# GOYDOS

> District Court, D. New Jersey · June 26, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366319

## Case

- **Full name:** James S. Goydos & Maria E. Martins v. Rutgers, The State University et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** June 26, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JAMES S. GOYDOS & MARIA E.
MARTINS,
Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 19-8966 (RK) (JTQ)
Vv. OPINION
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY
et al.,
Defendants.

KIRSCH, District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon cross-motions for summary judgment filed
by Defendant Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey (“Defendant” or “Rutgers”) (“Def.
MSJ,” ECF No. 194-3) and Plaintiffs Dr. James S. Goydos (“Dr. Goydos”) and Dr. Maria E.
Martins (“Dr. Martins”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) (“Pls. MSJ,” ECF No. 196-2). The parties
opposed each other’s motions (“Pls. Opp.,” ECF No. 202; “Def. Opp.,” ECF No. 201) and replied
(“Pls. Reply,” ECF No. 207; “Def. Reply,” ECF No. 206). The parties also submitted statements
of material facts in support of their respective motions (“Def. SUMF,” ECF No. 194-2; “Pls.
SUMF,” ECF No. 196-1) and responses thereto (Resp. to Def. SUMF,” ECF No. 202-1 {J 1-89;
“Resp. to Pls. SUMF,” ECF No. 201-1). Defendant submitted a reply to Plaintiffs’ responsive
statement. (“Def. Reply SUMF,” ECF No. 206-1.) Plaintiffs also submitted an additional statement
of undisputed material facts to which Defendant responded. (“Pls. ASUMF,” ECF No. 202-1
90-101; “Resp. to Pls. ASUMF,” ECF No. 206-2.) The Court has considered the parties’
submissions and resolves the pending motions without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ motion
is DENIED and Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.
L BACKGROUND
“Freedom of access to the courts is a cherished value in our democratic society.” Talamini
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U.S. 1067, 1070 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring). As has long been
observed, “the very object for which civil courts have been established . . . is to secure the peace
and repose of society by the settlement of matters capable of judicial determination.” S. Pac. R.
Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 27 (1897). “There is, and should be, the strongest presumption of
open access to all levels of the judicial system.” Talamini, 470 U.S. at 1072 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). “This is not, of course, to suggest that courts should tolerate gross abuses of the
judicial process.” /d. Litigants and lawyers alike must, among other things, “[s]top” and “[t]hink”
before bringing a lawsuit. Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 482 (3d Cir. 1987). This case is
an example of what can happen when that type of critical, or in this case, even rudimentary
reflection is absent. □
The facts of this case strain the bounds of decency and demonstrate the dark depths one
may go to with heartless abandon to exact revenge for some perceived grievance. At the time of
the events at issue, Dr. Goydos himself was an accomplished cancer researcher and Professor in
the Department of Surgery at Rutgers Robert Wood Johnson Medical School and Chief of the
Section of Melanoma and Soft Tissue Oncology at the Rutgers Cancer Institute of New Jersey
(“RCINS’).! (Def. SUMF § 1; Resp. to Def. SUMF § 1.) Dr. Steven K. Libutti (“Dr. Libutti”) was
the newly appointed Director of RCINJ. (Def. SUMF 4 7; Resp. to Def. SUMF § 7.) Dr. Libutti is

' As discussed later, for reasons which will become apparent, as part of his guilty plea, Dr. Goydos
surrendered his license to practice medicine. (Def. SUMF 7 87; Resp. to Def. SUMEF 4 87; ECF No. 194-
5, Ex. 49, Interim Consent Order.)

a Harvard and Columbia educated “internationally known expert in the management of
neuroendocrine tumors.” See Steven K. Libutti, MD, FACS, Rutgers Cancer Inst.,
https://cinj.org/about-cinj/steven-k-libutti-md-facs.? RCINJ hired Dr. Libutti “to help lead the
transformation of Rutgers into a national leader in cancer care.” (ECF No. 197, Ex. 10, Letter from
Brian L. Strom to Dr. Libutti at 2.)? Dr. Goydos disagreed with what he perceived as Dr. Libutti’s
approach of “splitting the clinical and research components [of RCINJ] into separate . . . silos.”
(Def. SUMF 4 7 (quoting ECF No. 194-5, Ex. 2, Goydos Dep. Tr. at 64:5—7); Resp. to Def. SUMF
{| 7.) Partially due to this disagreement, Dr. Goydos sought to leave RCINJ for another renowned
cancer research facility. (Def. SUMF | 6—8; Resp. to Def. SUMF 9 6-8.) If only it ended there.
A. AN ANONYMOUS Tip REPORTS A HIDDEN CAMERA AT RCINJ
On the afternoon of Tuesday, September 19, 2017, an anonymous tip was made to “Crime

* The Court takes judicial notice of Dr. Libutti’s biography on RCINI’s website. See ARCHforensic, LLC
v. Arch Eng’g, LLC, No. 21-16022, 2023 WL 2662584, at *6 n4 (D.NJ. Mar. 28, 2023)
(“The Court takes judicial notice of [the] online biography . .. .”); see also Vanderklok v. United States,
868 F.3d 189, 205 n.16 (3d Cir. 2017) (“To the extent that we rely on information beyond what the
government included in its amicus brief, that information is publicly available on government websites and
therefore we take judicial notice of it.”).
* The Court has reviewed and makes reference to a few sealed documents cited or quoted by the parties.
(See Def. SUMF § 10 (citing ECF No. 195, Ex. 8, September 19, 2017 Tip Submitted to Crime Stoppers of
Middlesex County); id. § 12 (citing ECF No. 195, Ex. 10, Documents Regarding Rutgers’ Receipt of
Anonymous Complaint); id § 60 (quoting ECF No. 195, Ex. 36, September 20 to 22, 2018 Email
Exchange); Pls. MSJ at 21 n.19 (citing ECF No. 197, Ex. 10, Letter from Brian L. Strom to Dr. Libutti).)
The Court will not place this Opinion under seal because the Court’s brief references and allusions to these
documents do not implicate any confidentiality concerns. See, e.g., Dayhoff Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 86 F.3d
1287, 1289 (3d Cir. 1996) (“We also note that in the course of our opinion we make reference to a
sealed appendix. This appendix was sealed because it contained certain sensitive commercial materials, but
the items to which we refer are not of that character.”); Shaporov vy. Levine, No. 22-1150, 2025 WL
2731460, at *4 0.9 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2025) (“[B]ecause the parties have not filed under seal their briefs
revealing much of the content of the sealed exhibits, the Court will not seal this Opinion.”); Romah v. Scully,
No. 06-698, 2007 WL 3493943, at *5 n.15 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2007) (“Because the evidence submitted by
Plaintiff was filed under seal, the Court will only generally refer to said documents.”); Bullion Monarch
Mining, Inc. v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc., No. 09-612, 2016 WL 8735620, at *1 n.1 (D. Nev. Sept. 30,
2016) (“The Court will . . . reference information in sealed documents in general terms to avoid sealing this
Order.”); United States v. Gourevitch, No. 12-CR-758, 2014 WL 4724701, at *3 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23,
2014) (“In this opinion, the court will refer only in general terms to information contained in the sealed
filings.”).

Stoppers of Middlesex County.” (Def. SUMF § 10; Resp. to Def. SUMF § 10.) The tipster,
purportedly a woman who was panicked and in fear, reported that there was a small hole in the
ceiling, and potentially a camera, over a stall in the second-floor women’s bathroom at RCINJ.
(Def. SUMF 4 10; Resp. to Def. SUMF 4 10; ECF No. 195, Ex. 8, September 19, 2017 Tip
Submitted to Crime Stoppers of Middlesex County.) An image of the suspected camera was
attached to the tip, and the tip further indicated that the tipster had twice seen Dr. Libutti exiting
that women’s bathroom. (ECF No. 195, Ex. 8, September 19, 2017 Tip Submitted to Crime
Stoppers of Middlesex County.) As Dr. Libutti was the only person named or referenced in the tip,
and that the tipster saw him recently exiting that women’s bathroom more than once, this tip clearly
suggested that he was a possible perpetrator.
Both the Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office (“MCPO”) and Rutgers University Police
Department (““RUPD”) immediately began investigating the tip. (Def. SUMF §] 13-14; Resp. to
Def. SUMF | 13~14.) In the women’s bathroom, RUPD officers discovered “a small hole
approximately the size of a penny carved into a ceiling tile.” (Def. SUMF § 14; Resp. to Def.
SUMF § 14.) After removing the ceiling tile, officers discovered wiring leading toward the
Director’s Suite. (Def. SUMF {ff 15-16; Resp. to Def. SUMF ff 15-16.)
The next day, RUPD officers returned to the scene and discovered a device near the hole.
(Def. SUMF 17; Resp. to Def. SUMF § 17.) That evening, Rutgers received an anonymous call
stating that the caller’s coworker was “hysterical” because she thought Dr. Libutti hid a camera in
the bathroom and noting that the coworker previously submitted an anonymous tip through
middlesextips.com. (Def. SUMF 4 18: Resp. to Def. SUMF § 18; ECF No. 195, Ex. 10, Documents
Regarding Rutgers’ Receipt of Anonymous Complaint.) That same night, officers determined that
the earlier-discovered device was, in fact, a camera that was connected to a digital video recorder.

(Def. SUMF 19-20; Resp. to Def. SUMF 19-20.) The officers followed the wires, which led
into Dr. Libutti’s office. (Def. SUMF § 21; Resp. to Def. SUMF 21.)
B. Mr. VARTAN CONDUCTS HIS INVESTIGATION
The next day, September 21——in light of the anonymous tipster identifying him as the
possible culprit, the confirmation of the camera, and the highly concerning wiring leading to his
personal office—officers interviewed Dr. Libutti, who denied any involvement with the camera.
(Def. SUMF 22; Resp. to Def. SUMF 4 22.) Dr. Libutti retained Lee Vartan, Esq. (“Mr. Vartan’)
as his legal counsel, and Mr. Vartan in turn retained Secure Investigations, an outside firm, to
investigate the incident. (Def. SUMF {J 23-24; Resp. to Def. SUMF § 23-24; ECF No. 194-5,
Ex. 14, Vartan Dep. Tr. at 6:23—7:7.) Given Dr. Libutti’s position, Mr. Vartan understandably was
concerned that “a charge . . . would be incredibly injurious” to Dr. Libutti. (ECF No. 194-5, Ex.
14, Vartan Dep. Tr. at 16:21—23.)
As part of the investigation, Mr. Vartan, Secure Investigations, or both interviewed Rutgers
employees and obtained records showing Dr. Libutti’s location at relevant times. (Def. SUMF
4 25; Resp. to Def. SUMF § 25.) Through this investigation, Mr. Vartan learned that on Monday,
September 18, 2017—the day before the anonymous tip-—-multiple witnesses found dust from the
ceiling tiles on their desks in the Director’s Suite that was not there when they left on Friday,
September 15, 2017, indicating that something jostled the ceiling tiles over the weekend; Dr.
Libutti was out of the country that weekend; Dr. Goydos knew Dr. Libutti would be out of the
country that weekend; and Dr. Goydos had previously been reported for unauthorized entry into
the Director’s office. (Def. SUMF § 27; Resp. to Def. SUMF § 27.) Mr. Vartan obtained Dr.
Goydos’s “swipe records” from a parking garage that allowed access to Robert Wood Johnson
University Hospital and RCINJ. (Def. SUMF § 28; Resp. to Def. SUMF § 28.) These records
revealed that Dr. Goydos was present at RCINJ for much of the day on Saturday, September 16,

2017 and Sunday, September 17, 2017. (Def. SUMF { 28; Resp. to Def. SUMF § 28.) Records
further indicated that Dr. Goydos had swiped into the building each of the ten times between
September 1 and September 17, 2017 where the door to the Director’s Suite was recorded by
security systems as having been “forced open.” (ECF No. 194-5, Ex. 26, Warrant Affidavit at 10,
13 (indicating that the door openings were recorded as “forced”);4 Def. SUMF § 28; Resp. to Def.
SUMF § 28.) Mr. Vartan also examined the contents of Dr. Libutti’s computer and phone and
found nothing incriminating. (Def. SUMF § 28; Resp. to Def. SUMF 28.)
Most relevant here, Rutgers personnel imaged (i.e., copied) Dr. Goydos’s Rutgers-owned
work computer in October 2017 at the direction of either Dr. Libutti (according to Plaintiffs) or
Mr. Vartan (according to Defendant). (Def. SUMF ¥ 29-30; Resp. to Def. SUMF Jf 29-30.) This
was done without authorization from Rutgers Office of General Counsel (““OGC”). (Pls. SUMF
{ 9; Resp. to Pls. SUMF § 9.) This request was communicated through various Rutgers employees.
(Def. SUMF ff 30-32; Resp. to Def. SUMF ¥ 30-32.) Ultimately, Adrian Rodriguez (“Mr. □
Rodriguez”), Director of Information Systems and Technology for Rutgers, asked Barry
Shandalow (“Mr. Shandalow”), an RCINJ technical support employee, to take the image. (Def.
SUMF 4{ 31-32; Resp. to Def. SUMF {ff 31-32.) Mr. Shandalow took the image late October 2,
2017 or early October 3, 2017 (the “October Imaging”). (Def. SUMF § 35; Resp. to Def. SUMF
4 35; Pls. SUMF { 6; Resp. to Pls. SUMF 6.)
Mr. Vartan testified that the image of the computer contained pictures of the camera and
associated wiring as well as internet search history that made it clear that Dr. Goydos, rather than
Dr. Libutti, had installed the camera. (ECF No. 194-5, Ex. 14, Vartan Dep. Tr. at 18:1-9; Def.

“ Based on the record and the parties’ failure to sufficiently define the significance of these “forced
openings,” the Court does not place much if any weight on this fact.

L£

SUMF § 42; Resp. to Def. SUMF § 42.) Mr. Vartan did not share information about the imaging
or the results of the imaging with Rutgers OGC or MCPO.° (Def. SUMF 4] 36; ECF No. 194-5, Ex.
14, Vartan Dep. Tr. at 18:9-18 (‘I knew [the results of the October Imaging| when I met with [the
MCPO] team but J didn’t tell them that. All I shared with them was the fact that we knew when
this had happened based upon the ceiling dust. We shared swipe records if I recall into and out of
the garage. We shared interview reports but I didn’t go any further because I did not want to harm
their investigation ... .”); ECF No. 194-5, Ex. 14, Vartan Dep. Tr. at 24:24-25 (“[MCPO] was
never told that I imaged the computer . . . .”); ECF No. 194-5, Ex. 14, Vartan Dep. Tr. at 26:17—
25 (noting that the results of the October Imaging were not shared with Rutgers, MCPO, or Rutgers
police); ECF No. 194-5, Ex. 14, Vartan Dep. Tr. at 35:1 (“I shared nothing with Rutgers.”).)
On October 8 or 9, 2017, Rutgers Ethics and Compliance or OGC “instructed Mr.
Rodriguez to cease any internal investigation activity.” (Pls. SUMF { 11; Resp. to Pls. SUMF 4
11; ECF No. 196-4, Ex. 2, Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 82:2—23.) Mr. Rodriguez then ceased the investigation
and wiped his copy of the image. (Pls. SUMF 12; Resp. to Pls. SUMF § 12.) There is no evidence
adduced that the October Imaging done at the behest of Dr. Libutti or Mr. Vartan was ever provided

to, viewed by, or otherwise used by Rutgers or MCPO as it relates to this incident or any aspect of
the investigations they both conducted. In fact, Mr. Vartan testified that he ordered the October
Imaging solely as part of his individual representation of Dr. Libutti to gather facts to attempt to
determine who the true culprit was. (See ECF No. 194-5, Ex. 14, Vartan Dep. Tr. at 24:14-16 (“I

> Plaintiffs contest whether “this is a proven fact,” but they offer no evidence to contradict it. (Resp. to Def.
SUMEF { 36.) Defendant having supported its assertion with evidence, Plaintiffs’ denial is insufficient to
create a genuine dispute of material fact. See Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir.
2007) (“The non-moving party may not merely deny the allegations in the moving party’s pleadings; instead
he must show where in the record there exists a genuine dispute over a material fact.”); see also Big Apple
BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (“[W]here the non-moving party’s evidence
contradicts the movant’s, then the non-movant's must be taken as true.” (emphasis added)).

represented Dr. Libutti. My sole concern was Dr. Libutti and I presume had I consulted with
Rutgers they would have said [not to conduct the October Imaging].”). This appears corroborated
by the fact that the search warrant affidavit ultimately submitted in support of a request for warrants
to search Dr. Goydos’s home and RCINJ office contained ample references to the imaging later
conducted by Rutgers, but none to the October Imaging. (See ECF No. 194-5, Ex..26, Warrant
Affidavit at 11-14.)
C. RUTGERS AND MCPO ConpDuUCT THEIR OWN INVESTIGATIONS
Rutgers OGC retained outside counsel to conduct its own investigation. (Def. SUMF 4 37;
Resp. to Def. SUMF § 37.) As part of this investigation, another image was taken of Dr. Goydos’s
computer in November of 2017 (the “November Imaging”). (See Def. SUMF § 38; Resp. to Def.
SUMF 38; Pls. SUMF / 13; Resp. to Pls. SUMF 13.)
As part of Rutgers’ investigation, William Maderer, Esq. (“Mr. Maderer”), counsel for
Rutgers, sent an email to Shaun I. Blick, Esq. (“Mr. Blick’’), counsel for Dr. Goydos, requesting
an interview with Dr. Goydos. (Def. SUMF § 43; Resp. to Def. SUMF 43.) Mr. Blick objected
to the request and instead offered to have Dr. Goydos answer written questions. (Def. SUMF 9
44-45; Resp. to Def. SUMF 4 44-45.) On March 23, 2018, Mr. Maderer conducted a
teleconference with Mr. Blick and again requested to interview Dr. Goydos. (Def. SUMF 4 46;
Resp. to Def. SUMF 4 46.) Mr. Maderer explained that if Dr. Goydos declined, he “may next be
directed by his supervisor to appear for the purpose of answering questions” and that if he did not
cooperate then, “he may be subject to disciplinary proceedings and disciplinary action.” (ECF No.
202-3, Ex. R-3, February 15 to March 23, 2018 Email Exchange at D-218 (email memorializing
call); see ECF No. 202-3, Ex. R-8, Maderer Dep. Tr. at 55:15-16 (confirming accuracy of
memorialization); Resp. to Def. SUMF 4 91; Def. Reply SUMF § 91.) Mr. Blick then reiterated
Dr. Goydos’s refusal to be interviewed and reaffirmed Dr. Goydos’s willingness to answer written

questions (Def. SUMF { 47; Resp. to Def. SUMF 47.) Counsel for Rutgers did not make any
further attempts to interview Dr. Goydos, and Dr. Goydos did not make any statement, answer any
questions, or sit for an interview. (Def. SUMF § 48; Resp. to Def. SUMF 4 48.)
On March 29, 2018, as part of MCPO’s investigation into the camera incident, an MCPO

detective submitted an affidavit in support of an application for search warrants to search Dr.
Goydos’s home and office. (Def. SUMF § 50; Resp. to Def. SUMF 4 50.) Among other things, the
affidavit summarized the results of the November Imaging. (See ECF No. 194-5, Ex. 26, Warrant
Affidavit at 11-14.) It noted that Dr. Goydos’s computer had been used to access
middlesextips.com the same day the initial tip naming Dr. Libutti was submitted, the computer
contained the same photograph of the camera that was attached to the tip, the computer contained
files with sexually explicit or suggestive file names, the computer had been used to search for
surveillance laws, the computer contained photos that seemed to have been covertly taken of
various RCINJ offices, and the computer contained various files and folders pertaining to Dr.
Libutti. (Id. at 11-13.)
On March 29, 2018, law enforcement obtained a Superior Court Judge’s authority to
execute search warrants of Dr. Goydos’s home and RCINJ office. (See ECF No. 194-5, Ex. 28,
Warrant to Search Dr. Goydos’s Residence; ECF No. 194-5, Ex. 32, Warrant to Search Dr.
Goydos’s Office.) On March 30, 2018, Dr. Goydos’s home and RCINJ office were searched
pursuant to the warrants. (Def. SUMF {ff 51-55; Resp. to Def. SUMF § 51-55.) At Dr. Goydos’s
home, officers seized an assault rifle and various incriminating items including documents with
Dr. Libutti’s personal information and account usernames and passwords, lock picking tools,
various covert and mini cameras, and three books titled “Wiring Simplified,” “Practical
Lockpicking,” and “Getting Even.” (Def. SUMF 52-53; Resp. to Def. SUMF J 52-53.) At Dr.

oO

Goydos’s RCINJ office, officers seized a computer and “covert camera.” (Def. SUMF { 55; Resp.
to Def. SUMF 4 55.)
The same day, March 30, 2018, Dr. Goydos was arrested for unlawful possession of the
assault rifle. (Def. SUMF 4 56; Resp. to Def. SUMF §[ 56.) While he was handcuffed to a bench in
the New Brunswick Police Department, two individuals identifying themselves as Rutgers police
officers gave Dr. Goydos a letter placing him on paid administrative leave. (ECF No. 194-5, Ex.
2, Goydos Dep. Tr. at 178:5—18; see Def. SUMF 4 57; Resp. to Def. SUMF 4 57.)
D. Dr. GOYDOS CONTESTS RUTGERS’ POSSESSION OF CERTAIN PROPERTY
Post arrest, from July through September of 2018, Mr. Blick—Dr. Goydos’s counsel—and
Rutgers OGC exchanged a series of emails concerning whether certain laboratory and personal
items were owned by Rutgers or Dr. Goydos. (Def. SUMF 4[] 58-60; Resp. to Def. SUMF 4 58—
60.) Ultimately, OGC agreed that “if it is established that Dr. Goydos is the proper owner of any
of these items, the University will make them available for pickup at Dr. Goydos’ expense.” (Def.
SUMEF { 60 (emphasis omitted) (quoting ECF No. 195, Ex. 36, September 20 to 22, 2018 Email
Exchange at D-277); Resp. to Def. SUMF § 60.)
Several months later, Mr. Blick and OGC engaged in another email exchange. (Def. SUMF
63-69; Resp. to Def. SUMF 63-69.) Despite the fact that Dr. Goydos was banned from
visiting campus, “as a professional courtesy,” OGC allowed him to return to RCINJ to retrieve his
personal belongings. (Def. SUMF §¥ 66, 68-69; Resp. to Def. SUMF § 66, 68-69.) It was further
established that if Dr. Goydos and Rutgers disagreed about the ownership of any items, they would
be stored until ownership could be resolved via documentation. (Def. SUMF ff 68-69; Resp. to
Def. SUMF {¥ 68-69.) On February 13, 2019, Dr. Goydos visited RCINJ and retrieved various
personal belongings. (Def. SUMF {] 70; Resp. to Def. SUMF § 70.) The next day, Mr. Blick sent
an email to OGC stating that several items allegedly belonging to Dr. Goydos were missing during

the visit. (Def. SUMF 71; Resp. to Def. SUMF § 71.) Another email exchange ensued. Mr. Blick
identified the items at issue, ranging from small items such as erasers worth a few dollars to
scanners and printers worth hundreds, and OGC reiterated its request for documentation. (Def.
SUMF 4§ 72-76; Resp. to Def. SUMF {9 72-76; ECF No. 194-5, Ex. 41, February 20 to 21, 2019
Email Exchange.) Then or to date, neither Mr. Blick nor Dr. Goydos provided the requested
documentation establishing Dr. Goydos’s ownership of the items he claimed were his, or proof of
the existence of any of the items he claimed were missing—let alone any proof of his ownership
of the supposedly missing items. (Def. SUMF 4 77; Resp. to Def. SUMF § 77.)
E. Dr. Goybos Is INDICTED, PLEADS GUILTY, AND IS SENTENCED
After learning that he was likely to face additional charges for his involvement in the illicit
camera framing incident, on December 14, 2018, Dr. Goydos resigned from his employment with
Rutgers. (Def. SUME 61; Resp. to Def. SUMF 4 61.) Two weeks later, Dr. Goydos was indicted
in New Jersey Superior Court for 160 counts of criminal conduct, including weapons-related
charges, burglary, official misconduct, and impersonation, among others. (Def. SUMF § 62; Resp.
to Def. SUMF § 62.) .
On December 19, 2019, Dr. Goydos pleaded guilty to one count each of burglary,
impersonation, official misconduct, and possession of an assault weapon and two counts of
computer theft. (Def. SUMF {| 78; Resp. to Def. SUMF { 78.) In his plea allocution, Dr. Goydos
admitted the following: with respect to the burglary count, that he entered the Director’s Suite
without authorization and accessed Dr. Libutti’s personal information on Dr. Libutti’s computer,
(Def. SUMF 79; Resp. to Def. SUMF 79; ECF No. 194-5, Ex. 44, Plea Hr’g Tr. at 17:10—19:5);
with respect to the first count of computer theft, that he accessed information from the computer
of Dr. Libutti’s assistant without permission and to use for his own purposes, (Def. SUMF § 80;
Resp. to Def. SUMF { 80; ECF No. 194-5, Ex. 44, Plea Hr’g Tr. at 19:6-20:14); with respect to

14

the second count of computer theft, that he accessed information—including Dr. Libutti’s personal
information from a computer located in the Director’s suite—without permission and for his own
purposes, (Def. SUMF § 81; Resp. to Def. SUMF 4 81; ECF No. 194-5, Ex. 44, Plea Hr’g Tr. at
20:15—21:17); with respect to the impersonation count, that he utilized the log-in credentials of
another person without consent to access the personal information of Dr. Libutti to benefit himself,
(Def. SUMF □ 83; Resp. to Def. SUMF § 83; ECF No. 194-5, Ex. 44, Plea Hr’g Tr. at 21:18—
23:19); and with respect to the official misconduct count, that it was through his position at Rutgers
that he was able to access the RCINSJ building and Director’s Suite, (ECF No. 194-5, Ex. 44, Plea
Hr’g Tr. at 23:20-24:25). As part of his guilty plea, the remaining 154 counts were dismissed.
(Def. SUMF 84; Resp. to Def. SUMF J 84.) Dr. Goydos was sentenced to 300 days’ incarceration
and four years’ probation. (Def. SUMF 4 85; Resp. to Def. SUME 4 85.)
Dr. Goydos appealed his sentence which was affirmed by the Appellate Division. State v.
Goydos, No. A-4504-19, 2022 WL 211123 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 25, 2022) (per curiam).
Dr. Goydos also filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The petition was denied by the Superior
Court, and the Appellate Division affirmed. See State v. Goydos, No. A-2015-23, 2025 WL
2779034 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 30, 2025) (per curiam). Dr. Goydos ultimately was
incarcerated for 110 days, forfeited any right to current and future public employment, and agreed
to cease practicing medicine in New Jersey. (Def. SUMF 86-88; Resp. to Def. SUMF 4 86—
88.)

19

Although the Court need not find the following as a matter of uncontested fact for purposes
of resolving the cross-motions and is not doing so, the clear implication of the facts as recited
above is as follows: The tipster, it turns out, was not some innocent anonymous woman who, at a
compromised moment, happened to look up from a bathroom stall, horrified at the prospect of
being surreptitiously viewed and/or recorded in one’s most private, personal of moments. Rather,
the extensive premeditation and execution of this sinister plot to frame Dr. Libutti, a renowned
physician, was apparently done by the hand of his colleague and fellow cancer researcher: Dr

_ Goydos. No villain here, Dr. Libutti was a victim. He, along with Rutgers, was smeared with the
terrible stain of this false accusation, at least until MCPO’s criminal investigation—culminating
in Dr..Goydos’s guilty pleas to multiple felonies.
F. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 27, 2019, Plaintiffs initiated this action by filing a ten-count complaint against
Rutgers and other defendants alleging violations of the Constitution of the United States, various
New Jersey statutes, and New Jersey common law. (ECF No. 1.) In the seven years since, six
United States district judges and multiple magistrate judges have presided over this case.
After many filings not relevant here, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second
Amended Complaint, and the Honorable Michael A. Shipp, U.S.D.J., granted the motion in part
and denied it in part. (ECF Nos. 71, 76-77.) Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended
Complaint, which is the operative complaint. “TAC,” ECF No. 82.) Again, Defendants moved to
dismiss, and again, the Court—this time, the Honorable Georgette Castner, U.S.D.J—-granted the
motion in part and denied it in part. (ECF Nos. 87, 102-03.) After Judge Castner dismissed some □
of Defendant’s previously filed counterclaims, Defendant filed an amended answer and
counterclaims. (ECF Nos. 134-35, 139.) Plaintiffs then answered the counterclaims. (ECF No.

12

141.) On June 14, 2024, this case was reassigned from Judge Castner to the Undersigned—the
sixth district judge to be assigned this action. (ECF No. 145; see also ECF Nos. 32, 74, 75, 94.)
After Judge Castner’s order partially granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss the TAC—
the still operative complaint—only four claims remain: Count Two, a Fourth Amendment claim
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Count Three, a Fifth Amendment claim brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983: Count Eight, a conversion claim under New Jersey common law; and Count Ten, a per
quod claim under New Jersey common law. (ECF Nos. 102-03.) Rutgers is the only remaining
defendant.® The parties have cross moved for summary judgment. (See Pls. MSJ; Def. MSJ.)
Defendant moves for summary judgment on all remaining counts, while Plaintiffs only move for
summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim. (See Pls. MSJ at 5; Def. MSJ at 1.) The
motions are fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.

Rutgers and RCINJ are named separately in the TAC. (See, e.g, TAC §§ 4-5.) However, as Defendant
explains, RCINJ “is part of Rutgers” and Rutgers is “the only remaining Defendant in this action.” (Def.
SUMEF at 1); see also Murray v. Rutgers Cancer Inst. of N.J., No. A-3347-23, 2025 WL 915540, at *2 &
n.2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 26, 2025) (per curiam) (noting that Rutgers was “[i]mproperly pled as”
RCINJ). Plaintiffs do not in any way contest this. Accordingly, “Defendant” and “Rutgers” refer to both
RCINJ and Rutgers.
The Fifth Amendment and conversion claims only name Rutgers and RCINJ as defendants. (TAC
326-43, 421-28.) The Fourth Amendment claim names Rutgers, RCINJ, and three individual
defendants, but the three individual defendants were dismissed by Judge Castner. (Jd. §§ 281-325; ECF
No. 103.) The per quod claim is “against all Defendants.” (TAC 99 441-450.) However, a per quod claim
is a derivative claim that is only maintainable against defendants against whom a plaintiff has an underlying
claim. See Archie v. County of Cumberland, No. 21-18334, 2023 WL 2554158, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2023)
(“As the Court finds that Plaintiff Shawn Archie has not _ stated an
underlying claim against Defendant Salem County, it follows that Plaintiff Tara Archie has not stated
a per quod claim against Defendant Salem County.”); see also Weir y. Mkt. Transition Facility of N.J., 723
A.2d 1231, 1235-36 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (“A per quod claim is only maintainable by reason
of a spouse’s personal injury. It depends upon and is incidental to the personal injury action. Our courts
have characterized it as a derivative claim, not a separate cause of action. Such claims must be joined with
the primary claim in a single action. The derivative claim can rise no higher than the personal injury claim
of the other spouse.” (quoting Tichenor v. Santillo, 527 A.2d 78, 82 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987))).

1A

Il. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Put another way, “[s]ummary judgment is

_ designed... assess whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether a trial is
necessary.” Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995). A dispute is “genuine” if
the evidence permits a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the nonmovant, and a fact is
“material” if it may affect the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986).
If the party seeking summary judgment carries its initial burden of demonstrating the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to “set forth specific
facts showing that there is a senuine issue for trial.” Jd. at 256. “[A] plaintiff cannot resist a
properly supported motion for summary judgment merely by restating the allegations of his
complaint,” Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 484 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)),
and a court’s duty to view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party does not extend to “the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings” unsupported by factual
evidence, Nitkin v. Main Line Health, 67 F 4th 565, 571 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting D.E. v. Cent.
Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 268 (3d Cir. 2014)). “Nor will ‘[b]are assertions, conclusory
allegations, or suspicions’ suffice.” /d. (alteration in original) (quoting Jutrowski v. Township of
Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288-89 (3d Cir. 2018)); see also Jackson v. Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 228
(3d Cir. 2010) (“Speculation does not create a genuine issue of fact; instead, it creates a false issue,
the demolition of which is a primary goal of summary judgment.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Likewise, the movant may establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by
showing that the plaintiff's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of his claim.

14

This showing “necessarily renders all other facts immaterial,” such that “there can be no genuine
issue as to any material fact” for a jury to decide. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
I. DISCUSSION
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIM
As discussed below, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in Rutgers’s favor on the
Fourth Amendment claim for two independently sufficient reasons. First, Plaintiffs cannot show
that Rutgers is liable for any constitutional violation stemming from the October Imaging. Second,
even Rutgers could be liable, the October Imaging was constitutional.
1. Liability Under Monell
Plaintiffs argue that the October Imaging violated Dr. Goydos’s Fourth Amendment right
to be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; (TAC §§ 288, 318;
Pls. MSJ at 11-16.) As they must, see infra note 8, Plaintiffs proceed under a Monell theory of
liability against Rutgers. (See TAC § 323 (describing Rutgers’s actions as “carried out through its
employees, agents, and officials” and pursuant to “policies, practices, and customs”); Pls. MSJ at
19-23); see generally Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Under Monell, Rutgers
may be liable for a plaintiffs injuries where those injuries were caused by either “an
unconstitutional policy or custom” of Rutgers or Rutgers’s “failure or inadequacy” to train its
employees “that ‘reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.’” Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105
(3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Est. of Roman vy. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019)).

Plaintiffs focus entirely on alleging a policy; specifically, they allege a policy based on Dr.
Libutti’s “single decision” to order the October Imaging.’ (Pls. MSJ at 21; see id. 19-23.) A policy

’ As a reminder, the parties dispute whether the October Imaging was ordered by Dr. Libutti or Mr. Vartan.
(Def. SUMF 4 29-30; Resp. to Def. SUMF { 29-30.) Because the Court grants Defendant’s motion for

16

may be based on “a single decision by municipal® policymakers under appropriate circumstances,”
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986). However, “a plaintiff presenting an
unconstitutional policy must point to an official proclamation, policy or edict by a decisionmaker
possessing final authority to establish municipal policy on the relevant subject.” Forrest, 930 F.3d
at 105. “Municipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to
establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered. The fact that a particular official—
even a policymaking official—has discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not,
without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion.” Pembaur,
475 U.S. at 481-82 (plurality opinion)’ (footnote omitted). Final authority matters because
“Monell is a case about responsibility.” Jd. at 478 (majority opinion). Entities are liable “for
their own illegal acts,” not simply the acts of their employees under a theory of respondeat

summary judgment, it views the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and assumes that the
October Imaging was ordered by Dr. Libutti, as Plaintiffs claim. See Graham v. Hathaway Lodge, Inc., No.
14-3420, 2015 WL 8490934, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2015) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); (Resp. to Def. SUME [ 29.)
For purposes of Plaintiffs’ motion, the Court, of course, views the evidence in the light most
favorable to Defendant, meaning that it considers Mr. Vartan to have ordered the October Imaging.
Plaintiffs make no argument that Mr. Vartan could have established Rutgers policy for Monell purposes.
(See Pls. MSJ at 19-23.) This provides an independently sufficient reason to deny Plaintiffs’ motion.
8 Monell concerned whether liability under Section 1983 could be imposed on municipal actors, and much
of Monell’s progeny speaks in terms of municipalities. However, Monell is frequently applied to many
types of sub-state governmental entities including certain state universities, and Rutgers in particular. See
Conlon v. Rutgers, No. 18-15770, 2021 WL 2905744, at *12 n.30 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2021); Kovats v. Rutgers,
633 F. Supp. 1469, 1476 (D.N.J. 1986) (“In Monell... , the Supreme Court held that municipalities and
other local governmental units are ‘persons’ to whom § 1983 applies. There does not appear to be an
analytical difference between universities and other governing bodies.”), aff'd, 822 F.2d 1303 (3d Cir.
1987). For ease of readability, the Court will not alter the quoted references to municipalities.
While this statement from Pembaur only garnered four votes, it constitutes established law in the Third
Circuit and beyond. See, e.g., Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 733 n.11 (3d Cir. 1987); Harrold v. City of
Jersey City, No. 19-9566, 2020 WL 1444923, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2020); Moldowan v. City of Warren,
578 F.3d 351, 394 (6th Cir. 2009); Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 385 (2d Cir. 2003).
Moreover, it is a useful statement of the outer bound of Monell liability, as Justice O’Connor withheld her
vote due to fears that this section could be “misread to expose municipalities to liability beyond that
envisioned by the Court in Monell.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 491 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).

17

superior. Id. at 479.
Here, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Libutti acted as a final policymaker of Rutgers in ordering
the October Imaging. “In order to ascertain if an official has final policy-making authority, and
can thus bind the municipality by his conduct, a court must determine (1) whether, as a matter of
state law, the official is responsible for making policy in the particular area of municipal business
in question, and (2) whether the official’s authority to make policy in that area is final □□□
unreviewable.” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 245 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
The quintessential example of such authority is that possessed by a “properly constituted
legislative body.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480.
To establish Dr. Libutti as the relevant policymaker, Plaintiffs first point to Dr. Libutti’s
deposition testimony where he explained that he was the head of RCINJ and explained his general
duties. (Pls. MSJ at 19 (citing ECF No. 196-4, Ex. 1, Libutti Dep. Tr. 9:20—10:9, 94:15-19).) Yet,
being a high-ranking official does not render one as necessarily a final policymaker. “The Court
cannot simply assume that a particular person, no matter how senior, counts as
the final policymaker.” Cruz v. City of Paterson, No. 20-15802, 2026 WL 850792, at *2 (D.N.J.
Mar. 27, 2026) (discussing “mayor and police chief”); see Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d
248, 265 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that police chief is not per se a final policymaker; instead, that
determination can be made “only after examining the chief’s responsibilities and decisionmaking
authority with respect to the conduct at issue”). What matters is who the relevant decisionmaker
was “in a particular area, or on a particular issue.” McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781,
785 (1997). Nothing in the cited portions of the deposition indicates that Dr. Libutti was the final
policymaker for deciding whether to search an employee’s office or employer-owned computer.
The same is true of the organizational chart cited by Plaintiffs showing Dr. Libutti as the head of

19

RCINJ. (See Pls. MSJ at 20 n.6 (citing ECF No. 196-4, Ex. 9, Leadership of RCINJ).)
Next, Plaintiffs point to the fact that Rutgers policies provide that the “Executive Director
of [RCINJ] is solely authorized to execute any and all Clinical Affiliation Agreements directly
relating to [RCINJ].” (See id at 20 (quoting ECF No. 196-4, Ex. 7, Clinical Affiliations
Agreements Policy at 5).) This is irrelevant. “Clinical Affiliations” are “joint programs with other
institutions . . . to provide a full range of clinical involvement for [Rutgers] students and faculty.”
(ECF No. 196-4, Ex. 7, Clinical Affiliations Agreements Policy at 1.) The fact that Dr. Libutti was
empowered to enter into such agreements with other institutions says nothing about his authority
to order the October Imaging, for the reasons just explained. Such an extrapolation is an attenuated
bridge too far. In fact, this evidence indicates that Dr. Libutti’s circumscribed authority of
establishing things such as “Clinical Affiliations,” which involve joint clinical/medical teaching
opportunities for Rutgers students and faculty alike, appears quite distinct from serving as a final
policymaker for imaging Rutgers-owned computers. To the extent this Clinical Affiliations policy
simply shows that Dr. Libutti was a high-ranking official, such is insufficient to establish that he
was the final policymaker in the “particular area” at issue. McMillian, 520 U.S. at 785.
Without explanation, Plaintiffs also point to Rutgers’s “Acceptable Use Policy for
Information Technology Resources” (“Acceptable Use Policy’). (See Pls. MSJ at 20 n.6 (citing
ECF No. 196-4, Ex. 8, Acceptable Use Policy).) This policy makes no mention of Dr. Libutti, so
it does not support Plaintiffs’ reed-thin argument. (See ECF No. 196-4, Ex. 8, Acceptable Use
Policy.) If anything, it bolsters Rutgers’s position. The policy notes that “the University . . .
reserves the right to examine all computer files and content in order to protect individuals and the
University.” (id. at 1 (emphasis added).) This identifies “the University” as the relevant
policymaker, not Dr. Libutti. 7d.) The identification of Rutgers as the final policymaker, of course,

190

defeats a Monell theory premised on Dr. Libutti’s actions or decisions. See City of St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (plurality opinion). The Acceptable Use Policy further
explains that it is a “University Policy,” that it is relevant to “[a]ll members of the Rutgers
University Community,” that “Approval Authority” for the policy is held by the “Executive Vice
President for Finance and Administration and University Treasurer,” that the “Responsible
Executive” is the “Senior Vice President and Chief Information Officer,” and that the “Responsible
Office” is the “Office of Information Technology.” (ECF No. 196-4, Ex. 8, Acceptable Use Policy
at 1.) In short, the policy contains no reference Dr. Libutti, by name or title, as the policymaker or
RCINJ in any capacity. To the contrary, there are multiple specific mentions of other university
officers and offices that may possess the relevant policymaking authority.
Citing to Rutgers’s letter to Dr. Libutti offering him the job of RCINJ Director, Plaintiffs
also assert that Dr. Libutti’s responsibilities included “directing RCINI operations, resources, and
institutional response to incidents across the Cancer Institute.” (Pls. MSJ at 21 (emphasis added)
(citing ECF No. 197, Ex. 10, Letter from Brian L. Strom to Dr. Libutti).) This argument fails
because nothing in the letter cited by Plaintiffs discusses in any way “institutional response[s] to
incidents.” Ud.; see generally ECF No. 197, Ex. 10, Letter from Brian L. Strom to Dr. Libutti.)
Plaintiffs hitching their wagon to such amorphous, vague language does not establish Dr. Libutti
as a final policymaker on the discrete decision to image the Rutgers-owned computer used by Dr.
Goydos in October of 2017 so as to attach Monell liability inculpating Rutgers.
Plaintiffs have not only failed to show that Dr. Libutti was a final policymaker with respect
to the October Imaging, but facts in the record affirmatively show that he was ‘not such a
policymaker. As Plaintiffs themselves explain, “[w]hen Rutgers OGC learned of the [October
Imaging], it immediately instructed RCINJ to stop internal investigative activity and directed that

aN

any further steps proceed through proper OGC channels.” (Pls. MSJ at 15.) OGC’s exercise of
control over the investigation demonstrates that Dr. Libutti lacked the “final and unreviewable”
authority necessary to be a final policymaker in this area. Hill, 455 F.3d at 245 (emphasis
removed). Plaintiffs try to avoid this natural conclusion by arguing that “[elven if OGC ...
possesses final authority over the enterprise forensic/investigative process, RCINJ’s Director
exercised final, unreviewed authority in a different sphere—operational incident response at
RCINJ.” (Pls. MSJ at 22.) However, as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, none of Plaintiffs’
evidence supports the assertion that Dr. Libutti possessed such authority. Plaintiffs also contend
that “at the moment of decision, Libutti’s direction to RCINJ staff was not subject to prior approval
or meaningful review within his domain.” (/d. at 23.) This argument, too, fails. The ability to
exercise discretion does not make one a final policymaker. See Pembaur, 475. U.S. at 481-83
(plurality opinion); cf Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 123 (plurality opinion) (“[A]n unjustified shooting
by a police officer cannot, without more, be thought to result from official policy.”).
In sum, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that Dr. Libutti was a final “policymaker[]” such
that his “single decision” to order the October Imaging could render Rutgers liable for the search
under Monell. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480. Because this is Plaintiffs’ sole theory of liability,
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Instead, the Court GRANTS summary
judgment in favor of Defendant on these grounds.'°

10 While Defendant does not discuss the Monell issue in its own motion for summary judgment, it
thoroughly discusses it in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion. (See Def. MSJ; Def. Opp. at 20-23.) In the
context of these cross-motions, the Court has no qualms with granting summary judgment on grounds raised
only in an opposition. Because Defendant moved for summary judgment on all counts, Plaintiffs were on
notice of the prospect that the Court might grant summary judgment in Defendant’s favor, and due to
Plaintiffs’ decision to raise the Monell issue, Plaintiffs had adequate time and opportunity to brief the issue.
Cf VanHook v. Cooper Health Sys., No. 21-2213, 2022 WL 990220, *4 (3d Cir. Mar. 31, 2022) (“District
courts have ‘the power to enter summary judgments sua sponte, so long as the losing party was on notice
that she had to come forward with all of her evidence.’ Notice is sufficient if the party “had reason to believe
the court might reach the issue and received a fair opportunity to put its best foot forward.’” (citation

51

2. Substantive Fourth Amendment Analysis
As an independently sufficient ground to grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant,
the Court also analyzes the substance of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim. For the reasons
explained below, the Court concludes that the October Imaging did not violate Dr. Goydos’s
Fourth Amendment rights.

The Fourth Amendment “‘ guarantees the privacy, dignity, and security of persons against
certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the Government,’ without regard to whether the
government actor is investigating crime or performing another function.” City of Ontario v. Quon,
560 U.S. 746, 755-56 (2010) (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14
(1989)). “The Fourth Amendment applies .. . when the Government acts in its capacity as an
employer.” Jd. at 756 (citing Treasury Emps. v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989)). However,
the amendment does not apply in the exact same way to governmental employers. As the Supreme
Court has explained, “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable for government employers.” /d. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Neither the Supreme Court nor Third Circuit, however, has settled on the proper test to

omitted) (first quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 326; and then quoting Gibson v. Mayor & Council of
Wilmington, 355 F.3d 215, 223 Gd Cir. 2004))). Additionally, the Third Circuit has explained that “[t]he
notice requirement is satisfied when a case involves ‘the presence of a fully developed record, the lack of
prejudice, [and] a decision based on a purely legal issue.’” Minn. Lawyers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ahrens, 432 F.
App’x 143, 148 (3d Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Gibson, 355 F.3d at 224). Here, the record
on this point is fully developed, there is no indication that summary judgment in this posture would uniquely
prejudice Plaintiffs, and “[t]he issue of whether an official has final policy making authority is a question
of state law” to be resolved by the Court. Harel v. Rutgers, 5 F. Supp. 2d 246, 267 (D.N.J. 1998), aff'd, 191
F.3d 444 Gd Cir. 1999); see Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989). Finally, even if
Plaintiffs had sufficiently supported Defendant’s liability under Monell, Defendant is independently entitled
to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim because there is no genuine dispute of
material fact concerning whether Dr. Goydos’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated—the Court finds
they were not.

99

assess warrantless searches by government employers. In O’Connor v. Ortega, a four-Justice
plurality utilized one test, while Justice Scalia utilized another in his concurrence. 480 U.S. 709,
717-18, 725—26 (1987) (plurality opinion); id. at 731-32 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Courts frequently apply both tests in tandem. See Quon, 560 U.S. 764-65 (2010) (applying both
tests); Gwynn v. City of Philadelphia, 719 F.3d 295, 303 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2013) (same). The Court
will follow that approach and apply both tests here. As is frequently the case, they lead to the same
conclusion.
Under the O’Connor Plurality’s approach, the Court must first determine if the government
employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in what was searched. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at
717-19 (plurality opinion). If he did, then a search for “noninvestigatory, work-related purposes”
or to investigate “work-related misconduct” is still constitutionally permissible if the search was
- reasonable in its “inception and the scope.” Jd. at 725-26. The Court will analyze the October
Imaging using these two steps and note where Justice Scalia’s approach diverges from that of the
O’Connor Plurality.
a. The Court Assumes That Dr. Goydos Had a Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy
Under the O’Connor Plurality’s approach, the Court must first determine “on a case-by- □

case basis” whether the employee “has a reasonable expectation of privacy” in what was searched.
Id. at 718. Here, despite the presence of Rutgers’ Acceptable Use Policy, the Court will assume,
arguendo, that Dr. Goydos had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer and office. See
Quon, 560 U.S. 758-62 (assuming an expectation of privacy despite a similar policy), Under
Justice Scalia’s approach, “the offices of government employees, and a fortiori the drawers and
files within those offices, are covered by Fourth Amendment protections as a general matter.”
O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Accordingly, the result is the

42

same: Dr. Goydos—at least for the sake of argument—had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
b. The October Imaging Was Reasonable in Its Inception and Scope
A warrantless search does not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment even where an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Among other exceptions, certain workplace
searches may not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Quon, 560 U.S. at 761-62. On this point, the
two tests align fairly closely. Under the O’Connor Plurality’s approach, for a warrantless search
by a government employer to be constitutional, “both the inception and the scope of the intrusion
must be reasonable.” O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726 (plurality opinion). “Ordinarily, a search of an
employee’s office by a supervisor will be ‘justified at its inception’ when there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-
related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose
such as to retrieve a needed file.” Jd. Similarly, a search is justified under Justice Scalia’s approach
where “the employer had a legitimate reason for the search, and . . . the search was not excessively
intrusive in light of that justification.” Quon, 560 U.S. at 764; see also O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 732
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). □

Defendant argues that the October Imaging was “justified at its inception” because, by the
time it was ordered, Mr. Vartan had learned the following through his investigation: first,
employees found dust from the ceiling on their desks on Monday, September 18, 2017, reasonably
suggesting that the camera was likely installed over the weekend (on Saturday the 16th or Sunday

_ the 17th); second, Dr. Libutti was out of the country that weekend; third, there was already a review
of Dr. Libutti’s computer which revealed no incriminating information whatsoever involving the
camera incident; fourth, Dr. Goydos was present at RCINJ for much of the day on both Saturday
and Sunday; fifth, Dr. Goydos was present at RCINJ each of the ten recorded times that the door
to the Director’s Suite had been “forced open” between September 1 and September 17, 2017;

IA

sixth, Rutgers had previously investigated Dr. Goydos after an employee accused him of
improperly accessing the Director’s Suite without permission; and seventh, Dr. Goydos had
recently expressed animosity regarding Dr. Libutti. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726 (plurality opinion);
(see Def. MSJ at 10-11; Def. Reply at 4-5.) Plaintiffs primarily contest this by arguing that there
is not sufficient evidence in the record to indicate that Mr. Vartan knew these things before the
October Imaging was ordered. (Pls. Opp. at 14-15, 15 n.14.)
The chronology of Mr. Vartan’s investigation primarily comes from Mr. Vartan’s
deposition. (See ECF No. 194-5, Ex. 14, Vartan Dep. Tr.; Def. SUMF § 29 (after discussing other
aspects of Mr. Vartan’s investigation, noting that “/d/ue to the information Mr. Vartan learned
regarding Plaintiff Goydos, and in an effort to preserve evidence, he decided to have Plaintiff
Goydos’ Rutgers-issued work computer imaged” (emphasis added) (citing ECF No. 194-5, Ex. 14,
Vartan Dep. Tr. at 15:10~21, 16:5~7)).)

On summary judgment, a nonmovant is entitled to all “reasonable inferences” but not
“unreasonable” ones. Parks LLC v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 863 F.3d 220, 232 (3d Cir. 2017) (emphasis
added). The order of events—investigating then imaging—is apparent from the context and plain
language of the deposition. Any alternative chronology amounts to an unreasonable inference. See
Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1278 n.6 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Even in the summary
judgment context, we are not required to accept any interpretation of testimony by the non-movant,
no matter how strained. Instead, we need only accept every reasonable interpretation that the non-
movant puts forward.”); see also Magnusson v. The Hartford, 258 F. App’x 444, 446 n.2 (3d Cir.
2007) (“While we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party when
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we need not accept that party’s ... mischaracterizations
of the evidence.”).

ye

When asked “what did you do” as part of the investigation, Mr. Vartan responded: “First
of all | retained a firm called Secure Investigations .... We did go to the Cancer Institute.” (ECF
No. 194-5, Ex. 14, Vartan Dep. Tr. at 10:21-25 (emphasis added).) When asked “what else did
you do at that time,” Mr. Vartan responded, “Certainly interviewed employees who were willing
to make themselves available, either when I was physically on-site with Secure Investigations or
when I was at the Cancer Institute myself.” Ud. at 11:9-15 (emphasis added).) Two pages later in
the deposition, Mr. Vartan explained that “[b]ased upon my investigation,” “I knew Dr. Goydos
had framed [Dr. Libutti].” Ud. at 13:8-11.) He specifically recalled that “[djuring interviews we
met” with individuals who explained that when they returned to work on Monday they found
“ceiling debris on [their] desk.” (/d. at 13:22—14:1.) He further recalled that “[w]e certainly knew
that Dr. Goydos . . . had some sort of history where he had been reprimanded before for[,] I think[, ]
breaking into the director’s office.” Ud. at 14:13-17.)
Most crucially, Mr. Vartan explained that “ultimately we made the decision to image a
computer based upon my conversation with [Middlesex County Prosecutor] Mr. [Andrew] Carey.

. Meaning I believed that there would be a charge [against Dr. Libutti]. I was very certain that Dr.
Libutti had been framed.” Ud. at 16:16-20.) Earlier in the deposition, Mr. Vartan explained that it
was by the time of his meeting with Mr. Carey that “I knew Dr. Goydos had framed [Dr. Libutti]”
“Tbjased upon my investigation.” (Ud. at 13:8~11.) Finally, Mr. Vartan also explained that Dr.
Goydos was “on my radar... screen right from the very beginning” because he wanted Dr.
Libutti’s job. (Jd. at 33:16-21.)
Accordingly, the record is clear that Mr. Vartan’s investigation commenced immediately
upon his retainer and before his meeting with Mr. Carey, and that the October Imaging took place
after that meeting. That initial investigation revealed, among other things, the ceiling debris and

yc

the fact that Dr. Goydos had previously improperly accessed the Director’s Suite. Moreover, “from
the very beginning,” Mr. Vartan knew that Dr. Goydos wanted Dr. Libutti’s job. Regardless of
when Mr. Vartan became aware of additional evidence, at that point, there were clearly “reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the search w[ould] turn up evidence that the employee [wa]s guilty of
work-related misconduct.” O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726 (plurality opinion).!!
Plaintiffs’ other attempts to argue that the search was constitutionally infirm also miss the
mark. Plaintiffs contend that the October Imaging “was ordered by RCINJ leadership (Dr. Libutti),
not by institutional counsel or IT pursuant to an established administrative protocol.” (Pls. Opp. at
14.) It is unclear how this would affect the constitutionality of the search as discussed above. If
anything, it seems to further show the shortcomings of Plaintiffs’ Monell theory, not any
substantive flaw with the search. Similarly, Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Vartan “is not a government
decision-maker for Fourth Amendment purposes and cannot supply a work-related justification on
Rutgers’ behalf.” Ud. at 15.) It is again unclear, however, why the fact that Mr. Vartan—instead
of Dr. Libutti personally—conducted the investigation should matter. Cf United States v.
Whitfield, 634 F.3d 741, 746 (3d Cir. 2010) (““[B]ecause the search was a joint endeavor, the court
may properly consider’ what other officers knew . . . .” (quoting United States v. Ledford, 218 F.3d
684, 689 (7th Cir. 2000))). .

Plaintiffs next argue that the search was “investigatory or criminal in purpose,” rendering
the O’Connor Plurality’s framework inapposite. (Pls. Opp. at 16.) True, the O’Connor Plurality’s
approach was limited to “noninvestigatory work-related intrusion[s] [and] investigatory search[es]
for evidence of suspected work-related employee misfeasance.” O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 723

' Tt is clear elsewhere in the record that the October Imaging followed other aspects of the investigation.
For example, a Rutgers employee through whom the order to image Dr. Goydos’s computer was conveyed
explained that, in seeking the image, Secure Investigations was “following . . . leads.” (ECF No. 194-5, Ex.
18, Tanzer Interview Tr. 8:5-6.)

(plurality opinion). The Court finds that the O’Connor Plurality’s framework applies here because
the October Imaging appears more akin to an “investigatory search for evidence of suspected work-
related employee misfeasance,” not a criminal investigation. Jd. Specifically, neither Mr. Vartan
nor Dr. Libutti are vested with any authority to investigate crimes, make charging decisions, direct
or oversee criminal investigators, commence grand jury proceedings, or the like. See United States
v. Slanina, 283 F.3d 670, 678-79 (Sth Cir. 2002) (noting the “obvious distinction” between
workplace searches by public employers who are law enforcement officials and those who are not),
vacated on other grounds, 537 U.S. 802 (2002)
In any event, even if the October Imaging can be stretched somehow to be construed as a
partial criminal investigation, an investigation can be both work-related and involve the
investigation of a crime. As one of the very cases cited by Plaintiffs explains, “O’Connor’s goal
of ensuring an efficient workplace should not be frustrated simply because the same misconduct
‘that violates a government employer’s policy also happens to be illegal.” Jd at 678; (Pls. Opp. at
16) Instead, “cases upholding searches by government employers into criminal, work-related
misconduct are fully consistent with the reasoning in O’Connor.” Slanina, 283 F.3d at 678; see
also Wayne R. Lak ave, 5 Search & Seizure § 10.3(d) n.214 (6th ed. Nov. 2025 update) (compiling
cases). Here, entering a supervisor’s office without permission, attempting to frame the supervisor,
and spying on co-workers, patients, or both certainly amounted to not only violations of criminal
law but also “work-related employee misfeasance.” O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 723 (plurality opinion);
_ see Slanina, 283 F.3d at 679 (holding that search of office computer for child pornography was
sufficiently “work-related”).
The other cases cited by Plaintiffs do not alter this analysis. (See Pls. Opp. at 15-16.) The
Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Taketa involved a search by Drug Enforcement

NyQ

Administration agents of a state law enforcement officer’s office in their shared workplace. 923
F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1991). In other words, the search was conducted by a public employer who was
also a law enforcement agent. There is “an obvious distinction” between the search conducted here
by non-law-enforcement individuals and the search at issue in 7: aketa. Slanina, 283 F.3d at 678.
Moreover, in Taketa, “the government employer testified that the investigation became wholly
criminal.” Slanina, 283 F.3d at 678 n.7. That is not the case here: the evidence yielded as a result
of the October Imaging was not used, let alone viewed, by any law enforcement personnel in a
criminal investigation related to the subject incident. The Supreme Court’s decision in Ferguson
vy. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001), is even less apt. That case involved a hospital policy
that subjected certain pregnant patients to urine tests for cocaine. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 71. The
tests were conducted without the patients’ “informed consent” and the “objective of the searches
was to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes.” Id. at 77, 83 (emphasis in original), The
Court held that these searches, unlike those at issue in O’Connor, did not “fit within the closely
guarded category of ‘special needs.’” /d. at 84; see O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 725 (plurality opinion).
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the scope of the search—a full image of the computer—was
so broad that it rendered the search unconstitutional. (Pls. Opp. at 16-18); see O’Connor, 480 U.S.
at 726 (plurality opinion) (explaining that the “scope” of the search “must be reasonable”). This
argument, too, fails. The Supreme Court “has repeatedly refused to declare that only the least
intrusive search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Quon, 560 U.S. at
763 (cleaned up) (compiling cases). As another court has explained, in the context of searches of
computers, “[i]t is unrealistic to expect a warrant to prospectively restrict the scope of a search by
directory, filename or extension or to attempt to structure search methods—that process must
remain dynamic.” United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1093 (10th Cir. 2009). This is because,

40

“[wlhile file or directory names may sometimes alert one to the contents (eg., ... ‘meth
stuff,’ ...), illegal activity may not be advertised even in the privacy of one’s personal computer—
it could well be coded or otherwise disguised.” Jd. Even though there was no warrant here, the
rationale remains the same. As the Supreme Court explained in Quon, the Fourth Amendment does
not require that searches be as limited as possible. Such a requirement “could raise insuperable
barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure powers because judges engaged in post
hoc evaluations of government conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by
which the objectives of the government might have been accomplished.” Quon, 560 U.S. at 763
(cleaned up). Accordingly, because it was not clear at the time of the October Imaging where or
how any incriminating material would have been stored, a full imaging was necessary, and “the
measures adopted [were] reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively
intrusive in light of the nature of the misconduct.” O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726 (plurality opinion)
(cleaned up) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985)).
“[BJoth the inception and the scope of the” October Imaging were “reasonable,” rendering

the search constitutional under the O’Connor Plurality’s approach. O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726
(plurality opinion). “For these same reasons—that the employer had a legitimate reason for the
search, and that the search was not excessively intrusive in light of that justification—the Court
also concludes that the search would be ‘regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-
employer context’ and would satisfy the approach of Justice Scalia’s concurrence.” Quon, 560
U.S. at 764-65 (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)). For
this reason, in addition to the Monell rationale discussed above, see supra Section III.A.1, the
Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim. '*

2 Because the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the October Imaging, the Court also rejects
Plaintiffs’ brief and procedurally questionable request to “revisit” its years-old dismissal of claims related

an

B. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT CLAIM
Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claim. (See Def.
MSJ at 14-19.) The crux of Plaintiffs’ argument is that, as part of the investigation into the camera
incident, Rutgers forced Dr. Goydos to choose between his Fifth Amendment rights and his job.
(See Pls. Opp. at 21.) Plaintiffs are correct that a public employee cannot be forced to make such
a choice. See Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass’n vy. Comm’r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280, 284 (1968).
Plaintiffs, however, are incorrect in their assertion that Dr. Goydos was forced to make this choice.
“[T]he touchstone of the Fifth Amendment is compulsion... .” Newman v. Beard, 617
F.3d 775, 780 (3d Cir. 2010) (alterations in original) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. □
801, 806 (1977)). The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination “does not apply in the
absence of compulsion.” Capers v. Governor of N.J., 525 F. App’x 69, 72 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing □
Lefkowitz, 431 U.S. at 806).
Plaintiffs clatm that Dr. Goydos was compelled when counsel for Rutgers, on March 23,
“communicated that Dr. Goydos could be directed by his supervisor to appear and that failure to
cooperate could result in disciplinary proceedings and disciplinary action.” (Pls. Opp. at 24 □
(emphasis added); see id. at 26.) However, the communications cited by Plaintiffs do not
demonstrate any compulsion on behalf of Rutgers. Outside counsel for Rutgers simply explained
that if Dr. Goydos declined to answer questions, he “may next be directed by his supervisor to
appear for the purpose of answering questions” and that, if he did not cooperate then, “he may be
subject to disciplinary proceedings and disciplinary action.” (ECF No. 202-3, Ex. R-3, February
15 to March 23, 2018 Email Exchange at D-218 (email memorializing call); see ECF No. 202-3,

to the November Imaging. (See Pls. Opp. at 19-20 (“On the developed summary judgment record, the same
deficiencies that doom Rutgers’ October justification—lack of a defined work-related purpose and
excessive scope—apply with equal force to November.”); see also ECF Nos. 76, 102 (holding that the
November Imaging was constitutional).)

Q7

Ex. R-8, Maderer Dep. Tr. at 55:15—16 (confirming accuracy of memorialization).) This is an
explanation of how things could potentially progress in the future, not “compulsion” as is required
to implicate the Fifth Amendment. Newman, 617 F.3d at 780 (quoting Lefkowitz, 431 U.S. at 806).
This also matters in terms of the logistics of any potential interview and immunity. Because
Rutgers’s communications with Dr. Goydos never reached the point of actually compelling him to
sit for an interview, Rutgers did not have any occasion to offer to immunize his statements, which
Plaintiffs concede would have nullified any constitutional concerns with any compelled interview.
(See Pls. Opp. at 25—26); see also Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia, 859 F.2d 276,
282 (3d Cir. 1988) (declining to determine “whether a public employer must inform employees
that use immunity attaches to questions relating to official duties, when the employee is required,
on pain of dismissal, to answer the questions”).
Perhaps recognizing the weakness of this argument, Plaintiffs point to the fact that, seven
days after the communications detailed above, on March 30, Dr. Goydos was placed on paid
administrative leave. (Pls. Opp. at 26.) Plaintiffs contend that “[tJhe tight temporal proximity
between the deposition-style demand backed by explicit discipline threats and the ensuing
leave/ban/surrender order creates, at minimum, a triable issue that Rutgers imposed job-related
penalties when Dr. Goydos declined to provide compelled testimony.” (/d. at 27.) Yet, curiously,
Plaintiffs fail to note that the very day Dr. Goydos was placed on paid administrative leave, he was
arrested for his unlawful possession of an assault rifle, a charge for which he was subsequently
indicted by a grand jury and to which he pleaded guilty and for which he was sentenced to
imprisonment. (See Def. SUMF 4] 56-57, 78, 85; Resp. to Def. SUMF 49 56-57, 78, 85.) Indeed,
Dr. Goydos was provided with the papers placing him on administrative leave while he was
handcuffed to a bench at the New Brunswick Police Department. (ECF No. 194-5, Ex. 2, Goydos

any

Dep. Tr. at 178:5-18.) “[E]ven in cases where the proximity of events and/or other evidence of
retaliatory animus is sufficient to create an inference of causation, a causal link between an
employee’s protected activity and an adverse employment action can be broken by an intervening
event.” Hernandez v. Temple Univ. Hosp., No. 17-4381, 2019 WL 130508, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 8,
2019) (cleaned up) (compiling cases).
In light of the intervening events—the signed search warrants on March 29, the execution
of the warrants on March 30, and Dr. Goydos’s arrest on March 30—there is simply no genuine
dispute of material fact that Dr. Goydos’s placement on leave was caused by anything other than
the search and Dr. Goydos’s subsequent arrest. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Rutgers
made it clear to Dr. Goydos that any disciplinary action against him based on his refusal to sit for
an interview would only occur after a further request from Rutgers and his subsequent denial.
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the Fifth Amendment claim is
GRANTED.
C. THE CONVERSION CLAIM
Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ conversion claim. (Def. MSJ at 19—
23.) Plaintiffs’ claims are based on Rutgers’s continued possession of property allegedly belonging
to Dr. Goydos after he was placed on leave and resigned. As Judge Castner observed in allowing
Plaintiffs’ conversion claim to proceed to discovery, Plaintiffs’ allegations “border the line
between factual and conclusory.” (ECF No. 102 at 23.) Discovery has not sufficiently substantiated
these claims.
Under New Jersey law, “[t]he elements of conversion are: ‘(1) the property and right to
immediate possession thereof belong to the plaintiff and (2) the wrongful act of interference with
that right by the defendant.’” Gap Props., LLC v. Cairo, No. 19-20117, 2012 WL 5757410, at *4
(D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2021) (quoting Latef v. Cicenia, No. A-5747-13T2, 2015 WL 10458543, at *5

42

(N.J. App. Div. Mar. 14, 2016)). “Additionally, where the defendant lawfully acquired plaintiff s
property, the plaintiff must show that he demanded the return of the property and that the defendant
refused compliance.” Meisels v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 222 A.3d 649, 661 (N.J. 2020). “The demand
is the linchpin that transforms an initial lawful possession into a setting of tortious conduct.” Jd.
Moreover, the refusal of a demand alone does not make the possession tortious; “the refusal must
be wrongful.” Jd. (quoting Mueller v. Tech. Devices Corp., 84 A.2d 620, 623 (N.J. 1951)). A lawful
possessor may “prescribe conditions which qualify his duty to return . . . property,” such as that
the alleged owner provide “proof of ownership.” Sgro v. Getty Petroleum Corp., 854 F. Supp.
1164, 1181 (D.N.J. 1994) (citing Mueller, 84 A.2d at 625: Hildegarde, Inc. v. Wright, 70 N.W.2d
257, 259-60 (Minn. 1955); and Bradley v. Roe, 27 N.E.2d 35, 38-39 (N.Y. 1940)).'°
Here, the uncontested facts demonstrate that that is all Rutgers required—that Dr. Goydos
provide “proof of ownership.” /d.; (See Def. SUMF ¥ 60, 66, 68, 69, 72, 75, 76; Resp. to Def.
SUMEF 4 60, 66, 68, 69, 72, 75, 76.) Dr. Goydos admits he never did. (Def. SUMF 4 77; Resp. to
Def. SUMF 4 77.) This, however, does not end the analysis. The demand requirement, and
derivative license to condition the return of property, only applies where the initial acquisition was
lawful. See Meisels, 222 A.3d at 661; Imp. Serv. Corp. v. Aliotta, No. 22-4640, 2024 WL 2765620,
at *13 (D.N.J. May 30, 2024). Rutgers’s initial acquisition of the property at issue was lawful. Dr.
Goydos chose to store allegedly personal property in his RCINJ office, and, after he was placed
on leave and eventually resigned, Rutgers held it for him until he could establish ownership. In

B See also, e.g., Billsie v. Brooksbank, 525 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1296 (D.N.M. 2007) (“Under certain
circumstances, a defendant seeking to ascertain the true owner of the property in question may retain the
property for a reasonable time period after the demand.” (quoting Boroughs v. Garrett, 352 P.2d 644, 647
(N.M. 1960))); Zimmerman v. FirsTier Bank, N.A., 585 N.W.2d 445, 448 (Neb. 1998) (“A bona fide
reasonable detention of property by one who has assumed some duty respecting it, for the purpose of
ascertaining its true ownership, or of determining the right of a demandant to receive it, will not sustain an
action for conversion.”).

aA

doing so, Rutgers was exercising a right equivalent to that when a landlord chooses to hold an
evicted tenant’s property in storage. See Banks v. Korman Assocs., 527 A.2d 933, 934 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1987); see also Niceforo v. UBS Glob. Asset Mgmt. Ams., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 428,
433 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ([The employer] therefore acquired the property lawfully at the outset
because [the employee] herself brought it to [the employer]’s offices and left it there.”). Indeed,
Rutgers went even further than necessary by allowing Dr. Goydos to come to campus, inspect the
items, and retrieve certain belongings. (Def. SUMF 68—70; Resp. to Def. SUMF J 68-70.)
In sum, because Rutgers lawfully obtained possession of property contained in its office
which Dr. Goydos used, it was entitled to require “proof of ownership” before providing any
property to Dr. Goydos which he claimed belonged to him. Sgro, 854 F. Supp. at 1181. Because
Dr. Goydos failed to provide such proof, Rutgers’s refusal was not “wrongful,” and Plaintiffs
cannot succeed on their conversion claim. Meisels, 222 A.3d at 661 (quoting Mueller, 84 A.2d at
623). Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the conversion claim is
GRANTED."
D. THE PER QUOD CLAIM
Finally, Defendant moves for summary judgment on the per quod claim raised by Dr.
Martins, Dr. Goydos’s wife. “A per quod claim is a derivative cause of action whose viability
depends on the existence of tortious conduct against the injured spouse.” Lockhart v. Willingboro

4 Plaintiffs also request that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), summary judgment be
“denifed] or deferr[ed]” because Rutgers has not provided Dr. Goydos’s lab inventory or lab notebook,
which would establish what items Dr. Goydos owned and the value of the items. (Pls. Opp. at 30-31.) The
Court declines Plaintiffs’ request because the purported evidence “pertains to facts that are not material to
the moving party’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” Jn re Avandia Mktg., Sales & Prods. Liab.
Litig., 945 F.3d 749, 761 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 568 Gd Cir. 2015)).
Even if the inventory and notebook contain everything Plaintiffs promise and they would allow them to
conclusively demonstrate to the Court that Dr. Goydos owned the items at issue, that would still not alter
the immutable and dispositive fact that Dr. Goydos failed to provide Rutgers with anything evincing his
ownership of the property at issue when Rutgers requested such documentation.

AE

High Sch., No. 14-3701, 2017 WL 4364180, at *8 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2017) (citing Tichenor v.
Santillo, 527 A.2d 78 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987)). Because the Court has granted summary
judgment against Plaintiffs on all other claims, there is nothing for Dr. Martins’s claim to derive
from, and it “‘must also fail.” /d.; see also, e.g., K.G. v. Owl City, No. 17-8118, 2023 WL 3735891,
at *11 (D.N.J. May 31, 2023), aff'd, No. 24-1175, 2025 WL 1577565 (3d Cir. June 4, 2025); Dello
Russo v. Nagel, 817 A.2d 426, 435 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003). Accordingly, Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment on the per quod claim is GRANTED.»

'S The Court is cognizant of the fact that, in its Answer, Rutgers requested that the Court award it
“reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in defending this meritless and vexatious action.” (ECF No.
139 at 39.) The Court is also aware that fees may be warranted, at least in connection to Plaintiffs’ Section
1983 claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“[In a Section 1983 action] the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs... .”).
However, given the presence of Rutgers’s still pending counterclaims, (see ECF No. 139 at 40-60), the
Court will defer on the issue of fees until Rutgers informs the Court as the whether it still seeks to proceed
as to its counterclaims which now, in light of this Opinion, are the only claims which remain.

yf

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED
and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. An appropriate Order accompanies
this Opinion.

Sha □
ROBERT KIRSCH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: June 26, 2026

V7

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366319. Public record. Not legal advice.