# CEZUS

> District Court, D. New Jersey · June 23, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366086

## Case

- **Full name:** James Cezus and other similarly situated employees v. Konica Minolta Business Solutions U.S.A., Inc.
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** June 23, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JAMES CEZUS and other similarly situated

employees,
Civil Action No. 21-792 (JXN)(LDW)

Plaintiffs,

OPINION
v.

KONICA MINOLTA BUSINESS
SOLUTIONS U.S.A., INC.,

Defendant.

NEALS, District Judge
Before the Court is Plaintiff James Cezus’s (“Plaintiff”) motion for class certification
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure1 23. (ECF No. 100.) Defendant Konica Minolta Business
Solutions, U.S.A., Inc. (“Defendant”) opposed (ECF No. 101); and Plaintiff replied (ECF No.
102). This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and
the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (“CAFA”). The action was removed to this
Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446(a) and 1441(a). The Court has carefully considered the
parties’ submissions and decides this matter without oral argument pursuant to Rule 78 and Local
Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion for class certification is
GRANTED.

1 “Rule” or “Rules” hereinafter refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Statement of Facts
i. The Relocation
Two Japanese technology companies merged in 2003 to form Defendant. (DeSantis Aff. ¶

3, ECF No. 101-2.) One company, Konica, had an office in Windsor, Connecticut (“Windsor
Office”). (Id.) The other, Minolta, had an office in Ramsey, New Jersey (“Ramsey Office”). (Id.)
Though Defendant initially maintained both offices after the merger (id.), by 2016, Defendant
sought to consolidate its operations in one place. (Id. ¶ 11.) After reviewing several possible
locations for a new headquarters, Defendant chose to move most of its Windsor operations to the
Ramsey Office. (Id. ¶ 14.)
In connection with its consolidation plan, Defendant applied for tax credits through the
“Grow NJ program” in September 2017. (See id. ¶¶ 19–21; DeSantis Ex. A (“Grow NJ Appl.”),
ECF No. 107-4.) Grow NJ was an “economic development program intended to encourage the
retention and creation of jobs in New Jersey.” (DeSantis Aff. ¶ 19.) Under the program, a business

that “created and/or retained jobs in New Jersey and made certain capital investments could be
eligible for tax credits over a [ten]-year period, per job and per year.” (Id.) To obtain Grow NJ tax
credits, Defendant committed to (a) bring “approximately 400 additional jobs to New Jersey,” with
at least 300 of those jobs coming from the Windsor Office; (b) invest more than $19 million in
expanding the Ramsey Office; and (c) maintain the Ramsey Office as Defendant’s headquarters
for at least fifteen years. (Id. ¶ 24; Grow NJ Appl.) As part of its application, Defendant supplied
the New Jersey Economic Development Authority (“EDA”) with a list of 852 employees working
in the Windsor and Ramsey Offices, along with forty-eight new positions Defendant expected to
fill. (DeSantis Aff. ¶ 25; DeSantis Ex. B (“EDA Emp. Spreadsheet”), ECF No. 107-5.)
Two months later, on November 14, 2017, the EDA approved Defendant’s Grow NJ
application. (DeSantis Aff. ¶ 27; DeSantis Ex. C (“EDA Approval Letter”), ECF No. 107-6.) The
EDA offered Defendant over $29 million in tax credits. (EDA Approval Letter at 3.) In exchange,
Defendant agreed to create 391 new jobs, most of which would be transferred from the Windsor

Office. (Id. at 2; DeSantis Aff. ¶ 27.)
The next day, Defendant’s CEO2 announced the company’s relocation plans in an
employee town hall meeting at the Windsor Office. (McVeigh Aff. ¶ 12, ECF No. 101-4.) The
CEO explained most jobs at the Windsor Office would be transferred to the Ramsey Office within
6 to 18 months. (Id. ¶ 13.) According to the CEO, Windsor Office employees could continue
working for Defendant at its Ramsey, Arizona, or Florida offices, and would be eligible for
relocation benefits. (Id.; Cezus Dep. 32:18–23, ECF No. 101-1.) The CEO advised that affected
employees who refused to accept a transfer would not receive severance benefits. (McVeigh Aff.
¶ 13; Cezus Dep. 46:1–47:22.) Defendant regularly emailed Windsor Office employees in the
following months reiterating that employees who transferred from Windsor to Ramsey would keep

their title, pay, and seniority and get a relocation bonus; but that employees who refused to transfer
would not receive severance. (McVeigh Aff. ¶¶ 17–21.)
Between mid-2018 and October 2018, Defendant sent each soon-to-be-relocated employee
a sixty-day notification letter, notifying the employee that their position would be transferred and
setting a deadline for the employee to inform Defendant whether they would transfer with their
position. (Id. ¶ 22.) By early October 2018, Defendant “determined that all departments and
positions that were relocating to Ramsey would move by the end of 2018.” (Id. ¶ 24.)

2 Richard K. Taylor.
By the end of 2018, eighty-four employees transferred from the Windsor Office. (See Pl.’s
Ex. L (“Affected Emp. List”), ECF No. 107-1.) Another large group of employees resigned before
the final transfer. (Id.) Roughly 120 employees refused to transfer and kept working at the Windsor
Office until the final transfer; they were terminated on December 14, 2018. (Id.) A handful of

positions at the Windsor Office were not transferred. (McVeigh Aff. ¶ 35.) Some departments
“were always expected to stay” at the Windsor Office. (Id.) Other positions were “duplicative of
positions” at the Ramsey Office, and were eliminated. (Id.) Employees in duplicative positions
were given severance. (Id.) In 2025, Defendant sold the Windsor Office at a loss. (DeSantis Aff.
¶ 45.)
ii. The Severance Plan
Defendant adopted a severance plan (“Plan”) in 2015. (See McVeigh Ex. A (“Plan”) § 1.3,
ECF No. 101-4.) The Plan was a “welfare benefit plan,” as defined by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. (Id. § 1.2.) Under the Plan, an employee
is eligible for severance if the employee is terminated due to an “Eligible Event.” (Id. § 3.1.) A

reduction in force (“RIF”) is an “Eligible Event.” (Id. § 2.5.) Within the Plan, a RIF means
Defendant (a) has permanently eliminated one or more jobs and (b) has classified the termination
as a RIF. (Id. § 2.15.) The Plan allowed Defendant to “determine, in its sole and absolute discretion,
whether or not an employee has a Termination of Employment due to a [RIF].” (Id.) A RIF,
however, does not include an employee’s resignation, regardless of the reason. (Id.) Moreover, the
Plan barred severance for any employee “who has refused an offer of employment in another
division, department, office, or unit of the Company.” (Id. § 3.1.01.)
iii. Plaintiff
Plaintiff worked for Konica and, later, Defendant in the Windsor Office from 1985 to 2018.
(Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) ¶¶ 28–30, ECF No. 25.) On October 15, 2018, Plaintiff received
notice that his position was being moved to Ramsey. (Cezus Dep. at 73:9–23.) Plaintiff had one

week to inform Defendant about whether he would transfer. (Id.) Plaintiff told Defendant he would
not accept the transfer. (Id. at 75:3–25.) Thereafter, Plaintiff worked at the Windsor Office until
he was terminated on December 14, 2018. (See McVeigh Aff. ¶ 34; Affected Emp. List.) Plaintiff
sought severance benefits, which Defendant’s Plan Administrator denied, as Plaintiff refused to
transfer to the Ramsey Office. (SAC ¶¶ 72–73.) The Plan Administrator then denied Plaintiff’s
appeal. (Id. ¶ 85.)
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed this putative class action lawsuit in New Jersey Superior Court on December
17, 2020. (See Compl., ECF No. 1-1.) Defendant timely removed to this Court. (See Notice of
Removal, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff amended the Complaint twice. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 14; SAC.)

The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant used the relocation from Windsor
to Ramsey as a guise to conduct a mass layoff without having to pay severance. (SAC ¶¶ 41–46.)
Plaintiff argues that Defendant knew most Windsor employees, including Plaintiff, would not
accept a transfer to a facility 123 miles away. (Id. ¶¶ 46, 50, 59.) Plaintiff claims Defendant kept
the Windsor Office open, but never filled the relocation-induced vacancies, resulting in what is
effectively a reduction in force. (Id. ¶ 54.) And, according to Plaintiff, had Defendant properly
designated Plaintiff’s position as “eliminated,” he would have been eligible for severance. (Id. ¶
60.) Plaintiff brought the Second Amended Complaint and now seeks to certify on behalf of the
following class:
All eligible participants in Konica Minolta Business Solutions, U.S.A, Inc.’s
severance and/or retirement plan entitled Amended and Restated Konica
Minolta Severance Plan adopted and effective January 1, 2015 (“The Plan” or
“Severance Plan”), who, as employees of the Company, experienced
Termination of Employment under the guise of relocating Plaintiff, and
similarly situated employees, to new positions at a New Jersey facility of the
Company, which Defendant knew would be near impossible for the proposed
employee Class Members to accept, and as such, would suffer termination. As
these employees were not intended to be replaced and their positions were
planned to be eliminated and/or consolidated, these employees were eligible for,
yet denied benefits under the Plan.

(Id. ¶ 95; Pl.’s Moving Br. at 9, ECF No. 100-1.)
Plaintiff moved for class certification on November 21, 2025. (See Mot. for Class Certif.,
ECF No. 100.) Plaintiff argues (1) his proposed class is numerous because it includes up to 400
Windsor Office employees; (2) this case raises at least one common question of fact or law because
class-wide liability depends on interpreting the Plan and on whether Defendant disguised a RIF as
a relocation; (3) his claims are typical of the class because he does not assert any claims for
anything aside from severance benefits; (4) he is an adequate class representative because his
interests do not conflict with those of class members, and his counsel will secure “the best possible
recovery” for the class; and (5) the class is readily ascertainable based on data Plaintiff could obtain
from the Plan’s administrator through class discovery. (Pl.’s Moving Br. at 14–20, ECF No. 100-
1.)
Plaintiff claims the Court may certify the class under Rules 23(b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3).
Plaintiff states that certification is proper under Rule 23(b)(1) because the Plan Administrator has
a duty to treat all class members alike, and separate lawsuits could force the Plan Administrator to
treat plan members differently. (Id. at 20–22.) According to Plaintiff, certification under Rule
23(b)(2) would also be proper because Defendant has refused to act on grounds applicable to the
entire class, such that injunctive relief would be appropriate. (Id. at 22.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges
that certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3) because (a) common questions of law
predominate over individual questions, as the same provisions of the Plan apply to all class
members and all class members were subject to the relocation; and (b) a class action is superior to
class members bringing individual lawsuits.

Defendant does not oppose Plaintiff’s class certification motion based on numerosity or
adequacy of Plaintiff’s counsel. (See Def.’s Opp’n at 25 n.14, ECF No. 101.) Rather, Defendant
argues that (1) Plaintiff’s theory that the relocation was a RIF in disguise lacks support in the
record; (2) this case does not present a common question of law or fact because the Plan’s
eligibility requirements for severance must be determined on an employee-by-employee basis, and
the Plan gives Defendant sole discretion to determine whether an employee was terminated due to
a RIF; (3) a common question does not predominate because “each class member must prove that
his or her position was not transferred to Ramsey, but was in fact eliminated”; (4) plaintiff fails to
show the class is “clearly defined” or “ascertainable”; (5) certification under Rule 23(b)(1) is
inappropriate because the Plan Administrator must determine severance eligibility on an

employee-by-employee basis; and (6) certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is unwarranted because the
Second Amended Complaint does not seek injunctive relief. (See generally id.) Plaintiff replied.
(See Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 102.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 23 sets forth a two-pronged standard for class certification. To obtain certification, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the putative class meets the threshold requirements of Rule 23(a)
as well as one of the three Rule 23(b) categories under which she wishes to proceed on behalf of a
class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 590 (3d Cir. 2012).
Under Rule 23(a), a class may be certified only if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class;
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)–(4). These four requirements are respectively referred to as “(1) numerosity;
(2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of representation.” In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am.
Sales Prac. Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 308–09 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Comcast Corp. v.
Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013).
Rule 23(a)(1) calls for certification if “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). A class is generally numerous “if the named plaintiff
demonstrates that the potential number of plaintiffs exceeds 40.” Marcus, 687 F.3d at 595. Under
Rule 23(a)(2), the commonality requirement is satisfied where “there are questions of law or fact
common to the class.”3 Plaintiffs also must show the “claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).4 Under Rule

23(a)(4), the representative parties must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. See
Beck v. Maximus, Inc., 457 F.3d 291, 296 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that adequacy “assures that the

3 “Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement requires that the putative class members ‘share at least one question of
fact or law in common with each other.’” Reinig v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 912 F.3d 115, 127 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting In
re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 528 (3d Cir. 2004)). Commonality “does not require that all class
members share identical claims, and indeed factual differences among the claims of the putative class members do not
defeat certification,” In re AremisSoft Corp. Sec. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 109, 120 (D.N.J. 2002) (internal citation and
quotation omitted). “Since a single question of fact suffices to satisfy commonality,” this requirement “is easily met.”
Bing Li v. Aeterna Zentaris, Inc., 324 F.R.D. 331, 339 (D.N.J. 2018).
4 “The typicality requirement ‘centers on whether the interests of the named plaintiffs align with the interests of the
absent members.’” Roofer’s Pension Fund v. Papa, 333 F.R.D. 66, 75 (D.N.J. 2019) (quoting Stewart v. Abraham,
275 F.3d 220, 227 (3d Cir. 2001)). “The standard for demonstrating typicality is undemanding and requires that ‘the
claims of the named plaintiffs and putative class members involve the same conduct by the defendant.’” Id. (quoting
Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 183-84 (3d Cir. 2001). “Complete factual
similarity is not required [to establish typicality]; just enough factual similarity so that maintaining the class action is
reasonably economical and the interests of the other class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their
absence.” In re Schering Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 589 F.3d 585, 598 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted).
named plaintiffs’ claims are not antagonistic to the class and that the attorneys for the class
representatives are experienced and qualified.”); New Directions Treatment Servs. v. City of
Reading, 490 F.3d 293, 313 (3d Cir. 2007) (observing that Rule 23(a)(4) “mainly seeks ‘to uncover
conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent.’” (citation

omitted)).
“If the Rule 23(a) criteria are satisfied, the court must also find that the class fits within
one of the three categories of class actions defined in Rule 23(b).” Prudential, 148 F.3d at 309.
Rule 23(b)(1) covers matters where separate actions by or against individual class members would
create a risk of “incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class,” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(b)(1)(A),5 or would either “as a practical matter . . . be dispositive of the interests” of
nonparty class members or “substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests,”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).6
Rule 23(b)(2) “permits class actions for declaratory or injunctive relief where ‘the party
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class.’”

Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 614. “Civil rights cases against parties charged with unlawful, class-
based discrimination are prime examples.” Id.
Rule 23(b)(3) applies when “‘class-action treatment is not as clearly called for’ as it is in
Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) situations, Rule 23(b)(3) permits certification where class suit ‘may
nevertheless be convenient and desirable.’” Id. at 615 (citation omitted). Rule 23(b)(3) has two
requirements: (1) “that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over

5 Rule 23(b)(1)(A) applies “where the party is obliged by law to treat the members of the class alike (a utility acting
toward customers; a government imposing a tax), or where the party must treat all alike as a matter of practical
necessity (a riparian owner using water as against downriver owners).” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 614 (1997) (citation omitted).
6 Rule 23(b)(1)(B) “includes, for example, ‘limited fund’ cases, instances in which numerous persons make claims
against a fund insufficient to satisfy all claims.” Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 614 (citation omitted).
any questions affecting only individual members” and (2) “that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
The Third Circuit has also recognized an “implicit ascertainability requirement,” Byrd v.
Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015), which the Court must consider “[p]rior to

determining whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been met,” Carney v. Goldman, No. 15-
260, 2018 WL 2441766, at *10 (D.N.J. May 30, 2018). A class is ascertainable if: (1) it can be
“defined with reference to objective criteria; and (2) there is a reliable and administratively feasible
mechanism for determining whether putative class members fall within the class definition.” Byrd,
784 F.3d at 163 (cleaned up). Ascertainability must be demonstrated under the same “rigorous”
standards provided for by Rule 23, which requires a plaintiff to present “evidentiary support” that
the proposed method of ascertaining a class will succeed. Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300,
306–07 (3d Cir. 2013).
Rule 23 “does not set forth a mere pleading standard.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564
U.S. 338, 350 (2011). The plaintiff “must affirmatively demonstrate his [or her] compliance with

the Rule—that is, he [or she] must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous
parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.” Id. “[T]o certify a class the district court must find
that the evidence more likely than not establishes each fact necessary to meet the requirements of
Rule 23.” In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 320 (3d Cir. 2008).
“[C]ertification is proper only if ‘the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that
the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.’” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350–51 (quoting Gen.
Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)). “The same analytical principles govern Rule
23(b).” Behrend, 569 U.S. at 34. Frequently, the Court’s “rigorous analysis” will “overlap with the
merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim.” Dukes, 564 U.S. at 351. Rule 23 “gives no license to
shy away from making factual findings that are necessary to determine whether the Rule’s
requirements have been met.” Marcus, 687 F.3d at 591. But Rule 23 does not empower a court “to
engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage.” Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans
& Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 466 (2013). “Merits questions may be considered to the extent—but

only to the extent—that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for
class certification are satisfied.” Id. The decision to certify a class is left to the discretion of the
court. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 310.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Class is Ascertainable
The Court must consider the “implicit ascertainability requirement,” Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163,
“[p]rior to determining whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been met.” Carney, 2018 WL
2441766, at *10. Again, a class is ascertainable if: (1) it can be “defined with reference to objective
criteria; and (2) there is a reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for determining
whether putative class members fall within the class definition.” Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163. “If class

members are impossible to identify without extensive and individualized fact-finding or ‘mini-
trials,’ then a class action is inappropriate.” Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593. “Some courts have held that
where nothing in company databases shows or could show whether individuals should be included
in the proposed class, the class definition fails.” Id. (collecting cases).
Here, Plaintiff defines the proposed class as:
All eligible participants in [the Plan], who, as employees of the Company,
experienced Termination of Employment under the guise of relocating Plaintiff,
and similarly situated employees, to new positions at a New Jersey facility of
the Company, which Defendant knew would be near impossible for the
proposed employee Class Members to accept, and as such, would suffer
termination. As these employees were not intended to be replaced and their
positions were planned to be eliminated and/or consolidated, these employees
were eligible for, yet denied benefits under the Plan.
(Compl. ¶ 95.)
The Court finds that the proposed class is “currently and readily ascertainable based on
objective criteria.” Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593. Courts must determine: (1) whether the defined class
specifies “a particular group that was harmed during a particular time frame, in a particular
location, in a particular way” and (2) whether it can “ascertain the class’s membership in an
objective manner.” Lutz Surgical Partners PLLC v. Aetna, Inc., No. 15-2595, 2023 WL 2153806
at *7 (D.N.J. Feb. 21, 2023) (cleaned up).
If a class is certified, the certification order or opinion “must include (1) a readily
discernible, clear, and precise statement of the parameters defining the class or classes to be

certified, and (2) a readily discernible, clear, and complete list of the claims, issues or defenses to
be treated on a class basis.” Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 320–21 (quoting Wachtel v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 453 F.3d 179, 187 (3d Cir. 2006)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B). “Clearly
delineating the contours of the class along with the issues, claims, and defenses to be given class
treatment serves several important purposes, such as providing the parties with clarity and assisting
class members in understanding their rights and making informed opt-out decisions.” Marcus, 687
F.3d at 591–92 (citing Wachtel, 453 F.3d at 187).
Here, the proposed class includes every employee in the Windsor Office: (1) whose
position was selected for transfer from the Windsor Office during the relocation effort; (2) who

did not accept the transfer; (3) who was terminated after refusing the transfer; and (4) who was
ineligible for severance benefits under the Plan as an employee “who has refused an offer of
employment in another division, department, office, or unit of the Company.” (Plan § 3.1.01.) The
Court readily finds this class (1) can be “defined with reference to objective criteria; and (2) there
is a reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for determining whether putative class
members fall within the class definition.” Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163. The proposed class members are
capable of identification without extensive and individualized fact-finding or “mini-trials.”
Marcus, 687 F.3d at 591–92. Company databases could readily show whether individuals should
be included in the proposed class. As such, the proposed class meets the “implicit ascertainability
requirement.”7 Id. Accordingly, the Court proceeds to determine whether the requirements of Rule

23 have been met. See Carney, 2018 WL 2441766, at *10.
B. The Class Satisfies Rule 23(a)
i. Numerosity
Rule 23(a)(1) requires that a class be “so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable.” No minimum number of plaintiffs “is required to maintain a suit as a class action,
but generally if the named plaintiff demonstrates that the potential number of plaintiffs exceeds
40,” the prong is met. Stewart, 275 F.3d at 226–27.
Plaintiff asserts that the putative members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable. Plaintiff contends that the Class includes up to approximately 400

Windsor, Connecticut employees formerly employed by Defendant whose positions were affected
by Defendant’s improper denial of benefits and identified on KMBS’ “Relocation/Termination
list” but no less than 100. (Pl.’s Moving Br. at 14.) Because classes of more than forty members
are numerous, the Court concludes Plaintiff satisfies Rule 23(a)(1). See Mulder v. PCS Health Sys.,
216 F.R.D. 307, 312 (D.N.J. 2003).

7 Defendants argue briefly that Plaintiff has not met the ascertainability requirement because Plaintiff “offers only
vague references to several different proposed class sizes.” (Def.’s Opp’n at 37.) The Court disagrees. The question
is whether a class (1) can be “defined with reference to objective criteria”; and (2) there is a reliable and
administratively feasible mechanism for determining whether putative class members fall within the class definition.”
Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163. As discussed above, this class meets both prongs.
ii. Commonality
Rule 23(a)(2) requires “questions of law or fact common to the class.” “The commonality
requirement will be satisfied if the named plaintiffs share at least one question of fact or law with
the grievances of the prospective class.” Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994). “[O]nly

one question of law or fact in common is necessary to satisfy the commonality requirement . . . .”
Schering Plough, 589 F.3d at 597 n.10. “The bar for establishing commonality is ‘not high’ and is
‘easily met.’” In re Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 17-699, 2024 WL 416500, at *19 (D.N.J. Feb. 5,
2024) (quoting In re Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust Litig., No. 03-4730, 2017 WL 275398,
at *23 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017)). “However, a bald assertion that all putative class members
suffered a violation of the same law is generally insufficient to satisfy the commonality
requirement.” Id. What matters “is not the raising of common ‘questions’—even in droves—but
rather, the capacity of a class-wide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the
resolution of the litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have the potential to
impede the generation of common answers.” Ferreras v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 946 F.3d 178, 185 (3d

Cir. 2019) (quoting Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350).
Plaintiff claims this case presents common questions of liability and relief. First, Plaintiff
argues that classwide liability requires interpreting and applying Plan provisions applicable to all
members of the class, including whether Defendant used the relocation as a guise to conduct a RIF
without having to pay putative class members severance benefits. (Pl.’s Moving Br. at 15–16.)
Relatedly, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s interpretation of what constitutes a RIF under the Plan
is common to all class members. (Id. at 16.) Plaintiff also contends that the amount of relief will
be based on benefits calculated in conformity with the proper interpretation of the Plan and ERISA.
(Id. at 15.)
The Court agrees. A classwide proceeding can generate common answers to resolve this
litigation, including (1) whether the relocation constituted a RIF under the Plan; (2) whether
Defendant conducted a RIF under the guise of a relocation to avoid paying benefits under the Plan;
and (3) whether class members “refused an offer of employment in another division, department,

office, or unit of the Company.” (Plan § 3.1.01.) “The ‘glue’ holding the class’s ERISA claims
together is, in other words, is the common reason why their statutory rights and plan benefits were
allegedly denied.” Franco v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 289 F.R.D. 121, 131 (D.N.J. 2013), aff’d,
647 F. App’x 76 (3d Cir. 2016); see also Cockerill v. Corteva, Inc., 345 F.R.D. 81, 106 (E.D. Pa.
2023) (“Because the claims center on how the Employers acted toward the classes as a whole, their
disposition is common to all class members.”) The Court, accordingly, finds that Plaintiff satisfies
the commonality requirement.
iii. Typicality
Rule 23(a)(3) is satisfied where “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” To evaluate typicality, courts ask whether the named

plaintiffs’ claims are “typical, in common-sense terms, of the class, thus suggesting that the
incentives of the plaintiffs are aligned with those of the class.” Beck, 457 F.3d at 296 (quoting
Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 55). “The standard for demonstrating typicality is undemanding and requires
that ‘the claims of the named plaintiffs and putative class members involve the same conduct by
the defendant.’” Papa, 333 F.R.D. at 75 (quoting Newton, 259 F.3d at 183–84). Typicality has
three components:
(1) the claims of the class representative must be generally the same as those of the
class in terms of both (a) the legal theory advanced and (b) the factual circumstances
underlying that theory; (2) the class representative must not be subject to a defense
that is both inapplicable to many members of the class and likely to become a major
focus of the litigation; and (3) the interests and incentives of the representative must
be sufficiently aligned with those of the class.
Schering Plough, 589 F.3d at 599.
Plaintiff’s claims use the same legal theories and underlying facts as those of the class.
Both Plaintiff’s and the class’s claims (1) interpret Plan provisions applicable to all members of
the class; and (2) assert that Defendant used the relocation as a guise to conduct a RIF and avoid

paying severance benefits under the Plan. Plaintiff’s interests align with those of the class because
Plaintiff seeks to enforce fiduciary duties and recover benefits owed to all class members under
the Plan.
Plaintiff’s interests do not appear to conflict those of the Class. Nor does it appear
Defendant has a unique defense against Plaintiff that would interfere with Plaintiff’s representation
of the class. Accordingly, the Court concludes Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and
protect the interests of the members of the Class. Further, Plaintiff and members of the proposed
Class have a similar interest in recovering any losses due to them under the Plan because of
Defendant’s conduct. Moreover, Plaintiff contends that he does not assert any claims relating to
the Plan in addition to or different than those of the Class. (Pl.’s Moving Br. at 16–17.) The Court,

therefore, concludes by a preponderance of evidence that Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims
of Class members.
iv. Adequacy
Under Rule 23(a)(4), a class may not be certified unless the representative class members
“will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Adequacy involves a two-pronged
test: “first, the named plaintiff’s interests must be sufficiently aligned with the interests of the
absentees; and second, the plaintiff’s counsel must be qualified to represent the class.” Lutz, 2023
WL 2153806, at *10. “Rule 23(a)’s adequacy of representation requirement serves to uncover
conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent.” In re Pet Food
Prod. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 343 (3d Cir. 2010) (cleaned up).
As discussed in the Court’s typicality analysis, Plaintiffs’ interests are sufficiently aligned
with any absent members of the proposed class. Although Defendants do not contest the adequacy
of class counsel, the Court notes that proposed Class Counsel, the Clancy Law Firm and Green

Savits, are experienced civil litigators, having more than fifty years combined legal experience in
New York, New Jersey federal and state courts, have engaged in extensive investigation and
discovery in this matter and have experience in complex litigation, class actions and/or ERISA
matters. (See Clancy Decl., ECF No. 100-2; Kaplan-Khodorovsky Decl., ECF No. 100-4); Guidry v.
Wilmington Tr., N.A., 333 F.R.D. 324, 330 (D. Del. 2019) (granting class certification and finding
that “[b]ased on the experience of counsel . . . Plaintiff’s counsel will fairly and adequately represent
the interests of the class.”).
C. The Class May be Certified Under Rule 23(b)(1)
After satisfying the Rule 23(a) requirements, Plaintiffs must also show that the class is
appropriate under Rule 23(b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3). Marcus, 687 F.3d at 590. The Court finds that
certification is proper under Rule 23(b)(1).8 Rule 23(b)(1) provides for certification if:

[P]rosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create
a risk of: (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class
members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class; or (B) adjudications with respect to individual class members
that, as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede
their ability to protect their interests.

Certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) is appropriate “in cases where the party is obliged by
law to treat the members of the class alike . . . or where the party must treat all alike as a matter of

8 Because “the proposed class must satisfy at least one of the three requirements listed in Rule 23(b),” Dukes, 564 U.S.
at 345, the Court need not address Plaintiffs’ argument in the alternative for certification under Rule 23(b)(2) or (b)(3).
practical necessity.” Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 614. This case meets Rule 23(b)(1)(A)’s
requirements because the Plan Administrator has a legal obligation to interpret the terms of the
Plan consistently for all similarly situated participants.9 Individual cases could produce different
interpretations of the Plan and set incompatible standards of conduct for the Plan and its

administrator, which favors a class wide certification. See Luense v. Konica Minolta Bus. Sols.
U.S.A., Inc., No. 20-6827, 2024 WL 2765004, at *8 (D.N.J. May 30, 2024) (“[M]ultiple actions
alleging that Defendants breached their fiduciary duties could lead to inconsistent results and
incompatible standards for Defendants’ conduct moving forward.”); In re Merck & Co., Inc. Sec.,
Derivative & ERISA Litig., No. 05-1151, 2009 WL 331426, at *12 (D.N.J. Feb. 10, 2009)
(“Pursuing separate actions would raise a substantial risk that different courts would reach
inconsistent conclusions about the standards of conduct for the fiduciaries, and that different courts
might order conflicting injunctive or other remedies.”); In re Citigroup Pension Plan ERISA Litig.,
241 F.R.D. 172, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding Rule 23(b)(1)(A) satisfied “because the
defendants have a statutory obligation, as well as a fiduciary responsibility, to ‘treat the members

of the class alike.’”) Thus, class certification is consistent with and satisfies Rule 23(b)(1)(A).
And, because the Plan Administrator must interpret the Plan consistently for similarly
situated participants, resolving a case for one individual class member would, as a practical matter,
resolve the case for all other class members. See Boley v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 337 F.R.D.
626, 639 (E.D. Pa. 2021), aff’d, 36 F.4th 124 (3d Cir. 2022) (“Allowing individual participants to
pursue separate actions would result in outcomes likely to be dispositive of the interests of other

9 Defendant argues that class members are not similarly situated because the Plan Administrator “would be obligated
to consider the individual circumstances of other employees that might be different from Plaintiff’s.” (Def.’s Opp’n
at 39.) Not so. Class members are similarly situated because Plaintiff’s “claims are based on [Defendant’s] conduct,”
i.e., that Defendant disguised a RIF as a relocation effort to deprive all class members of ERISA severance benefits.
Schering Plough, 589 F.3d at 604. Plaintiff’s claims do not, as Defendant argues, depend “on unique facts and
individual relationships.” Id.
Plan participants.”). The Court, accordingly, finds certification is also appropriate under Rule
23(b)(1)(B).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs motion for class certification and appointment of class
representatives and counsel under Rule 23 (ECF No. 100) is GRANTED. An appropriate Order
accompanies this Opinion.

DATED: 6/23/2026 fe _—
JUL VIER NEALS
United Sates District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11366086. Public record. Not legal advice.