommodation to her CPTSD-related limitations. See Keyhani v. Trs. of
Univ. of Pennsylvania, 812 F. App’x 88, 91 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that an employee’s preference
for one reasonable accommodation over another was “not sufficient to establish that defendant
failed to act in good faith”).

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As to her second claim, Plaintiff appears to hypothesize that the District’s rejection of the
accommodations listed in her December 2020 letter, without an “individualized assessment,”
amounted to a failure to engage in an interactive process and a violation of the ADA. See Pl.’s
Opp’n Br. at 3-4. But even accepting that contention, Plaintiff still must satisfy the fourth prong
of her prima facie case by showing that she “could have been reasonably accommodated but for
the employer’s lack of good faith.” Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 504 (3d Cir. 2010)
(quoting Williams v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 772 (3d Cir. 2004)). If
Plaintiff truly required additional accommodations for any disability-imposed limitation, it is now
incumbent upon her to show, “as part of her burden of persuasion,” that there existed “an effective
accommodation” that would have “render[ed] her otherwise qualified” for her position. Fowler v.
AT&T, Inc., 19 F.4th 292, 307 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n. of Se.
Pennsylvania, 168 F.3d 661, 670 (3d Cir. 1999)). Plaintiff can meet that burden by showing the
existence of some reasonable accommodation—even one she did not specifically request—that
would have addressed a disability-imposed limitation and rendered her capable of performing the
essential functions of her position.
Plaintiff does not squarely address this aspect of her prima facie burden. Even construing
her opposition generously, the Court discerns only three vague assertions that could arguably bear
on the issue: (i) that “[m]any of the items” set forth in her December 2020 letter had previously
been provided at Glendora Elementary; (ii) that she had “previously performed the job
successfully” with “those accommodations”; and (iii) that other school districts “routinely provide
similar supports for special education staff.” Pl.’s Opp’n Br. at 3-4.
None of these assertions identifies any concrete accommodation at all, much less supplies
evidence of a reasonable accommodation that would have addressed a disability-imposed

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limitation. Plaintiff does not identify which of her numerous requests (if any) had actually been.
implemented at Glendora, what disability-related limitation any particular measure alleviated, or
how it would have enabled her to perform the essential functions of her position. Her assertion
concerning the practices of other school districts is doubly speculative and no more probative.
Thus, even assuming that the District failed to make a good faith effort to engage in an interactive
process, she provides no basis on which a jury could find that she could have been reasonably
accommodated but for the lack of good faith. See Drizos v. PNC Invs. LLC, No. 22-1736, 2023
WL 4986496, at *6 (3d Cir. Aug. 3, 2023) (affirming summary judgment on ADA claim where
plaintiff failed to address fourth prong of prima facie burden); Gavurnik v. Home Props., L.P., 712
F. App’x 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2017) (affirming summary judgment where the plaintiff had identified
an accommodation but failed to adduce any evidence that it would have effectively addressed a
disability-imposed limitation).
In conclusion, Plaintiff has supplied no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find
that the District failed to accommodate her in violation of the ADA. The undisputed record shows
that in response to Plaintiff's 2018 request, the District engaged in an interactive process,
considered the limitations she identified, and implemented reasonable alternative accommodations
that Plaintiff herself proposed. And even assuming the District should have initiated another
interactive process in 2020, Plaintiff has yet to point to any reasonable accommodation that could
have emerged from such a process and alleviated some limitation imposed by her disability.
Without more, any purported “lack of investigation into a reasonable accommodation” on the
District’s part is simply “unimportant.” Donahue v. Consol. Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir.
2000) (Alito, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted). For these reasons, the Court grants the
District’s motion as to Plaintiff's ADA claims.

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B. Remaining State Law Claims
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) grants district courts discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction
once it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” The Third Circuit has
long instructed that, “absent extraordinary circumstances,” supplemental jurisdiction over a
plaintiff's state-law claims “should be declined where [her] federal claims are no longer viable.”
Shaffer v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Albert Gallatin Area Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Observing no such extraordinary circumstances here, the Court
declines to retain supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining NJLAD claims and
accordingly remands this action to state court. See D & D Assocs., Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of N.
Plainfield, 552 F. App’x 110, 117 (Gd Cir. 2014) (affirming decision to decline supplemental
jurisdiction over state-law claims following entry of summary judgment on all federal claims); see
also Brumfield v. Atl. City Hous. Auth., No. 21-cv-16061, 2025 WL 227311, at *13 (D.N.J. Jan.
17, 2025) (remanding action to state court after entering summary judgment on federal
discrimination claims); S.M. 0/b/o B.M. v. Freehold Reg’l Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 22-cv-107,
2024 WL 180827, at *15 (D.N.J. Jan. 17, 2024) (declining supplemental jurisdiction over NJLAD
claims following summary judgment on all federal claims).
No extraordinary circumstance warrants retention of this case. With the ADA claims
resolved, this action no longer presents a federal question. What remains is a collection of claims
governed entirely by New Jersey law and requiring resolution of grievances and controversies the
Court did not discuss in deciding the federal claims. Retaining jurisdiction would do little more
than draw the Court into a broader set of disputes concerning state-law duties, remedies, and
defenses arising from Plaintiff's employment with a local public entity. Those questions are more
appropriately resolved by a New Jersey court. Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise

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supplemental jurisdiction and will dismiss the remaining claims without prejudice so that they can
be pursued in an appropriate forum. See D & D Assocs., Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of N. Plainfield, 552
F. App’x 110, 117 (3d Cir. 2014) (affirming decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over
state-law claims following entry of summary judgment on all federal claims); see also S.M. o/b/o
B.M. v. Freehold Reg’l Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 22-cv-107, 2024 WL 180827, at *15 (D.N.J.
Jan. 17, 2024) (declining supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims against employer school
district following summary judgment on all federal claims).
Vv. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, the Court grants the District’s motion as to Plaintiff’ □
ADA claims only. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs
remaining state-law claims and therefore denies the District’s motion as to those claims and
dismisses them without prejudice so that Plaintiff may pursue them in an appropriate state forum.

Dated: June 30, 2026

REN M. WILLIAMS, U.S.D.J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366389. Public record. Not legal advice.