# Opinion

> District Court, M.D. Florida · April 3, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11365083

## Case

- **Full name:** Swift Paws, Inc. v. Defendants Identified in Schedule A
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** April 3, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION

SWIFT PAWS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:26-cv-259-JSS-LHP

DEFENDANTS IDENTIFIED IN
SCHEDULE A,

Defendants.
___________________________________/
ORDER
Plaintiff sues Defendants (identified in Schedule A attached to the complaint,
(Dkt. 1-2)) under the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–390, for the alleged infringement of
looping lure systems for use as lure-chasing pet toys patented under United States
Patent Numbers 10,609,904 and 12,156,508. (Dkt. 1.) At 6:15 P.M. E.D.T. on March
9, 2026, the court granted Plaintiff’s verified motion (Dkt. 9) and entered an ex parte
temporary restraining order (TRO), including an asset freeze, against Defendants.
(Dkt. 10.) On March 13, 2026, the court extended the period for the TRO to 6:15 P.M.
E.D.T. on April 6, 2026. (Dkt. 17.) Plaintiff has paid the $10,000 that the court
required as security for the TRO, (Dkt. 10 at 16; Dkt. 20), and now moves to convert
the TRO to a preliminary injunction against Defendant Zhende Tech (identified in at
least the first two entries of Schedule A, which are associated with the Amazon
platform, (Dkt. 1-2 at 1)), (Dkt. 23). Zhende Tech opposes the motion to convert.
(Dkt. 24.) On March 30, 2026, the court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion.
the TRO to a preliminary injunction against Zhende Tech.
BACKGROUND
In the complaint, Plaintiff asserts one count of infringement of its two utility
patents. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 45–53.) To remedy the alleged infringement, Plaintiff seeks

injunctive and monetary relief, including legal fees. (Id. at 16–17.)
Plaintiff, a corporation headquartered in Melbourne, Florida, develops and sells
pet products, including pet toys. (Dkt. 9 at 2.) As relevant here, Plaintiff developed
and sold the looping lure systems for use as lure-chasing pet toys with the claimed
elements of the asserted patents (the patented products). (Id. at 2–3.) Plaintiff owns

United States Patent Number 10,609,904 titled Lure Chasing System (the ‘904 patent).
(Id. at 3.) The ‘904 patent application was filed on December 14, 2014, and issued by
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) on April 7, 2020. (Id.)
Plaintiff has attached the ‘904 patent as Exhibit 2 to the complaint. (Id.; see Dkt. 1-3.)
In addition, Plaintiff owns United States Patent Number 12,156,508 titled Pulley

System Allowing for Passage of Object Attached to Line (‘508 patent). (Dkt. 9 at 3.)
The ‘508 patent application was filed on April 11, 2022, and issued by the USPTO on
November 13, 2024. (Id.) Plaintiff has attached the ‘508 patent as Exhibit 3 to the
complaint. (Id.; see Dkt. 1-4.) Since at least 2016, Plaintiff has sold its products to the
public. (Dkt. 9 at 3.) Plaintiff sells its products—including the patented products—

through its website, its Amazon store, the Chewy retail site, and other online sites. (Id.
at 3–4.) Further, Plaintiff’s patented products have appeared multiple times on the
national television show Shark Tank. (Id. at 4.)
Plaintiff has recently learned that some ecommerce stores were promoting,
advertising, marketing, distributing, offering for sale, and selling products covered by
one or more claims of each of the asserted patents. (Id.) This ecommerce activity
occurred through stores operating under the seller aliases identified in Schedule A,

which is Exhibit 1 to the complaint. (Id.; see Dkt. 1-2.) Defendants are the stores listed
in Schedule A, including Zhende Tech. (See Dkts. 1, 1-2, 9.) According to Plaintiff,
Defendants conceal their identities using fictitious names and addresses to register and
operate their network of online storefronts. (Dkt. 9 at 4.) Plaintiff asserts upon
information and belief that Defendants reside or operate in foreign jurisdictions and

manufacture, distribute, import, offer for sale, or sell products, including infringing
products, from the same or similar sources in those foreign locations into the United
States, where the products are offered for sale under aliases through online
marketplaces. (Id.)
Plaintiff states that through online marketplaces, such as Amazon, eBay,

TikTok, and Temu, Defendants have infringed, and continue to infringe, on Plaintiff’s
asserted patents by manufacturing, distributing, importing, offering for sale, or selling
the looping lure systems for use as lure-chasing pet toys, which perform the same
function in the same way and achieve the same result as is claimed in the asserted
patents. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ infringing products are in direct

competition with the patented products sold by Plaintiff, without any license or
authorization from Plaintiff. (Id.) Schedule A identifies Defendants by providing their
sold-by names, seller business names, product Amazon Standard Identification
Numbers (ASINs), and product and seller storefront links, which consist of
Amazon.com web addresses or similar information. (Dkt. 1-2.)
A claims chart with descriptions and photographs, attached as Exhibit 4 to the
complaint, displays one of Zhende Tech’s allegedly infringing products for comparison

with Plaintiff’s patent claims. (Dkt. 1-5.) Review of the claims chart reveals that
Defendants’ allegedly infringing products likely infringe the asserted claims of the
asserted patents. (See id.) Plaintiff reports that Defendants’ infringing products are
made with inferior materials and are offered at reduced prices, thereby negatively
affecting Plaintiff’s revenue, goodwill, and market position. (Dkt. 9 at 12–14.)

Plaintiff further reports that Defendants often use tactics involving search engine
optimization and product promotion methods that directly divert consumers to
Defendants’ infringing products from Plaintiff’s patented products, which reduces
Plaintiff’s market share. (Id.)
At the evidentiary hearing, Plaintiff and Zhende Tech presented argument on

the motion, and Plaintiff introduced eleven exhibits into evidence and called one
witness. Zhende Tech did not introduce any exhibits or call any witnesses. The eleven
exhibits, which were admitted without objection, consisted of the ‘904 and ‘508 patents
(Exhibits 1 and 2), Schedule A (Exhibit 3), documents showing the assignment of the
patents to Plaintiff (Exhibits 4 and 5), the claims chart (Exhibit 6), screenshots related

to Defendants’ online marketplaces (Exhibits 7 and 8), reviews of allegedly infringing
products (Exhibit 9), video footage of Plaintiff on Shark Tank (Exhibit 11), and
screenshots of complaints from Plaintiff to online marketplaces about allegedly
infringing products (Exhibit 12). (Dkt. 27.) Plaintiff used a physical exemplar of an
allegedly infringing product from Zhende Tech (Exhibit 10) to argue patent
infringement but did not offer the exemplar into evidence. (See id.)
Meghan Wolfgram, Plaintiff’s founder and chief executive officer, testified on

its behalf. (See Dkt. 13.) She provided general information about Plaintiff, described
her role in developing Plaintiff’s products and securing the patents at issue, and
discussed the assignment of the patents to Plaintiff. She also stated that she bought
the exemplar from Zhende Tech through Amazon and that the claims chart shows
photographs of the exemplar. With reference to the exemplar, Ms. Wolfgram

explained how the features described in the patents function and how the claims chart
illustrates Zhende Tech’s infringement of the patents. As to sales, she testified that
Plaintiff sells products in various ways—online, at charity events and pet competitions,
and through twenty-five to thirty independent retailers—and that Plaintiff has sold
20,000 products since 2012. She further testified that Plaintiff granted a license to one

company to sell a product covered by the patents and that as the sales of allegedly
infringing products increased, the licensee’s sales decreased, indicating that
Defendants are diverting consumers from Plaintiff and the licensee. According to Ms.
Wolfgram, Plaintiff could not manufacture products at prices as low as those of the
allegedly infringing products without sacrificing quality. Relatedly, she shared

negative consumer reviews about the allegedly infringing products and explained that
the negative reviews have damaged Plaintiff’s reputation because Plaintiff’s name has
become synonymous with all products in its category of lure-chasing pet toys. In fact,
Ms. Wolfgram reported, a consumer called Plaintiff’s customer support number to
complain about an unsafe product because he believed that he had bought one of
Plaintiff’s products when actually, he had purchased a competitor’s product.
Before the hearing, Zhende Tech submitted a response focusing in large part on

the terms “drive window,” “arcuate surface,” and “opening height” in the ‘904 patent
and “object passthrough window” and “inwardly beveled pulley shield” in the ‘508
patent. (Dkt. 24 at 3–16.) Zhende Tech discussed the terms when arguing that the
exemplar does not demonstrate infringement of the patents and when challenging the
validity of the ‘904 patent based on the indefiniteness of some of its terms. (Id.) During

both direct and cross-examination, Ms. Wolfgram explained how the exemplar
includes the challenged terms. Following Ms. Wolfgram’s testimony, the parties
presented closing arguments. Plaintiff argued that Zhende Tech is attempting to
rewrite the text of the patent claims based on language in the patent specifications and
that claim construction is unnecessary because the terms in the patent claims,

including the challenged terms, can be given their ordinary meanings. Plaintiff further
maintained, with respect to irreparable injury, that the same photographs for allegedly
infringing products appear on the sites of various online marketplaces such that the
sales discussed during the hearing represent only a fraction of the sales diverted from
Plaintiff. Zhende Tech contended that claim construction is necessary and that as a

lay witness, Ms. Wolfgram cannot provide it. Zhende Tech conclusorily objected
under Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403, and 702 and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26 to Ms. Wolfgram’s lay testimony connecting claims terms to the
exemplar. Zhende Tech also asserted that the patents include indefinite terms and that
as to irreparable injury, Plaintiff has a monetary remedy for infringement whereas
Zhende Tech has no adequate remedy if the court issues a preliminary injunction and
thereafter Zhende Tech is found not to have infringed the patents.

APPLICABLE STANDARDS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs TROs and preliminary injunctions.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65. The key difference is that whereas TROs may issue without
notice to the adverse party, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1), “[t]he court may issue a
preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1).

“Every order granting an injunction and every [TRO] must . . . state the reasons why
it issued[,] . . . state its terms specifically[,] and . . . describe in reasonable detail—and
not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or
required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1). Rule 65 further states: “The court may issue a
preliminary injunction or [TRO] only if the movant gives security in an amount that

the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found
to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c); accord M.D.
Fla. R. 6.01(a)(4) (requiring a TRO motion to “include . . . a precise and verified
explanation of the amount and form of the required security”); M.D. Fla. R. 6.02(a)(1)
(requiring the same of a preliminary injunction motion).

“A TRO or preliminary injunction is appropriate where the movant” satisfies
four requirements: (1) “there is a substantial likelihood of success on the merits,” (2)
“the TRO or preliminary injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable injury,” (3) “the
threatened injury outweighs the harm that the TRO or preliminary injunction would
cause to the non-movant,” and (4) “the TRO or preliminary injunction would not be
averse to the public interest.” Parker v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 275 F.3d 1032,
1034 (11th Cir. 2001); accord M.D. Fla. R. 6.01(b), 6.02(a)(1). Preliminary injunctive

relief “is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant
clearly establishes the burden of persuasion as to each of the four prerequisites.” Wall
v. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 543 F. Supp. 3d 1290, 1292 (M.D. Fla. 2021)
(alteration adopted and quotations omitted).
Relatedly, a “request for equitable relief invokes the district court’s inherent

equitable powers to order preliminary relief, including an asset freeze, in order to
assure the availability of permanent relief.” Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading,
Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 987 (11th Cir. 1995). An order freezing assets should provide a
procedure for the person whose assets are frozen to petition the court to modify the
asset freeze. See id. at 987–88 (affirming an asset freeze in a trademark infringement

case because the asset freeze “expressly allowed [the defendants] to petition the district
court to modify the freeze” (citing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Atlantex Assocs., 872 F.2d 966,
970–71 (11th Cir. 1989))).
ANALYSIS

The court discusses the four requirements for a preliminary injunction—
likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury, balance of harms, and public
interest—and then explains why continuing the asset freeze is warranted.
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The Patent Act permits courts to “grant injunctions in accordance with the
principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such
terms as the court deems reasonable.” 35 U.S.C. § 283. “In seeking a preliminary
injunction pursuant to section 283, a patent holder must establish a likelihood of

success on the merits both with respect to validity of its patent and with respect to
infringement of its patent.” Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451 (Fed.
Cir. 1988).
The Patent Act creates a presumption of validity for a patent. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a)
(“A patent shall be presumed valid. . . . The burden of establishing invalidity of a

patent . . . shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”). “In the context of a
preliminary injunction, while the burden of proving invalidity is with the party
attacking validity, the party seeking the injunction retains the burden of showing a
reasonable likelihood that the attack on its patent’s validity would fail.” Oakley, Inc. v.
Sunglass Hut Int’l, 316 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). Plaintiff

has satisfied that burden by showing that the patents underwent rigorous examination,
with the examiners considering numerous references. (See Dkts. 1-3, 1-4; Dkt. 23 at
6–7.) See Grinnell Corp. v. Am. Monorail Co., 285 F. Supp. 219, 225 (D.S.C. 1967) (“It
is abundantly evident from the file history of the . . . patent that the application was
subjected to rigorous examination. . . . Thus[,] the . . . application is entitled fully to

the presumption of validity accorded by the statute . . . .”).
Admittedly, “[w]hen the presumptions and burdens applicable at trial are taken
into account, the injunction should not issue if the party opposing the injunction raises
a substantial question concerning infringement or validity, meaning that it asserts a
defense that the party seeking the injunction cannot prove lacks substantial merit.”
Oakley, 316 F.3d at 1340 (alteration adopted and quotation omitted). As discussed at
the hearing, Zhende Tech focuses on terms in the asserted patent claims in an attempt

to “raise[] substantial questions of invalidity and non[-]infringement demonstrating
that Plaintiff cannot meet its [preliminary injunction] burden and [that] the TRO
should be dissolved.” (Dkt. 24 at 5–6.) With regard to invalidity, Zhende Tech
maintains that terms such as “drive window” and “arcuate” in the ‘904 patent render
that patent invalid as indefinite. (See id. at 4, 8 (citing Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz,

Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“A patent is indefinite if its claims, read in
light of the specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to
inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the
invention.” (quotation omitted))).) It would appear that Zhende Tech does not attack
the validity of the ‘508 patent but instead argues only the non-infringement of that

patent. (See id. passim.) To the extent that Zhende Tech argues the ‘508 patent’s
invalidity, for example, based on the purported indefiniteness of claim terms, the court
concludes that the legal presumption of validity remains intact as to that patent.
For a patent “to be indefinite, reasonable efforts at claim construction must
result in a definition that does not provide sufficient particularity or clarity to inform

a skilled artisan of the bounds of the claim.” 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp.,
725 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The patents at issue are sufficiently definite
when the court considers the legal framework for claim construction. See id. at 1321
(“To the extent possible, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning,
as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time
of the invention. Idiosyncratic language, highly technical terms, or terms coined by
the inventor are best understood by reference to the specification. While [courts]

construe the claims in light of the specification, limitations discussed in the
specification may not be read into the claims. Courts may rely on dictionary
definitions when construing claim terms, so long as the dictionary definition does not
contradict any definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent
documents.” (citations omitted)); see also Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d

1576, 1582–83 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“It is well-settled that, in interpreting an asserted
claim, the court should look first to the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent
itself, including the claims, the specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution
history. Such intrinsic evidence is the most significant source of the legally operative
meaning of disputed claim language. . . . In most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic

evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim term. In such
circumstances, it is improper to rely on extrinsic evidence.” (citation omitted)). The
court notes that “claims themselves [may] provide substantial guidance as to the
meaning of particular claim terms.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).

The challenged terms in the ‘904 patent, specifically “drive window” and
“arcuate,” do not suffer from indefiniteness. As to the term “drive window,” the
specification for the ‘904 patent consistently uses “drive” in relation to a motorized
pulley unit, contrasted with a transfer pulley unit, (see Dkt. 27-1 at 2, 9–11), and
consistently uses “window” to describe a feature, numbered forty-eight in the
specification’s figures, that permits a lure to enter and exit a unit, (see id. at 10–11).
Although the term “drive window” does not appear in the specification, only in the

claims, (see id. passim), a skilled artisan would know the bounds of the asserted claims
in light of the ordinary meaning of “drive window” as a combination of “drive” and
“window” and the definitions of those constituent terms derived from their uses in the
specification. See Bancorp Servs., LLC v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (“It is true that the entire term . . . is not defined in the patent . . . .

Nonetheless, the components of the term . . . allow the reader to infer the meaning of
the entire phrase with reasonable confidence.”). As to the term “arcuate,” which is
similarly confined to the claims, (see Dkt. 27-1), the parties seemingly agree that the
dictionary definition of the term, i.e., “curved like a bow,” applies. Although Zhende
Tech challenges the definiteness of the term, it also provides this definition in its

response, (Dkt. 24 at 8), and when on the witness stand, Ms. Wolfgram was amendable
to using the definition. In addition, she pointed out the relationship between “arcuate”
and the more familiar term “arc.” The Oxford English Dictionary defines “arcuate”
as “[c]urved like a bow, arc-shaped, arched” and confirms an etymological kinship
between the word and “arc.” See Arc, Oxford English Dictionary (online ed. 2026);

Arcuate, Oxford English Dictionary (online ed. 2026). The court cannot conclude that
any of the terms in the patents are indefinite such that the patents are invalid, and
overall, Zhende Tech fails to “raise[] a substantial question concerning . . . validity”
with respect to either patent. See Oakley, 316 F.3d at 1340.
Regarding infringement, a defendant infringes a utility patent when “during the
term” of the patent, “without authority,” the defendant “makes, uses, offers to sell, or
sells any patented invention[] within the United States or imports into the United

States any patented invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 271. Plaintiff’s claims chart, (see Dkts. 1-
5, 27-6), in and of itself, suffices to demonstrate Zhende Tech’s infringement of
Plaintiff’s patents, as the chart illustrates where in Zhende Tech’s product each
element of the asserted claims of the asserted patents is found. See Quickie Mfg. Corp.
v. Libman Co., 180 F. Supp. 2d 636, 642 (D.N.J. 2002) (“[T]he relevant comparison in

an infringement determination is . . . of the accused device with the claims of the
patent at issue.”); cf. KI Ventures, LLC v. Fry’s Elecs., Inc., 579 F. App’x 985, 991 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (supporting that “pictures with arrows that clearly point to the accused parts
for every claim limitation,” like the photographs in the claims chart attached to
Plaintiff’s complaint, can “clarify . . . infringement contentions”). That said, Ms.

Wolfgram’s testimony also showed how the exemplar product includes each claim
element. Insofar as Zhende Tech disputes her expertise, “expert evidence is not always
necessary to resolve questions of patent infringement.” Kyocera Wireless Co. v. President
Elecs., Ltd., 179 F. App’x 53, 54 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Union Carbide Corp. v. Am. Can
Co., 724 F.2d 1567, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). In any event, her years of experience

developing Plaintiff’s products make Ms. Wolfgram a knowledgeable lay witness, if
not an expert witness. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 (providing that an expert may be
“qualified . . . by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education”).
Zhende Tech argues that its products do not infringe Plaintiff’s patents because
the “drive window,” “arcuate surface,” and “opening height” elements of the ‘904
patent and the “object passthrough window” and “inwardly beveled pulley shield”
elements of the ‘508 patent are absent from Zhende Tech’s products. (See Dkt. 24 at

3–16.) Having considered Zhende Tech’s arguments about non-infringement,
including those advanced during the evidentiary hearing, the court does not find the
arguments persuasive. Overall, Zhende Tech does not “raise[] a substantial question
concerning infringement.” See Oakley, 316 F.3d at 1340. The court concludes that in
light of their features, Zhende Tech’s products likely infringe the elements of the

asserted claims.
Plaintiff can likely establish the validity of the asserted patents as well as
Defendants’ infringement thereof. Accordingly, Plaintiff has demonstrated a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits to obtain a preliminary injunction.
B. Irreparable Injury

For the irreparable injury requirement, the party seeking the preliminary
injunction must establish that “the injury is immediate and is not compensable by
monetary damages. Even when considered under traditional equitable rules, however,
the existence of a likely infringer in the market may” satisfy this requirement “because
of the difficulty of protecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies.” Tiber

Labs., LLC v. Hawthorn Pharms., Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1381 (N.D. Ga. 2007)
(quotation omitted). Plaintiff has identified Defendants as multiple likely infringers
sharing an online market with Plaintiff and has submitted evidence that Defendants
are causing Plaintiff harm by using inferior materials—to the detriment of Plaintiff’s
goodwill—to sell products at reduced prices, thereby diverting consumers from
Plaintiff. (Dkt. 23 at 7–8.) Ms. Wolfgram testified, for example, that Plaintiff could
not manufacture products for prices as low as those charged by the alleged infringers

unless Plaintiff sacrificed the quality of its products. Consequently, Plaintiff has shown
that a preliminary injunction is required to prevent irreparable injury.
Zhende Tech contends: “Plaintiff’s asserted harm is, at most, competitive
marketplace harm that can be addressed through damages if infringement were
ultimately proven.” (Dkt. 24 at 17.) The court disagrees. Evidence supports that

Defendants’ infringement of the patents has caused Plaintiff to lose customers and has
damaged its goodwill. The reviews in Exhibit 9 demonstrate that consumers have
experienced several problems with allegedly infringing products: one reviewer
commented that he was “[v]ery disappointed” that a product “completely stopped
working no matter how long [he] charge[d] it,” a second reviewer described a product’s

quality as “truly . . . ‘bottom of the barrel’ bad” and “[a]bsolutely awful,” a third
reviewer indicated that a product “started to smell like it was burning” on just the
second day of owning it, and a fourth reviewer stated: “I have four cats walking around
crying for this broken toy. [I will] never buy another.” (Dkt. 27-9 at 1–2.) Ms.
Wolfgram testified that such negative reviews have damaged Plaintiff’s reputation

because consumers equate all lure-chasing pet toys with Plaintiff. She further testified
to actual consumer confusion—insofar as a consumer called Plaintiff to complain
about a product that he mistakenly believed he had bought from Plaintiff—and to the
diversion of customers from Plaintiff and its sole licensee. “[T]he loss of customers
and goodwill is an irreparable injury.” Ferrero v. Associated Materials, Inc., 923 F.2d
1441, 1449 (11th Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted).
C. Balance of Harms

As Plaintiff observes, (see Dkt. 23 at 8), requiring a patent holder “to compete
against its own patented” product such that irreparable injury occurs “places a
substantial hardship” on the patent holder. Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659
F.3d 1142, 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2011). In contrast, “an infringer of [intellectual property]
cannot complain about the loss of ability to offer its infringing product.” WPIX, Inc.

v. ivi, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 594, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (collecting cases); accord i4i L.P.
v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The district court’s analysis [of
the balance of harms] properly ignored the expenses [the defendant] incurred in
creating the infringing products. Similarly irrelevant are the consequences to [the
defendant] of its infringement, such as the cost of redesigning the infringing

products. . . . [N]either commercial success, nor sunk development costs, shield an
infringer from injunctive relief. [The defendant] is not entitled to continue infringing
simply because it successfully exploited its infringement.” (citations omitted)).
Accordingly, because Plaintiff has shown a substantial likelihood that it is competing
in its online marketplace against products—sold by Defendants—that infringe its

patents, Plaintiff has established that its threatened injuries outweigh the harms that a
preliminary injunction would cause Defendants. See XYZ, 668 F. Supp. 3d at 1276
(“[The p]laintiff faces hardship from loss of sales and his inability to control his
reputation in the marketplace. By contrast, [the d]efendants face no hardship if they
are prohibited from the infringement of [the p]laintiff’s copyrights and patents which
[consists of] illegal acts.”). Although Zhende Tech complains that it “should not be
restrained from selling a non-infringing product,” (Dkt. 24 at 17), Plaintiff has shown

that Defendants, including Zhende Tech, are likely selling infringing products.
D. Public Interest
Given “the importance of the patent system in encouraging innovation,” Sanofi-
Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006), the public has a
“general interest in upholding patent rights,” i4i L.P., 598 F.3d at 863. Further, as

Plaintiff explains, absent a preliminary injunction, consumers “will continue to be
confused and misled by the infringing acts of Defendants[,] and the market will be
flooded with inferior [i]nfringing [p]roducts in contravention of Plaintiff’s [patent]
rights.” (Dkt. 23 at 9.) Because “the public interest is served by preventing consumer
confusion in the marketplace,” Davidoff & Cie, S.A. v. PLD Int’l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297,

1304 (11th Cir. 2001), Plaintiff has demonstrated that a preliminary injunction
preventing Defendants from infringing Plaintiff’s utility patents would serve the public
interest. Cf. Alston v. www.calculator.com, 476 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1323 (S.D. Fla. 2020)
(“[W]hen a trademark is shown to have been infringed, the public’s right to be free of
confusion . . . is infringed[,] too[.]” (citation omitted)). Zhende Tech’s argument to

the contrary depends on the premise that Zhende Tech has not infringed on Plaintiff’s
patents, (see Dkt. 24 at 18), but the court has explained above that Plaintiff is likely to
succeed on the merits of its infringement claims with respect to Defendants, including
Zhende Tech.
E. Asset Freeze
By satisfying the requirements for likelihood of success, irreparable injury,
balance of harms, and public interest, Plaintiff has established the need for a

preliminary injunction. See Wellons, 754 F.3d at 1263; Wall, 543 F. Supp. 3d at 1292.
To maintain the status quo, Plaintiff seeks to continue the freeze on Defendants’ assets
related to the allegedly infringing products that Defendants sell through Amazon.com
and other online marketplaces as indicated by Schedule A. (Dkt. 23 at 10; see Dkt. 1-
2.)

When a plaintiff seeks equitable relief, a court can order an asset freeze “to
assure the availability of permanent relief,” Levi Strauss, 51 F.3d at 987, and “the
district courts’ equitable powers [to freeze assets] apply even more broadly when the
public interest is involved,” AT&T Broadband v. Tech Commc’ns, Inc., 381 F.3d 1309,
1317 (11th Cir. 2004). Here, the remedies sought in the complaint include equitable

relief: namely, injunctive relief to restrain Defendants from infringing, and assisting
others in infringing, Plaintiff’s utility patents and to prevent non-party financial service
providers, ecommerce platforms, web hosts, search engines, and the like from
facilitating Defendants’ infringement. (Dkt. 1 at 16–17.) Moreover, Plaintiff
represents that “[a]s a result of Defendants’ infringement, Plaintiff intends to seek the

equitable relief of an accounting of Defendants’ profits under 35 U.S.C. § 289,” and
Plaintiff maintains: “Plaintiff has a good-faith belief that . . . Defendants will . . . hide
their ill-gotten assets beyond the jurisdiction of this [c]ourt, unless those assets
continue to be restrained.” (Dkt. 23 at 10.) The court agrees that an asset freeze is
warranted. See Purple Innovation, LLC v. Individuals, No. 24-24008-CIV-MARTINEZ,
2024 WL 5399073, at *3, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 239537, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 25,
2024) (granting an asset freeze and reasoning: “In light of the inherently deceptive

nature of the counterfeiting business, and the likelihood that [the d]efendants have
violated federal trademark and patent laws, [the p]laintiff has good reason to believe
[the d]efendants will hide or transfer their ill-gotten assets beyond the jurisdiction of
this [c]ourt unless those assets are restrained.”). The public’s interests in enforcing
patent rights and counteracting consumer confusion, discussed above, lend additional

support to this asset-freeze determination. See AT&T, 381 F.3d at 1317.
Any person whose assets are frozen pursuant to this order may petition the court
to modify the asset freeze by filing a motion in this case in compliance with the Local
Rules. See Levi Strauss, 51 F.3d at 987–88; Purple Innovation, 2024 WL 5399073, at *5,
2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 239537, at *14 (“Any [d]efendant or financial institution

account holder subject to this [o]rder may petition the [c]ourt to modify the asset
restraint set out in this [o]rder[.]”).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly:
1. Plaintiff’s motion to convert (Dkt. 23) is GRANTED as set forth in this order.

2. This preliminary injunction is ENTERED against Defendant Zhende Tech:
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
1. Defendant, its officers, directors, employees, agents, subsidiaries, and
distributors, and all other persons in active concert or participation with
Defendant are preliminarily restrained from
a. manufacturing, importing, advertising, promoting, offering to sell,
selling, distributing, or transferring any products infringing Plaintiff’s

asserted patents (Patent Numbers 10,609,904 and 12,156,508), including
any reproduction, copy, or colorable imitation thereof;
b. communicating, directly or indirectly, with any person or persons
i. from whom Defendant purchased or obtained products infringing
the asserted patents,

ii. to whom Defendant sold or offered to sell these products, or
iii. whom Defendant knows or reasonably believes to possess,
control, or have access to any of these products;
c. otherwise communicating, directly or indirectly, about this action with
any person, except for Defendant’s legal representation;

d. secreting, concealing, destroying, selling off, transferring, or otherwise
disposing of
i. any products not manufactured or distributed by Plaintiff that bear
the asserted patents or
ii. any evidence relating to the manufacture, importation, sale, offer

for sale, distribution, or transfer of any products that infringe the
asserted patents; and
e. knowingly instructing, aiding, or abetting any other person in engaging
in any of the activities referred to in a. through d. above.
2. During the pendency of this action or until further order of the court, Defendant
shall not transfer any ownership interest of a business if that business has in any
way used online marketplaces with respect to products that infringe the asserted

patents, including any reproduction, copy, or colorable imitation thereof.
3. Upon receiving notice of this order, Defendant and any third-party financial
institutions, payment processors, banks, escrow services, money transmitters,
or marketplace platforms who are providing services for Defendant including
but not limited to online marketplaces (collectively, the third-party providers)

shall, within five business days after receipt of notice of this order,
a. restrain the transfer of all funds, including funds relating to ongoing
account activity, held or received for Defendant’s benefit or to be
transferred into Defendant’s financial accounts, restrain any other
financial accounts tied thereto, and immediately divert those restrained

funds to a holding account for the trust of the court. Such restraining of
the funds and the disclosure of the related financial institution account
information (as provided below) shall be made without notice to the
account owners or the financial institutions until after those accounts are
restrained. No funds restrained by this order shall be transferred or

surrendered by any third-party provider for any purpose (other than
pursuant to a chargeback made pursuant to their security interest in the
funds) without the express authorization of this court.
b. provide Plaintiff expedited discovery of
i. the identity of all financial accounts and subaccounts associated
with the stores operating under the identifying information seen in
Schedule A, as well as any other accounts of the same customers,

ii. all known contact information for Defendant, including its
identities, locations, aliases, and email addresses, and
iii. an accounting of the total funds restrained and identities of the
financial accounts and subaccounts for which the restrained funds
are related.

4. Any person subject to this order may petition the court to modify the asset freeze
set forth in this order by filing in this case a motion that fully complies with the
Middle District of Florida Local Rules, available at the court’s
https://www.flmd.uscourts.gov/sites/flmd/files/flmd-amended-local-rules-
effective-november-01-2025.pdf webpage.

5. This order shall apply to all seller accounts, seller identification names,
ecommerce stores, domain names, websites, and financial accounts which
Defendant is allegedly using to infringe Plaintiff’s patents.
6. This order shall remain in effect until the court orders otherwise.
7. The $10,000 security that Plaintiff furnished to the court in connection with the

TRO, (see Dkt. 20; Dkt. 23 at 10), meets Rule 65(c)’s security requirement such
that Plaintiff need not provide additional security for the preliminary injunction.
ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, on April 3, 2026.

i —_
JUKIE S. SNEED
NITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11365083. Public record. Not legal advice.