# Vasquez-Banegas

> District Court, M.D. Florida · April 13, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11365847

## Case

- **Full name:** Marlon David Vasquez-Banegas v. Pamela Bondi, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** April 13, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION

MARLON DAVID VASQUEZ-BANEGAS,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 2:26-cv-844-JES-NPM

PAMELA BONDI, et al.,

Respondents.
___________________________________
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Petitioner Marlon David Vasquez Banegas’
petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), the government’s
response (Doc. 5), and Vasquez Banegas’ reply (Doc. 6). For the
reasons below, the Court grants the petition to the extent set
forth in this Order.
I. Background
Vasquez Banegas is a native and citizen of Honduras who
entered the United States without inspection in 2014. (Doc. 4 at
2). He was not detained at the border. Vasquez Banegas’ children
are United States citizens. (Doc. 1 at 2). He has no criminal
history. (Id.)
On September 2, 2025, Vasquez Banegas was arrested when he
was a passenger in a car pulled over for an allegedly illegal
window tint. (Doc. 4-1 at 3). He is now detained at the Glades
County Detention Center under the mandatory provisions of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2). (Doc. 4 at 2). Vasquez Banegas argues that he is
entitled to either release or to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a). (Doc. 1 at 4).

II. Discussion
The core dispute before this Court is whether 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2) or § 1226(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) applies to Vasquez Banegas. The distinction matters
because § 1225(b)(2) mandates detention throughout removal
proceedings, whereas noncitizens detained under § 1226(a) have the
right to a bond hearing before an immigration judge.
Section 1225(b)(1) establishes the procedures for expedited
removal. It allows immigration officers to remove noncitizens
“without further hearing or review.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
As expedited removal affords substantially fewer protections to
the noncitizen's rights, the INA limits its applicability in two

ways. First, noncitizens may be eligible for expedited removal
“only if they are inadmissible on the basis that they either lack
proper entry documents or falsified or misrepresented their
application for admission.” Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights
v. Noem, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48,61 (D.D.C. 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§
1225(b)(1)(A)(i) and 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7)). And “[a]mong that
set, only two categories of noncitizens are eligible for expedited
removal: (1) noncitizens ‘arriving in the United States,’ and (2)
noncitizens who ‘ha[ve] not been admitted or paroled into the
United States’ and cannot affirmatively show that they have been
‘physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-
year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of

inadmissibility.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–
(iii)).
Section 1226 of the INA also “authorizes the Government to
detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome
of removal proceedings[.]” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281,
289 (2018). But § 1226 provides additional safeguards, including
the right to an individualized bond hearing. Id. at 306 (“Federal
regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive
bond hearings at the outset of detention.”)(citing 8 C.F.R. §§
236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)). Noncitizens already in the country
are treated differently than those seeking entry. As the Supreme
Court observed, “our immigration laws have long made a distinction

between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission
. . . and those who are within the United States after an entry,
irrespective of its legality. In the latter instance, the Court
has recognized additional rights and privileges not extended to
those in the former category who are merely ‘on the threshold of
initial entry.’” Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958)
(quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206
(1953)); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)(“But
once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes,
for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the
United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is
lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”). And until recently,

DHS has treated aliens—such as Vasquez Banegas—already present in
the country as detained under § 1226 and entitled to bond hearings.1
Respondents argue that, despite having resided in the United
States for more than twelve years, Vasquez Banegas is properly
detained under section 1225(b).2 Indeed, the Court recognizes that
in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, et al.,166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026)
and Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-3248, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir. Mar. 25,
2026), the Fifth Circuit and Eighth Circuits concluded that most
noncitizens apprehended anywhere in the United States are never

1 The Government’s recent about-face toward mass mandatory
detention under § 1225 was blessed by the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) in In re Yajure Hurtado, 29 I.& N. Dec. 216, 229
(B.I.A. 2025). But the Court owes no deference to the BIA’s
statutory interpretations. In 2024, the Supreme Court concluded
that “agencies have no special competence in resolving statutory
ambiguities. Courts do.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603
U.S. 369, 400–01 (2024). And “[c]ourts interpret statutes, no
matter the context, based on the traditional tools of statutory
construction, not individual policy preferences.” Id. at 403.
2 In Patel v. Hardin, No. 2:25-cv-870-JES-NPM (M.D. Fla. Dec.
1, 2025), Respondents argued that the Court lacks jurisdiction to
consider this petition and that the petitioner has not properly
exhausted his administrative remedies. The Court rejected those
arguments in Patel and in scores of other recent cases presenting
the same issues. See, e.g., Cetino v. Hardin, No. 2:25-cv-1037-
JES-DNF (M.D. Fla. Dec. 12, 2025); Reyes Rodriguez v. Florida
Southside Facility, No. 2:25-cv-1012-JES-DNF (M.D. Fla. Dec. 15,
2025). In those cases, the Court was satisfied of its jurisdiction
and determined that exhaustion was excused because it would be
futile. The Court’s reasoning on these issues also applies here.
eligible for release on bond, no matter how long they have resided
inside the United States. This is contrary to the conclusions
reached by the overwhelming majority of district court judges to

have considered the issue. See also Castanon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1060–62 (7th Cir 2005)
(concluding that the government was unlikely to prevail on the
merits that petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under §
1225(b)(2)(A)). This Court respectfully disagrees with the Fifth
and Eighth Circuits’ analyses and finds the analysis in Castanon-
Nava and the dissents in Buenrostro-Mendez and Avila to be more
persuasive on the statutory interpretation issue. In any event,
neither Buenrostro-Mendez nor Avila are binding precedent in this
Court.
Thus, the Court rejects the government’s argument that
Vasquez Banegas is subject to expedited removal and concludes that

Respondents’ authority to detain him stems from section 1226(a).
As a noncitizen detained under section 1226(a), Vasquez Banegas
has a right to a bond hearing.
The Court will thus order Respondents to either bring Vasquez
Banegas before an immigration judge for a merit-based § 1226 bond
hearing or release him within ten days. To satisfy this Order,
the hearing must include consideration of all evidence properly
submitted by the petitioner and the factors announced in In re
Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37 (BIA 2006), and Vasquez Banegas’ counsel
must be given at least 48 hours’ notice of the hearing, but only
if they enter their appearance in the Executive Office of
Immigration Review’s online filing system in time to receive the

notice.
The Court is aware that the Executive Office for Immigration
Review (“EOIR”) is the agency that schedules bond hearings. In
other cases, Respondents have claimed they cannot direct the EOIR
when to conduct a bond hearing. Regardless, subjecting Vasquez
Banegas to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1) is unlawful. If
Respondents are unable to ensure that Vasquez Banegas timely
receives the meaningful and thorough bond hearing to which he is
entitled under § 1226(a), they must release him.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED:
1. Marlon David Vasquez Banegas’ Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is GRANTED to the extent set forth in this

Order.
2. Within TEN (10) DAYS Respondents shall either provide
Vasquez Banegas with the statutory process required under § 1226—
which includes a merit-based bond hearing—or release him under
3
reasonable conditions of supervision.

3
In recent cases in the Middle District of Florida—and
despite being ordered to do so—the immigration judge has refused
to provide a merit-based bond hearing, determining that under
Hurtado he had no discretion to issue a bond. See, e.g., Fernandez
Alvarez v. Noem, et al., No. 2:26-cv-313-SPC-DNF (M.D. Fla. Mar.
4, 2026); Nahadian Fard v. Bondi, et al., No. 6:26-cv-157-GAP-RMN,
3. If Respondents release Vasquez Banegas, they shall
facilitate his transportation from the detention facility by
notifying his counsel when and where he may be collected.
4. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any pending motions
and deadlines, enter judgment, and close the case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on April 13, 2026.

VAY ee DH
E. STEELE
3q IOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Doc. 23 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2026). If the immigration judge in
this case reaches the same conclusion or otherwise declines to
consider bond, Petitioner must be released.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11365847. Public record. Not legal advice.