# Brown

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · June 12, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11365131

## Case

- **Full name:** Kimberly S. Brown v. Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** June 12, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
Kimberly S. Brown, : .
: Case No. 1:25-cv-552
Plaintiff, :
: Judge Susan J. Dlott
v. :
: Order Affirming Report and
Commissioner of Social Security, : Recommendation and Overruling
: Objections
Defendant. :

This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (R&R) issued by
Magistrate Judge Karen L. Litkovitz. (Docs. 12, 13.) Plaintiff Kimberly S$. Brown initiated this
suit to appeal a final administrative decision denying her claim for disability insurance benefits.
The Magistrate Judge in the R&R recommended that the non-disability finding by the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) be affirmed and Brown’s Statement of Errors be overruled.
(Doc. 12 at PageID 1536.) Brown has filed Objections to the R&R. (Doc. 13.) For the reasons
that follow, the Court will OVERRULE Brown’s Objections and AFFIRM the R&R.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW OF A REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) & (C) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(1)
authorize magistrate judges to make recommendations concerning dispositive motions that have
been referred to them. Parties then have fourteen days to make, file, and serve specific written
objections to the report and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
If a party files objections to a report and recommendation on a dispositive matter, a district judge
must review it under the de novo standard. Baker v. Peterson, 67 F. App’x 308, 310 (6th Cir.
2003).

II. BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
This case has a complicated factual and procedural history. The Court will focus here on
the facts and procedural history directly relevant to Brown’s Objections to the R&R.
A. Administrative Process
Brown filed an application for disability insurance benefits in July 2021 based on
Legionnaire’s disease, COPD, and anxiety. (Doc. 7-5 at PageID 293-297; Doc. 7-6 at PagelD
336.) The first denial of her application was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
(Doc. 7-9 at PageID 969.) A second hearing was held before ALJ Christopher S. Tindale in
February 2025. The ALJ issued a Decision on May 8, 2025 again denying her application after
concluding that she was not disabled. (Doc. 7-8 at PageID 886-906.)
B. ALJ Decision
An ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine if a claimant is
disabled:
1) If the claimant is doing substantial gainful activity, the claimant is not disabled.
2) If the claimant does not have a severe medically determinable physical or
mental impairment—i.e., an impairment that significantly limits his or her
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities—the claimant is not
disabled.
3) If the claimant has a severe impairment(s) that meets or equals one of the
listings in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the regulations and meets the duration
requirement, the claimant is disabled.
4) If the claimant’s impairment does not prevent him or her from doing his or her
past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled.
5) If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work, the claimant is not
disabled. If the claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, the claimant is
disabled.
Rabbers v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 582 F.3d 647, 652 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 404.1520(b)-(g)).

The ALJ here made the following relevant findings (using the numbers provided in the
Decision):
eee
5. [Plaintiff] has the following severe impairments: chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease (COPD)/asthma, depressive disorder, personality disorder, posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), disorders
of the spine (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).
***
7. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that
[plaintiff] has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in
20 CFR 404.1567(b) with the following limitations: she must avoid concentrated
exposure to extreme heat, extreme cold, high humidity, and to pulmonary irritants
such as fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and poor ventilation. She can carry out simple
tasks, maintain attention, make simple decisions, and adequately adhere to a
schedule. She can have no public interaction. She can have occasional contact
with supervisors and coworkers but no tandem tasks, no supervising others, no
customer service duties, and no negotiation. She cannot have over-the-shoulder
supervisor scrutiny. She can adapt to a setting in which duties are routine and
predictable.
* ok
12. Considering [plaintiff]’s age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that [plaintiff] can perform (20 CFR 404.1569 and 404.1569a).
13. [Plaintiff] has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security
Act, from May 30, 2020, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g)).
(Doc. 7-8 at PageID 893, 896-905.) The ALJ concluded that Brown “not disabled under
sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act.” (/d. at PageID 905.)
Finding 7, which was the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) finding, is most directly in
dispute in the Objections. Brown argues that the ALJ failed to adequately account for a finding
by a state agency expert, Cindy Matyi, Ph.D., a psychologist, that Brown was limited to
“superficial” interaction with others in the RFC. Dr. Matyi had determined that Brown had
“social interaction limitations” and she opined as follows:

Claimant is susceptible to misinterpreting interpersonal nuance, yet can relate
adequately on a superficial basis in an environment that entails infrequent public
contact, minimal interaction with coworkers, and no over-the-shoulder supervisor
scrutiny.
(Doc. 7-3 at PageID 122.) Dr. Matyi did not provide a definition for the term “superficial.”
The ALJ specifically found Dr. Matyi’s report to be “somewhat persuasive” but he noted
that her “assessment contains some vague terms, which reduce[ ] the overall persuasiveness.”
(Doc. 7-8 at PageID 902.) He further stated that Dr. Matyi’s “social limitations were vague,
extreme, and not consistent with the record which shows [Brown] did not allege interaction
issues in her function report, she worked as a bartender, cashier, and in customer service, and she
interacted fine with providers and staff.” (/d.) The ALJ did not use the term “superficial” in
Brown’s RFC, and he never explicitly defined the term as used by Dr. Matyi.
Cc. Procedural History, Report and Recommendation, and Objections
Brown filed her Complaint in this case on August 8, 2025 and her Statement of Specific
Errors on December 21, 2025. (Docs. 6, 8.) She asserted that the ALJ failed to incorporate the
superficial interaction limitation in the RFC given by Dr. Matyi. (Doc. 8 at PageID 1503-1505.)
Defendant Commissioner of Social Security filed a Memorandum in Opposition in which he
argued that the ALJ’s decision should be affirmed because it was supported by substantial
evidence. (Doc. 11.)
In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court overrule Brown’s
Statement of Errors and affirm the ALJ’s finding that Brown is not disabled. She specifically
concluded that the ALJ’s “evaluation and application of Dr. Matyi’s limitation to superficial
interaction is supported by substantial evidence.” (Doc. 12 at PageID 1533.) In reaching this
conclusion, the Magistrate Judge pointed out that “there is no official, agency-accepted definition
of the term superficial.” (Doc. 12 at PageID 1529.) This Court agrees with that legal finding.

See, e.g., Mabry-Schlicher v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 24-3811, 2025 WL 1604376, at *4 (6th
Cir. June 6, 2025) (stating that SSA regulations and guidance do “not provide a precise definition
or enumerate specific criteria to satisfy a ‘superficial’ contact limitation”); Dieter v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., No. No. 3:25 CV 265, 2026 WL 709730, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 13, 2026) (following
Mabry-Schlicher). She also found that ALJ Tinsdale’s treatment of the superficial interaction
limitation in the RFC was based on substantial evidence. (Doc. 12 at PageID 1531.)
In her Objections, Brown contends that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that the
ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Matyi’s superficial interaction limitation was supported by substantial
evidence. Brown contends that the ALJ Tindale’s analysis cannot be considered complete
because he did not address the definition of the term superficial given by the SSA Appeals
Council in a different case but submitted by Brown in the administrative proceedings. (Doc. 13
at PageID 1540.)' The Court disagrees. ALJ Tindale was not required to evaluate or use the
definition of the term “superficial” giving by the SSA Appeals Council in an unrelated case. See
Markcus C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:22-cv-1917, 2023 WL 1783514, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb.
6, 2023) (denying a plaintiffs request to remand “so that the ALJ can reevaluate plaintiff's
claimed disability using the ‘superficial interaction’ definition the Appeals Council employed in
the unrelated case), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2162261 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 22,
2023); see also Dieter, 2026 WL 709730, at *3 (finding that an ALJ did not err by not
considering a competing definition of the term “superficial” from a non-binding Appeals Council
decision).

' Brown also broadly contends that this Court should “carefully review the arguments set forth
in Plaintiff's Statement of Specific Errors” in addition to the objection discussed above. (Doc.
13 at PagelID 1539.) However, “the district court need not provide de novo review where the
objections are frivolous, conclusive or general.” Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir.
1986) (per curiam) (cleaned up). Brown’s request that the Court also review the arguments made
in the Statement of Errors is too broad and general to warrant de novo review.

Ill. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 12) is ADOPTED, and
Brown’s Objections (Doc. 13) are OVERRULED. Brown’s Statement of Errors (Doc. 8) is
OVERRULED as well. ALJ Tindale’s finding that Brown is not disabled is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
BY THE COURT:

Susan J. Dlott ( :
United States DistricWJudge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11365131. Public record. Not legal advice.