# Brady

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · June 16, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11365236

## Case

- **Full name:** Adrain M. Brady v. Sheriff Jeffrey Balzer, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** June 16, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS

ADRAIN M. BRADY, : Case No. 2:26-CV-188
:
Plaintiff, :
: Chief District Judge Sarah D. Morrison
vs. :
Magistrate Judge S. Courter M. Shimeall
:
SHERIFF JEFFREY BALZER, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
:
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff, a resident of London, Ohio, has filed this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. (Doc. 1-1). He names Sheriff Jeffrey Balzer, the Delaware County Board of
Commissioners, PrimeCare Medical, Inc., Jane Doe, RN, and Jane Doe, MD, as Defendants. (See
Doc. 1-1, at PageID 10–11).
In his Complaint, Plaintiff expressly states he is suing Sheriff Jeffrey Balzer only in an
official capacity and Jane Doe, RN, and Jane Doe, MD, only in their individual capacities. (See
Doc. 1-1, at PageID 10–11). His motion to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted by
separate Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (Doc. 2).
This case is currently before the Court for a sua sponte screening of the Complaint to
determine whether the Complaint or any portion of it should be dismissed because it is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
I. Legal Standard
A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim
with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328–29
(1989); see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no

arguable legal basis when the defendant is immune from suit or when the plaintiff claims a
violation of a legal interest that clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has
no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational
or “wholly incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); Lawler, 898 F.2d at
1199. The Court need not accept as true factual allegations that are “fantastic or delusional” in
reviewing a complaint for frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).
Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). A complaint filed by a pro
se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). That
said, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Hill, 630 F.3d at 470–71 (noting
that the “dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to
state a claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

2
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept all well-
pleaded factual allegations as true but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
(1986)). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide

“more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual
enhancement.” Id. at 557. The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . .
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).
II. Allegations
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants1 did not administer a proper
“induction” process of treating Plaintiff with Suboxone, leading to life-threatening adverse
reactions that implicate a deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments2 and medical battery and negligence claims under state law. (See

generally Doc. 1-1). He contends that on December 5, 2025, he signed a medical agreement to
begin Suboxone treatment on December 20, 2025, and that the treatment protocol “required
seven days of oral film induction to ensure patient safety before administrating a high-dose

1 Plaintiff does not specify the particular Defendants at issue with this allegation. Construing the Complaint
liberally, his Complaint only discusses medical treatment. The Court therefore construes these allegations as having
been made against Jane Doe, RN, and Jane Doe, MD.
2 It is not entirely clear by the face of the Complaint if Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee (which would
implicate the Fourteenth Amendment) or incarcerated (which would implicate the Eighth Amendment). Plaintiff
refers to the Eighth Amendment three times in his Complaint, but the applicable law is dictated by his status at the
time of the alleged violations. (See Doc. 1-1, at PageID 12–13, 15). In construing the Complaint as liberally as may
be allowed under these circumstances, the Court will analyze Plaintiff’s claims under both the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
3
300mg injection.” (Doc. 1-1, at PageID 15). Plaintiff alleges that, on the arranged start date of
his Suboxone induction protocol, treatment was not administered despite his several inquiries to
nursing staff. Id. He attests that he did not receive a response to his inquiries until December
24 and that the response he received was, “You have been told that you start on [December] 26,

now stop sending messages.” Id. Plaintiff relates that he informed nursing staff in writing that
starting on December 26 “would not allow for the medically required 7-day induction period
before the injection.” Id.
On December 26, 2025, Plaintiff alleges that medical staff treated him with a 4mg oral
Suboxone strip, then administered the 300mg Suboxone injection one hour later, forgoing the 7-
day induction protocol. (Doc. 1-1, at PageID 15). Additionally, he attests that the nurse
administering the doses “expressed confusion regarding the procedure, having to consult a
supervisor on whether to wait ten minutes or an hour, demonstrating a lack of adequate training
and a reckless disregard for Plaintiff’s safety.” Id. Plaintiff asserts that this procedure went
against FDA safety guidelines and the “jail’s own agreed-upon protocol.” Id. He alleges that

he suffered adverse side effects one hour after the injection, “including vomiting black bile and
developing hives and rashes across the face and chest,” but that the only treatment he received
from medical staff was “topical hydrocortisone,” instead of “emergency medical intervention”
or “monitoring Plaintiff for internal complications or toxicity.” Id. Finally, Plaintiff contends
that medical staff failed to provide a mental health evaluation before his release three days later.
Id.
Upon release, Plaintiff contends that the combination of Defendants’ improper Suboxone
treatment on December 26, 2025, and their lack of treating its side effects resulted in the

4
following “life-threatening complications”:
*Seven (7) emergency room visits post-release.
*Two and a half weeks of continuous vomiting and inability to eat over a week.
*Severe constipation and physical distress.
*Acute psychosis, including severe visual and auditory hallucinations.
*A subsequent relapse triggered by the physical and mental trauma of the
improperly administered medication.

(Doc. 1-1, at PageID 15). For relief, Plaintiff seeks reimbursement for all post-release medical
expenses, including “all ER visits, any follow-up care, and medications [he] had to pay for after
[his] release,” as well as lost wages from “[his] illness (the 2.5 weeks of vomiting and psychosis)
prevent[ing] him from working,” physical pain and suffering, and emotional distress. (Id. at
13–14.) He also seeks punitive damages because “[t]he nurse expressed confusion and ignored
the 7-day induction protocol, [] the staff ignored [his] written concerns on [December] 24, [and]
the defendants acted with reckless disregard for [his] safety, mental wellbeing, and life.” Id. at
14.
III. Analysis
In construing the Complaint liberally, Plaintiff brings several claims. He alleges a failure
to train or supervise claim against Defendants Sheriff Jeffrey Balzer in his official capacity,
Delaware County Board of Commissioners, and PrimeCare Medical, Inc. He brings a claim for
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment and
Fourteenth Amendments against Defendants Jane Doe, RN, and Jane Doe, MD. The Court also
understands Plaintiff to bring state-law claims for medical battery and medical malpractice against
Defendants.
A. Eighth/Fourteenth Amendment Claim Related to Medical Care/Treatment
As an initial matter, because it is unclear from the face of the Complaint whether Plaintiff
5
was a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner during the timeframe at issue, the Court will analyze
his deliberate indifference to medical needs claim under both the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. See Hehrer v. Cty. of Clinton, 161 F.4th 955, 962 (6th Cir. 2025) (“While
the Eighth Amendment’s ban on ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ protects convicted prisoners,

the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban on ‘depriv[ations]’ of ‘life’ or ‘liberty’ ‘without due process of
law’ protects pretrial detainees.” (citations omitted)). Although this distinction used to have little
practical significance, recent precedent has applied different standards for pretrial detainees,
making the constitutional source of the claim more important. See id. at 963. The standard for
the Eighth Amendment claim has not changed. If brought under the Eight Amendment, a
prisoner’s deliberate indifference to medical needs claim has both an objective and subjective
component. Helphenstine v. Lewis Cty., Kentucky, 60 F.4th 305, 315 (6th Cir. 2023) (citing
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)). As the
Helphenstine Court explained:
The “objective component” addresses the conditions leading to the alleged
violation: it “requires a plaintiff to prove that the alleged deprivation of medical
care was serious enough to violate the Constitution.” The “subjective” component,
meanwhile, addresses the officials’ state of mind and requires a plaintiff to show
that a defendant “kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.”
Id. (citations omitted).
By contrast, the Sixth Circuit has adopted an “easier-to-meet” subjective standard for
pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Hehrer, 161 F.4th at 963. Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee must plausibly allege “(1) that [he] had a sufficiently
serious medical need and (2) that each defendant acted deliberately (not accidentally), [and] also
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recklessly in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that
it should be known.” Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at 317. As it relates to medical care, the Sixth
Circuit has explained that:
Generally, “a patient’s disagreement with his physicians over the proper course of
treatment alleges, at most, a medical-malpractice claim, which is not cognizable
under § 1983.” Darrah v. Krisher, 865 F.3d 361, 372 (6th Cir. 2017). But “a
doctor’s provision of ‘grossly inadequate medical care’ to an involuntary detainee
may amount to deliberate indifference.” Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 819
(6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Terrance, 286 F.3d at 844). “Grossly inadequate medical
care is medical care that is ‘so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to
shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.’” Id. (quoting
Terrance, 286 F.3d at 844). And when the medical need is obvious, “medical care
which is so cursory as to amount to no treatment at all may amount to deliberate
indifference.” Terrance, 286 F.3d at 843 (citation omitted).

Id. at 322.
1. Plaintiff’s Claim against the Individual-Capacity Defendants

At this stage of the proceeding, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged both
elements, under either Constitutional Amendment framework. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges there
was an agreed upon treatment plan to treat his drug addiction with Suboxone, that the medical staff
knowingly disregarded that plan and his inquiries about it, that the administering nurse Defendant
Jane Doe R.N. “expressed confusion” as to the proper procedure for administration of the
medications, and that Defendants failed to provide him with medical care or monitor his symptoms
post injection beyond providing hydrocortisone cream, despite having severe adverse reactions
including: vomiting black bile and continuous vomiting for two and a half weeks, acute psychosis
with severe visual and auditory hallucinations, and seven emergency room visits post-release.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim can proceed as it
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relates to Defendants Jane Doe R.N. and Jane Doe M.D. in their individual capacities.3
2. Plaintiff’s Claim against the Delaware County Board of Commissioners

“A municipality is a ‘person’ under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” meaning “it can be held liable for
constitutional injuries for which it is responsible.” Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at 323 (quoting
Morgan v. Fairfield Cnty., 903 F.3d 553, 565 (6th Cir. 2018)). Still, although a local government
and its political subdivisions may be considered a “person” for purposes of § 1983, it cannot be
held liable for the acts of its employees on a respondeat superior theory. Myers v. Delaware Cty.,
Ohio, No. 2:07-CV-844, 2009 WL 3446752, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 22, 2009). “Instead, it is when
execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the government as an
entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978);
Nichols v. Wayne Cty. Mich., 822 F. App’x 445, 448 (6th Cir. 2020) (“To state a municipal-liability
claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege the deprivation (1) of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) that was directly caused by a municipal policy or
custom.” (citing Hardrick v. City of Detroit, 876 F.3d 238, 243 (6th Cir. 2017)).

A plaintiff may prove an unconstitutional “policy” or “custom” by demonstrating “(1) the
existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final
decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate
training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal
rights violations.” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Thomas v. City

3 While the Court has determined that this deliberate indifference claim may proceed for further development
at this juncture, “[t]he court cautions Plaintiff this is only a preliminary determination. The court has not made a
determination on the merits of his claim[] or potential defenses thereto, nor are Defendants precluded from filing a
motion to dismiss [or other appropriate motion] under . . . the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Wiley v. Austin,
No. 8:20CV220, 2020 WL 6204382, at *3 (D. Neb. Oct. 22, 2020).
8
of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005)).
In this case, however, Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege how any of “the specific
instances of misconduct alleged in the complaint” are connected to a Delaware County policy or
failure to train or supervise. See Braunskill v. Smith, No. 1:24-CV-140, 2024 WL 4465269, at *4

(S.D. Ohio June 11, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:24-CV-140, 2024 WL
4182011 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 13, 2024). Indeed, if anything, Plaintiff’s allegations support the
contrary. Here, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Jane Doe, R.N., and Jane Doe, M.D., went
against Delaware County Jail’s “agreed-on protocol” when they allegedly improperly
administered the Suboxone, which belies any argument that the Board of Commissioners had a
Policy that could have caused Plaintiff’s alleged injuries. (Doc. 1-1, PageID at 15). Thus,
Plaintiff cannot point to a specific policy or custom that contributed to his alleged harm.
Further, to the extent Plaintiff is trying to bring his Monell claim against Delaware County
Commissioners for a failure to properly train the medical staff, such allegations still fail to
sufficiently allege a Monell claim. According to the Sixth Circuit, “[a] municipality’s culpability

for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.”
Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at 323 (citing Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011)). To
successfully plead a failure-to-train theory, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the governmental
entity was deliberately indifferent. Id. This can be shown in two ways. A plaintiff can
demonstrate deliberate indifference by showing either that there was “(1) a ‘pattern of similar
constitutional violations by untrained employees’ or (2) ‘a single violation of federal rights,
accompanied by a showing that [the municipality] has failed to train its employees to handle
recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for a constitutional violation.’” Id. (quoting

9
Shadrick v. Hopkins Cty., 805 F.3d 724, 738–39 (6th Cir. 2015)). Moreover, if a plaintiff is trying
to rely on a single-incident theory to show a failure to train, there are an additional three elements
that must be met: “(1) that the [government entity’s] ‘training or supervision was inadequate for
the tasks performed; (2) the inadequacy was the result of the municipality’s deliberate indifference;

and (3) the inadequacy was closely related to or actually caused the injury.’” Winkler v. Madison
Cty., 893 F.3d 877, 902 (6th Cir. 2018).
Proceeding under a theory of failure to supervise has similar requirements. See Bickerstaff
v. Cuyahoga Cty., No. 1:18cv1142, 2020 WL 5626692, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Sep. 21, 2020)
(explaining that, to state a claim under a failure-to-supervise theory, a plaintiff must show that “the
government’s policy or custom was ‘representative of (1) a clear and persistent pattern of illegal
activity, (2) which the [government] knew or should have known about, (3) yet remained
deliberately indifferent about, and (4) that the [government’s] custom was the cause of the
deprivation of her constitutional rights” (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
Here, Plaintiff’s claim against the Delaware County Board of Commissioners should be

dismissed because he failed to plausibly allege a pattern of conduct or a single incident that meets
the requisite elements outlined above. The Court therefore recommends that Plaintiff’s claim
against the Delaware County Board of Commissioners be dismissed.
3. Plaintiff’s Official Capacity Claim Against Sheriff Jeffrey Balzer

Construed liberally, Plaintiff sues Defendant Sheriff Jeffrey Balzer in his official capacity
for a failure to train or supervise Defendants Jane Doe, RN, and Jane Doe, MD. (Doc. 1-1, PageID
at 15). For the same rationale underlying Defendant Delaware County Board of Commissioners’
dismissal above, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s claim on this count be dismissed.
10
As this Court has previously explained:
“While ‘[p]ersonal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a
government official for actions he takes under color of state law,’ individuals sued
in their official capacities stand in the shoes of the entity they represent.” Alkire
v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 165 (1985)). Thus, “[a] suit against an individual in his official capacity is
the equivalent of a suit against the governmental entity.” Matthews v. Jones, 35
F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994).

Kilkenny v. Gabriel, No. 2:19-CV-3661, 2019 WL 4601856, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 23, 2019)
(Vascura, M.J.), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:19-CV-3661, 2019 WL 6609211
(S.D. Ohio Dec. 5, 2019).
Plaintiff’s official-capacity constitutional claim in this case is subject to dismissal because
he has failed to allege sufficient facts to plausibly suggest that his rights were violated by a custom
or policy or a failure to train or supervise, as would be required to hold Defendant Balzer liable in
an official capacity. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Ultimately, because he cannot maintain suit
against the County itself, he cannot maintain suit against Defendant Balzer. Accordingly,
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under against Defendant Sheriff Jeffery Balzer in his official
capacity, and the Court therefore recommends that the claim be dismissed.
4. Plaintiff’s Claim against PrimeCare Medical, Inc.

Finally, Plaintiff sues Defendant PrimeCare Medical, Inc., in its capacity of “provider of
the medical staff at Delaware County Jail.” (Doc. 1-1, PageID at 10). While PrimeCare Medical,
Inc., is a private party, ordinarily not amenable to suit under § 1983, the Sixth Circuit has held that
a private entity that “contracts with the state to perform a traditional state function such as
providing medical services to prison inmates may be sued under § 1983 as one acting under ‘color
of state law.’” Buchanan v. Hamilton Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 1:10-CV-503, 2012 WL 6761507,
11
at *5 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 26, 2012) (citing Hicks v. Frey, 992 F.2d 1450, 1458 (6th Cir. 1993), and
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54 (1988)). However, similar to a municipality, a private entity like
PrimeCare Medical, Inc. cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the actions of its employees under
a theory of respondeat superior. See Nauroth v. Southern Health Partners, Inc., No. 1:07–539,

2009 WL 3063404, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 2009) (citing Thomas v. Coble, 55 F. App’x 748,
749 (6th Cir. 2003)). Plaintiff must instead show that PrimeCare Medical, Inc.’s employees
followed its custom or policy when committing the alleged constitutional violations and that the
custom or policy was the “moving force” behind the violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
Similarly, as stated above, to proceed on a failure-to-train-or-supervise theory of liability requires
a plaintiff to demonstrate either a pattern of similar conduct or a single incident that demonstrated
the entity “failed to train its employees to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious
potential for a constitutional violation.” Shadrick v. Hopkins Cty., 805 F.3d 724, 738 (6th Cir.
2015). But a plaintiff does not meet their burden “by showing that one nurse was unsatisfactorily
trained, that ‘an otherwise sound’ training program was ‘negligently administered,’ or that harm

could have been avoided if the nurse had had ‘better or more training, sufficient to equip [her] to
avoid the particular injury-causing conduct.” Id.
In this case, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts that demonstrate Defendants Jane Doe, R.N.,
and Jane Doe, M.D., were following a PrimeCare Medical, Inc., custom or policy when they
allegedly improperly treated him. In fact, Plaintiff’s concern arises from the individual
Defendants’ alleged failure to follow the Suboxone protocol he agreed to. But he raises no issues
with the proposed treatment plan itself. (Doc. 1-1, PageID at 15). And again, Plaintiff has failed
to sufficiently allege that there was a pattern or practice of disregarding treatment protocols or that

12
there was a single incident that was so obvious. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant
PrimeCare Medical, Inc. should be dismissed.
B. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims
To the extent Plaintiff is also asserting state law claims for medical battery and

malpractice/negligence, the Court will permit, at least at this time, Plaintiff’s related state law
claims for medical battery and medical negligence/malpractice to proceed against the individual
Defendants Jane Doe R.N. and Jane Doe M.D. in their individual capacities.
However, having found that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s federal claims against
Defendants Delaware County Board of Commissioners, Sheriff Jeffrey Balzer, and PrimeCare
Medical, Inc., the Undersigned further recommends that the Court decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims as to these Defendants and dismiss such claims
without prejudice. See Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 39 (2025) (“[W]ith
any federal anchor gone, supplemental jurisdiction over the residual state claims disappears as
well.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

In short, Plaintiff’s Eighth/Fourteenth Amendment claim for alleged deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs against Defendants Jane Doe, R.N., and Jane Doe, M.D., in
their individual capacities MAY PROCEED past the initial screening stage. The same goes for
Plaintiff’s state-law claims for medical battery and medical malpractice/negligence against these
two Defendants.
But it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff’s
federal claims against Defendants Delaware County Board of Commissioners and PrimeCare
13
Medical, Inc., respectively, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1); DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff’s federal claim against
Defendant Jeffery Balzer in his official capacity; and DECLINE to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims as to these three Defendants and DISMISS such

claims without prejudice, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
The Undersigned notes, however, that neither remaining Defendant—Jane Doe, R.N., and
Jane Doe, M.D.—is identified by name. Because Plaintiff has provided insufficient identifying
information for these Defendants, see generally Jones v. Sheriff Officer Unknown of Lancaster
Cty., No. 8:20CV365, 2021 WL 2351118, at *3 (D. Neb. June 9, 2021), the Court will treat them
as unidentified defendants. Although designation of a “John Doe” or “unknown” defendant is not
favored in the federal courts, it is permissible when the identity of the alleged defendant is not
known at the time the complaint is filed, and Plaintiff could identify defendant through discovery.
See Yates v. Young, 772 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1985) (unpublished), 1985 WL 13614, citing Schiff v.
Kennedy, 691 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1982); Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1980); Maclin

v. Paulson, 627 F.2d 83 (7th Cir. 1980); see also Downie v. City of Middleburg Hts., 76 F.Supp.2d
794, 801 n.5 (N.D. Ohio 1999). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require the Court to
dismiss unknown defendants simply because the plaintiff is unaware of the identity of those
defendants at the time of the filing of the complaint. Rather, “the plaintiff should be given the
opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery
would not uncover the identities, or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds.”
Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642; see also Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999).
Under the circumstances of this case, it is appropriate to permit service of the complaint on

14
a high-ranking official who could identify Jane Doe, R.N., and Jane Doe, M.D., through discovery.
See Mosby v. Doe, No. 08-cv-677, 2009 WL 192502, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 27, 2009). As
Defendant Sheriff Jeffrey Balzer is the current Delaware County Sheriff and therefore is in a
position to know or determine the name of these two Defendants, it is appropriate to serve

Defendant Sheriff Jeffery Balzer for this limited purpose only. Once Plaintiff discovers the name
of these Defendants, he will be required to amend his complaint to identify them, and Defendant
Sheriff Jeffery Balzer will be dismissed.
It is therefore ORDERED that Plaintiff, within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order,
submit a completed summons and U.S. Marshal form for Defendant Sheriff Jeffery Balzer for this
limited purpose. Plaintiff is advised that failure to comply with this Order may result in the
dismissal of this action for want of prosecution.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. Plaintiff’s federal claims against Defendant Delaware County Board of
Commissioners be DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted.
2. Plaintiff’s federal claims against Defendant Sheriff Jeffrey Balzer in his official
capacity be DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to state a plausible Monell claim, see
Newberry, 789 F.3d at 646. Defendant Balzer should not yet be dismissed from this case,
however, as he will be the stand-in party for service of the unknown individual Defendants.
3. Plaintiff’s federal claims against PrimeCare Medical, Inc. be DISMISSED without
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
4. Any state-law claims against Defendants Delaware County Board of

15
Commissioners, Sherriff Jeffrey Balzer, and PrimeCare Medical, Inc. be DISMISSED without
prejudice. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
1. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of this Order, Plaintiff SHALL submit to the

Court a completed summons and U.S. Marshal form for Defendant Sheriff Jeffrey Balzer.
2. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send to Plaintiff a summons form and a U.S.
Marshal form for this purpose. Upon receipt of the completed summons and U.S. Marshal forms,
the Court ORDERS service of process by the United States Marshal in this case as directed by
Plaintiff. Plaintiff shall be granted leave to proceed against Defendant Sheriff Jeffrey Balzer,
solely for the purpose of determining the identities of Defendants Jane Doe, R.N. and Jane Doe,
M.D.
3. Plaintiff SHALL file a motion to issue service, including updated U.S. Marshal and
summons forms, if and when Plaintiff discovers the identities of Defendants Jane Doe, R.N., and
Jane Doe, M.D., through discovery. Plaintiff is advised that no service will be issued on

Defendants Jane Doe, R.N., and Jane Doe, M.D., unless Plaintiff complies with this Order.
4. Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants or, if appearance has been entered by counsel,
upon Defendants’ attorney(s), a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for
consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed with the
Clerk of Court a certificate stating the date on which a true and correct copy of any document was
mailed to Defendants or counsel. Any paper received by a District Judge or Magistrate Judge
which has not been filed with the Clerk or which fails to include a certificate of service will be
disregarded by the Court.

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5. Plaintiff shall inform the Court promptly of any changes in his address which may
occur during the pendency of this lawsuit.
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of
the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed
findings and recommendations. This period may be extended further by the Court on timely
motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report and
Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral
hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such
portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the
assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections

WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in
accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Berkshire v. Dahl, 928 F.3d 520,
530 (6th Cir. 2019); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638
F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ S. Courter M. Shimeall
S. COURTER M. SHIMEALL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11365236. Public record. Not legal advice.