# Galloway

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · June 29, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11365737

## Case

- **Full name:** Christopher-Michael Williams v. Gary Galloway, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** June 29, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
:
Christopher-Michael :
Williams, :
: Case No. 2:25-cv-01410
Plaintiff, :
v. : Judge Graham
:
Gary Galloway, et al., : Magistrate Judge Jolson
:
Defendants. :

OPINION & ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendations (“R&R”) (doc. 9) as well as the Defendants’ motions to dismiss (doc.
13; doc. 15; doc. 18). For the reasons that follow, the Court ADOPTS the R&R, in
part, and GRANTS the motions to dismiss.
Background
Plaintiff Christopher-Michael Williams (“Williams”), proceeding pro se, is
incarcerated with the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”)
and currently housed at the Chillicothe Correctional Institution (“CCI”). The
Defendants are ODRC employees. Williams brings this action alleging that his
constitutional rights were violated when he was prohibited, by rule, from
participating in a “Family Day”1 event because the crimes he was convicted of
involved child victims. The rule was imposed by the event organizer, the “R.A.M.

1 Though Williams’ allegations concern a specific event in late 2025, the parties also appear
to use “Family Day” as a generic term for various institutional events for which inmates’
families are invited to participate.
Gavel Club,” which is administered by inmate volunteers. Williams alleges that the
Defendants are responsible not only for what he contends is a discriminatory policy
for Family Day participation, but also for a policy which allowed inmates, such as

those on the R.A.M. Gavel Club board, to implement such discriminatory policies
against other inmates like Williams.
Williams’ initial Complaint was screened by the Magistrate Judge, pursuant
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), to determine whether the Complaint
or any portion of it should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune to such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Magistrate Judge

determined that Williams should be allowed to proceed on his Equal Protection and
Freedom of Association claims against all five Defendants, each brought pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, but that the remaining claims should be dismissed. See doc. 4.
Williams filed an Amended Complaint (doc. 8), which the Magistrate Judge
again screened pursuant to the PLRA, which yielded a supplemental R&R. See doc.
9. The Magistrate Judge again determined that the Equal Protection and Freedom of

Association claims should proceed. The Magistrate Judge also construed the amended
allegations to be stating a claim for retaliation, which, “in an abundance of caution”
was also allowed to proceed. Id. at # 293. However, despite the amendments, the
Magistrate Judge again recommended dismissal of Williams’ remaining claims.
Williams did not object to the R&R, and the time for doing so has passed.
Defendants filed motions to dismiss (substantively identical to one another) which
argued for dismissal of all claims in Williams’ Amended Complaint.2 See doc. 13, doc.
15, doc. 18. Williams filed a response in opposition to dismissal. Doc. 26. These
matters are now fully briefed and ripe for decision.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Section 636 of Title 28 of the United States Code sets forth the jurisdiction and
powers of magistrate judges, and, in so doing, “essentially creates two different
standards by which district courts review a magistrate judge's finding.” Monroe v.
Houk, No. 2:07-CV-258, 2016 WL 1252945, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 23, 2016). As to
dispositive motions—e.g., a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment—
or an initial screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a magistrate judge may be

designated to make a report and recommendation to the district court for the
disposition of the motion. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). When a prisoner seeks redress
from a governmental entity, the court must screen the complaint and dismiss any
portion of the complaint which is determined to be “frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or… seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A (West).

When a party raises timely objections to a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation, the court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of
the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). When no objections are timely filed, a district court
reviews a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation for clear error. Fed. R. Civ.

2 However, the motions did not directly address the retaliation claim as construed by the
Magistrate Judge.
P. 72, advisory committee note (“When no timely objection is filed, the court need only
satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the
recommendation.”).

As to non-dispositive motions, magistrate judges may be designated to hear
and determine “any pretrial matter pending before the court.” 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(A). When reviewing such determinations by the magistrate judge, the
district court may reconsider the determination “where it has been shown that the
magistrate judge’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Id.
A motion to dismiss brought under Fed. Civ. R. 12(b)(6) argues that the
operative complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. When ruling

on such a motion, the court is “[r]equired to construe the complaint in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff and to accept the factual allegations as true.” Leisure v. FBI
of Columbus, Ohio, 2 F. App'x 488, 489 (6th Cir. 2001). Pleadings filed by pro se
litigants are “to be liberally construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.
Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 292
(1976)). However, the court is not required to credit a claimant’s “summary

allegations or unwarranted legal conclusions.” Leisure, 2 F. App'x at 489 (citing
Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737, 745 (6th Cir. 1999), abrogated by
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S. Ct. 992, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2002)).
“Although typically courts are limited to the pleadings when faced with a motion
under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may take judicial notice of other court proceedings
without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.” Buck v. Thomas M.
Cooley L. Sch., 597 F.3d 812, 816 (6th Cir. 2010).
DISCUSSION

As noted above, no objections have been raised to the supplemental R&R, and
thus the Court may adopt the R&R in the absence of clear error. The Court will do so
here, except for the portion of the R&R which found Williams to be stating a claim for
retaliation, which the Court determines to be clear error. Furthermore, the Court
finds the motions to dismiss to be well-taken.
I. The Court Adopts the R&R Except for the Construction of
a Retaliation Claim.
In his Amended Complaint, Williams articulates three (3) “Claim[s] for Relief”:
(1) “[Violation] of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution”;
(2) “Substantive and Procedural Due Process Violations of the 14th Amendment”; and
(3) “Civil Conspiracy to Violate 14th Amendment Right to Equal Protection of the
Law.” Doc. 8. The Magistrate Judge read the Amended Complaint to raise a total of

five (5) distinct claims, articulated in the R&R as:
1. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claims against
all Defendants for the alleged discrimination toward
Plaintiff as an inmate convicted of sex crimes against
children;

2. Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claims
against all Defendants for denying Plaintiff’s participation
in Family Day;

3. First Amendment freedom of association claims against all
Defendants for allegedly infringing on his right to visit
with and parent his children;
4. Conspiracy claims against all Defendants for allegedly
collectively planning to block Plaintiff from participating in
Family Day; and

5. Retaliation claims against all Defendants for allegedly
denying Plaintiff’s Family Day application because he has
filed multiple lawsuits.
Doc. 9, # 292-93.
However, the Magistrate Judge further found that the claims enumerated 2
(8th Amendment) and 4 (conspiracy) in the list above warranted dismissal. With no
objections to the R&R, the Court will adopt the recommendations and dismiss the 8th
Amendment and Conspiracy claims. The Court also agrees that claims 1 and 3 in the
list above are pleaded with sufficient clarity in the Amended Complaint to survive
initial screening. However, the Court respectfully declines to adopt the additional
finding that a retaliation claim can be properly construed from the pleadings.
The Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are “to be liberally construed.”
Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. And that the Magistrate Judge construed the retaliation
claim “in an abundance of caution,” and as “only a preliminary determination.” Doc.
9, # 293. Nevertheless, the Court finds that a retaliation claim is inconsistent with
the pleadings and the substance of Williams’ allegations.
The R&R cites a single sentence in the Amended Complaint as the source of
the retaliation claim, in which Williams writes:
The fact that Christopher has filed multiple lawsuits, and
then thereafter, had been denied equal treatment, when in
the past he was allowed to participate in all other Family
Day Activities was the result of a conspiracy of all the
named defendants.
Doc. 8, # 274. Though this allegation raises the specter of retaliation, it goes no
further. Williams appears to be stating this as an explanation for why Alfred Marcus
was named as a Defendant when he “had nothing to do with the discrimination

grievance,” but was knowledgeable of Williams’ previous lawsuits.3 Id. at # 274.
Williams cites the record of his institutional grievance regarding the Family Day
event, which shows that the grievance was “viewed” by “Marcus, A.,” shortly before
the grievance was denied by Defendant Ivey. Doc. 3-1, # 117. This does not allege a
sufficient factual basis to state a plausible claim for retaliation. Even assuming that
Defendant Marcus was aware of his prior lawsuits, Williams was denied from
participating in the Family Day event before Marcus “viewed” the grievance. Id.

Beyond that, the Court finds that any possible retaliation claim suffers from the same
causal deficiencies articulated by the Magistrate Judge regarding the civil conspiracy
claim. See doc. 9, # 295.
In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of the conspiracy
claim due to Williams’ allegation that the “unwritten policy… is not new and has been
done for years before [he] was injured.” Id.; doc. 8, # 282. Therefore, the Magistrate

Judge reasoned, “it is mere conjecture to allege that Defendants created a custom4
they could rely on years later” to injure Williams. Doc. 9, # 295. This is equally true

3 Williams does not actually allege any reason that Defendant Marcus (or any other
Defendant) would be aware of Williams’ past lawsuits, but because Williams sued Defendant
Marcus in a previous case in this Court (see case no. 2:23-cv-01042), the Court can presume
such awareness for the purpose of interpreting Williams’ pleadings.
4 As noted above, the restriction was imposed not by Defendants but by inmate volunteers
serving on the board of the club that organized the Family Day event, thus further
attenuating any connection between these Defendants and Williams’ alleged injury.
for any retaliation claim, as Williams identifies the “not new” policy as the sole source
of his injury. Doc. 8, # 282. Furthermore, Williams does not allege a sequence of
events which could plausibly describe retaliation. He alleges he “filed multiple

lawsuits, and then thereafter” was denied participation in a Family Day, “when in
the past he was allowed to participate in all other Family Day Activities.” Id. at #
274. But he was permitted to participate in a different Family Day event on
September 19, 2025, mere weeks before the Family Day from which he was barred
(and years after Williams’ first brought lawsuits against the institution and its
employees, see supra n.3). Furthermore, his pleadings indicate that he has
participated in other Family Day events in the past and will be permitted to do so in

the future. See doc. 8, # 275 (alleging Defendants “let certain groups discriminate if
they want to, the[n] let other Groups like Helping Hands not add the discriminating
clause when they have family days.”).
Williams simply does not allege any facts that can be construed to support a
retaliation claim. He does not allege that Defendants became aware of his lawsuits
after his participation in the September Family Day, such as would support a

retaliatory chain of events.5 Notwithstanding his undeveloped suggestion of
retaliation, Williams consistently alleges that he was injured because of animus

5 Though not entirely clear from the pleadings, the Court’s understanding is that the child-
victim-offender restriction on Family Day participation was imposed by the R.A.M. Gavel
Club, the organization hosting the October Family Day event, while the September Family
Day event (a marathon fundraiser) was not put on by the R.A.M. Gavel Club, and thus no
such restriction applied. But even assuming the same restriction applied to both events, but
was only enforced for the October event, Williams’ has still not described a retaliation claim,
but has merely speculated that he was barred from participation for reasons other than the
written restriction which plainly applies to him.
against him due to his crimes of conviction. See also Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252,
264 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Spies v. Voinovich, 48 F. App'x 520, 524 (6th Cir. 2002))
(“an ‘inmate cannot immunize himself from adverse administrative action by prison

officials merely by filing a grievance or a lawsuit and then claiming that everything
that happens to him is retaliatory.’”). That theory, which is distinct from a retaliation
theory, is adequately accounted for under Williams’ Equal Protection and Free
Association claims which were allowed to proceed. Therefore, the Court finds that the
construction of a retaliation claim was clear error which the Court declines to adopt.
II. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss as to the Remaining
Claims are Well-Taken.
Defendants moved to dismiss Williams’ Amended Complaint in three (3)
separate (but substantively identical) motions. Doc. 13; doc. 15; doc. 18. Because the
Court adopts the R&R’s dismissal of all but the Equal Protection and Free Association
claims, the Court need not consider the motions to the extent they raise arguments
beyond those remaining claims.

1. The Pleadings Do Not Raise a Viable Free Association Claim.
Williams has not pleaded a reasonably plausible claim of violation of his right
to free association. The Supreme Court has observed that freedom of association is
“among the rights least compatible with incarceration.” Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S.
126, 131, 123 S. Ct. 2162 (2003). This is not to say that such a right is “altogether
terminated by incarceration,” but a regulation that limits inmates’ rights to free

association will be upheld so long as it bears a rational relation to legitimate
penological interests. Id. at 131-32.
In this case, such precedent squarely forecloses Williams’ claim as alleged. As
the Supreme Court noted with regard to restrictions on visitations by children, such
regulations “bear a rational relation to… valid interests in maintaining internal

security and protecting child visitors from exposure to sexual or other misconduct.”
Id. at 133. Restricting inmates convicted of crimes6 against children from
participating in a child-oriented event serves the same valid interests. Williams
disagrees, contending that the restriction unfairly applies to “all of whom are
convicted of crimes against children, and not to other inmates who are similarly
situated in every relevant way.” Doc. 8, # 279. But he is incorrect, because convictions
of crimes against children are facially relevant to the propriety of restricting inmates

from participating in a child-oriented event. See sub., § II.2.
Supreme Court precedent also instructs the Court to consider “whether
alternative means are open to inmates to exercise the asserted right.” Overton, 539
U.S. at 132. Williams’ pleadings make clear that he indeed has alternative means to
exercise the right, which he describes as “maintaining a relationship to care for, and
raise up, his natural children for secular and non-secular relational rearing.” Doc. 8,

# 279. He claims that restricting his participation in Family Day is “not supported by
law or legitimate penological interests when the ODRC has permitted [him] to
have his minor children on his visiting list, and visit him at every visit.” Id.
(emphasis supplied); see also id. at # 272 (“[Williams’] children have come to multiple
family days in other programs here in this institution”); and id. at # 273 (“[Williams]

6 Williams’ assertion that he is innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted is irrelevant
here, where he is guilty of the crimes as a matter of law.
has never been accused of any illegal activities on a visit with his family.”). In other
words, he sees his children regularly.7
Because Williams has a means of exercising his substantially curtailed right

to free association, his inability to participate in Family Day events hosted by the
R.A.M. Gavel Club is as much of a constitutional injury as any other day he is unable
to associate with his family due to circumstances inherent to his incarceration—
which is to say, it is no injury at all.
2. The Pleadings Do Not Raise a Viable Equal Protection Claim.
Williams fails to state an Equal Protection claim for which relief can be
granted. “The Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination by government which

either burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or intentionally treats
one differently than others similarly situated without any rational basis for the
difference.” TriHealth, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, 430 F.3d 783,
788 (6th Cir. 2005). Here, Williams acknowledges that he has not been targeted as a
member of a suspect class, but he instead proceeds under a class-of-one theory. Doc.

7 Thus, by his exclusion from (a single) Family Day, Williams and other inmates convicted of
crimes against children are, in effect, only being prevented from associating with other
children and families who might attend that particular event. In this sense, the policy draws
even stronger support from Overton, which affirmed the constitutionality of prison
regulations defining how closely related an inmate must be to a minor for the minor to be
allowed to visit the inmate. See 539 U.S. at 133 (considering regulations which excluded, inter
alia, “minor nieces and nephews and children to whom parental rights have been
terminated”). Williams contends that “[t]here is no law that says [he] cannot be around
children on visits due to the crime for which he is convicted” (doc. 8, # 280), but the very fact
of his consecutive life terms of imprisonment for his crimes (rape of minors under the age of
13), along with Overton’s recognition of free association as “among the rights least compatible
with incarceration” (539 U.S. at 131), complicate that assertion. Williams’ efforts to challenge
the constitutionality of his convictions have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Williams v.
Hamilton Cnty. Prosecutor, 2025-Ohio-3298, appeal not allowed sub nom. Williams v.
Hamilton Cty. Prosecutor, 2026-Ohio-13, 180 Ohio St. 3d 1464, 272 N.E.3d 1213.
8, # 268. To prevail on a class-of-one theory, a plaintiff “may demonstrate that
government action lacks a rational basis either by [(1)] negativing every conceivable
basis which might support the government action, or [(2)] by showing that the

challenged action was motivated by animus or ill-will.” TriHealth, 430 F.3d at 788.
In his Amended Complaint, Williams repeatedly recites the above standard,
claiming he can demonstrate that each Defendant’s action “lacks a rational basis” in
both ways, i.e., by rebutting every conceivable basis and by showing ill-motives. Doc.
8, # 269. On either theory, Williams fails to convert. First, Williams cannot show
improper motivation for reasons already discussed—namely, the lack of any facts
plausibly indicating animus or ill-will, and the complete lack of any causal connection

to the Family Day restriction. See supra, § I.
Nor can he rebut every conceivable basis for the restriction. The Court finds
that restricting inmates with child-victim offenses from participating in child-
oriented events is facially rational. But even without such a finding, government
action bears a “strong presumption of validity,” on rational basis review. F.C.C. v.
Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2102 (1993). Therefore, the

Court need not resort to fact-finding, because a government action “may be based on
rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data,” and nevertheless
pass constitutional muster. Id. at 315. In other words, there need not be evidence in
the record supporting the practical wisdom of the restriction.
Against that standard, Williams’ arguments fall flat. He contends that the
policy excluding inmates with child-victim offenses is irrational when other violent
criminals may be allowed to participate. This also goes to his similarly-situated
argument: Williams claims that he is receiving disparate treatment when he is
excluded from participation in a Family Day based on his child-victim offense, when

inmates with violent offenses are included in the event despite being “similarly
situated… in all relevant respects.” Doc. 8, # 272 (emphasis original).8 While the Court
must “accept the factual allegations as true,” it is not required to credit a claimant’s
“unwarranted legal conclusions.” Leisure, 2 F. App'x at 489. Williams’ assertion that
he is similarly situated in all relevant respects is pure speculation presented as a
legal conclusion without factual support.
More importantly, a classification, such as the one to which Williams was

subjected, “does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification is not
made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.”
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S. Ct. 1153, 1161 (1970) (internal
quotations omitted); see also Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315-16 (regulatory line-
drawing “inevitably requires that some persons who have an almost equally strong
claim… be placed on different side of the line, and the fact that the line might have

been drawn differently at some points is a matter for legislative, rather than judicial,
consideration”) (internal quotations omitted).
In sum, Williams has not alleged facts which support an Equal Protection
claim. Even assuming the threshold issue—that the rule excluding Williams, passed

8 Whereas Williams refers to “relevant” similarities (or differences), the Sixth Circuit refers
to the “materiality” of the same. TriHealth, 430 F.3d at 790. Regardless, the Sixth Circuit
has observed that “[m]ateriality is an integral element of the rational basis inquiry.” Id.
by a board of inmate volunteers, can be fairly considered as government action—and
construing all other inferences in his favor, Williams has not made any allegation
“sufficient to overcome the presumption of rationality that otherwise attache[s] to

governmental action.” TriHealth, 430 F.3d at 789; cf. Bower v. Vill. of Mount Sterling,
44 F. App'x 670 (6th Cir. 2002) (Equal Protection claim sufficiently pleaded where
allegations described conduct patently contrary to state law). Therefore, the Court
will grant Defendants’ motions and dismiss this claim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court ADOPTS the R&R in part and
DISMISSES Williams’ Eighth Amendment and Civil Conspiracy claims. However,

the Court declines to adopt the R&R to the limited extent that it construes the
Amended Complaint to state a retaliation claim, which the Court finds to be clear
error. Furthermore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss the
remaining claims. Finally, the Court CERTIFIES to the United States Court of
Appeals that an appeal would be objectively frivolous and therefore Williams should
not be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ James L. Graham
JAMES L. GRAHAM
United States District Judge

DATE: June 29, 2026

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11365737. Public record. Not legal advice.