# Blanton

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · May 18, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11364645

## Case

- **Full name:** Amanda B. v. Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** May 18, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

AMANDA B.,1 Case No. 2:25-cv-711
Plaintiff, Graham, J.
Litkovitz, M.J.
vs.

COMMISSIONER OF REPORT AND
SOCIAL SECURITY, RECOMMENDATION
Defendant.

Plaintiff Amanda B. brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) for
judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner)
denying plaintiff’s applications for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security
income (SSI). This matter is before the Court on plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. 10) and
the Commissioner’s response in opposition (Doc. 12). Plaintiff did not file a reply.
I. Procedural Background
In May 2023, plaintiff protectively filed an application for DIB; and in October 2023,
plaintiff filed an application for SSI. (Tr. 219, 221). In both applications, plaintiff alleged
disability since February 1, 2022, due to anxiety and depression. (Tr. 272). Her applications
were denied initially and on reconsideration. Plaintiff, through counsel, requested and was
granted a de novo hearing before administrative law judge (ALJ) Kimberly Cromer. Plaintiff
and a vocational expert (VE) appeared by telephone and testified at the ALJ hearing on June 25,
2024. (Tr. 43-70). On July 12, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision denying plaintiff’s applications.
(Tr. 26-38). On May 5, 2025, this decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when
the Appeals Council denied review. (Tr. 1-3).

1 Pursuant to General Order 22-01, due to significant privacy concerns in social security cases, any opinion, order,
judgment or other disposition in social security cases in the Southern District of Ohio shall refer to plaintiffs only by
their first names and last initials.
II. Analysis
A. Legal Framework for Disability Determinations
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must suffer from a medically determinable
physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A)
(DIB), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (SSI). The impairment must render the claimant unable to engage in the
work previously performed or in any other substantial gainful employment that exists in the
national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2), 1382c(a)(3)(B).
Regulations promulgated by the Commissioner establish a five-step sequential evaluation
process for disability determinations:

1) If the claimant is doing substantial gainful activity, the claimant is not disabled.

2) If the claimant does not have a severe medically determinable physical or
mental impairment – i.e., an impairment that significantly limits his or her
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities – the claimant is not
disabled.

3) If the claimant has a severe impairment(s) that meets or equals one of the
listings in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the regulations and meets the duration
requirement, the claimant is disabled.

4) If the claimant’s impairment does not prevent him or her from doing his or her
past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled.

5) If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work, the claimant is not
disabled. If the claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, the claimant
is disabled.

Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 652 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 404.1520(b)-(g)). The claimant has the burden of proof at the first four
steps of the sequential evaluation process. Id.; Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 548
(6th Cir. 2004). Once the claimant establishes a prima facie case by showing an inability to
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perform the relevant previous employment, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that
the claimant can perform other substantial gainful employment and that such employment exists
in the national economy. Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 652; Harmon v. Apfel, 168 F.3d 289, 291 (6th
Cir. 1999).
B. The Administrative Law Judge’s Findings
The ALJ applied the sequential evaluation process and made the following findings of
fact and conclusions of law:
1. [Plaintiff] meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act
through June 30, 2028.

2. [Plaintiff] has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 1, 2022,
the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).

3. [Plaintiff] has the following severe impairments: depressive disorder, bipolar
disorder, and anxiety disorder (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

4. [Plaintiff] does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526,
416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the [ALJ] finds that [plaintiff]
has the residual functional capacity to perform full range of work at all exertional
levels but with the following non-exertional limitations: [plaintiff] cannot climb
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She cannot work at unprotected heights or work
around hazardous machinery. She is also unable to perform commercial driving.
Mentally, [plaintiff] can perform simple, routine tasks. She cannot work with the
general public as part of routine job duties. She can also have occasional
interaction with coworkers and supervisors. [Plaintiff] cannot perform fast-paced
production such as assembly line or work where [the] machine sets the pace; and
work is of a variable rate. She can perform only occasional decision making, and
experience only occasional changes in the work setting. Moreover, [plaintiff]
cannot perform strict production, hourly requirements; and have end of day work
goals. She is also unable to perform tandem, routine jobs tasks with coworkers.

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6. [Plaintiff] is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and
416.965).2

7. [Plaintiff] was born on [in] . . . 1985 and was 36 years old, which is defined as
a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR
404.1563 and 416.963).

8. [Plaintiff] has at least a high school education (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).

9. Transferability of job skills is not an issue in this case because [plaintiff]’s past
relevant work is unskilled (20 CFR 404.1568 and 416.968).

10. Considering [plaintiff]’s age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that [plaintiff] can perform (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569a, 416.969, and
416.969a).3

11. [Plaintiff] has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act,
from February 1, 2022, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and
416.920(g)).

(Tr. 31-38).

C. Judicial Standard of Review
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s determination is limited in scope by 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) and involves a twofold inquiry: (1) whether the findings of the ALJ are supported by
substantial evidence, and (2) whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards. See Blakley v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
478 F.3d 742, 745-46 (6th Cir. 2007).

2 Plaintiff’s past relevant work was as a mixer operator, which is unskilled, medium work that was actually
performed at a heavy level. (Tr. 37, 63).
3 The ALJ relied on the VE’s testimony to find that plaintiff would be able to perform the requirements of representative
medium, unskilled occupations such as cleaner II (53,000 jobs nationally), hand packager (70,000 jobs nationally), and store
laborer (162,000 jobs nationally). (Tr. 38, 65).

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The Commissioner’s findings must stand if they are supported by “such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill,
587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229
(1938)). Substantial evidence consists of “more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a
preponderance. . . .” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007). In
deciding whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, the Court
considers the record as a whole. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1978).
The Court must also determine whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards in the
disability determination. Even if substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that the
plaintiff is not disabled, “a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails

to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives
the claimant of a substantial right.” Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 651 (quoting Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746).
D. Specific Errors
Plaintiff’s raises a single assignment of error: the ALJ failed to adequately account for the
opinions of the state agency consultants Kevin Edwards, Ph.D., and Clare McGinness, Ph.D.,
that plaintiff was limited to occasional and superficial interactions with others. In particular,
plaintiff argues that the ALJ included their opined limitations on the quality of plaintiff’s
interactions with coworkers and the general public but not with supervisors.
1. ALJ decision
In September 2023, Dr. McGinness reviewed plaintiff’s file initially for the DIB claim in

September 2023. (Tr. 72-79). As relevant here, Dr. McGinness found moderate impairment in
the area of interacting with others. (Tr. 75). Functionally, she found plaintiff capable of work
with occasional, superficial interactions with others. (Tr. 78). In December 2023, Dr. Edwards
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reviewed the updated record at the reconsideration level for the DIB claim and initially for the
SSI claim. (Tr. 81-89, 91-99). Dr. Edwards affirmed Dr. McGinness’ opinions. (Tr. 84, 94, 87,
97).
When evaluating Dr. McGinness’ and Dr. Edwards’ opinions, the ALJ stated:
The State agency (DDS) consultants found that [plaintiff] had moderate “paragraph
b” limitation, but only mild limitation with the fourth domain, adapting/managing
herself. (Exs. 2A, 4A, 6A). These findings are partially persuasive, as they are
generally consistent with her longitudinal mental health record, showing
conservative overall treatment. However, the undersigned finds that she has
moderate difficulty with adapting/managing herself given her subjective
complaints concerning attending to her personal care. DDS was unable to consider
her subjective complaints. Therefore, these opinions are partially persuasive, and
have been partially incorporated into the residual functional capacity in this
decision, given her ongoing anxiety and depression.

(Tr. 36). In her RFC determination, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff “cannot work with the
general public as part of routine job duties[,]” “can . . . have occasional interaction with
coworkers and supervisors[,]” and is “unable to perform tandem, routine job[ ] tasks with
coworkers.” (Tr. 33-34).
2. Arguments
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by limiting the quality of plaintiff’s interactions with
only the general public and coworkers but not with supervisors, which is inconsistent with the
state agency consultants’ opinions. Plaintiff admits that this would not have been error except
for the fact the ALJ found the state agency consultants’ opinions partially persuasive and yet
failed to explain why she failed to adopt all of their opined limitations.
The Commissioner argues in opposition that plaintiff has “not point[ed] to evidence
outside the prior administrative medical findings to show that such a limitation was required.”
(Doc. 12 at PAGEID 595). In any event, the ALJ found those opinions only partially persuasive.
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The Commissioner also argues that the ALJ was partially persuaded by another medical opinion
(the consultative psychological examiner) that did not include a superficial-interaction limitation
with supervisors. Finally, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s prohibition against “tandem .
. . tasks with coworkers” adequately covered the state agency consultants’ qualitative-interaction
limitation.
3. Analysis
The ALJ alone is responsible for determining a plaintiff’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1546(c).4 While medical source opinions are considered, the final responsibility for
deciding the RFC is reserved to the Commissioner. See Coldiron v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 391 F.
App’x 435, 439 (6th Cir. 2010) (“The Social Security Act instructs that the ALJ—not a

physician—ultimately determines a claimant’s RFC.”). “Even where an ALJ provides ‘great
weight’ to an opinion, there is no requirement that an ALJ adopt a state agency psychologist’s
opinions verbatim; nor is the ALJ required to adopt the state agency psychologist’s limitations
wholesale.” Reeves v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 618 F. App’x 267, 275 (6th Cir. 2015).
If, however, “the ALJ accepts a medical opinion but does not include a restriction
recommended by that expert in the RFC, the ALJ must explain why [s]he did not do so.”
Hankinson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:18-cv-58, 2020 WL 240812, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 16,
2020). “The Court cannot uphold an ALJ’s decision, even if there is enough evidence in the
record to support the decision, [where] the reasons given by the trier of fact do not build an
accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result.” Canty v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

4 “The Commissioner’s regulations governing the evaluation of disability for DIB and SSI are identical.” Miller v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:18-cv-281, 2019 WL 4253867, at *1 n. 1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 9, 2019) (quoting Colvin v.
Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007)). The Court’s references to DIB regulations should be read to
incorporate the corresponding and identical SSI regulations, and vice versa, for purposes of this Report and
Recommendation.
7
No. 2:15-cv-2221, 2016 WL 5957679, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 14, 2016) (citing Fleischer v.
Astrue, 774 F. Supp. 2d 875, 877 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (quoting Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307
(7th Cir. 1996))).
Here, the state agency consultants found plaintiff limited to “occasional, superficial
interactions with others.” (Tr. 78, 87, 97). The ALJ found their opinions partially persuasive to
the extent they were not restrictive enough in the area of adapting/managing oneself. (See Tr.
36). In her RFC determination, the ALJ specified that the quantity of plaintiff’s interaction was
limited as to both “coworkers and supervisors.” (Tr. 33). Inexplicably, however, when it came
to the quality5 of plaintiff’s interactions, the ALJ limited plaintiff only as related to coworkers
but not supervisors.

This was exactly the situation in Hoffer v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:20-cv-2871, 2022
WL 584666, (N.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 2022) (report and recommendation), adopted, 2022 WL
580756 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 25, 2022). There, the state agency consultants found that the plaintiff
should be limited to occasional and superficial contact generally and without applying those
limitations to particular groups of people (i.e., public, coworkers, or supervisors). Id. at *4. The
ALJ assigned these opinions “some weight” because she found they were not restrictive enough.
Id. at *5-6. For the RFC, the ALJ found that the plaintiff was limited to occasional interaction
with coworkers and supervisors; no tandem work with coworkers; and no interaction with the
general public. Id. at *3. The Court remanded the matter, explaining:
With respect to Claimant’s social interaction limitations, the ALJ incorporated the
state agency reviewing psychologists’ opinions into the RFC with the exception of

5 “Courts routinely recognize that limiting the quantity of time spent with an individual does not accommodate a
limitation relating to the quality of the interactions—including a limitation to ‘superficial’ interaction.” Garvin v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:20-cv-2566, 2021 WL 2200423, at *6 (S.D. Ohio June 1, 2021) (report and
recommendation), adopted, 2021 WL 2533191 (S.D. Ohio June 21, 2021).

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the quality of interaction Claimant could have with his supervisors. The RFC limits
the quality of Claimant’s interaction with public to “no interaction” and with
coworkers to “no tandem work”. However, the decision is silent as to the quality
of the interaction Claimant can have with his supervisors. It is possible that that
the ALJ intended to include “supervisors” in the limitation for “no tandem work
with coworkers”. It is possible the ALJ did not find the limitation credible and,
therefore, purposely left out a superficial limitation with respect to supervisors. It
is also possible that the superficial limitation was simply overlooked regarding
supervisors. This Court cannot determine the intent of the ALJ, however, without
engaging in speculation. Although it may be likely that the ALJ intended the “no
tandem work with coworkers” to apply equally to Claimant’s supervisors, the ALJ
repeatedly distinguished coworkers and supervisors both in the decision . . . and
during the administrative hearing. . . . Had the ALJ limited Claimant to “no tandem
work” without specifying “with coworkers” this Court could conceivably conclude
that the limitation applied to both coworkers and supervisors.6

Id. at *5 (footnote omitted).
The Hoffer court also found that the error was not harmless because it was repeated in the
vocational questioning. Id. at *6. Here too, the vocational questioning left the matter
unresolved. (See Tr. 64 (“We’re going to look at simple routine work, no work with the general
public as part of routine job duties, occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors.
We’re going to restrict no tandem routine job tasks with coworkers.”)).7
The Commissioner’s arguments otherwise are unpersuasive. First, although the ALJ
described the state agency consultants’ opinions as only partially persuasive, she did so because
they were not restrictive enough; thus, the ALJ’s “partial” qualification does not explain why she
did not include limitations at least as restrictive as those they assessed. Second, the

6 Cf. Smith v. Astrue, No. 1:12-cv-00831, 2012 WL 6607007, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 18, 2012) (remand not required
where no such distinctions were made) (“The Court . . . finds no error as the term co-workers does not necessarily
exclude one’s bosses or managers.”). The Commissioner’s argument that the RFC’s limitation to tandem jobs with
coworkers covers the state agency consultants’ opinions regarding the quality of interaction ignores this distinction.
7 The ALJ later asked if there would be other work plaintiff could perform if she were “assessed with more marked
level of social interaction requiring work more in isolation and interaction with supervisors was more at, let’s say,
you know, 10 to 15 percent more during the workday kind of like shift change communication[,]” and the VE
responded, “[n]o[.]” (Tr. 67). While this inquiry is focused on quantity versus quality of interaction, it again
suggests a meaningful distinction between coworkers and supervisors.
9
Commissioner suggests that plaintiff was required to point to evidence in addition to the state
agency consultants’ opinions consistent with greater limitations on the quality of plaintiff’s
social interactions. The Commissioner does not offer authority to support this proposition. As
discussed above, while the ALJ was not required to adopt the state agency consultants’ opinions
in full, she was required to explain why she adopted certain parts of opinions she found
persuasive but omitted others. See Canty, 2016 WL 5957679, at *3.
Further, the Commissioner’s post-hoc rationalizations for why the ALJ might have
omitted the superficial interaction limitation with respect to supervisors are not substantial
evidence to support her decision. See Keeton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 583 F. App’x 515, 524
(6th Cir. 2014) (“In reviewing an ALJ’s findings and conclusions, this Court shall not ‘accept

appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalization for agency action in lieu of [accurate] reasons and
findings enunciated by the Board.’”) (quoting Hyatt Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 939 F.2d 361, 367 (6th
Cir. 1991)). The Commissioner points to the opinion of consultative psychological examiner
Nena Kircher, Psy.D., who found that plaintiff’s social limitations “would interfere with her
ability to interact appropriately with co-workers and supervision and have interfered with these
relationships in the past” but did not include a limitation to superficial interaction with
supervisors. (Tr. 423). Even if the Court were to consider this post-hoc rationalization,
however, it is not persuasive. The ALJ did not find Dr. Kircher’s opinion inconsistent with the
state agency consultants’ opinions; rather, she found it vague in terms of vocationally relevant
functions. Thus, this does little to explain why the ALJ singled out supervisors from the

otherwise persuasive opined limitation on the quality of plaintiff’s interactions.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

Plaintiff’s Statement of Specific Errors (Doc. 10) be SUSTAINED and the
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Commissioner’s non-disability finding bb REVERSED AND REMANDED under Sentence
Four of § 405(g) for further proceedings consistent with this Report and Recommendation.

Date: 9/18/2026 Heun K Xethovr
Karen L. Litkovitz
United States Magistrate Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

AMANDA B., Case No. 2:25-cv-711
Plaintiff, Graham, J.
Litkovitz, M.J.
vs.

COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES REGARDING THE FILING OF OBJECTIONS TO R&R

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of
the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations. This period may be extended further by the Court on
timely motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected
to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report
and Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral
hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such
portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the
assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party's objections
WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in
accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
12

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11364645. Public record. Not legal advice.