# Caminiti

> District Court, M.D. Florida · April 1, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11364764

## Case

- **Full name:** Women’s Care Florida, LLC v. Deanna Caminiti
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** April 1, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

WOMEN’S CARE FLORIDA, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:25-cv-3011-KKM-LSG

DEANNA CAMINITI,

Defendant.
___________________________________
ORDER
Women’s Care Florida, LLC, sues its former employee and physician
Deanna Caminiti for breaching her employment agreement and for unjust
enrichment. See Compl. (Doc. 1-1). Caminiti asserts counterclaims for sex
discrimination, fraud, breach of the employment agreement, and violation of
the Equal Pay Act. See Am. Countercls. (Doc. 20). Women’s Care moves to
dismiss Caminiti’s counterclaims for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies and failure to state a claim. See MTD (Doc. 25). Caminiti opposes.
Resp. (Doc. 34). For the following reasons, I grant in part and deny in part
Women’s Care’s motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Caminiti is a board-certified physician who has specialized in obstetrics
and gynecology (OB/GYN) for roughly twenty years and maintained “a
successful and lucrative medical practice in the Greater Cincinnati/Northern
Kentucky area.” Am. Countercls. ¶ 1. In 2024, Women’s Care recruited

Caminiti to relocate her medical practice to Florida. See id. ¶ 4. In doing so,
Women’s Care “represented to Dr. Caminiti that [Women’s Care] maintained
a professional, fully trained, and competent administrative staff, support staff,
and employees,” and likewise “maintained the offices, staff, and resources

needed for a fully functioning, professional medical office specializing in an
OB/GYN practice, including patient records and monitoring, access to lab
testing and timely results, and resources, practices, and procedures in the
office.” Id. ¶¶ 5–7. Women’s Care told Caminiti that she “would be one of five

physicians covering the [Women’s Care] office at Lakewood Ranch.” Id. ¶ 7.
Caminiti accepted Women’s Care’s employment offer and signed a
“Physician Employment Agreement” in June 2024. Agreement (Doc. 20-1). Per
the Agreement, Caminiti’s five-year term of employment was to “commence on

or about September 9, 2024,” and she was to receive a one-time $100,000
incentive bonus. Id. at 2, 5, 13. According to Caminiti, however, Women’s Care
“was completely unprepared for [her] to commence her employment, and in
fact, [Women’s Care’s] staff was completely unaware that Dr. Caminiti was

commencing employment there at all,” causing a several week delay in
Caminiti’s start date and causing her to lose thousands in income. Am.
Countercls. ¶ 13.
Once Caminiti finally started her employment, she “discovered that
[Women’s Care] had lied to her about nearly all aspects of her employment and

the office conditions, and that all of the factual representations made to her in
the recruitment process were completely false.” Id. ¶ 14. For example, the
Lakewood Ranch office had only two other physicians, “presenting a serious
and unacceptable risk to patients of the practice.” Id. ¶ 15. Women’s Care “had

no after-hours communication services in place,” and its “calendar and
scheduling systems were a dangerous and incoherent mess.” Id. ¶¶ 17–19.
“Caminiti was repeatedly placed in a position where angry patients were
waiting on lab results, which were unreasonably delayed and inconsistent,”

and “Caminiti discovered that [Women’s Care] maintained an unattended web-
based messaging system, through which [Women’s Care] patients (including
Dr. Caminiti’s patients) submitted electronic communications to physicians,
with no oversight, review, or response at all.” Id. ¶¶ 20–23.

Caminiti alleges that she reported these issues to Women’s Care and
“demand[ed] that [Women’s Care] remedy these practices and comply with the
Agreement.” Id. ¶ 24. “[Women’s Care] dismissed all of these concerns as
‘growing pains’ for the office,” and Caminiti’s requested meetings with

management were “canceled” or “ignored.” Id. ¶¶ 24–26; see id. ¶ 26 (“Dr.
Caminiti also reported these problems and breaches to [Women’s Care’s] Chief
of Staff Julia Jolley, both verbally and in writing, but the communications were
ignored.”).

Around the same time, Caminiti “learned that [Women’s Care] was
intentionally discriminating against herself and other female OB/GYN
physicians in the practice” by paying two male physicians $60,000 more in
annual salaries despite “significantly less experience and qualifications than

Dr. Caminiti,” in addition to providing the male physicians extra vacation, paid
time off, and private office space. Id. ¶¶ 27–28. Women’s Care “again ignored
[Caminiti’s] notices and requests” to discuss the apparent discrimination,
leading Caminiti to contact the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) on December 3, 2024. Id. ¶¶ 30–31. Just over two weeks
later, on December 18, Caminiti “resigned her employment and terminated the
Employment Agreement for cause.” Id. ¶ 32.
In September 2025, Women’s Care sued Caminiti in state court for

breach of contract and unjust enrichment, seeking repayment of Caminiti’s
incentive bonus and payment of Caminiti’s “tail” insurance coverage, as
provided for in the Agreement. See generally Compl. Caminiti timely removed
the action to federal court and filed an answer and four counterclaims. See

(Docs. 1, 6). Caminiti alleges sex discrimination in violation of Title VII and
the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) (Count I), fraud and misrepresentation
(Count II), breach of contract (Count III), and violation of the Equal Pay Act,
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (Count IV). See Am. Countercls. ¶¶ 39–70. Women’s Care
moves to dismiss each claim.

II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This
pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it

demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

not do.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice
if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
“To survive a motion to dismiss” under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must

plead sufficient facts to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible when a “plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The complaint’s factual

allegations are accepted “as true” and construed “in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff.” Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008).
III. ANALYSIS
Women’s Care raises several arguments in support of dismissing

Caminiti’s four counterclaims. I address each in turn.1
A. Count I: Sex Discrimination
In a single count,2 Caminiti alleges that Women’s Care unlawfully
discriminated against her based on her sex in violation of both Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the FCRA. See Am. Countercls. ¶¶ 39–50.
Women’s Care first argues that the claims must be dismissed because Caminiti
failed to exhaust administrative remedies, as required by each statute. See
MTD at 5–8. And to the extent that Caminiti pursued the required

administrative remedies, Women’s Care maintains that Caminiti did so too
late. Id. at 8–9. I largely agree, and more specifically conclude that Caminiti’s
FCRA claim is premature, while her Title VII claim is time barred. I dismiss

1 At the outset, Women’s Care avers that Caminiti filed a shotgun pleading because
each count realleges previous facts. See MTD at 4–5. For reasons of judicial economy,
I proceed to Women’s Care’s substantive arguments, which also suggest that—despite
the pleading deficiency—Women’s Care had “adequate notice of the claims against
[it] and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty.
Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015).

2 Ordinarily, “[c]laims under the Florida Civil Rights Act and under Title VII are
different claims and must be set forth in separate counts.” Widemond v. CoreCivic of
Tennessee, LLC, No. 3:25-CV-1033-MMH-LLL, 2025 WL 2710597, at *1 (M.D. Fla.
Sept. 23, 2025). Because Women’s Care does not raise this issue, I do not dismiss on
this basis but treat Count I as containing two separate statutory claims.
each claim without considering Women’s Care’s alternative argument that
Caminiti fails to sufficiently allege disparate treatment. See id. at 9.

“To bring suit for discrimination under the FCRA [or] Title VII,” a
“plaintiff first must exhaust administrative remedies. And to exhaust
remedies, the plaintiff must file timely a discrimination charge with the
appropriate commission,” here either the EEOC or the Florida Commission on

Human Relations (FCHR). Poulsen v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 302 F. App’x
906, 907 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (first citing Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp.,
270 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001) (Title VII); and then citing Woodham v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 829 So.2d 891, 894 (Fla. 2002) (FCRA));

see Perry v. S. Wine & Spirits of Am., Inc., No. 8:10-cv-2876-T35-EAJ, 2012 WL
12897391, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2012) (“[T]he filing of a charge of
discrimination with the [FCHR] constitutes dual filing with the EEOC.”), aff’d
sub nom. Perry v. S. Wine Spirits, 511 F. App’x 888 (11th Cir. 2013). A plaintiff

must file a charge within 300 days of the last discriminatory act to be timely
under Title VII, and within 365 days of the alleged violation under the FCRA.
See Poulsen, 302 F. App’x at 907 n.2; § 760.11(1), Fla. Stat. Then, within 180
days of the filing, the FCHR “shall determine if there is reasonable cause to

believe that discriminatory practice has occurred in violation of the [FCRA].”
§ 760.11(3), Fla. Stat. The plaintiff cannot file a lawsuit until the FCHR finds
reasonable cause or fails to render a determination within 180 days. See id.
§ 760.11(3)–(4), (8); Woodham, 829 So.2d at 897–98.

Here, the last possible date that discrimination occurred was December
18, 2024, the date of Caminiti’s resignation. See, e.g., Alford v. Pasco-Pinellas
Hillsborough Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 8:25-cv-94-VMC-SPF, 2025 WL
3275946, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2025) (finding that the latest violation

occurred when the plaintiff’s employment ended and dismissing the complaint
with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Am. Countercls.
¶ 32. On that timeline, Caminiti was required to file her Title VII charge by
October 14, 2025, and her FCRA charge by December 18, 2025. Although

Caminiti contacted the EEOC on December 3, 2024, she did not file a formal
charge of discrimination until December 17, 2025, when she filed a complaint
with the FCHR alleging sex discrimination. Id. ¶¶ 31, 37; (Doc. 20-3).
Accordingly, Caminiti’s Title VII claim is time barred. And while Caminiti

timely filed her charge for FCRA purposes, she filed her charge less than 180
days ago, and she does not allege that the FCHR has issued a reasonable cause
determination. Accordingly, her FCRA claim is premature and subject to
dismissal.3

3 Although Caminiti counters that “an action filed prematurely should be abated –
not dismissed – until the cause of action accrues,” Resp. at 9 (quoting Thomas v.
Suwannee Cnty, 734 So. 2d 492, 497 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)), that general rule applies
only when prematurity is “curable simply by the passage of time,” Thomas, 734 So.
Caminiti resists this conclusion, arguing that Women’s Care waived any
timeliness or exhaustion defense because it “preemptively filed this lawsuit,”

and further that the deadline should be equitably tolled because Women’s Care
“delayed in filing this lawsuit and then waited until the 300th day after the
termination of Dr. Caminiti’s employment to serve the complaint.” Resp. at 8.
Both arguments fail. First, Caminiti cites no authority for the proposition that

Women’s Care waived this defense as to the Title VII or FCRA claim by
“preemptively” filing suit for breach of the employment agreement. Caminiti
had ample time to file a charge with either the EEOC or FCHR, and Women’s
Care properly raised Caminiti’s failure to exhaust in its motion to dismiss. See,

e.g., Basel v. Sec’y of Def., 507 F. App’x 873, 874 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam)
(“Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a matter . . . that should be raised
in a motion to dismiss.”).
Second, Women’s Care’s conduct does not entitle Caminiti to equitable

tolling for the sex discrimination claims. To be sure, the timely filing of a
“charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite,”
and so can be subject to equitable tolling. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982); Christian v. S. Co., No. 24-10762, 2025 WL 66722, at

2d at 497 (quoting Angrand v. Fox, 552 So.2d 1113, 1115–16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)).
That is not the case here, where Caminiti has no right to sue if the FCHR “determines
that there is not reasonable cause to believe that” the FCRA has been violated.
§ 760.11(7), Fla. Stat. (permitting only an administrative hearing in such case).
*3 (11th Cir. Jan. 10, 2025) (per curiam). But the party seeking equitable
tolling must prove that she “diligently” pursued her rights and that some

“extraordinary circumstance” stood in her way and prevented timely filing.
Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States, 577 U.S. 250, 255
(2016) (citation modified); Justice v. United States, 6 F.3d 1474, 1479 (11th Cir.
1993) (explaining that equitable “tolling is an extraordinary remedy” to be

extended “sparingly”). Caminiti concedes that she was not “diligently”
pursuing her FCRA claim, see Menominee, 577 U.S. at 255, noting that she
“elected to simply move on with her medical practice and career, rather than
become ensnarled in protected litigation, because [Women’s Care] took no

action for 10 months after the exchange of claims and positions,” Resp. at 9.
Women’s Care’s mere inaction is insufficient to toll Caminiti’s filing deadline,
and Caminiti’s counterclaims for sex discrimination are dismissed.
B. Count II: Fraud and Misrepresentation

Next, Women’s Care asserts that Caminiti’s counterclaim alleging fraud
or misrepresentation fails to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s
heightened pleading standard. See MTD at 13–14. I agree.
To state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation,4 Caminiti must

allege: “(1) a false statement concerning a material fact; (2) the representor’s

4 Although styled as a claim for “fraud/misrepresentation,” Caminiti’s theory
resembles a fraudulent inducement claim. See Am. Countercls. ¶ 53 (“[Women’s Care]
knowledge that the representation is false; (3) an intention that the
representation induce another to act on it; and (4) consequent injury by the

party acting in reliance on the representation.” Butler v. Yusem, 44 So. 3d 102,
105 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam) (citation modified). On top of these elements,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that “a party must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” A fraud claim

must detail: “(1) precisely what statements or omissions were made in which
documents or oral representations; (2) the time and place of each such
statement and the person responsible for making (or, in the case of omissions,
not making) them; (3) the content of such statements and the manner in which

they misled the plaintiff, and; (4) what the defendant obtained as a
consequence of the fraud.” In re Galectin Therapeutics, Inc. Secs. Litig., 843
F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2016). “[This] rule serves an important purpose in
fraud actions by alerting defendants to the precise misconduct with which they

knowingly made these false representations to Dr. Caminiti for the specific purpose
of inducing Dr. Caminiti to resign her current employment and accept the
employment position with [Women’s Care].”). Courts applying Florida law disagree
about whether fraudulent misrepresentation and inducement are the same claim. See
NorthStar Reg’l P.S.C. v. InSync Healthcare Sols., LLC, No. 8:23-CV-02636-KKM-
NHA, 2025 WL 1707205, at *4 n.4 (M.D. Fla. June 18, 2025) (collecting cases). Courts
viewing them as distinct have concluded that fraudulent inducement requires a
showing of justifiable reliance. Id. (citing Susan Fixel, Inc. v. Rosenthal & Rosenthal,
Inc., 842 So. 2d 204, 209 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)). That disagreement is not immediately
relevant here, as Caminiti’s claim fails independently under Rule 9(b).
are charged.” Durham v. Bus. Mgmt. Assocs., 847 F.2d 1505, 1511 (11th Cir.
1988) (citation modified).

Here, Caminiti alleges that Women’s Care “falsely represented the terms
and conditions of employment, in general, and [Women’s Care’s] office staffing,
conditions, practices, and procedures, to induce Dr. Caminiti to resign her
highly successful and lucrative medical practice after 18 years and join

[Women’s Care’s] offices in Tampa, Florida.” Am. Countercls. ¶ 52. That
principal allegation is woefully inadequate to meet Rule 9(b)’s specificity
demands. And although earlier portions of Caminiti’s counterclaim shed light
on the substance of Women’s Care’s purportedly false representations

regarding its staffing and resources, see id. ¶¶ 5–7, 15, they too fail to allege
“precisely what statements or omissions were made in which documents or oral
representations,” when such statements were made, or who made the
statements on behalf of Women’s Care, see Galectin Therapeutics, 843 F.3d at

1269; Sampson v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 453 F. App’x 863, 866 (11th Cir. Oct. 5,
2011) (per curiam) (holding that a complaint for fraud based on a bank
allegedly misrepresenting property values on the mortgage market failed to
meet Rule 9(b)’s requirement because the plaintiff failed to allege, among other

things, who made the misrepresentations). Absent more specific allegations,
Caminiti does not sufficiently allege a claim for fraud or misrepresentation.
Her claim is therefore dismissed without prejudice.
C. Count III: Breach of Contract
Next, Women’s Care argues that Caminiti fails to allege a material

breach of the Agreement, in part because she does not identify any written
provisions obligating Women’s Care to perform in the way she claims it did not.
See MTD at 15–16. Caminiti responds that she sufficiently alleged a breach of
at least two material terms, and that Women’s Care also breached an implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing by hindering her from practicing
medicine in step with “the professional duties that she owes to her patients.”
Resp. at 11–13.
To state a claim for breach of contract in Florida, a plaintiff must allege

“(1) the existence of a contract; (2) a material breach of that contract; and (3)
damages resulting from the breach.” Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d
1256, 1272 (11th Cir. 2009). Neither party here contests the existence of a valid
contract, only the allegation of material breach. “To constitute a vital or

material breach, a party’s nonperformance must go to the essence of the
contract.” MDS (Canada) Inc. v. Rad Source Techs., Inc., 720 F.3d 833, 849
(11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citation modified). “As a general rule, ‘[t]he issue
of whether an alleged breach is vital or material is reviewed as a question of

fact.’ ” O’Donnell v. Lee, 387 So. 3d 447, 453 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024) (quoting
Covelli Fam., L.P. v. ABG5, L.L.C., 977 So. 2d 749, 752 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008));
see Hamilton v. Suntrust Mortg. Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 1309 (S.D. Fla. 2014)
(explaining that whether a breach is material “is generally not appropriate for
resolution on a motion to dismiss” (citing Ron Matusalem & Matusa of Fla.,

Inc. v. Ron Matusalem, Inc., 872 F.2d 1547, 1551 (11th Cir. 1989)).
The Employment Agreement provided that Caminiti’s employment
“shall commence on or about September 9, 2024.” Agreement ¶ 10. Caminiti
alleges that Women’s Care was “completely unprepared” for her to start, and

“unreasonably delayed the start of [her] employment for several weeks, in
material breach of the contract, causing [her] to incur tens of thousands of
dollars in damages, costs, and losses, including, but not limited to, a
substantial loss of income resulting from the delays.” Am. Countercls. ¶¶ 13,

58. Although Women’s Care maintains that “Caminiti’s start date was an
estimated time frame, not a guarantee,” MTD at 16, construing all inferences
in Caminiti’s favor, she fairly alleges that Women’s Care’s several week delay
constituted a material breach. Likewise, notwithstanding Women’s Care’s

averment that “it had to secure ‘tail insurance’ for Dr. Caminiti after she failed
to secure it herself,” MTD at 16 (citing Compl ¶¶ 21–24), I construe inferences
in Caminiti’s favor on review of this motion. She therefore adequately alleges
that Women’s Care materially breached because it failed to procure “tail”

liability coverage for Caminiti despite her terminating the Agreement “with
cause.” See Agreement ¶ 8; Am. Countercls. ¶ 62.
Finally, to the extent that Caminiti argues (for the first time) that
Women’s Care breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by,

among other things, failing to provide her adequate resources to responsibly
practice OB/GYN medicine, see Resp. at 11–13; Am. Countercls. ¶¶ 59–61, I do
not read her counterclaim to squarely level such an accusation. In any
amended counterclaim, Caminiti should allege how the covenant “attaches to

[Women’s Care’s] performance of a specific contractual obligation.” Centurion
Air Cargo, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv. Co., 420 F.3d 1146, 1151 (11th Cir. 2005)
(citing Cox v. CSX Intermodal, Inc., 732 So. 2d 1092, 1097 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)).
D. Count IV: Equal Pay Act

An Equal Pay Act claim requires a plaintiff to plead that “an employer
pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes ‘for equal work on jobs the
performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which
are performed under similar working conditions.’ ” Arrington v. Cobb County,

139 F.3d 865, 876 (11th Cir. 1998), as amended (May 28, 1998) (quoting
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974)). “To establish a
prima facie case, a plaintiff need only demonstrate that the jobs at issue are
substantially similar; a plaintiff does not have to show that the skills or

qualifications of the actual male and female employees holding the positions
are also substantially equivalent.” Id. In the comparator analysis, it is the
“actual job content,” not job titles or job descriptions that controls. See id.
Here, Caminiti alleges that she “was paid substantially less wages than
comparably situated male OB/GYN physicians employed by [Women’s Care]

who had less experience and training, including, but not limited to, paying such
male physicians an annual salary that was $60,000.00 more than Dr. Caminiti
and other female OB/GYN physicians.” Am. Countercls. ¶ 66; see id. ¶ 67
(alleging that male comparators received additional “PTO/vacation pay and

related benefits”). Caminiti further alleges that she “performed equal work or,
in many instances, more work, more call duty coverage, and more
responsibilities than male OB/GYN physicians employed by [Women’s Care],
under identical (or worse) working conditions.” Id. ¶ 68; see id. ¶ 27 (describing

“male physicians with the exact same job duties and responsibilities”).
According to Women’s Care, these allegations are insufficient because
Caminiti does not provide “any information regarding her job duties and
responsibilities compared to those of her male coworkers,” and merely relies on

the fact that male colleagues “may have had the same title as OB/GYNs.” MTD
at 18. Although Caminiti avers that the duties are equivalent because, “[b]y
definition, the actual job duties and responsibilities of OB/GYN
physicians . . . is to provide obstetrics and gynecology medical care to [Women’s

Care] patients,” Resp. at 14, she attempts to prove too much. The Equal Pay
Act analysis looks at “actual job content,” and although “job titles or
descriptions may be considered,” they are not dispositive. Arrington, 139 F.3d
at 875–76. While it stands to reason that OB/GYNs at Women’s Care perform
similar work, it is equally (if not more) reasonable to think that some

physicians might perform certain procedures, while others do not, or that some
physicians perform more procedures than others. In fact, Caminiti’s
compensation structure indicates that a physician’s workload may vary—the
Agreement entitles her to “an annual productivity bonus equal to 20% of the

sum of net collections received by the Employer for professional services”
performed by Caminiti, to the extent those collections exceed three times her
base salary. See Agreement at 13. Caminiti does not explain how this bonus
structure factors into any comparison between her and her male counterparts.

Caminiti’s Equal Pay Act claim is therefore dismissed without prejudice.
In any amended complaint, Caminiti should allege specific facts about her male
comparators’ job responsibilities, that those job responsibilities—and not just
job titles—were substantially similar to her own, and that Women’s Care paid

the male physicians more for those same duties.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the following is ORDERED:
1. Counter Defendant Women’s Care Florida’s Motion to Dismiss

(Doc. 25) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
2. Caminiti’s claim for violation of Title VII in Count I of the
Amended Counterclaim is DISMISSED with prejudice.
3. Caminiti’s claims for violation of the FCRA in Count I, Fraud or
Misrepresentation (Count IJ), and violation of the Equal Pay Act
(Count IV) in the Amended Counterclaim are DISMISSED
without prejudice.
4. Counter Plaintiff Caminiti may file amended counterclaims no
later than April 15, 2026.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, April 1, 2026.

. .

United States District Judge

18

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11364764. Public record. Not legal advice.