# Opinion

> District Court, M.D. Florida · April 15, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366109

## Case

- **Full name:** Aliesky Alvarez Sanchez v. Warden, Glades County Detention Center, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** April 15, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

ALIESKY ALVAREZ SANCHEZ,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 2:26-cv-812-JES-NPM

WARDEN, GLADES COUNTY
DETENTION CENTER, et al.,

Respondents.
___________________________________
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Petitioner Aliesky Alvarez Sanchez’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), the government’s
response (Doc. 6), and Petitioner’s replies (Doc. 7; Doc. 8). For
the reasons below, the Court grants the petition to the extent set
forth in this Order.
I. Background
Alverez Sanchez is a native and citizen of Cuba who entered
the United States on February 8, 2023, pursuant to a grant of
humanitarian parole and was processed as an arriving alien. (doc.
1 at 2). Alverez Sanchez has a United States citizen child and
close family members in the United States who are lawful permanent
resident. (Doc. 1 at 5).
On March 12, 2026, Alverez Sanchez was arrested by Miami-Dade
police on charges of five counts of filing false insurance claims
pertaining to vehicle collisions and four counts of grand theft.
(Doc. 6 at 2). After he bonded out of state criminal court, the
police turned Alvarez Sanchez over to Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) the same day. (Doc. 1 at 5; Doc. 6 at 2).

Alvarez Sanchez is now detained at the Glades County Detention
Center under the mandatory provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
(Doc. 1 at 5; Doc. 6 at 3). He argues that he is entitled to
either release or to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
(Doc. 1 at 8–9).
II. Discussion
The core dispute before this Court is whether 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2) or § 1226(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) applies to Alvarez Sanchez. The distinction matters
because § 1225(b)(2) mandates detention throughout removal
proceedings, whereas noncitizens detained under § 1226(a) have the
right to a bond hearing before an immigration judge.

Section 1225(b)(1) establishes the procedures for expedited
removal. It allows immigration officers to remove noncitizens
“without further hearing or review.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
As expedited removal affords substantially fewer protections to
the noncitizen's rights, the INA limits its applicability in two
ways. First, noncitizens may be eligible for expedited removal
“only if they are inadmissible on the basis that they either lack
proper entry documents or falsified or misrepresented their
application for admission.” Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights
v. Noem, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48,61 (D.D.C. 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§
1225(b)(1)(A)(i) and 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7)). And “[a]mong that
set, only two categories of noncitizens are eligible for expedited

removal: (1) noncitizens ‘arriving in the United States,’ and (2)
noncitizens who ‘ha[ve] not been admitted or paroled into the
United States’ and cannot affirmatively show that they have been
‘physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-
year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of
inadmissibility.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–
(iii)).
Section 1226 of the INA also “authorizes the Government to
detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome
of removal proceedings[.]” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281,
289 (2018). But § 1226 provides additional safeguards, including
the right to an individualized bond hearing. Id. at 306 (“Federal

regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive
bond hearings at the outset of detention.”) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§
236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)). Noncitizens already in the country
are treated differently than those seeking entry. As the Supreme
Court observed, “our immigration laws have long made a distinction
between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission
. . . and those who are within the United States after an entry,
irrespective of its legality. In the latter instance, the Court
has recognized additional rights and privileges not extended to
those in the former category who are merely ‘on the threshold of
initial entry.’” Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958)
(quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206

(1953)); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“But
once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes,
for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the
United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is
lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”). And until recently,
DHS has treated aliens—such as Alvarez Sanchez—already present in
the country as detained under § 1226 and entitled to bond hearings.1
Respondents argue that, despite having resided in the United
States for more than three years, Alvarez Sanchez is properly
detained under section 1225(b).2 Indeed, the Court recognizes that

1 The Government’s recent about-face toward mass mandatory
detention under § 1225 was blessed by the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) in In re Yajure Hurtado, 29 I.& N. Dec. 216, 229
(B.I.A. 2025). But the Court owes no deference to the BIA’s
statutory interpretations. In 2024, the Supreme Court concluded
that “agencies have no special competence in resolving statutory
ambiguities. Courts do.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603
U.S. 369, 400–01 (2024). And “[c]ourts interpret statutes, no
matter the context, based on the traditional tools of statutory
construction, not individual policy preferences.” Id. at 403.
2 In Patel v. Hardin, No. 2:25-cv-870-JES-NPM (M.D. Fla. Dec.
1, 2025), Respondents argued that the Court lacks jurisdiction to
consider this petition and that the petitioner has not properly
exhausted his administrative remedies. The Court rejected those
arguments in Patel and in scores of other recent cases presenting
the same issues. See, e.g., Cetino v. Hardin, No. 2:25-cv-1037-
JES-DNF (M.D. Fla. Dec. 12, 2025); Reyes Rodriguez v. Florida
Southside Facility, No. 2:25-cv-1012-JES-DNF (M.D. Fla. Dec. 15,
2025). In those cases, the Court was satisfied of its jurisdiction
in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, et al.,166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026)
and Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-3248, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir. Mar. 25,
2026), the Fifth Circuit and Eighth Circuits concluded that most

noncitizens apprehended anywhere in the United States are never
eligible for release on bond, no matter how long they have resided
inside the United States. This is contrary to the conclusions
reached by the overwhelming majority of district court judges to
have considered the issue. See also Castanon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1060–62 (7th Cir 2005)
(concluding that the government was unlikely to prevail on the
merits that petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under §
1225(b)(2)(A)). This Court respectfully disagrees with the Fifth
and Eighth Circuits’ analyses and finds the analysis in Castanon-
Nava and the dissents in Buenrostro-Mendez and Avila to be more
persuasive on the statutory interpretation issue. In any event,

neither Buenrostro-Mendez nor Avila are binding precedent in this
Court.
The government could have detained Alvarez Sanchez when he
entered the country in 2023. Instead, they released him and
allowed him to stay for more than three years before rearresting
him. Thus, the Court rejects the government’s argument that
Alvarez Sanchez is subject to expedited removal and concludes that

and determined that exhaustion was excused because it would be
futile. The Court’s reasoning on these issues also applies here.
Respondents’ authority to detain him stems from section 1226(a).
As a noncitizen detained under section 1226(a), Alvarez Sanchez
has a right to a bond hearing.

The Court will thus order Respondents to either bring Alvarez
Sanchez before an immigration judge for a merit-based § 1226 bond
hearing or release him within ten days. To satisfy this Order,
the hearing must include consideration of all evidence properly
submitted by the petitioner and the factors announced in In re
Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37 (BIA 2006), and Alvarez Sanchez’s
counsel must be given at least 48 hours’ notice of the hearing,
but only if they enter their appearance in the Executive Office of
Immigration Review’s online filing system in time to receive the
notice.
The Court is aware that the Executive Office for Immigration
Review (“EOIR”) is the agency that schedules bond hearings. In

other cases, Respondents have claimed they cannot direct the EOIR
when to conduct a bond hearing. Regardless, subjecting Alvarez
Sanchez to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1) is unlawful. If
Respondents are unable to ensure that Alvarez Sanchez timely
receives the meaningful and thorough bond hearing to which he is
entitled under § 1226(a), they must release him.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED:
1. Aliesky Alvarez Sanchez’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (Doc. 1) is GRANTED to the extent set forth in this Order.
2, Within TEN (10) DAYS Respondents shall either provide
Alvarez Sanchez with the statutory process required under § 1226—
which includes a merit-based bond hearing—-or release him under
reasonable conditions of supervision.?
3, If Respondents release Alvarez Sanchez, they shall
facilitate his transportation from the detention facility by
notifying his counsel when and where he may be collected.
4. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any pending motions
and deadlines, enter judgment, and close the case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on April 15, 2026,

ON E
JGHH E. STEELE
SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

3 In recent cases in the Middle District of Florida—and
despite being ordered to do so-the immigration judge has refused
to provide a merit-based bond hearing, determining that under
Hurtado he had no discretion to issue a bond. See e.g., Fernandez
Alvarez v. Noem, et al., No. 2:26-cv-313-SPC-DNF (M.D. Fla. Mar.
4, 2026); Nahadian Fard v. Bondi, et al., No. 6:26-cv-157-GAP-RMN,
Doc. 23 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2026). If the immigration judge in
this case reaches the same conclusion or otherwise declines to
consider bond, Petitioner must be released.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366109. Public record. Not legal advice.