# Grant

> District Court, M.D. Florida · April 8, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11365613

## Case

- **Full name:** Hewitt A. Grant, II v. Thomas Dixon, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** April 8, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

HEWITT A. GRANT, II,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:22-cv-1253-CEH-AAS

THOMAS DIXON, et al.,

Defendants.
/

ORDER

Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Hewitt A. Grant, II’s Amended Civil Rights
Complaint. (Doc. 36). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is required to screen the
Amended Complaint and dismiss it if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. After careful review, the Court concludes that the
Amended Complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
I. Background
In November 2015, Grant was convicted on state charges of animal fighting or
baiting, managing a property used for training animals for fighting, possession of
equipment for fighting or baiting, and cruelty to an animal. Grant v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,
No. 8:19-cv-2954-KKM-SPF, 2023 WL 2561361, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2023). In
brief, Grant bred dogs for fighting and ran a dogfighting ring in Polk County, Florida.
Id. at 2-4. After he was convicted at a jury trial, Grant received a total sentence of
twenty years’ imprisonment. Id. at 1. His direct appeal was unsuccessful, as were his
efforts to collaterally attack his convictions in state and federal court. Id. at 2, 23.
Grant initiated this civil rights action in May 2022. (Doc. 1 at 1). Defendants

moved to dismiss the original Complaint for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 28). Before
the Court could rule on the motion, Grant sought leave to file an Amended Complaint.
(Doc. 33). That request was granted, and the motion to dismiss was denied as moot.
(Doc. 35). The Court indicated that it would screen the Amended Complaint before
requiring Defendants to file a responsive pleading. (Id. at 4).

In the Amended Complaint, Grant alleges that his Fourth Amendment rights
were violated during an October 22, 2014, search of his property. (Doc. 36 at 5-7). On
that day, Deputies Thomas Dixon, Ricky Anderson, and James Scarborough allegedly
“broke through a six-foot privacy fence” and “unlawfully enter[ed]” Grant’s property.

(Id. at 7). The deputies “moved [Grant] off his property” and took his “money, keys,
and cell phone.” (Id.) When Grant tried to return to his property, Deputy Douglas
Tanner “restrained” him and took him “across the street.” (Id.) After Grant gave his
consent to search, Deputies Dixon and Anderson began searching the property. (Id. at
7, 37).

“[H]ours later,” Deputy Scarborough obtained a search warrant for the property
using “invalid and fraudulent documents.” (Id. at 7). The search continued. (Id.) Based
on the evidence obtained from the property, Deputy Scarborough allegedly “gave
Grant multiple [f]ake and [f]raudulent criminal charges” related to dogfighting. (Id.)
In March 2015, Grant moved to suppress “all the evidence obtained before and
after the search warrant.”1 (Doc. 28-1 at 1). He argued that the evidence came from
“an illegal search without a warrant” and “an illegal investigatory detention,” both of

which violated “the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.” (Id.) The trial court held a suppression hearing, taking testimony from
Grant as well as Deputies Dixon, Anderson, and Scarborough. (Doc. 36 at 36-39).
After the hearing, the court entered a written order denying the motion to suppress.2
(Id. at 40). The court held that although “the initial entry into the curtilage” of the

property was “illegal,” “at no time was there an illegal search of the property or illegal
seizure of [Grant].” (Id.) The court reasoned that after the initial entry (but before the
search), Grant “knowingly and voluntarily provided consent to a search of his
property.” (Id.) Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Grant went to trial and

was found guilty as charged. Grant, 2023 WL 2561361, at *1. His convictions were
affirmed on direct appeal. Id.
In the Amended Complaint, Grant separately alleges that his constitutional
rights were violated by the entry of an April 2006 injunction “prohibiting him from

1 The Court takes judicial notice of Grant’s motion to suppress. See United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549,
1553 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[A] court may take judicial notice of a document filed in another court not for
the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation
and related filings.”).

2 Grant attached a copy of the order to his Amended Complaint. (Doc. 36 at 36-40). Thus, the Court
may consider the order in screening the Amended Complaint. See K.C.R. v. Judd, 941 F.3d 504, 511
(11th Cir. 2019) (“In deciding whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted,
we normally consider all documents that are attached to the complaint or incorporated into it by
reference.”).
possessing or having custody over any animals.” (Doc. 36 at 8). Sheriff Grady Judd
sought the injunction after Deputy Paul Wright found “emaciated dogs, no food or
water, and unhealthy conditions” at Grant’s property. (Id.) According to Grant, the

April 2006 injunction was “defective” because it (1) failed to “describ[e] in reasonable
detail the . . . acts restrained,” (2) lacked “any specific finding that Grant was unable
or unfit to adequately provide for his animals,” (3) did not “specify the reason for
entry,” and (4) charged him an “excessive fine of $38,305.” (Id. at 8-9). Moreover, law
enforcement allegedly used the April 2006 injunction to obtain “probable cause” for

the October 2014 search of Grant’s property.3 (Id. at 10, 41-42).
Based on these allegations, Grant sues Sheriff Judd as well as Deputies Dixon,
Anderson, Tanner, Scarborough, and Wright. (Id. at 2-4). He seeks compensatory
damages, injunctive relief, and a declaration that Defendants’ conduct “violated [his]

rights under the constitution and laws of the United States.” (Id. at 13-14).
II. Legal Standard
Under § 1915A, a district court may dismiss the complaint of a prisoner if the
complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (a)-(b)(1). “The same standards that apply to a dismissal

under [Rule] 12(b)(6) apply to dismissals under § 1915A.” Jeffus v. Mahl, No. 22-12040,
2024 WL 832295, at *1 (11th Cir. Feb. 28, 2024).

3 Grant also claims that (1) in January 2006, a sheriff’s deputy “ordered over 60 [of his] animals to be
euthanized and killed,” and (2) the April 2006 injunction led to 150 “other . . . animals” being taken
from him. (Doc. 36 at 9).
To survive review under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must include a “short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Labels,

conclusions, and formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action are not
sufficient. Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further,
mere naked assertions are not sufficient. Id. A complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, which, if accepted as true, would “state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted).
The court, however, is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion stated as a
“factual allegation” in the complaint. Id.

Courts “hold the allegations of a pro se complaint to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168
(11th Cir. 2014). “Yet even in the case of pro se litigants this leniency does not give a
court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient
pleading in order to sustain an action.” Id. at 1168-69.

III. Discussion
After careful review, the Court concludes that the Amended Complaint must be
dismissed. First, Grant is collaterally estopped from challenging the October 2014
search and detention because the state court already rejected his Fourth Amendment
claim. Second, Grant’s challenge to the April 2006 injunction is untimely under the
four-year statute of limitations applicable to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions.4
A. October 2014 Search and Detention

Grant alleges that on October 22, 2014, Deputies Dixon, Anderson, Tanner,
and Scarborough violated the Fourth Amendment by searching his property and
detaining him. (Doc. 36 at 7-8). According to Grant, the deputies never obtained a
valid consent to search, nor did they have a “legal search warrant or probable cause.”

(Id. at 7). As a result of the evidence obtained from his property, Grant was arrested
on what he describes as “[f]ake and [f]raudulent criminal charges.” (Id.)
Grant is collaterally estopped from bringing this claim because it has already
been litigated in state court. Collateral estoppel “refers to the effect of a judgment in
foreclosing relitigation of a matter that has been litigated and decided.” Quinn v.

Monroe Cnty., 330 F.3d 1320, 1328-29 (11th Cir. 2003). A federal court “must apply
the State’s law of collateral estoppel under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
United States Constitution.” Brown v. City of Hialeah, 30 F.3d 1433, 1437 (11th Cir.
1994). “Under Florida law, collateral estoppel applies if (1) an identical issue, (2) has
been fully litigated, (3) by the same parties or their privies, and (4) a final decision has

been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Quinn, 330 F.3d at 1329.

4 “The application of an affirmative defense such as . . . collateral estoppel[] and the expiration of the
statute of limitations are examples of frivolity that warrant a sua sponte dismissal by the court.” Cintron
v. Upright, No. 2:07-cv-7-JES-DNF, 2007 WL 168523, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2007); see also Crenshaw
v. Ellis, No. 2:25-cv-87-WKW, 2026 WL 358292, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 9, 2026) (“On screening, the
court may consider, sua sponte, affirmative defenses that are clear from the face of the complaint,
[including] collateral estoppel [and] the expiration of the statute of limitations.”).
Defendants here were not parties to Grant’s criminal case. But in the “criminal-
to-civil context,” “Florida courts have relaxed the mutuality requirement and
approved the use of defensive collateral estoppel by a defendant who was not a party,

or in privity with a party, to the prior [criminal case].” Id. at 1330-31; see also Vazquez
v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 968 F.2d 1101, 1106 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that Florida law
“allows generally for defensive uses of collateral estoppel in criminal-to-civil contexts
without mutuality of parties”).
Grant fully litigated his Fourth Amendment claim in his state criminal case and

lost. With the assistance of counsel, he moved to suppress “all the evidence obtained
before and after the search warrant.” (Doc. 28-1 at 1). In support, Grant argued that
the deputies violated “the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution” by conducting “an illegal search” and “an illegal investigatory

detention.” (Id.) Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion to
suppress. (Doc. 36 at 40). The court held that although “the initial entry into the
curtilage” of the property was “illegal,” “at no time was there an illegal search of the
property or illegal seizure of [Grant].” (Id.) Grant was subsequently convicted at a jury
trial, and his convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Grant, 2023 WL 2561361, at

*1.
Thus, because Grant “had a full and fair opportunity to litigate” the validity of
the search and detention in his state criminal case, he is “collaterally estopped from
bringing his Fourth Amendment claim.” Wiggins v. Loar, 760 F. App’x 965, 967-68
(11th Cir. 2019); see also Lloyd v. Card, 283 F. App’x 696, 701 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding
that plaintiff “was estopped from litigating his complaints about the search warrant”
because he “had a fair opportunity to contest all factual issues in his state [criminal]
proceedings”); Debose v. Morzouck, No. 1:23-cv-42-AW-HTC, 2023 WL 5352926, at *3

(N.D. Fla. June 20, 2023) (“Because the state court already determined [that
defendant] did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights when she seized Plaintiff’s
cell phone, Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from raising those same claims here.”),
adopted by 2023 WL 5352608 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2023); Mitchell v. McManus, No. 8:14-
cv-1822-JDW-JSS, 2017 WL 1449698, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 21, 2017) (holding that

plaintiff was “collaterally estopped from re-litigating his search and seizure claim in [a
civil] action” because his “motion to suppress was fully litigated” in state criminal
case).5
B. April 2006 Injunction

Grant separately alleges that his constitutional rights were violated by the entry
of an April 2006 injunction “prohibiting him from possessing or having custody over
any animals.” (Doc. 36 at 8). According to Grant, the injunction was “defective” for
several reasons, including that it lacked “any specific finding that [he] was unable or
unfit to adequately provide for his animals.” (Id. at 8-9).

5 Grant claims that he “is enslaved against his will . . . in prison violating [the] Thirteenth
Amendment.” (Doc. 36 at 12). But the Thirteenth Amendment “does not apply when a prisoner is
incarcerated under a valid judgment.” Cargill v. United States Dep’t of Just., No. 2:20-cv-920-AMM-
GMB, 2022 WL 5292578, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 23, 2022), adopted by 2022 WL 5246431 (N.D. Ala.
Oct. 6, 2022). Grant also alleges that he was subjected to “discrimination” in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, (Doc. 36 at 11), but his conclusory allegations are insufficient to state an
equal protection claim, see Mack v. City of High Springs, 486 F. App’x 3, 8 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[Plaintiff]
only alleged in a conclusory manner that he was discriminated against because of his race or disability.
Such conclusory allegations, however, are not sufficient to properly state a claim.”).
This claim is untimely. “[A] plaintiff must commence a § 1983 claim arising in
Florida within four years of the allegedly unconstitutional or otherwise illegal act.”
Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1188 (11th Cir. 1999); see also McGroarty v.

Swearingen, 977 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2020) (same). “The statute of limitations
on a [§] 1983 claim begins to run when the facts which would support a cause of action
are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for
his rights.” Van Poyck v. McCollum, 646 F.3d 865, 867 (11th Cir. 2011). Put differently,

a § 1983 action “do[es] not accrue until the plaintiff knows or has reason to know that
he has been injured.” Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 716 (11th Cir. 1987).
As noted above, the injunction was entered in April 2006. (Doc. 36 at 45). Grant
appears to allege that he was not properly served with a copy of the injunction. (Id. at
10). But the Amended Complaint makes clear that he knew of the injunction by

October 2014 at the latest, when law enforcement cited it as “probable cause” for the
search. (Id. at 10-11, 41-42). The Court thus assumes, in Grant’s favor, that he did not
“know[] or ha[ve] reason to know that he [was] injured” by the injunction until
October 2014. Mullinax, 817 F.2d at 716. With that generous assumption, Grant had
until October 2018 to file a § 1983 suit challenging the injunction. He did not bring this

action until May 2022—well outside the four-year window. (Doc. 1 at 1). Moreover,
Grant does not allege any facts that would support tolling the statute of limitations.
See Joseph v. State Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 196 F. App’x 760, 761 (11th Cir. 2006)
(affirming dismissal upon screening because, “[i]n the absence of an applicable toll,”
plaintiff’s claim was time barred). Therefore, his constitutional challenge to the
injunction must be dismissed as untimely.6
C. Leave to Amend

The Court declines to afford Grant another opportunity to amend his
Complaint. “Where a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff
must be given at least one chance to amend the complaint before the district court
dismisses the action with prejudice.” Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d

1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018). Here, however, Grant already amended his Complaint
after receiving the initial motion to dismiss. (Docs. 34, 36). Notably, that motion
sought dismissal based on collateral estoppel and the statute of limitations—the same
issues that require dismissal of the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 28 at 6-11). Moreover,
there is no indication that “a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim.”

Woldeab, 885 F.3d at 1291. Therefore, this action will be dismissed with prejudice. See
Jordan v. Brevard Cnty. Sheriff, No. 6:23-cv-556-WWB-DCI, 2024 WL 2809302, at *3
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 2024) (pro se amended complaint dismissed with prejudice where
plaintiff had “already taken the liberty of amending his claims” in response to “first
motion to dismiss”), adopted by 2024 WL 2809222 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2024).

6 It is unclear whether Grant intends to assert a Fourth Amendment claim based solely on the initial
entry onto his property (as opposed to the search and detention). Any such claim would be untimely
because the entry occurred in October 2014, and Grant did not file suit until May 2022. See Dixon v.
Miami Dade Cnty., 307 F. App’x 270, 270 (11th Cir. 2009) (Fourth Amendment claim based on
defendant “enter[ing] [plaintiff’s] premises without consent or warrant” was untimely because entry
took place “more than four years prior to the action”). Likewise, any claim based on the alleged
euthanizing of Grant’s animals in January 2006 would be untimely by over a decade.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Grant’s Amended Complaint, (Doc. 36), is DISMISSED with prejudice
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
2. The Clerk is directed to remove the stay and administrative closure flags
from the docket, to enter judgment against Grant, and to CLOSE this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on April 8, 2026.

Chakene g AJ ards Ho TO pt yell
Charlene Edwards Honeywell
United States District Judge

Copies to:
Hewitt A. Grant, II, pro se
Counsel of Record

11

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11365613. Public record. Not legal advice.