# MONSKY

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · May 27, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11364814

## Case

- **Full name:** Jeremy Monsky v. Amazon.com, Inc.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** May 27, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11364814

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JEREMY MONSKY :
: CIVIL ACTION
v. : No. 26-643
:
AMAZON.COM, INC. :

McHUGH, J. May 27, 2026
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Jeremy Monsky is an avid online shopper, who found an offer on Amazon.com
seemingly too good to be true, a $100 gift card for only $50. He proceeded to order some. Amazon
filled the order with $50 gift cards for which he was charged $50. Chagrined that he got what he
paid for and not the windfall for which he hoped, Monsky brought this lawsuit, raising fanciful
claims seeking over $2 million in damages and declaratory relief. Amazon has moved to dismiss,
a motion that will be granted in full, and the complaint dismissed with prejudice.
I. Facts as Pled
Jeremy Monsky describes himself as “a responsible shopper that spends significant time
and effort looking for deals and other bargains online.” Compl. ¶ 112. Sometimes, Monsky finds
a price so low that he knows “that the deal or bargain . . . is not an intentional deal or marketing
strategy . . . but is, in all likelihood, an unintentional act on the part of the seller, or some other
unintentional consequence of other complex advertising systems utilized by the seller.” Id. ¶ 113.
In Monsky’s experience, companies either honored these unlikely deals or voided the transactions.
See id. ¶¶ 114-17.1

1 For example, an airline honored a deal that allowed Monsky to fly round-trip to Hanoi, Vietnam for only
$500, while Apple canceled an erroneously low sale price on AirTag GPS locators. See Compl. ¶¶ 115-16.
In late 2023, Monsky found a listing on Amazon.com which offered a $100 gift card to the
consumer for only $50. See, e.g., id. ¶ 105. Monsky bought an unspecified number of gift cards

hoping to receive $100 for every $50. Id. ¶ 103. Instead, Amazon charged him $50 for every $50
in gift card value. Id. ¶¶ 105, 108. About eight months later, Monsky found a similar discrepancy
on Amazon, made another purchase, and again got only the money he had paid for. Id. ¶ 118.2
Amazon charged both transactions to Monsky’s credit card on file. Id. ¶ 106.
To explain Amazon’s low sale price, the Complaint alleges a vast conspiracy: Monsky
contends that Amazon intentionally maintains a “flaw in the design of [its] systems” so that
customers’ credit cards are charged for different gift card amounts than the website showed them,
inducing customers to buy gift cards they would not have bought otherwise. Id. ¶ 34. Monsky
offers a lengthy background narrative, alleging that Amazon’s gift card interface presents chronic
errors caused by programming flaws, that Amazon knows this, and that Amazon has denied any

such errors to the banks which contract with Amazon to process each day’s purchases. See id. ¶¶
42-81. And because Amazon allegedly has had various forms of notice of this error dating back
to 2010, and never fully corrected it, Monsky concludes the error was intentional. See id. ¶¶ 82-
99.3

2 Amazon argues that this second purchase, in June 2024, is not pled clearly enough to place Monsky’s
November 2025 complaint within the two-year statute of limitations required by most or all of his claims.
See Def.’s Br. at 18-19, ECF 12-1. While that paragraph of the Complaint is not clearly written, it is clear
enough that Monsky alleges a second purchase in June 2024.
3 At the Complaint’s start, Monsky declares that “the purpose of this lawsuit” is to confirm his view that
Pennsylvania criminal codes with monetary penalties may be enforced through private lawsuits. Compl. ¶
6. Specifically, he hopes to find relief in a Pennsylvania criminal statute against “access device fraud” as
a way of leveling the playing field between individual consumers and corporations, who he says engage in
acts of interference with consumers’ money that would be criminal if a natural person committed them. See
id. ¶¶ 3-6. The Complaint also includes several paragraphs describing a prior action on similar grounds
initiated by his counsel as support for punitive damages. None of this is relevant to the pending motion.

2
II. Standard of Review
In the Third Circuit, motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are governed by the well-

established standard in Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009). In
addition to factual sufficiency, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests “the legal sufficiency of plaintiff’s
claim,” asking “whether the plaintiff would be able to prevail even if [he] were able to prove all
of [his] allegations.” Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2006).4
III. Discussion
Monsky brings seven claims for relief: one based in Pennsylvania’s consumer protection
statute, four based in Pennsylvania tort law, and two requests for declaratory judgments. Across
the claims, Monsky pleads facts that contradict his asserted causes of action, cites (and miscites)
authority that is irrelevant or contradictory to his arguments, and asserts theories of liability with
no foundation in Pennsylvania law. Because each substantive claim suffers from some such fatal

flaw, each will be dismissed, and without a tether to an active controversy, the final two claims for
declaratory relief fail.
A. Count One – Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection
Law
Monsky first claims that when Amazon gave him only $50 worth of gift cards per $50
spent, it violated Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL),
73 Pa. Con. Stat. § 201-1 et seq. See generally Compl. ¶¶ 100-21. But because Monsky fails to

4 Monsky spends several pages of his response to the Motion arguing that the standards set in Twombly and
Iqbal do not apply to his complaint, arguing for a bespoke standard, and reasserting a previous motion he
filed seeking novel relief from this Motion. See Pl.’s Resp. at 10-13, ECF 23. Suffice it to say the motion
to dismiss was appropriately filed and the prevailing standard cited above governs this Motion’s resolution.

3
plead justifiable reliance, and in fact pleads his own lack of belief in Amazon’s displayed price,
this count will be dismissed.

The UTPCPL requires a private plaintiff to plead justifiable reliance. Structurally, the
statute defines various methods of unfair competition, see 73 Pa. Con. Stat. §§ 201-2(4)(i)-(xxi),
then defines a private right of action for “[a]ny person who purchases or leases goods or services
. . . and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result
of” those enumerated unfair methods of competition, id. § 201-9.2(A) (emphasis added). The
phrase “as a result of” has led courts applying the law to require justifiable reliance as a causal
bridge between an unfair method and a plaintiff’s damages. See, e.g., Hunt v. U.S. Tobacco Co.,
538 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[D]ue to the causation requirement in the Consumer Protection
Law's standing provision . . . a private plaintiff pursuing a claim under the statute must prove
justifiable reliance.”).

Despite this clear guidance, Monsky declares that “no Pennsylvania Court has ever held
that reliance is a requirement for a violation under § 201-2(4)(xiv),” which is one of the twenty-
one unfair methods of competition. Pl.’s Resp. at 15. But the cases he cites contradict him.5 For
example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Gregg v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc. stated that “Section
201-9.2 . . . requires a private plaintiff to demonstrate justifiable reliance . . . regardless of which

5 Monsky also incorrectly suggests that the Third Circuit has only applied the justifiable reliance element
to cases arising out of the UTPCPL’s final, catchall unfair method of competition. See Pl.’s Resp. at 14.
Hunt emphatically says the opposite: “[t]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court] has categorically and repeatedly
stated that . . . a private plaintiff pursuing a claim under the statute must prove justifiable reliance. . . . It
has not recognized any exceptions, and has applied this rule in a variety of situations.” 538 F.3d at 221-22.

4
unfair method of competition a plaintiff challenges in a private cause of action.” 245 A.3d 637,
646 (Pa. 2021).6

Justifiable reliance has two requirements. First, “reliance” requires that a plaintiff made
their purchasing decision because they both “heard and believed” the defendant’s
misrepresentation. Weinberg v. Sun Co., Inc., 777 A.2d 442, 446 (Pa. 2001). Second, that reliance
must have been “justifiable,” meaning that “common prudence or diligence could not have
ascertained the truth.” Shane v. Hoffman, 324 A.2d 532, 646 (Pa. 1974) (emphasis added).7
Here, Monsky pleads that he did not actually believe Amazon meant to offer him $100
worth of gift cards for $50. He starts by identifying himself as an experienced bargain hunter who
actively searches for algorithmic glitches and other unexplained price drops; when he finds them,
he places orders, hoping that companies will honor the deal, but knowing from experience that
they may not. See Compl. ¶¶ 112-17. By implicitly conceding he did not expect that Amazon

truly intended to make a money-losing offer, Monsky makes it implausible to conclude that he
believed the advertised price was genuine. And by pleading his experience with finding and taking
advantage of pricing anomalies, Monsky undermines his ability to plausibly allege that “common
prudence or diligence could not have ascertained the truth” about the offer. Indeed, he would be
uniquely qualified to do so. As to the UTPCPL, Monsky has pleaded himself out of court.

6 See also Schwartz v. Rockey, 932 A.2d 885, 897 n.16 (Pa. 2007) (“[T]he justifiable reliance criterion
derives from the causation requirement which is express on the face of section 9.2[, the statute's private-
plaintiff standing provision]”); Toy v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 928 A.2d 186, 202-03 (Pa. 2007) (“[A] plaintiff
alleging violations of the Consumer Protection Law must prove justifiable reliance.”); Yocca v. Pittsburgh
Steelers Sports, Inc., 854 A.2d 425, 438 (Pa. 2004) (“To bring a private cause of action under the
[UTPCPL], a plaintiff must show that he justifiably relied on the defendant’s wrongful conduct or
representation and that he suffered harm as a result of that reliance.”).
7 Hoffman focuses on the common law tort of fraud, which Pennsylvania courts have adopted in their
analysis of individual claims brought under the UTPCPL. See Toy, 928 A.2d at 203.

5
B. Count Two – Common Law Fraud
Count Two alleges “Amazon committed bank fraud when it included Monsky’s

transactions for the mispriced gift cards, in the list of transactions that it sold to its Acquiring bank
of the end of the business day that Monsky made the instant purchases.” Compl. ¶ 124. This count
lacks the required pleading that Monsky justifiably relied on the specific misrepresentation at
issue.
A claim for fraudulent misrepresentation requires a plaintiff to show “(1) a representation;
(2) which is material to the transaction at hand; (3) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity or
recklessness as to whether it is true or false; (4) with the intent of misleading another into relying
on it; (5) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation; and (6) the resulting injury was proximately
caused by the reliance.” Marion v. Bryn Mawr Tr. Co., 288 A.3d 76, 87 (Pa. 2023).
Here, putting to one side that this is a far-fetched theory of fraud, the claim is technically

deficient as to the fifth and sixth elements: Monsky needed to plead some way that he justifiably
relied on the misrepresentation made in the first four elements. “The primary inquiry on the
question of liability [for fraud] is whether the plaintiff made out a case of damage to himself as the
proximate result of his justifiable reliance upon a factual situation which the defendant had falsely
represented to him.” Neuman v. Corn Exch. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 51 A.2d 759, 763 (Pa. 1947)
(emphasis added); see also Feudale v. Aqua Pa., Inc., 122 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015)
(“A claim for intentional misrepresentation requires justifiable reliance on the false information
by the injured party. . . . we are unaware of[] any authority which would allow a third party to
recover for a misrepresentation made to and relied upon by another party”). Here, Monsky does

not explain how he relied in any way on Amazon’s alleged statement to its partner bank, nor how
that reliance was the cause of Monsky’s alleged injury.

6
In response, Monsky points to a case where a plaintiff had a right of action based on false
statements a defendant made to a third party, without the plaintiff’s knowledge or reliance. See

Pl.’s Resp. at 20-21 (discussing Morganroth & Morganroth v. Norris, McLaughlin &. Marcus,
PC, 331 F.3d 406 (3d Cir. 2003)). But as Amazon points out, that case arose under the common
law of New Jersey, not Pennsylvania, discussed a different tort that did not require the same
elements as common law fraud, and has since been abrogated by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
See Def.’s Reply at 9-10 (discussing Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 876 A.2d 253, 261 (N.J.
2005)). Amending this pleading would require Monsky to either change the misrepresentation to
something he himself relied on or explain how he justifiably relied on Amazon’s communications
with its bank. The former option would face the same issues as the UTPCPL claim discussed
above, i.e., that Monsky alleges the opposite of justifiable reliance; the latter option is utterly
implausible. For this reason, Count II is also dismissed with prejudice.

C. Counts Three and Four – Negligence and Strict Liability
The next two counts plead Pennsylvania common law torts. Count Three asserts
negligence based on Amazon’s purported duty to take “reasonable care in designing and
implementing its e-commerce platform.” Compl. ¶ 131. Count Four seeks to impose strict liability
on Amazon based on the alleged design defects that made its website “dangerous to the consumer
or the consumer’s property.” Id. ¶ 148. These counts are fatally flawed because they seek an
award of purely economic damages and would require a federal court sitting in diversity to invent
causes of action not recognized by state law.
Generally, the economic loss doctrine recognizes no cause of action sounding in tort where
the only injury alleged is a loss of money, as opposed to physical injury and damage to tangible

property. See, e.g., 2-J Corp. v. Tice, 126 F.3d 539, 541 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Aikens v. Balt. &

7
Ohio R. Co., 501 A.2d 277 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)). This prohibition applies to both negligence and
strict liability claims. See Aikens, 501 A.2d at 279.

Here, Counts Three and Four allege purely economic damages. In his complaint, Monsky
asserts that he was damaged by having to pay off his credit card for a charge different from the
one he expected. See Compl. ¶¶ 143, 157.8 As an initial matter, this is an ephemeral claim
bordering on the silly. Beyond that, in the most analogous case, the Third Circuit has held that
even damaged physical credit cards are purely economic losses, on the grounds that allowing that
exception would swallow the rule against economic losses. See Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale
Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 176-77 (3d Cir. 2008). For the same reason, it is implausible that simply
being charged money on one’s credit card could amount to a non-economic loss.
In his reply brief, Monsky tries to argue his tort claims fall into an exception to the
economic loss doctrine, because “recovery for purely pecuniary damages is permissible under a

negligence theory provided that the plaintiff can establish the defendant’s breach of a legal duty
arising under common law that is independent of any duty assumed pursuant to contract.” Dittman
v. UPMC, 196 A.3d 1036, 1038 (Pa. 2018). To that end, Count Three alleges “a duty to exercise
reasonable care in designing and implementing its e-commerce platform and specifically providing
for payment processing services,” Compl. ¶ 131, as well as a “societal duty to warn” about possible
discrepancies in the gift card-buying interface, Pl.’s Resp. at 22. And Count Four mentions “a

8 Monsky also pleads he was “injured in the loss of the benefit of his bargain” and “waste of his time and
efforts and the denial of his ability to look for deals and bargains online.” Compl. ¶ 144. Putting to one
side that Amazon certainly did not enter into a bargain to lose money, these allegations fail to describe an
actionable injury.

8
duty to provide its product, an e-commerce platform, that is free from a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or the consumer’s property.” Compl. ¶¶ 148, 152.

But Monsky cites no authority for either of these duties, and the Court’s research has not
revealed any such cases under Pennsylvania law. As a federal district judge sitting in diversity, I
am constrained to apply Pennsylvania common law as I believe the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
would if presented with the same facts. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buffetta, 230 F.3d 634,
637 (3d Cir. 2000). In doing so, “it is not the role of a federal court sitting in diversity to create its
own common law.” Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 902 (3d Cir. 1983). But to the
extent that I am obligated to predict how Pennsylvania courts would rule, I have no hesitation that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would find no policy basis for supporting these theories of
recovery.9
D. Count Five – Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Monsky’s final substantive count claims that Amazon violated a “special agency
relationship that exists between a consumer and e-commerce platform,” specifically that Amazon
owed Monsky a fiduciary duty to charge his credit card for only the exact transaction amount that
Monsky expected to receive. Compl. ¶¶ 158-70. There is no support for this special relationship
under Pennsylvania law, and Monsky has not plausibly shown that it should exist here.
A fiduciary duty requires an agent to act only in their principal’s interest. See Basile v. H
& R Block, Inc., 761 A.2d 1115, 1120 (Pa. 2000) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 387

9 A related problem with the strict products liability claim is that no court applying Pennsylvania law has
found that a website is a product. See Macek v. Draftkings, Inc., No. 25-cv-1995, 2026 WL 802286, at *13
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2026) (reviewing Pennsylvania courts’ tort treatments of websites and digital services).
The sole products liability case Monsky cites deals with defective construction scaffolding. See Compl. ¶¶
148, 152 (citing Sullivan v. Werner Co., 306 A.3d 846, 848 (Pa. 2023)).

9
(1958)). Forming a fiduciary relationship has three steps: “[1] the manifestation by the principal
that the agent shall act for him, [2] the agent’s acceptance of the undertaking and [3] the

understanding of the parties that the principal is to be in control of the undertaking.” Scott v.
Purcell, 415 A.2d 56, 60 (Pa. 1980). Once formed, fiduciary relationships are the “highest duty
implied by law.” Yenchi v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 161 A.3d 811, 820 (Pa. 2017). For that reason,
they “usually involve some special vulnerability in one person that creates a unique opportunity
for another person to take advantage to their benefit.” Id. at 821 (emphasis added).
Here, the relationship between Monsky and Amazon is that of buyer and seller. Merchants
across Pennsylvania receive and charge sales to consumers’ credit cards an untold number of times
every day, a commercial practice that facilitates transactions for both parties. Amazon points out
that Pennsylvania courts have declined to find a fiduciary relationship even between a bank and
its members10 or a lender and its borrower.11 See Def.’s Br. at 15. Such relationships are far closer

than that between a company engaging in e-commerce and its customers. And Monsky offers no
explanation as to why an entity with which he is dealing at arm’s length while seeking to exploit
errors in its website would owe him and duty to assist his efforts.
Monsky responds that customers’ payment information is highly sensitive, pointing to data
breaches and unauthorized credit card charges. See Pl.’s Resp. at 30-32. But Amazon accurately
processed the charges Monsky authorized and is not alleged to have improperly disclosed his
personal information. The proposition that it should be deemed a fiduciary is frivolous.

10 See generally First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Hazleton v. Off. of State Treasurer, Unclaimed Prop. Rev.
Comm., 669 A.2d 914 (Pa. 1995).
11 See generally Grimm v. Discover Fin. Servs., No. 08-cv-747, 2008 WL 4821695 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2008).

10
E. Counts Six and Seven – Declaratory Relief
Monsky further asks for two forms of declaratory relief: first, he asks for an advance
judicial declaration of the “maximum liability Amazon could face,” declaring a “constitutional

right . . . to have this legal issue settled and determined, at the beginning of the litigation, not at
the end.” Compl. ¶¶ 174-75 (emphasis in original). Second, he seeks a declaration that
Pennsylvania citizens may bring civil suits against corporations under any Pennsylvania criminal
laws which have monetary penalties, offering as an example the “access device” offense he
discusses throughout his complaint. See generally id. ¶¶ 193-204.
Generally, federal courts may not answer hypothetical questions through “advisory
opinions.” See United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 155-56 (1961). For that reason, any
request for declaratory relief must be related to a ripe, active controversy. See Step-Saver Data
Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 912 F.2d 643, 647-48 (3d Cir. 1990). When a court properly dismisses

all the substantive counts of a lawsuit, any remaining requests for declaratory relief are rendered
moot. See Jones v. ABN Amro Mortg. Grp., Inc., 606 F.3d 119, 126 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010). Apart
from that, the “constitutional right” Monsky asserts has no basis in law, and his request that a
federal court declare a right on the part of Pennsylvania citizens to enforce the state’s criminal
laws through civil actions shows a complete lack of understanding of the federal courts’ proper
role in administering state law in diversity actions.

11
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss will be granted, and the
action dismissed with prejudice.12 An appropriate order follows.

/s/ Gerald Austin McHugh
United States District Judge

12 Leave to amend is liberally granted but is not warranted where “the amendment would be futile.” U.S.
ex rel. Schumann v. Astrazeneca Pharms. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 849 (3d Cir. 2014). Amendment here would
be futile because Monsky’s core factual allegations show that he cannot prevail under any recognized cause
of action, and there is no defensible basis on which this Court can purport to expand Pennsylvania law in
the manner that he proposes.

12

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11364814. Public record. Not legal advice.