# Thomas

> District Court, S.D. California · March 5, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11364585

## Case

- **Full name:** Christopher Thomas v. San Diego Police Department, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. California
- **Decided:** March 5, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
6 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
7 CHRISTOPHER THOMAS, Case No.: 3:25-cv-02628-JAH-MSB

8 Plaintiff,
ORDER
9 v.
1) GRANTING MOTION TO
10 SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT,
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
ET AL,
11 (ECF NO. 2)
Defendants.
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2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT
13 PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
14
15
16 INTRODUCTION
17 On October 3, 2025, Plaintiff Christopher Thomas (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se,
18 filed a complaint seeking injunctive relief, as well as damages against the San Diego Police
19 Department and six other named Defendants (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging civil
20 rights violations after his arrest and prosecution. See ECF No. 1 (“Complaint” or “Compl.).
21 Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges four causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. Plaintiff
22 failed to pay the required civil filing fees on time pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1914(a). Instead,
23 Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”), pursuant to 28
24 U.S.C. §1915(a). See ECF No. 2 (“Motion”). After careful review of the Complaint, and
25 for the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED, and the causes of action
26 are DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to amend.
27 //
28 //
1 DISCUSSION
2 I. Plaintiff’s IFP Motion
3 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the
4 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of
5 $405.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(1), if the
6 plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP, he may proceed despite failure to pay the entire
7 fee. See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). For a court to grant
8 leave to proceed IFP, the plaintiff is required to submit an affidavit, including a statement
9 of all his assets, showing his inability to pay the statutory fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The
10 plaintiff need not be penniless to proceed IFP, rather the affidavit need only state the
11 plaintiff cannot, “because of his poverty[,] pay or give security for costs ... and still be able
12 to provide himself and dependents with the necessities of life.” Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de
13 Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948) (internal quotations omitted). “Section 1915
14 typically requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound discretion in determining
15 whether affiant has satisfied the statute's requirement of indigency.” Cal. Men's Colony v.
16 Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 194 (1993)
17 (internal citations omitted).
18 In support of his Motion, Plaintiff filed an application to proceed without paying
19 fees or costs. See ECF No. 2. The application reflects that Plaintiff has been unemployed
20 for two years and has no monthly income. Id. Plaintiff owns a 2006 Chevy HHR valued
21 at approximately $500 and maintains a balance of $286.43 in a Chase bank account. Id.
22 Plaintiff reports no additional assets and incurs approximately $400 in monthly expenses
23 for credit card payments, hotels, and food. Id. Based on the affidavit, the Court finds that
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1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $55.
27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14
(eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to
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1 Plaintiff cannot pay the filing fee to commence his suit. Accordingly, this Court GRANTS
2 Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP.
3 II. Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
4 A. Standard of Review
5 A plaintiff who seeks leave to proceed IFP subjects their complaint to sua sponte
6 review, and mandatory dismissal, if the action or appeal “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii)
7 fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against
8 a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith,
9 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“section 1915(e) not only permits but
10 requires, a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a
11 claim”) (citation omitted). “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to
12 state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the
13 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v.
14 Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal citation omitted). Moreover, when
15 the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, these pleading standards are even less stringent because
16 “[a] document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed[.]’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
17 89, 94 (2007) (internal citation omitted).
18 Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250
19 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law because
20 of a “lack of a cognizable legal theory or [ ] insufficient facts under a cognizable legal
21 claim.” Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984).
22 Although Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed essential facts, it must plead sufficient
23 facts that, if true, “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp.
24 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citation omitted). If the court finds a
25 complaint fails to state a claim, the court “should grant leave to amend, unless it determines
26 that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” See Doe v.
27 United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citation
28 omitted).
1 B. Insufficiency of Complaint
2 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the deprivation of a right
3 secured by the Constitution and federal laws, and (2) “the alleged deprivation was
4 committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
5 (1988) (internal citations omitted).
6 1. Plaintiff’s False Arrest Claim
7 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by
8 unlawfully arresting and detaining him without probable cause. Compl. at 2. To prevail
9 on a false arrest claim under the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff must “demonstrate that
10 there was no probable cause to arrest him.” Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 978
11 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir.
12 1998) (per curiam)). A probable cause inquiry “merely asks whether, under the totality of
13 the circumstances, a prudent officer would have believed there was a fair probability that
14 [a person] committed a crime.” United States v. Collins, 427 F.3d 688, 691 (9th Cir. 2005).
15 Here, Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n or about February 2, 2022, [he] was arrested by
16 members of the San Diego Police Department.” Compl. at 2. He does not identify which
17 Defendants he intends to pursue the claim against. Id. He also provides no factual
18 allegations regarding the circumstances of the arrest nor the absence of probable cause.
19 See id. Absent specific facts about the arrest, the Court cannot assess whether probable
20 cause existed. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for false arrest.
21 2. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Claims
22 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by
23 suppressing exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady2, coercing him to accept an unjust
24 plea, and maliciously prosecuting him. Id.
25 //
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1 i. Brady Violation
2 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits “the suppression
3 by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request … where the evidence
4 is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
5 prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. There are three components to a Brady violation:
6 “[t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory,
7 or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either
8 willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S.
9 263, 281-82 (1999).
10 Here, Plaintiff alleges that “prosecutors possessed surveillance evidence that clearly
11 established [his] innocence.” Compl. at 2. He alleges that prosecutors continued to pursue
12 charges against him, which he contends violated his Brady rights. Id. Plaintiff does not
13 detail the types of alleged surveillance evidence, nor does he allege how the evidence was
14 suppressed by prosecutors. Absent such facts, the Court cannot determine if a Brady
15 violation occurred. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for a Brady
16 violation.
17 ii. Plea Coercion
18 A guilty plea violates the Constitution if it is not voluntary and intelligent. Brady v.
19 United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 (1970) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242
20 (1969)). Plaintiff alleges “[p]rosecutors attempted to coerce Plaintiff into accepting a
21 ‘three-strike’ plea despite Plaintiff having no prior criminal history.” Compl. at 2. Plaintiff
22 indicates that he did not accept any guilty plea, thus no deprivation occurred. See Mabry
23 v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507-08 (1984) (“A plea bargain standing alone is without
24 constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere executory agreement which, until embodied
25 in the judgment of a court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other
26 constitutionally protected interest. It is the ensuing guilty plea that implicates the
27 Constitution.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for plea coercion.
28 //
1 iii. Malicious Prosecution
2 To state a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show that “the
3 defendants prosecuted [him] with malice and without probable cause, and that they did so
4 for the purpose of denying [him] equal protection or another specific constitutional right.
5 Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal citations
6 omitted). The prosecution must also have terminated in the acquittal or discharged of the
7 accused. See Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 44 (2022).
8 Here, Plaintiff alleges that after refusing to accept a plea deal, “[d]efendants
9 retaliated by repeatedly delaying the case for approximately 2.5 years, leaving Plaintiff
10 under the burden of a pending violent felony charge.” Compl. at 2. He also states this was
11 to “[punish] him for exercising his constitutional right to trial.” Id. Plaintiff does not
12 identify which Defendants he intends to pursue the claim against. Id. Even if the
13 Complaint is liberally construed to show malice, Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing that
14 Defendants prosecuted him without probable cause, or that they did so for the purpose of
15 denying him equal protection or another constitutional right. See id. Absent such facts,
16 the Court cannot determine whether Defendants prosecuted him without probable cause
17 and for the purpose of denying a specific constitutional right. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails
18 to state a plausible claim for malicious prosecution.
19 3. Plaintiff’s Retaliation Claim
20 Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff for refusing to accept a
21 plea bargain by intentionally delaying proceedings for over two years, punishing him for
22 exercising his constitutional right to a trial.” Id. at 2.
23 In reviewing a claim of retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally-protected
24 rights, the Court considers: (1) whether the Plaintiff was engaged in an activity that is
25 entitled to constitutional protection; (2) whether their exercise of the constitutionally-
26 protected right was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s action; and (3)
27 whether the defendant has established that it would have taken the same action in the
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1 absence of the protected conduct. Rendish v. City of Tacoma, 123 F.3d 1216, 1219 (9th
2 Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted).
3 Here, Plaintiff does not identify which Defendants he intends to pursue the claim
4 against. Compl. at 2. Plaintiff does not allege facts showing that Defendants “intentionally
5 delay[ed] proceedings.” See id. Absent such facts, the Court cannot determine whether
6 Plaintiff exercising his right to trial was a substantial or motivating factor in Defendants’
7 actions. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for retaliation.
8 4. Plaintiff’s Monell Claim
9 Plaintiff seeks to assert a Monell3 claim against the City of San Diego and the San
10 Diego Police Department, stating “[t]he violations resulted from the policies, customs, or
11 practices of the City of San Diego and the San Diego Police Department, including failure
12 to supervise and discipline employers who engaged in misconduct. Id. at 2.
13 Municipalities may be held directly liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional
14 violations, but are not liable based on a respondeat superior theory. Monell, 436 U.S. at
15 691. A municipality may be liable under § 1983 if an employee commits an alleged
16 constitutional violation pursuant to a formal governmental policy or a longstanding practice
17 or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local governmental
18 entity. Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). Absent a formal governmental
19 policy or procedure, plaintiff must show a “longstanding practice or custom which
20 constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity.” Id. (citing
21 Gillette v. Delmore, 970 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1992)). “[A] custom or practice can
22 be inferred from ... evidence of repeated constitutional violations for which the errant
23 municipal officers were not discharged or reprimanded.” Velazquez v. City of Long Beach,
24 793 F.3d 1010, 1027 (9th Cir. 2015); (citing Hunter v. Cnty of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225,
25 1233 (9th Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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1 Here, Plaintiff conclusively states that the City of San Diego and the San Diego
2 Police Department “fail[ed] to train, supervise, or discipline officers and prosecutors
3 engaged in coercive plea bargaining and suppression of evidence.” Compl. at 2. Plaintiff
4 fails to allege facts showing that Defendants failed to train, supervise, or discipline officers
5 and prosecutors, and neither the officers nor prosecutors were discharged or reprimanded
6 as a result of repeated violations. See id. Finally, Plaintiff does not allege facts that any
7 such failure caused the alleged constitutional violations. See id. Absent such facts, the
8 Court cannot determine if a Monell violation occurred. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state
9 a plausible claim for his Monell claim.
10 CONCLUSION
11 For all the reasons discussed above, IT IS HEARBY ORDERED:
12 1. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed IFP, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), is
13 GRANTED.
14 2. Plaintiff's case is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
15 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
16 3. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days from the date of this order to file
17 an Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of the pleading described
18 herein. Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that should he choose to file an Amended
19 Complaint, it must be complete by itself, comply with the Federal Rules of Civil
20 Procedure, including Rule 8(a), and that any claim not re-alleged will be considered
21 waived. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner &
22 Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes
23 the original”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting
24 that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended
25 pleading may be considered “waived if not replied”). A failure to file an Amended
26 Complaint will result in dismissal of this action without further order of the Court.
27 //
28 //
1 Dated: March 5, 2026

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11364585. Public record. Not legal advice.