# SCIABICA

> District Court, D. New Jersey · June 23, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366127

## Case

- **Full name:** Jenna Sciabica v. Marlboro Township Public Schools, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** June 23, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366127

## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JENNA SCIABICA,
Plaintiff, .
Civil Action No. 25-17223 (MAS) (RLS)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
MARLBORO TOWNSHIP PUBLIC
SCHOOLS, ef al.,
Defendants.

SHIPP, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon four motions to dismiss Plaintiff Jenna Sciabica’s
(‘Plaintiff’) Complaint (ECF No. 1): (1) Defendant Marlboro Township’s (the “Township”)
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 3); (2) Defendant Pasquale Menna’s (““Menna’’) Motion to Dismiss
(ECF No. 12); (3) Defendant Laurie Swanson’s (“Swanson”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16);
and (4) Defendants Marlboro Township Public Schools (““MTPS”), Michael Ballone (“Ballone”),
John Pacifico (“Pacifico”), Loreen Labuza (“Labuza”), Michael J. Gross, Esq. (“Gross”), Vincent
Caravello (“Caravello”), Christine Jelinsky (“Jelinsky”), and Michaela Weir’s (“Weir”) Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 29). Plaintiff opposed all four motions, (ECF Nos. 17, 19, 25, 35.) Defendants!
filed replies for three of the motions. (ECF Nos. 24, 32, 38.) The Court has carefully considered
the parties’ submissions and reaches its decision without oral argument under Local Civil Rule
78.1(b). For the reasons below, Defendants’ Motions are granted.

“Defendants” collectively refers to the Township, Menna, Swanson, MTPS, Ballone, Pacifico,
Labuza, Gross, Caravello, Jelinsky, and Weir.

I. BACKGROUND’
A. The Parties
Plaintiff, a New Jersey resident, was a special education teacher with MTPS for sixteen
years. (Compl. {ff 2, 9, ECF No. 1.) MTPS is “a public[-]school district organized under New
Jersey law, operating schools within [the] Township[.]” Ud. J 10.) The Township is “a municipal
corporation and a state-created governmental organization[.|” (Ud. 4] 18.) Other Defendants hold
various titles in connection with MTPS or the Township: (1) Ballone serves as the Superintendent
of MTPS (id. § 11); (2) Pacifico serves as Principal of Marlboro Memorial Middle School (id.
{ 12); (3) Labuza is Vice-Principal of MTPS (id. □ 13); (4) Gross is counsel for MTPS (id. § 14);
(5) Caravello is Business Administrator for MTPS (id. § 15); (6) Jelinsky is Assistant Business
Administrator for Marlboro Township Schools (id. § 16); (7) Weir is an employee of MTPS (id.
17); and (8) Menna is a municipal prosecutor for the Township (id. § 20).°
B. Plaintiff’s Career
Plaintiff, who served as a special education teacher in MTPS from 2008 until her “forced
resignation in 2024[,]” “was a tenured teacher with an unblemished record[.]” Ud. J§ 2, 9, 28.) She
was “instrumental in introducing the Wilson Reading System to [the] Township, a specialized
curriculum designed to help students with dyslexia and other reading difficulties.” Ud. § 29.)
Plaintiff was also the only teacher in MTPS with a “Level II Wilson certification.” (id. 4 30.)
Despite this, Plaintiff was forced to act “out of her highly specialized position [which] denied

* For the purpose of considering the instant motion, the Court accepts all factual allegations in the
Complaint as true. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008).
3 Other individuals are named as defendants in Plaintiff's Complaint, but the Court does not
address them or the facts related to their purported involvement beyond the extent needed to
contextualize the facts related to Defendants who filed the instant motions to dismiss. (See Compl.
21-27.)

struggling readers with language disabilities an educational resource that no other teacher[] in the
district w[as] qualified or licensed to provide.” Ud.) According to Plaintiff, “[t]he destruction of
[her] career” began on March 13, 2024, because of an “innocent interaction in a school
hallway ... involving a playful reference to a dance dress fitting that had occurred the previous
week in the presence of the student’s mother[.|” Ud. J 3.)
G Plaintiff’s Relationship with L.T. and Wendi Turturici
L.T. was a student assigned to Plaintiffs special education class due to L.T.’s “reading and
short-term memory challenges that necessitated additional academic support.” Ud. {§ 33, 53.) L.T.
attended Plaintiff's class two or three days per week for specialized instruction. (ld 4 33.) While
working with L.T., Plaintiff “observed symptoms that concerned her and contacted [L.T.’s
mother,] Wendi Turturici [¢Turturici’)] to share her observations.” Ud. § 34.) This “led to the
identification of L.T.’s previously undiagnosed seizure disorder, prompting immediate medical
intervention... .” (/d.) Turturici was “grateful” for Plaintiff's intervention, and Plaintiff claims
that her “intervention cemented a relationship built on trust, gratitude, and mutual respect between
[Plaintiff] and L.T.’s family, leading to an extended friendship that would last for three years prior
to the incident at issue.” Ud. 7¥ 35, 36.)
Plaintiff developed a close friendship with Turturici, which was “characterized by frequent
communication, shared humor, and mutual support during challenging times” and included
regularly sharing text messages, memes, TikTok videos, and personal information. (/d. J 37, 38.)
Some of the communications included their “irreverent, sometimes crude sense of humor that
included discussions of topics that might seem inappropriate to outsiders but were perfectly normal
within the context of their friendship.” (/d. {[ 38.) In fact, according to Plaintiff, “Turturici
frequently used inappropriate language in her home and around her children, creating an

environment where casual, sometimes crude humor was the norm.” (/d. § 39.) Moreover, Turturici
also supported Plaintiff when Plaintiffs life partner was diagnosed with cancer and after her
partner passed away. (/d. {ff 41-45.) According to Plaintiff, Turturici offered comfort, support, and
practical assistance whenever she needed during this time. (/d.)
Due to the relationship Plaintiff established with L.T. and Turturici, Plaintiff “developed a
mentoring relationship with L.T.” and “viewed L.T. as if she were [Plaintiff’s] own daughter or
niece[.]” Ud. §] 53, 54.) This resulted in Plaintiff occasionally texting L.T., and sending
approximately fifty text messages to L.T. over the course of three years, all of which were “with
the knowledge and explicit approval of... Turturici.” Ud. 49 56, 57.)
D. The March 13, 2024, Incident
On March 5, 2024, “Turturici repeatedly requested that [Plaintiff] help L.T. try on her
dance dress to ensure proper fit for an upcoming performance.” Ud. $60.) At “Turturici’s
insistence, [Plaintiff] assisted L.T. with the dress fitting in the family’s home, with... Turturici
present and actively participating in the process.” (/d. § 61.) “When it became apparent that the
chest area of the dress was too large for L.T., [Plaintiff] helped position L.T.’s breasts appropriately
over the built-in padding to achieve the proper fit —all under the direct supervision and with the
explicit approval of . . . Turturici.” (7d. § 62.) L.T. expressed “minor embarrassment” about the
fitting process, but Turturici bluntly dismissed those concerns. Ud. § 63.)
On March 13, 2024, Plaintiff encountered L.T. in the hallway at Marlboro Memorial
Middle School “in full view of other teachers and students,” including Weir, another teacher. (/d.
{7 65, 66.) Plaintiff asked L.T. briefly about her health, as she had been ill the prior week, and
“gently felt L.T.’s forehead to check for fever[.]” Ud. Ff 67, 68.) Then, Plaintiff “made a playful
reference to the dress fitting that had occurred the previous week, asking ‘What did mom decide.

How are we getting those boobalas in the dress?’ while lightly tapping L.T.’s upper chest area
twice with her fingertips.” (Ud. J 69.) “The entire physical contact lasted no more than a second or
two” and L.T.’s reaction to the interaction was “entirely positive[,|” as “she giggled, stomped her
feet playfully, and continued down the hallway with a smile on her face[.]” Ud. {§ 70, 71.)
E. Aftermath of the Incident
Weir, who was “positioned approximately two or three feet away from the interaction[]
with L.T.’s back to her,” reported to the police that Plaintiff had “‘groped’ L.T.’s breasts ‘using
two hands[.]’” Ud. 73, 75.) L.T., however, attended regular classes and activities after the
incident and never reported “feeling uncomfortable or violated by the interaction, nor did she seek
support from school counselors or other staff members.” (/d. $§| 78-80.)
Despite L.T.’s response to the incidents, “Defendants immediately presumed [Plaintiff's]
guilt and took drastic disciplinary action[.]” Ud. 4 82.) Ballone “perpetuated .. . Weir’s false
accusations and used these lies as the basis to force Plaintiff to resign from her position as a special
education teacher.” (/d. § 83.) Despite there being video footage of the incident between Plaintiff
and L.T., Ballone withheld the video footage from Plaintiff. (7d. {§ 75, 84.) Plaintiff was suspended
with pay pending investigation, but Plaintiff claims that “Defendants [neither] informed [her] of
any investigation launched against her” nor provided her “with requisite notice of the specific
charges against her, the evidence supporting those charges, or her right to representation during
the investigation process.” (Ud. {9 85-87.) Moreover, “Defendants refused to show Plaintiff the
video of the incident. . . until August 31, 2024,” despite the fact that both Plaintiff and her attorney
made timely demands.* (/d. 88.)

* Plaintiff also claims that her attorney was not permitted to review the video until May 9, 2024.
(Compl. { 88.)

On May 13, 2024, Defendants “leveled tenure charges against Plaintiff... which was no
more than a wholesale adaptation of the allegations contained” in a civil complaint filed by
Turturici and her family. Ud. 89.) As a result, Plaintiff claims that “Defendants pressured [her]
to resign under circumstances that were coercive and fundamentally unfair, threatening even more
severe consequences if she refused to comply.” Ud. 991.) Following Plaintiff's resignation,
Defendants transmitted “false and stigmatizing information about her to the New Jersey State
Board of Examiners and other state authorities” that resulted in administrative proceedings that
jeopardized Plaintiff's teaching certification and pension benefits. J§ 93, 95.) Additionally,
Swanson and other named defendants posted “false and defamatory content about [Plaintiff] on
Facebook, Instagram, and other social media platforms.” (/d. |] 102.)
Plaintiff claims that, “as a direct result of the torrent of Defendants’ abuse,” she was
admitted to a psychiatric ward of a hospital and was released after a judicial hearing. Ud. § 108.)
On a separate occasion, Plaintiff was treated and released from the psychiatric emergency room
and has “been obligated [to receive] mental health services including but not limited to intensive
therapies and medications[.|” (/d.) Plaintiff's mental health treatment is still ongoing, and she
alleges that she has suffered and continues to suffer “devastating economic losses” such as loss of
salary, benefits, and pension contributions. Ud. § 108-10.) Moreover, Gross, Jelinsky, and
Caravello have “made false representations to unemployment authorities on at least three
occasions that resulted in the denial of [Plaintiff's] unemployment benefits, further exacerbating
her financial distress.” Ud. ¥ 111.) The destruction of Plaintiff's reputation has, according to her,
“made it impossible for her to secure alternative employment as a teacher, effectively ending a
career that spanned more than a decade and a half” and has subjected her to “credible threats to
her physical safety requiring police intervention[.]” Ud. 112, 113-15.)

F. Procedural Background
On November 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed her Complaint alleging twelve causes of action:
(1) Monell liability resulting from a violation of Plaintiff's procedural and substantive due process
rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserted against MTPS, Ballone, Pacifico, Labuza, Gross,
Caravello, and Jelinsky, in their official capacities (collectively, “School District Defendants”)
(“Count One”); (2) “stigma-plus” liability resulting from a violation of due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against School District Defendants (“Count
Two”); (3) Monell liability resulting from a violation of Plaintiffs procedural and substantive due
process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserted against Menna in his official capacity and the
Township (collectively, “Police Defendants”) (“Count Three”); (4) violation of due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Menna in his individual capacity
(“Count Four”); (5) violation of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (the “NJCRA”), N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 10:6-2, asserted against School District Defendants and Police Defendants (“Count Five”);
(6) defamation asserted against Swanson and other defendants (“Count Six’); (7) intentional
infliction of emotional distress asserted against Swanson and other defendants (“Count Seven”);
(8) breach of contract against School District Defendants (“Count Eight”); (9) violation of New
Jersey Wage Payment Law against School District Defendants (“Count Nine’); (10) constructive
termination against School District Defendants (“Count Ten”); (11) “bad faith denial of insurance
coverage” against two insurance company defendants (“Count Eleven”); and (12) breach of
insurance contract against two insurance company defendants (“Count Twelve”). Ud. 119-64.)
School District Defendants, Police Defendants, Weir, and Swanson subsequently filed
motions to dismiss. (See generally Township’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 3; Menna’s Mot. to
Dismiss, ECF No. 12; Swanson’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 16; Sch. Dist. Defs. & Weir’s Mot.

to Dismiss, ECF No. 29.) Plaintiff opposed all four motions. (P1.’s Opp’n Br. to Township’s Mot.,
ECF No. 17; Pl.’s Opp’n Br. to Menna’s Mot., ECF No. 25; Pl.’s Opp’n Br. to Swanson’s Mot.,
ECF No. 19; Pl.’s Opp’n Br. to Sch. Dist. Defs. & Weir’s Mot., ECF No. 35.) School District
Defendants, Police Defendants, and Weir replied. (Township’s Reply, ECF No. 24; Menna’s
Reply, ECF No. 32; Sch. Dist. Defs. & Weir’s Reply, ECF No. 38.)
Il. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure® 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of
what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
A district court conducts a three-part analysis when considering a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6). See Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (Gd Cir. 2011). First, the court must
identify “the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Ashcroft v, Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675
(2009). Second, the court must identify all of the plaintiffs well-pleaded factual allegations, accept
them as true, and “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Fowler v.
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 Gd Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The court can discard bare
legal conclusions or factually unsupported accusations that merely state the defendant unlawfully
harmed the plaintiff. See Igbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Third, the court
must determine whether “the [well-pleaded] facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show
that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679), A facially plausible claim “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

> All references to “Rule” or “Rules” hereafter refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” /d. at 210 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). On a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the “defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been
presented.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc.
v. Fidelcor, Inc. , 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that the claims asserted against them should be dismissed because
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (See generally Township’s
Moving Br., ECF No. 3-3; Menna’s Moving Br., ECF No. 12-6; Swanson’s Mot. to Dismiss; Sch.
Dist. Defs. & Weir’s Moving Br., ECF No. 29-2.) The Court first turns to the Complaint as asserted
against Weir.
A. Complaint Against Weir
Weir argues that the Complaint in its entirety should be dismissed as to Weir because
“[w]hile Plaintiff names [Weir] as a defendant in the caption of the Complaint, and details actions
she allegedly took in this case, none of the Counts in the Complaint assert that any cause of action
is asserted against her.” (Sch. Dist. Defs. & Weir’s Moving Br. 10.) Plaintiff “does not oppose
dismissal without prejudice” as to Weir. (P1.’s Opp’n Br. to Sch. Dist. Defs. & Weir’s Mot. 5.)
The Court, accordingly, dismisses the Complaint as to Weir. See, e.g., Royal v. Rutherford
Police Dep’t, No. 11-4862, 2020 WL 3496950, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. June 29, 2020) (“Defendant
Feliciano is only referred to once in the [operative] [c]omplaint and is not named in any causes of
action. ... As there are no claims stated against .. . Feliciano in the [operative] [c]omplaint, he
will be dismissed from this matter.’”’).

B. Counts One Through Four Asserted Against School District Defendants, Police
Defendants, and Menna in his Individual Capacity
Plaintiff asserts four counts pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) Count One against School
District Defendants under a theory of Monell liability (Compl. 119-28); (2) Count Two against
School District Defendants under a theory of “stigma-plus” liability (id. J§ 129-32); (3) Count
Three against Police Defendants under a theory of Monell liability (id. § 133-39); and (4) Count
Four against Menna in his individual capacity (id. {J 140-47).
Section 1983 operates as the procedural vehicle by which a plaintiff may bring a claim for
violation of constitutional rights in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under
§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under
color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
L. Count One
“A public entity ... may be held liable for the violation of a constitutional right under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 only when the alleged unconstitutional action executes or implements policy or a
decision officially adopted or promulgated by those whose acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy.” Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Monell v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978)). Moreover, “[a] school district may incur Monell
liability under [§] 1983 for a violation of an individual’s constitutional rights when it implements
an official policy or custom that results in a constitutional deprivation.” G.S. vy. Penn-Trafford Sch.
Dist., No. 20-3281, 2023 WL 4486667, at *3 (3d Cir. July 12, 2023) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at
694).
“To plead a municipal liability claim [pursuant to Monell], a plaintiff must allege that ‘a
[local] government’s policy or custom. . . inflict[ed] the injury’ in question.” Est. of Roman vy. City

10

of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (second, third, and fourth alterations in original)
(citation omitted). “To satisfy the pleading standard, [the plaintiff] must [not only] identify a
custom or policy, [but also] specify what exactly that custom or policy was.” McTernan v. City of
York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). Furthermore, “[a]lthough a policy or custom is necessary
to plead a municipal claim, it is not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. A plaintiff must also
allege that a policy or custom was the ‘proximate cause’ of h[er] injuries.” Est. of Roman, 914 F.3d
at 798 (citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 Gd Cir. 1996)). To meet this burden, a plaintiff
may allege facts of an “‘affirmative link’ between the policy or custom and the particular
constitutional violation [s]he alleges.” /d. (citing Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir.
1990)). Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized that “municipal liability may be imposed
for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances.” Pembaur v.
City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986)).
As an initial matter, Plaintiff concedes that Count One must be dismissed as to School
District Defendant individuals who are not final policymakers. (See Pl.’s Opp’n Br. to Sch. Dist.
Defs. & Weir’s Mot. 5.) The Complaint does not allege facts as to the final decision-making
authority for Labuza, Gross, Caravello, and Jelinsky (see generally Compl.), and Plaintiff argues
in opposition that the theory she advances relates to Ballone, Pacifico, and MTPS (see PI.’s Opp’n
Br. to Sch. Dist. Defs. & Weir’s Mot. 5). Count One is, therefore, dismissed as to Labuza, Gross,
Caravello, and Jelinsky.
With respect to Ballone, Pacifico, and MTPS, School District Defendants argue that
Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Plaintiff only alleges
“conclusory statements” regarding the relevant “policies, customs, and practices|.]” (Sch. Dist.
Defs. & Weir’s Mot. to Dismiss 14-15.) The Court agrees.

11

Plaintiff's Complaint vaguely alleges that she suffered constitutional violations as a result
of MTPS’s: (1) “custom of disciplining employees without due process or meaningful
investigation”; (2) “policy of transmitting stigmatizing accusations to licensing authorities without
substantiation”; (3) “failure to train and supervise administrators regarding the Constitutional
rights of employees”; and (4) “deliberate indifference to the reputational and property interests of
employees when responding to complaints.” (Compl. § 126.) Third Circuit precedent, however,
explicitly requires a plaintiff to “specify what exactly that custom or policy was.” McTernan, 564
F.3d at 658. Without more, Plaintiff's claim must fail against Ballone, Pacifico, and MTPS.
Count One is, accordingly, dismissed as to all School District Defendants.
2. Count Two
“Civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on reputational harms are known as
‘stigma-plus’ claims.” D&D Assocs., Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 552 F. App’x 110, 113 (3d Cir. 2014)
(citing Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir. 2006)). To state such a claim, a
plaintiff “must show a stigma to h[er] reputation plus deprivation of some additional right or
interest.” Dondero v. Lower Milford Township, 5 F Ath 355, 360 (3d Cir. 2021) (emphasis in
original) (quoting Hill, 455 F.3d at 236). Under the “stigma” prong, the plaintiff must allege that
the stigmatizing statements were both “public” and “false.” /d For the “plus” prong, the plaintiff
must “allege an alteration or extinguishment of an interest protected by the Constitution or state
law.” Cooley vy. Barber, No. 07-3327, 2007 WL 2900550, at *1 Gd Cir. Oct. 4, 2007) (citations
omitted).
Here, Plaintiff vaguely alleges that: (1) “Ballone ... perpetuated . . . Weir’s false
accusations” (Compl. 83); (2) “Defendants transmitted false and stigmatizing information about
her to the New Jersey State Board of Examiners and other state authorities” which contained

12

“materially false statements about the nature of the allegations against [Plaintiff]” (id. {J 93, 94);
(3) Gross, Jelinsky, and Caravello “made false representations to unemployment authorities on at
least three occasions” (id. § 111); and (4) “Defendants publicly and falsely accused Plaintiff of
professional misconduct and moral unfitness in connection with her employment, disseminating
those stigmatizing charges to third parties, including within the school community, law
enforcement, and to state licensing authorities” (id. J 130). Plaintiff does not, however, allege what
the actual statements are that caused such harm to her reputation or who made which statement.
(See generally Compl.) Without more, Plaintiff's stigma-plus claim asserted against School
District Defendants must fail. See, e.g., Berkery v. Wissahickon Sch. Bd., 99 F. Supp. 3d 563, 572
(E.D. Pa. 2015) (finding plaintiff's stigma-plus claim failed because “nowhere does [p]laintiff
identify the alleged stigmatizing statement(s) which she baldly alleges are false” and “[w]ithout
the statements, no assessment can be made as to whether, even construed in [p]laintiff’s favor,
such statements could have a stigmatizing effect on [p]laintiffs reputation”); Zucal v. County of
Lehigh, 660 F. Supp. 3d 334, 350 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (finding plaintiffs failed to plead a stigma-plus
claim where “[pflaintiffs have failed to identify the substance of the purported stigmatizing
statements”).
Count Two is, accordingly, dismissed.
3. Counts Three and Four
Plaintiff alleges a Monell liability claim against Police Defendants and a procedural due
process violation claim against Menna in his individual capacity based on allegations that Menna
instructed employees to “disseminate a CD copy of surveillance video that had been confidentially
viewed in camera in the criminal trial against Plaintiff.” (Compl. ¥§ 136, 141.) Plaintiff, however,
fails to allege that the video was actually disseminated or who it was disseminated to. (See

13

generally id.) Moreover, Plaintiff fails to provide case law to support any argument that she has a
property interest in, or a privacy right to, the video. (See generally P1.’s Opp’n Br. to Township’s
Mot.; PI.’s Opp’n Br. to Menna’s Mot.); see also Hill, 455 F.3d at 234-35 (noting that to state a
claim for “deprivation of procedural due process rights, a plaintiff must allege that[:] (1) [s]he was
deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s
protection of ‘life, liberty, or property[;]’ and (2) the procedures available to [her] did not provide
‘due process of law’” (quoting Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000))).
Without more, Plaintiff's claims relating to instructions about disseminating a video must
fail. Counts Three and Four’ are, accordingly, dismissed.
C. Count Five Asserted Against School District Defendants and Police Defendants
Plaintiff asserts Count Five against School District Defendants and Police Defendants for
a violation of the NICRA. (Compl. {§ 145-47.) Plaintiff alleges that her “deprivations [asserted
under Count Five] mirror and supplement the violations of the United States Constitution alleged
in Counts One through Four... .” Ud. 147.)
For the same reasons Plaintiff's § 1983 claims fail, however, so too does her NJCRA claim.
See, e.g., Wronko v. Howell Township, No. 17-1956, 2018 WL 516055, at *6 (D.N.J. Jan. 23, 2018)
(“For the reasons set forth in connection with the § 1983 analysis .. . , [p]laintiff[] cannot state a
claim under the NJCRA[.]”); Fearron v. Restuccia, No. 20-14819, 2023 WL 2367679, at *11
(D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2023) (dismissing NJCRA claims for “same reasons as the § 1983 claim”); K./. v.
Greater Egg Harbor Reg'l High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 431 F. Supp. 3d 488, 504 n.8 (D.N.J.

° The Court further notes that Menna, as a prosecutor, is protected by prosecutorial immunity for
claims asserted against him that relate to the acts he performed in accordance with his prosecutorial
role. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (“[A]cts undertaken by a prosecutor
in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of
his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity.”).
14

2019) (Courts in this Circuit have consistently interpreted the NJCRA and Section 1983
analogously [.]” (citing Szemple v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 493 F. App’x 238, 241 (3d Cir. 2012))).
Count Five is, accordingly, dismissed.
D. Counts Six and Seven Asserted Against Swanson
Plaintiff asserts Counts Six and Seven against Swanson for defamation and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. (Compl. □□ 148-54.) Swanson argues that, among other things, the
claims against Swanson should be dismissed because Plaintiff “fails to identify any conduct
undertaken by . . . Swanson individually.” (Swanson’s Mot. to Dismiss *27.) The Court agrees.
Here, the only facts alleged in the Complaint as to Swanson are that Swanson, among other
defendants, “participated in the mobbing by posting false and defamatory content about [Plaintiff]
on Facebook, Instagram, and other social media platforms” and these statements “falsely branded
[Plaintiff] as a ‘predator,’ ‘groomer,’ ‘pedophile,’ and other deeply offensive terms[.]” (Compl.
47 102-03.) Plaintiff, however, has not alleged any details about the purported defamatory
statements Swanson individually made. See, e.g., Trainor v. McGibney, No. 24-8873, 2025 WL
1207595, at *3-4 (D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2025) (dismissing defamation claim and intentional infliction
of emotional distress claim premised on defamatory statements where “[p]laintiffs have not
indicated what the specific language at issue is and when the alleged posts were published [and a]s
such, [p]laintiffs’ allegations are not enough to provide notice as to which statements are at issue”).
Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff attempts to group plead the claims arising in tort, Plaintiff has
failed to allege a cause of action against Swanson. See Testa v. Hoban, No. 17-1618, 2018 WL
623691, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2018) (finding that plaintiff “failed to plead ‘a short and plain

’ Page numbers preceded by an asterisk refer to the page numbers noted in the ECF header.

15

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ against [certain djefendants”
where plaintiff failed to plead any allegations as to those defendants (citations omitted)); McLeod
v. Fifth Jud. Dist. of Pa, No. 20-1362, 2022 WL 13986832, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2022)
(“Pleadings that fail to identify each defendant’s role for the alleged wrong are insufficient.” (citing
Pushkin v. Nussbaum, No. 12-324, 2017 WL 1591863, at *7 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2017)).
Counts Six and Seven asserted against Swanson are, accordingly, dismissed.
E. Count Eight Asserted Against School District Defendants
Plaintiff asserts Count Eight for a breach of contract claim against School District
Defendants. (Compl. { 155-56.) School District Defendants argue that Count Eight should be
dismissed as Plaintiff “failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate a viable breach of contract
claim[,]” including because: (1) “there [are] no facts alleged, nor could be alleged that [Plaintiff]
was employed by any of the six individuals [Plaintiff] named[;]” and (2) Plaintiff fails to allege
“that [her] employment was based on a contract, and if it was, what the terms of that contract
[were], what terms [MTPS] allegedly breached, and whether that alleged breach led to a legally
cognizable loss.” (Sch. Dist. Defs. & Weir’s Moving Br. 20.) Plaintiff recognizes in opposition
that “[bJecause Plaintiffs employment relationship existed with the School District as the
employing entity, contractual liability runs against that entity rather than individual employees”
and, as a result, Plaintiff “does not oppose dismissal of the breach of contract claim against the
individual defendants to the extent they were not parties to the employment contract.” (P1.’s Opp’n
Br. to Sch. Dist. Defs. & Weir’s Mot. 25-26.)
Under New Jersey law, a breach of contract claim requires four elements: (1) “the parties
entered into a contract containing certain terms;” (2) the plaintiff performed her contractual
obligations; (3) the defendant breached the contract; and (4) the plaintiff suffered damages because

16

of the defendant’s breach. Goldfarb v. Solimine, 245 A.3d 570, 577 (N.J. 2021) (quoting Globe
Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 139 A.3d 57, 64 (N.J. 2016)). Here, Plaintiff fails to allege a breach of
contract claim, including because Plaintiff's Complaint does not allege: (1) a contract containing
certain terms; (2) the fact that her employment with MTPS was governed by a contract containing
certain terms; or (3) a breach of those certain terms. (See generally Compl.); Goldfarb, 245 A.3d
at 577. Without more, Plaintiff's breach of contract claim asserted against all of School District
Defendants must fail.
Count Eight is, accordingly, dismissed.
F. Count Nine Asserted Against School District Defendants
Plaintiff's Count Nine asserts a cause of action under the New Jersey Wage Payment Law
(the “WPL”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-4.1, ef seg. (Compl. {4 157-58.) School District Defendants
argue that this claim should be dismissed because “Plaintiff has not alleged any facts
demonstrating that her salary was withheld.” (Sch. Dist. Defs. & Weir’s Moving Br. 21.) In
opposition, Plaintiff argues that she adequately alleges a claim under the WPL because she “was
an employee of the Marlboro School District who performed services as a tenured educator” and
alleges that “Defendants failed to pay compensation owed to her in connection with her
employment and separation from service, including earned salary and related employment
payments.” (Pl.’s Opp’n Br. to Sch. Dist. Defs. & Weir’s Mot. 26.)
The WPL “sets forth requirements as to an employer’s timing and mode of payments to
[its] employee[s]” and “confers a private cause of action on employees for an employer’s failure
to pay wages according to its requirements.” Mahanor v. Berkley Life Scis., No. 31-18981, 2022
WL 2541773, at *16 (July 7, 2022) (citations omitted). The WPL defines “wages” as “the direct
monetary compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, where the amount is

17

determined on a time, task, piece, or commission basis excluding any form of supplementary
incentives and bonuses which are calculated independently of regular wages and paid in addition
thereto.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-4.1.
Here, Plaintiff's conclusory allegations state that “Defendants violated New Jersey wage
payment laws by withholding [Plaintiff's] earned salary without legal justification[.]” (Compl.
110.) Plaintiff does not identify which Defendants® purportedly withheld her salary and further
asserts that she was actually “suspended with pay” (id. J 85) and that she subsequently resigned
Ud. 91, 92). Without more, Plaintiff has not adequately alleged facts that one or more of School
District Defendants withheld her wages in accordance with certain requirements in violation of the

The Court, accordingly, dismisses Count Nine.
G. Count Ten Asserted Against School District Defendants
Plaintiff's Count Ten asserts a “constructive termination” claim against School District
Defendants based on the alleged fact that “Defendants created intolerable working conditions
through false accusations and public defamation, forcing [Plaintiffs] constructive termination.”
(Compl. {| 159-60.) School District Defendants argue that Count Ten should be dismissed because
““constructive termination’ is not a stand-alone cause of action.” (Sch. Dist. Defs. & Weir’s
Moving Br. 24.) The Court agrees. See 4 McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 12:317 (3d ed.) (“Constructive
termination is not a stand-alone case of action; the constructive discharge doctrine simply extends

® The Court notes, however, that a claim pursuant to the WPL is only available as against one’s
employer. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-4.2 (“[E]very employer shall pay the full amount of wages
due to [its] employees... (emphasis added)); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-4.10 (“Any employer who
knowingly fails to pay the full amount of wages to an employee . . .” (emphasis added)), Plaintiff
recognizes this in her opposition, noting that “[t]o the extent liability lies with the employer
responsible for paying wages, Plaintiff does not oppose limiting the claim [to the relevant
Defendant] accordingly.” (Pl.’s Opp’n Br. to Sch. Dist. Defs. & Weir’s 27.)
18

liability to employers who indirectly effect a discharge that would have been forbidden by statute
if done directly.”); Knox v. Union Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. 13-5875, 2015 WL 769930, at *8 (D.N.J.
Feb, 23, 2015) (dismissing “constructive discharge claim” because it is not an independent cause
of action); Matos v. PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., No. 03-5320, 2005 WL 2656675, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 17,
2005) (“[C]onstructive discharge is merely a form of adverse employment action, and is not an
independent claim.” (citations omitted)).
The Court, accordingly, dismisses Count Ten.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are granted. The Court
will issue an Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

“
MICHAEL A. Sut
23 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: , 2026

To the extent Plaintiff attempts to plead a claim for an adverse employment action such as
wrongful discharge, she fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as she fails to
adequately plead the other elements of the claim. See, e.g., DeFalco v. Rutgers Univ. Police Dept,
No. 15-6607, 2017 WL 6667517, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2017) (noting that to adequately plead a
cause of action for wrongful discharge resulting from a “constructive discharge, [p]laintiff must
assert both discrimination and a discharge, i.e. a cessation of employment’).
19

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366127. Public record. Not legal advice.