# RISIS

> District Court, D. New Jersey · June 23, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366113

## Case

- **Full name:** Daniel M. Risis v. Livingston Police Department
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** June 23, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DANIEL M. RISIS,

Plaintiff,
No. 25cv16644 (EP) (JBC)
v.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
LIVINGSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Defendant.

PADIN, District Judge.

In this civil rights action, pro se Plaintiff Daniel M. Risis alleges that the Livingston Police
Department’s (“LPD”) “policies, customs, and coordinated actions chilled Plaintiff’s protected
speech, selectively enforced laws on the basis of gender, and denied hearings, fair process, and
access to courts, causing irreparable and compensable harm.” D.E. 1 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”)
¶ 35.
The Complaint alleges seven counts against the LPD.1 Id. ¶¶ 35–41. Count I alleges that
the LPD engaged in policies and customs that eroded Plaintiff’s protected speech, discriminated
against Plaintiff based on gender, and denied Plaintiff a fair hearing. Id. ¶ 35. Count II alleges
§ 1983 violations based on “[w]arrantless intrusions, fabricated complaints, seizure/non-return of

1 On February 17, 2026, this Court noted Plaintiff’s failure to serve and directed him to serve seven
defendants (the “Unserved Defendants”): Robert Menendez, Mikie Sherrill, the Essex County
Prosecutor’s Office, the New Jersey Department of Children and Families, the Family Court of
Essex County, Mallary Blask Risis, and Matthew Smuro. The Court provided Plaintiff 30 days
to show cause in writing why this case should not be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) as to
those unserved defendants. The Court then sua sponte provided a 30-day extension to serve the
Unserved Defendants. D.E. 30. Despite the extension, Plaintiff failed to serve the Unserved
Defendants, and this Court dismissed the action without prejudice as to the Unserved Defendants.
D.E. 32.
property, and denial of process” by the LPD. Id. ¶ 36. Count III alleges that Defendants conspired
to deprive him of equal protection and equal privileges in violation of § 1985(3). Id. ¶ 37. Count
IV alleges that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1986 by having “knowledge and ability to prevent
ongoing deprivations” and “fail[ing] to act.”2 Id. ¶ 38. Count V alleges that Defendants violated
the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“Civil RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1964.

Id. ¶ 39. Count VI asserts state-law claims for interference with custody, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, defamation, and civil conspiracy. Id. ¶ 40. Finally, Count VII alleges § 1983
violations based on a failure to train LPD officers not to engage in “[c]onstitutional deprivations.”
Id. ¶ 41.
The Township of Livingston (the “Township”)—which the Complaint names only as the
LPD, and which represents that it was improperly pleaded as such—appeared as the real party in
interest and moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).3
D.Es. 9 (“Motion” or “Mot.”) & D.E. 9-1. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. D.E. 16 (“Opposition”
or “Opp’n”). The Township replies. D.E. 15 (“Reply”). The Court decides the Motion without

oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); L. Civ. R. 78.1(b).

2 Because Plaintiff brings this claim against “supervisory/official Defendants who had power to
prevent and failed to do so,” the Court assumes this count includes the LPD.

3 The Court notes that this action was brought against the LPD—not the Township. But “[u]nder
New Jersey law, naming [the LPD] as a defendant is legally equivalent to naming the [Township]”
so “the Court will construe Plaintiff’s § 1983” claims against the Township. El v. Atl. City
Freeholders Bd. of Commissioners, No. 22-6281, 2023 WL 8271768, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2023).
I. BACKGROUND4
Plaintiff is a New Jersey resident and father of two minor sons. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 18; D.E. 1-
4 (the “Attachments”) at 6.5 From around 2019 through 2025, Mallary Blask Risis, Plaintiff’s
wife, who Plaintiff alleges he is separated from, reportedly took their sons across county and state
lines at least twenty-four times without consent or prior court authorization. Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff

reported these removals and submitted domestic violence claims against Ms. Risis to the LPD, the
Essex County Prosecutor’s Office, and the New Jersey Department of Children and Families.
Id. ¶ 21. According to Plaintiff, the officers and agencies of these departments did not enforce
New Jersey’s custodial-interference statutes. Id. ¶ 22.
Plaintiff asserts that Ms. Risis’s private counsel, Matthew Smuro, acted jointly with State
officials to shield her from liability. Attachments at 1. Plaintiff claims that Smuro and State
officials (1) advanced falsehoods about Plaintiff and suppressed discovery, and (2) municipal
actors entered his home on fabricated complaints. Id. ¶ 25. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that he
faced fabricated charges and unlawful detainment under the pretext of violations of unspecified

temporary restraining orders. Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiff also alleges that since 2023, Defendants then-
Senator Robert Menendez and then-Representative Mikie Sherrill (together, the “Public
Officials”) willfully ignored Plaintiff’s complaints of alleged constitutional violations. Id. ¶ 27;
Attachments at 3–4.

4 The facts in this section are taken from the factual allegations in the Complaint, which the Court
presumes to be true for purposes of resolving the Motion to Dismiss. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

5 Plaintiff includes three attachments: Attachment A details the list of defendants and the basis for
their inclusion in this action. Attachment B is a letter from the Plaintiff to the Court requesting an
independent review of officials that permitted his alleged harassment. Attachment C lists the
criminal and civil statutes Mallary Blask Risis has purportedly violated. Because the Attachments
are consolidated in one docket entry, the Court refers to page numbers in the entry, D.E. 1-4.
After airing the Public Officials’ decision to ignore Plaintiff’s complaints, Plaintiff
allegedly began experiencing what he believed was retaliation for pursuing his grievances.
Compl. ¶ 28. For instance, Plaintiff asserts that three unidentified men were permitted to sit in on
a private family court proceeding, breaching confidentiality and judicial ethics. Id. Plaintiff
asserts that when attempting to identify these individuals, “production was delayed or refused,

impeding his access to evidence and relief.” Id. ¶ 29. Plaintiff argues that these retaliatory actions
amount to “a pattern of racketeering activity” under Civil RICO. Id. ¶¶ 30, 39.
As a result of the alleged pattern of retaliation, Plaintiff has sustained psychological,
financial, and reputational harm, including “complex PTSD symptoms and economic devastation.”
Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff also contends that substantial financial assets, such as multiple properties, were
disrupted during litigation. Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiff, however, does not detail which PTSD-related
symptoms he suffers from or how litigation has affected him financially. See id.
The Complaint seeks compensatory, treble, and punitive damages; attorney fees;
declaratory relief; and an injunction prohibiting retaliation, harassment, and defamation arising

from the facts alleged. Id. at 12–14.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court accepts all well-pled factual
allegations as true, construes the complaint in the plaintiff’s favor, and determines “whether, under
any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. Cnty.
of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d
361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)). “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the
complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly
authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.” Mayer v.
Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). Courts may not consider “[f]actual claims and
assertions raised by a defendant.” Doe v. Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th 335, 345 (3d Cir. 2022).
Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court construes his Complaint liberally and holds it
to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 94 (2007). But liberal construction does not relax the obligation to plead facts: a pro se plaintiff
must still allege enough to state a plausible claim. Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239,
245 (3d Cir. 2013).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, a plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible,
meaning “the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). Although there is no “‘probability
requirement,’” plaintiff’s claims must do more than present “a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Id. The allegations must include “more than labels and conclusions.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Thus, “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings
that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must
be supported by factual allegations.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678.
III. DISCUSSION
At threshold, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff can hold the LPD liable for a
§ 1983 violation under the Monell doctrine. Under that doctrine, a municipality answers under
§ 1983 not for its employees’ acts on a theory of respondeat superior, but only for its own policy
or custom that is the moving force behind a constitutional violation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 690–94 (1978). Because the LPD is not an independent legal entity but is instead
an administrative arm of the Township, it is not amenable to suit. The proper defendant is the
Township of Livingston, which—improperly pleaded as the LPD—is the real party in interest and

has appeared to defend. See D.E. 9-1. And even if the Township were substituted as defendant,
the Complaint would fail under Monell because Plaintiff pleads no municipal policy or custom.
The Complaint faces a recurring obstacle. Plaintiff names eight defendants—the LPD
among them—along with fifty fictitious John Does, but pleads against them collectively. See
Compl. Plaintiff does little to distinguish which defendant did what. Id. Each of the seven counts
re-alleges all thirty-four preceding factual paragraphs and then asserts its claim against
undifferentiated groups: “all Defendants,” “state/municipal Defendants,” or “supervisory/official
Defendants.” Id. ¶¶ 35–41. That is a shotgun pleading, and it leaves the Court unable to discern
which factual allegations are directed at the LPD or the Township as opposed to the seven other

named defendants. See Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 93 (3d Cir. 2019) (requiring that
a complaint “identif[y] discrete defendants and the actions taken by these defendants”). The Court
construes the pro se Complaint liberally and does not rest dismissal on this defect alone, but
Plaintiff’s failure to tie specific allegations to specific defendants compounds the pleading
deficiencies addressed below—most directly, the absence of any allegation connecting a policy or
custom to the Township.
The Court addresses Plaintiff’s federal claims in turn: the § 1983 claims governed by
Monell (Counts I, II, and VII), the § 1985(3) conspiracy claim (Count III), the derivative § 1986
claim (Count IV), and the civil RICO claim (Count V). Because no federal claim survives, the
Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims in Count VI.
A. Liability Under the Monell Doctrine
1. Plaintiff’s Monell claim against the LPD
Plaintiff improperly tries to extend § 1983 liability to the LPD through the Monell doctrine.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law,
deprives another of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because
the LPD operates as an arm of local government, Plaintiff’s effort to hold it liable implicates
Monell, which governs when—and against whom—a constitutional violation by a municipal entity
gives rise to § 1983 liability. Municipalities are “persons” under § 1983, but only when a
municipal policy or custom causes the violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91. Police departments
like the LPD are not municipalities—they are administrative sub-units with no independent legal
existence, and therefore not suable persons under § 1983. Padilla v. Twp. of Cherry Hill, 110 F.
App’x 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2004).

To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that a person acting under color
of state law deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law. West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The LPD is not a “person” that may be found liable under § 1983 under Monell
because it is not an independent legal entity. See Carter v. Matos, No. 09-5503, 2010 WL
3169284, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2010) (dismissing a § 1983 claim against a police department);
Johnson v. Provenzano, No. 12-1253, 2014 WL 7011545, at *9 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 2014) (same).
And where, as here, the defendant is a municipality like the Township, a plaintiff must also
satisfy Monell’s demand of a policy or custom that is the “moving force” behind the violation.
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). In other words, “liability cannot be predicated
solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Kornegey v. City of Philadelphia, 299 F. Supp.
3d 675, 680 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)
(noting that a defendant must be personally involved in the alleged wrongful conduct to be held
liable for civil rights violations)). Accordingly, Counts I and II are DISMISSED with prejudice6
as to the LPD and are DISMISSED without prejudice as to the Township.

2. Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Monell
Read against the Township—the proper municipal defendant, which has appeared—
Plaintiff’s Monell claim fails. The Complaint points to no facts suggesting that a Township policy
or custom authorized the harassment Plaintiff alleges.7 To make a Monell claim, plaintiffs must
show: (1) the existence of a policy or custom, (2) that policymakers acted with deliberate
indifference to the known consequences of that policy or custom, and (3) that the policy or custom
was the “moving force” behind the constitutional violation. Toka v. Burlington Cnty., No. 23-
1971, 2026 WL 1506314, at *7 (D.N.J. May 29, 2026) (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan
Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404–06 (1997)). For example, Monell itself involved a class

of female employees of the Department of Social Services and of the Board of Education of the
City of New York who were compelled to take unpaid leaves from their jobs due to their
pregnancies. 436 U.S. at 660–61. The Supreme Court held that since the case “unquestionably”

6 Because § 1983 claims cannot be brought against the LPD, amendment would be futile. Fallon
v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr. of Se. Pa., 877 F.3d 487, 494 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that dismissal with
prejudice is warranted when “[a]mendment would be futile if the complaint . . . would nonetheless
be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim”).

7 The Court addresses Plaintiff’s pleading failures with respect to the Township, as it is the proper
Defendant and the real party in interest here. The Court’s reasoning and decision would be the
same as to the LPD, assuming it could be sued under Monell.
involved a policy that forced the plaintiffs to take unpaid leave, the municipality of New York City
could be held liable under § 1983. Id. at 694–95.
Plaintiff does not meet his burden under the Monell doctrine. Unlike Monell, where the
plaintiffs identified an official policy causing the harm, Plaintiff here merely alludes to vague
references of “deliberate evidence suppression” and discriminatory policies and customs.

Compl. ¶¶ 23–26. And Plaintiff does even less to allege that a policymaker, policy, or custom
authorized the discrimination outlined in the Complaint. See generally Compl.
Instead, Plaintiff relies solely on “labels and conclusions” that do not survive a Rule
12(b)(6) challenge. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Such conclusory statements, either alone or in
conjunction, are insufficient to present a factual basis to establish liability under Counts I and II of
the Complaint under Monell. See Costino v. Anderson, No. 14-6940, 2017 WL 4404392, at *6
(D.N.J. Oct. 4, 2017) (explaining that “conclusory allegations are . . . insufficient to state a
plausible Monell claim to survive a motion to dismiss.”). Plaintiff also argues that the LPD acted
within its scope of employment, Compl. ¶ 13, improperly invoking the standard reserved for a

respondeat superior theory of liability, which, under Monell, cannot be the sole reason for § 1983
liability, Kornegey, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 680.
Alternatively, Plaintiff could demonstrate that a municipality’s failure to train officers
amounts to a Monell violation when “(1) municipal policymakers know that employees will
confront a particular situation; (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a history of employees
mishandling; and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will frequently cause deprivation of
constitutional rights.” Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
In Carter, the plaintiff brought a § 1983 claim against unknown policymakers within the
Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office for inadequately training their police officers. 181 F.3d at
342–43. The Third Circuit held that the plaintiff had adequately pleaded all three elements,
focusing on element two, which it found satisfied due to Philadelphia’s 39th Police District’s
history of corruption, which amounted to a “history of employee[] mishandling.” See id. at 357.
Here, Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts for Count VII to support all three Carter
elements. Plaintiff identifies no Township policymaker, no prior incident, and no specific gap in

training. See Compl. Fatally, Plaintiff includes nothing to establish either that Township or LPD
officials knew their officers would face the kind of situation Plaintiff describes or that such
encounters have a history of mishandling under element two. Id. And finally, Plaintiff fails to
allege a single fact tying the alleged training deficiency to a pattern of constitutional harm where
the wrong choice by an officer would frequently cause deprivation. Id. Thus, Count VII is
DISMISSED with prejudice as to the LPD and is DISMISSED without prejudice as to the
Township.8
B. Plaintiff’s Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights Claim Fails
Here, too, Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

conspired to deprive him of equal protection and equal privileges. Compl. ¶ 37. The Township
responds that the Complaint identifies no agreement among any defendants and no racial or class-
based discriminatory animus—both of which a claim under § 1985(3) requires. Mot. at 5–6.
Section 1985(3) does not reach every agreement to do another wrong; it supplies a remedy only

8 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s opposition leans heavily on body-worn-camera footage, which he
claims the Township has withheld. D.Es. 16-1 & 16-2 (“Plaintiff’s Certifications”). But the
allegations in Plaintiff’s Certifications do not appear in the Complaint, and on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion the Court looks to the pleadings, not to new facts a party supplies in its brief. Pennsylvania
ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a complaint
may not be amended by briefs to a motion to dismiss). Plaintiff may not amend his Complaint
through his Opposition. And even credited, Plaintiff’s Certifications describe missing footage—
not any municipal policy or custom. They therefore do not save the Monell claims.
for conspiracies to deprive a person of equal protection of the laws that are motivated by some
racial or otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88, 102 (1971) (holding that § 1985(3) requires “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action”). To state a claim for
conspiracy under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege four elements:

(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4)
whereby a person is injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or
privilege of a citizen of the United States.
Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters
& Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828–29 (1983)).
To allege a conspiracy under the first element, a plaintiff must plead plausible factual
allegations to support the reasonable inference that two or more persons formed an actual
agreement to deprive the plaintiff of their civil rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); see Watson v. Sec’y,
Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 436 F. App’x 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2011). Further, a plaintiff must set forth
allegations that address the (1) period of the conspiracy, (2) object of the conspiracy, and (3)
actions of the alleged conspirators taken to achieve the conspiracy. Kelly v. Pier, No. 16-3417,
2017 WL 3397030, at *10 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2017) (quoting Ivan v. Cnty. of Middlesex, 595 F. Supp.
2d 425, 484 (D.N.J. 2009)); see also Schlichten v. Cnty. of Northampton, 279 F. App’x 176, 179
(3d Cir. 2008) (requiring a conspiracy to be pleaded with specificity).
Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim fails at the first element. Although Plaintiff claims that
defendants conspired to deprive him of equal protection and equal privileges, and he alludes to
collaboration between private counsel and public officials, Plaintiff presents no facts that support
the inference that the LPD reached an agreement, either among themselves or with other
defendants, to deprive him of his civil rights. See Compl. Indeed, Plaintiff does not distinguish
among defendants in alleging the conspiracy—the same shotgun defect noted above. See Foulke
v. Twp. of Cherry Hill, No. 23-2543, 2024 WL 3568841, at *1 (D.N.J. July 29, 2024) (dismissing
a § 1983 complaint due to shotgun pleading).
Such vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient to support a conspiracy claim. See
Grant v. Slattery, No. 22-941, 2022 WL 4550632, at *7 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2022) (holding that

plaintiff failed to describe any concerted action between school board members necessary to plead
conspiracy); Kelly, 2017 WL 3397030, at *11 (holding that numerous general and conclusory
allegations that municipal defendants “conspired between and amongst themselves” do not fulfill
the plausibility requirement). Put simply, Plaintiff fails to “allege that [LPD or any defendant]
communicated with one another or came to an agreement to conspire against him.” Muhammad
v. Cappellini, 477 F. App’x 935, 938 (3d Cir. 2012) (affirming the dismissal for failure to plead a
conspiracy).
And even if Plaintiff had pleaded adequate factual allegations to establish a conspiracy, to
satisfy the second element, Plaintiff has pleaded no facts related to discriminatory animus or

invidious discrimination. Kidwai v. Hudson Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off., No. 23-23206, 2026 WL
881599, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2026) (dismissing § 1985(3) claim for failing to plead racial or
class-based discriminatory animus). Because Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to satisfy
the elements of his conspiracy claim under § 1985, Count III is DISMISSED without prejudice
as to both the Township and the LPD.
C. Plaintiff’s Section 1986 Claim Fails
Count IV rises and falls with Count III. Section 1986 creates liability for those who know
that a § 1985 conspiracy is afoot, have the power to stop it, and fail to do so. Rogin v. Bensalem
Twp., 616 F.2d 680, 696 (3d Cir. 1980). The claim is entirely derivative. D’Aurizio v. Palisades
Park, 963 F. Supp. 378, 386 (D.N.J. 1997) (“[A]ll claims under section 1986 are derivative in
nature, requiring a valid underlying section 1985(3) claim.”) (citation omitted). As the Third
Circuit has put it, “transgressions of § 1986 by definition depend on a preexisting violation of §
1985.” Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1295 (3d Cir. 1994). Because Plaintiff has not stated a
claim under § 1985(3), his § 1986 claim necessarily fails with it. Count IV is DISMISSED

without prejudice as to both the Township and the LPD.
D. Plaintiff’s Civil RICO Claim Fails
Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts to state a Civil RICO claim. Section 1962(c) of the
RICO statute provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Section 1964(c) creates a civil cause of action for any person injured “in his
business or property” by a defendant’s RICO violation. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). To state a civil
RICO claim under § 1962(c), a plaintiff must allege four elements:
(1) the existence of an enterprise . . . affecting interstate commerce; (2) that the
defendant was employed by or associated with the enterprise; (3) that the defendant
participated, directly or indirectly, in the conduct or the affairs of the enterprise;
and (4) that the defendant participated through a pattern of racketeering activity that
. . . include[d] . . . at least two racketeering acts.
Munsif v. Cassel, 331 F. App’x 954, 958 (3d Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff has failed, among other things, to plead sufficient facts to establish a pattern of
racketeering. A pattern of racketeering requires the commission of at least two predicate acts of
racketeering within a ten-year period that are related and that amount to, or threaten the likelihood
of, continued criminal activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5); see, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492
U.S. 229, 240 (1989) (holding that plaintiffs successfully pleaded a pattern of racketeering activity
by alleging that defendants gave several bribes which were related by a common purpose). The
RICO statute lists obstruction offenses and certain types of fraud as predicate acts. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1).
Plaintiff alleges that a pattern of racketeering activity was created by the LPD through
“obstruction, fraud, and related predicate acts.” Compl. at 11. Although the Complaint does not

identify the obstruction statute upon which he bases his claims, he apparently9 seeks to proceed
under 18 U.S.C. § 1503. Under § 1503, anyone who “corruptly or by threats of force, or by any
threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence,
obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice” may be held criminally liable. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1503.
Plaintiff bases his obstruction claim upon allegations that the LPD “executed unlawful
entries” and deliberately suppressed evidence—but he does not provide specific details.
Attachment A at 2. Plaintiff does not plead facts or provide examples of the alleged corruption,
any threat of force, or any threatening communication on the part of the LPD. Plaintiff again

simply provides conclusory allegations, which cannot form the basis for an adequately pleaded
claim. See Winters v. Jones, No. 16-9020, 2018 WL 326518, at *10 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2018) (holding
claims that defendants obstructed justice by using corrupt plaintiffs to file lawsuits are insufficient
to plead a plausible obstruction of justice claim as a RICO predicate act); Matta v. Kaur, No. 24-

9 Plaintiff’s Complaint does not cite an obstruction statute by number. Section 1961(1) lists several
obstruction-related RICO predicates under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1510, 1512, and 1513. Plaintiff
does not point to any of the listed predicates but instead alleges generalized “deliberate evidence
suppression” and that “production was delayed or refused, impeding his access to evidence and
relief.” Compl. ¶ 29; Attachments at 2. That broad formulation tracks § 1503’s catch-all language
reaching anyone who “obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to . . . obstruct, or impede the due
administration of justice,” 18 U.S.C. § 1503, more closely than any of the other listed obstruction
predicates. The Court therefore construes Plaintiff’s obstruction theory as arising, if at all, under
§ 1503.
5743, 2025 WL 2987103, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 23, 2025) (noting that the Third Circuit has never
recognized obstruction of justice as a viable RICO predicate except in cases involving witness
intimidation). Thus, Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded obstruction as a predicate act.
The RICO statute lists mail fraud and wire fraud as predicate acts; general fraud is not
listed. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Plaintiff does not allege either mail or wire fraud. See Compl.

Nor does he present any facts to establish mail or wire fraud. Id. Plaintiff’s claims that fraud
establishes a pattern of racketeering also fail. See Briksza v. Moloney, No. 08-1785, 2009 WL
1767594, at *8 (D.N.J. June 19, 2009) (holding that plaintiff’s blanket allegations that defendants
engaged in fraud were insufficient predicate acts under RICO); Zellner v. Monroe Cnty. Mun.
Waste Mgmt. Auth., No. 07-1976, 2008 WL 2962595, at *9 (M.D. Pa. July 28, 2008) (holding that
general allegations of fraud will be dismissed as potential predicate acts because general fraud is
not listed in the RICO statute).
Further, Plaintiff here must plead the circumstances of the alleged underlying RICO fraud
predicate with particularity. Morales v. Superior Living Prod., 398 F. App’x 812, 814 (3d Cir.

2010) (requiring specificity for fraud-based RICO claim); Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). This requirement
can be met by pleading the date, place or time, or by injecting precision and some measure of
substantiation into the allegations. Morales, 398 F. App’x at 814.
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege specific instances of fraud at any point in the Complaint.
Plaintiff relies exclusively on vague and conclusory statements such as “[e]ach retaliatory action
fits a pattern . . . meeting the RICO threshold of concerted enterprise conduct through repeated
predicate acts of obstruction, fraud, and deprivation of rights.” See id. at 8. But “Plaintiff[] may
not rest upon vague or conclusory allegations of fraud.” Weiss v. First Unum Life Ins., No. 02-
4249, 2003 WL 25713970, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 27, 2003) (citation omitted) (holding that plaintiff’s
allegations of fraud failed because plaintiff did not specify which specific fraudulent acts the
particular defendants were alleged to have engaged in). Because Plaintiff has failed to plead
sufficient facts to support his RICO claim under § 1962(c), Count V is DISMISSED without
prejudice as to both the Township and the LPD.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above,
IT IS, on this 23rd day of June, 2026,
ORDERED that Livingston Township’s Motion to Dismiss, D.E. 9, is GRANTED and it
is further
ORDERED that Counts I, I, and VII against the Livingston Police Department are
DISMISSED with prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED that Counts I, II, and VII against the Livingston Township are DISMISSED
without prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED that Counts III, IV, V, and VI'° are DISMISSED without prejudice as to both
the Livingston Police Department and the Livingston Township; and it is finally
ORDERED that Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within 45 days of this Order. □□
Fuky Tod
“Evelyn Padin, U.S.D.J.

‘0 Because the Court dismisses all of Plaintiff’s federal claims, it declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state-law claims in Count VI. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“If the federal claims are dismissed before trial . . .
the state claims should be dismissed as well.”).
While the Court provides Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint, see Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236,
the Court cautions Plaintiff that “cany amendment must have a good faith basis on which [p]laintiff
can proceed,” Uygur v. Gensler, No. 24-975, 2024 WL 3497888, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 2024).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366113. Public record. Not legal advice.