# Opinion

> District Court, E.D. New York · June 30, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11364369

## Case

- **Full name:** 25 Wanser LLC, and 40 Bayview LLC v. The Town of Hempstead, The Town Board of the Town of Hempstead, and John/Jane Doe #1 through John/Jane Doe # 10
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** June 30, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
‑‑‑‑‑‑‑-----------------‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑X
25 WANSER LLC, and
40 BAYVIEW LLC,
ORDER
Plaintiffs, 25-CV-5824(JS)(AYS)

‑against‑

THE TOWN OF HEMPSTEAD,
THE TOWN BOARD OF THE
TOWN OF HEMPSTEAD, and
JOHN/JANE DOE #1 through
JOHN/JANE DOE # 10,

Defendants.
‑‑‑‑‑‑‑-----------------‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑X

APPEARANCES

For Proposed
Intervenor Martin
Oliner: Stephen Wagner, Esq.
M. David Possick, Esq.
Cohen Tauber Spievack & Wagner P.C.
420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 2400
New York, New York 10170

For Defendants
Town of Hempstead
and the Town
Board of the Town
of Hempstead: Stanley A. Camhi
Jaspan Schlesinger Narendran LLP
300 Garden City Plaza, 5th Floor
Garden City, New York 11530

SEYBERT, District Judge:

Pursuant to Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Proposed Intervenor Martin Oliner (“Proposed
Intervenor”) objects to Magistrate Judge Anne Y. Shields’s May 26,
2026 Report and Recommendations (“R&R,” ECF No. 41), which
recommends denying Proposed Intervenor’s Motion to Intervene. (See
Obj., ECF No. 43; see also Motion, ECF No. 26; Support Memo, ECF
No. 26-1.) Plaintiffs 25 Wanser LLC and 40 Bayview LLC
(“Plaintiffs”) and Defendants Town of Hempstead and Town Board of

the Town of Hempstead (“Defendants,” collectively with Plaintiffs,
the “Parties”) oppose the Motion and have filed separate replies
to Proposed Intervenor’s Objection.1 (See Opp’n, ECF No. 42;
Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 44.) Because Proposed Intervenor has not
identified a protectable interest warranting intervention as of
right or a persuasive basis for permissive intervention, the Court
OVERRULES his Objection and DENIES the Motion.
BACKGROUND
I. Facts
As Judge Shields provided in the R&R:

Plaintiffs, 25 Wanser LLC and 40 Bayview LLC
(“Plaintiffs”), are real estate developers who
seek to build a 300-plus unit mixed-use
residential building in North Lawrence, New
York (the “Project”). (Compl. ¶ 29.) On May
27, 2019, Defendant Town of Hempstead (the
“Town”), through Defendant The Town Board of
the Town of Hempstead (the “Board”), adopted

1 On June 23, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a Reply. (See ECF No. 45.)
The Reply was filed by Attorney Colleen P. Collins, the Chief
Legal Officer of Plaintiffs, who has not filed a Notice of
Appearance in this Action. Plaintiffs have counsel of record,
who did not file a Reply. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Reply has
not been considered by the Court.
legislation entitled “Transit Oriented
Development and Related Districts for North
Lawrence and Inwood[”] (the “TOD Ordinance”),
which established a Transit Oriented
Development District (“TOD District”)
permitting mixed-use, high density
residential developments in a 73.2-acre area
in the overlay district of North Lawrence and
Inwood. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27, 45.) The TOD Ordinance
provided for an expedited approval process for
applicant developers, which was intended to
reduce project time and costs. (Id. ¶ 56.)
Over the next three years, and in reliance on
the TOD Ordinance, Plaintiffs sought to
advance their development plans in the TOD
District, ultimately submitting their project
application with the Town on February 18,
2022. (Id. ¶¶ 60-74.) During that time,
however, it became apparent to the Town that
the review procedure set forth in the TOD
Ordinance was insufficient to ensure that a
“hard look” was taken regarding the
environmental impacts that the high-density,
mixed-use development would have on the local
community and surrounding areas. (Def. Mem. of
Law 5.) On September 20, 2022, the Town
enacted a moratorium on development in the TOD
District and retained the services of Nelson
Pope Voorhis, an environmental planning firm,
to conduct a further review and analysis of
the TOD Ordinance. (Compl. ¶¶ 91, 110.)
The moratorium was set to expire on June 18,
2024. Prior to its expiration, on June 2,
2024, the Board scheduled a public hearing on
a proposed action to repeal the TOD Ordinance
while allowing previously submitted project
applications, such as Plaintiffs’, to still be
considered (the “Grandfathered-In Clause”).
(Id. ¶ 109.) On November 19, 2024, the Board
voted unanimously to repeal the TOD Ordinance
without the Grandfathered-In Clause.
(Id. ¶ 142.)
In June 2025, Plaintiffs initiated two Article
78 proceedings against the Town in New York
Supreme Court. (Id. ¶ 158.) The first sought
to compel the Town to review and act upon
Plaintiffs’ permit application in accordance
with the TOD Ordinance. The State Court found
in Plaintiffs’ favor in that action. (Id. ¶¶
159-61.) The Town timely filed a Notice of
Appeal and asserted its right to a stay of the
State Court’s directives pending appeal. (Def.
Mem. of Law 6.)
The second Article 78 proceeding sought an
order declaring the repeal of the TOD
Ordinance null and void for failure to comply
with New York General Municipal Law § 239-m
prior to its adoption. (Compl. ¶ 162.) Again,
the State Court decided in Plaintiffs’ favor
and again, the Town appealed. (Id.; Def. Mem.
of Law 7.)
Plaintiffs commenced the within action on
October 17, 2025, pursuant to 42 U.S.C Section
1983, asserting claims for violations of the
Takings Clause and the Equal Protection Clause
under the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as
both substantive and procedural due process
violations and First Amendment retaliation.
Plaintiffs seek solely money damages and do
not request any declaratory or injunctive
relief.
On January 13, 2026, Proposed Intervenor
Oliner filed the within motion to intervene
herein as a defendant, pursuant to Rule 24 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket
Entry (“DE”) [26].) Oliner is the former Mayor
of Lawrence, New York as well as a resident
who lives in close proximity to Plaintiffs’
proposed project site. (Oliner’s Mem. of Law
1.) Oliner asserts as grounds for his motion
that he has a significant, protectable
interest in preventing the Project from moving
forward and that the Town and the Board are
not adequately representing this vital
interest. (Id. 2.) Plaintiffs and Defendants
oppose Oliner’s motion.
(R&R at 1-3.) Proposed Intervenor’s Objection adopts the above
factual summary by reference, but also adds the state court denial
of the TOD Ordinance was “on purely procedural grounds arising
from the Town’s failure to comply with New York General Municipal
Law § 239-m’s referral requirements.” (Obj. at 2.)

II. The R&R
On May 26, 2026, Judge Shields issued the R&R. (See
Generally R&R.) Judge Shields first explained Rule 24(a)(2)
requires a court to permit intervention where a proposed
intervenor:

(1) files a timely motion, (2) claims ‘an
interest relating to the property or
transaction that is the subject of the
action,’ and (3) ‘is so situated that
disposing of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the movant’s ability
to protect its interest,’ [and] (4) ‘unless
existing parties adequately represent that
interest.’
(R&R at 4 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2); SEC v. Xia Yue, No.
21-CV-5350, 2026 WL 872956, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2026).)
Applying these factors, Judge Shields determined
Proposed Intervenor lacked a cognizable interest required for
mandatory intervention under Rule 24(a)(2). (R&R at 5–6.)
Emphasizing that Plaintiffs seek only money damages—and not
declaratory or injunctive relief needed to resume development of
the project—Judge Shields explained Proposed Intervenor’s asserted
interests in “zoning, land use, traffic patterns, environmental
quality, and character of his community” were insufficient under
the Rule. (Id.) Judge Shields further found Proposed Intervenor
failed to demonstrate any entitlement to money damages, the sole
relief sought in this Action. (Id.)

Judge Shields also recommended denying permissive
intervention under Rule 24(b), which allows intervention where the
proposed intervenor’s claim or defense shares a common question of
law or fact with the main action. (Id. at 7.) Proposed
Intervenor’s stated concerns—including “support[ing the] voice of
the residents of Lawrence and Inwood” and “restor[ing] public faith
in democracy”—were deemed “extraneous.” (Id. (quoting United
States v. City of N.Y., 198 F.3d 360, 367 (2d Cir. 1999)).)
Accordingly, Judge Shields determined permitting intervention on
this basis would unduly delay adjudication of the Parties’ rights,
the principal discretionary consideration under Rule 24(b). (Id.

at 7-8.)
III. Objection and Opposition
On June 9, 2026, Proposed Intervenor filed a timely
Objection to Judge Shields’s R&R, continuing to assert interests

in “zoning, land use, traffic, environmental quality, and
community character.” (Obj. at 3.) He primarily contends Judge
Shields mischaracterized the Action as one for money damages, since
Plaintiffs’ Complaint also seeks “such other, further, or
different relief as this Court deems just and proper.” (Id. at 1,
3–4.) He additionally argues that the true objective of Plaintiffs’
Action is not “money damages for purported constitutional
violations,” but rather to use “constitutional litigation to
pressure the Town into permitting a 300-plus unit high-density
development that the Town’s own expert found environmentally
deficient and that thousands of residents have opposed.” (Id. at

1, 4.) Proposed Intervenor also objects to Judge Shields’s
recommendation regarding permissive intervention under Rule 24(b),
principally arguing that the R&R adopts an overly technical reading
of the phrase “claim or defense.” (Id. at 6.)
On June 18, 2026, Defendants filed their response to
Proposed Intervenor’s Objection, and on June 23, 2026, Plaintiffs
filed a separate response. (See generally Defs.’ Reply and Pls.’
Reply.) Both urge the Court to adopt the R&R in its entirety.

(Id.) As noted (see supra note 1), the Court declines to consider
Plaintiff’s response.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law

A. Report and Recommendations
A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole
or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also FED R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3).
A party objecting to an R&R “must lodge a specific objection to
some specific aspect of the R&R,” and “[w]hen a timely filed
objection raises and properly briefs arguments previously rejected
by the magistrate judge, the district judge must review those
arguments de novo.” Nambiar v. Cent. Orthopedic Grp., LLP, 158
F.4th 349, 361 (2d Cir. 2025). The Court need not review the
findings and conclusions to which no proper objection has been

made, and an objection “may not simply rest on the briefs
considered by the magistrate judge.” Id.; Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140, 150 (1985).
B. Intervention

As Judge Shields correctly stated:
Rule 24(a)(2) sets forth a four-part test for
intervention as of right, stating that the
Court “must permit anyone to intervene” who
(1) files a timely motion, (2) claims “an
interest relating to the property or
transaction that is the subject of the
action,” and (3) “is so situated that
disposing of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the movant’s ability
to protect its interest,” (4) “unless existing
parties adequately represent that interest.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2); see also SEC v. Xia
Yue, No. 21-CV-5350, 2026 WL 872956, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2026). All four parts of
the foregoing test must be met for
intervention as of right. See John Wiley &
Sons, Inc. v. Book Dog Books, LLC, 315 F.R.D.
169, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing United States
v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 25 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir.
1994)).
Under Rule 24(b)(1)(B), which provides for
permissive intervention, a court “may permit
anyone to intervene who has a claim or defense
that shares with the main action a common
question of law or fact.” FED. R. CIV. P.
24(b)(1)(B). “A motion for permissive
intervention, like one for intervention of
right, must be timely.” SEC v. Euro Sec. Fund,
No. 98-CV-7347, 2006 WL 1461776, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2006) (quoting Catanzano By
Catanzano v. Wing, 103 F.3d 223, 224 (2d Cir.
1996)). “In exercising its broad discretion
under Rule 24(b), a court considers the same
factors that it considers for intervention as
of right.” Innovation Ventures LLC v.
Pittsburg Wholesale Grocers Inc., No. 13-CV-
6397, 2019 WL 4805041, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
30, 2019) (quoting MASTR Adjustable Rate
Mortg. Tr. 2006-A3 v. UBS Real Estate Secs.,
No. 12-CV-7332, 2013 WL 139636, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2013)) (additional citation
omitted).
Whether intervention is sought as of right or
by permission, Rule 24(c) further requires the
motion to “state the grounds for intervention
and be accompanied by a pleading that sets out
the claim or defense for which intervention is
sought.” FED. R. CIV. P. 24(c). Many courts,
however, have found that “a failure to attach
. . . a proposed pleading,” as required by
Rule 24(c), “is not fatal to the motion to
intervene.” Innovation Ventures, 2019 WL
4805041, at *2 (quoting N. Shore-Long Island
Jewish Health Sys., Inc. v. Multiplan, Inc.,
No. 12-CV-1633, 2015 WL 777248, at *18
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2015)) (additional citation
omitted); see also Murray v. City of New York,
No. 21 Civ. 6892, 2023 WL 3984342, at *2 n.3
(E.D.N.Y. June 13, 2023) (“Courts in this
Circuit regularly excuse the failure to
include a pleading with a motion to
intervene.”) (collecting cases).
(R&R at 4-5.)
II. Application

A. Proposed Intervenor is Not Entitled to Mandatory
Intervention
Proposed Intervenor’s Objection does not establish a
protectable interest under Rule 24(a). In an attempt to
characterize this Action as anything other than a money-damages
case, Proposed Intervenor argues the Complaint’s boilerplate
request for “such other, further, or different relief as this Court
deems just and proper” demonstrates that Plaintiffs seek more than
monetary relief. (Obj. at 3 (citing Compl. pp. 48).) However,
Proposed Intervenor cites to no authority indicating such a brief,
boilerplate sentence included at the end of a money-damages
Complaint can transform an action into one for declaratory or
injunctive relief for purposes of an intervention motion. Nor
does a fair reading of the Complaint suggest this Action seeks
such relief. Rather, as is plain from its text, the causes of
action listed in Plaintiffs’ Complaint each include attempted
computations for monetary damages, thereby underscoring
Plaintiffs’ desire for money damages. (See Compl. ¶ ¶ 176-257.)
Proposed Intervenor’s argument that “[c]ourts have
recognized that the proper inquiry is not what remedy a plaintiff
has chosen but what the proceeding is actually about” is likewise
unavailing. (Obj. at 3-4.) This argument rests primarily on his

settlement-leverage theory and reliance upon Rent Stabilization
Association of New York City v. State Division of Housing &
Community Renewal, 252 A.D.2d 111, 115 (3d Dep’t 1998). Rent
Stabilization is a New York State case that did not arise under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, wherein a New York State
court determined New York City was a necessary party in a case
where the validity of one of its ordinances was being litigated by

private parties. Id. Even setting aside that Rent Stabilization
addressed intervention under the C.P.L.R. rather than Rule 24(a),
the interest at issue there—a municipality’s interest in the
validity of its own ordinance—was far more direct and protectable
than Proposed Intervenor’s speculative concerns regarding
settlement leverage. As Defendants state in their Reply, Proposed
Intervenor “has not come forward with any evidence that the Town
is not vigorously defending this Action or the proceedings
Plaintiffs commenced in State court.” (Defs.’ Reply at 4.) Because
Proposed Intervenor’s asserted interest rests entirely upon
speculation, he is not entitled to intervention as of right under

Rule 24(a)(2).
B. Permissive Intervention is Also Not Warranted
As Proposed Intervenor’s cited interest is entirely
speculative, he is also not entitled to permissive intervention
under Rule 24(b). See Innovation Ventures LLC, 2019 WL 4805041,

at *2 (courts possess “broad discretion under Rule 24(b)”).
Proposed Intervenor’s reliance on Commack Self-Service Kosher
Meats, Incorporated v. Rubin, a case where several rabbis were
permitted to intervene in litigation concerning New York’s kosher
laws, is not availing. (Obj. at 5 (citing 170 F.R.D. 93, 106
(E.D.N.Y. 1996)).) In Commack Kosher, the Court found the rabbis
had “an interest in the enforcement and the constitutionality of

the Kosher Laws.” 170 F.R.D. at 106. As in Rent Stabilization,
the interest asserted in Commack Kosher did not depend upon
speculation about litigation theories or reading into the parties’
motivations. Rather, the intervenors had a direct stake in each
case, which respectively impacted their ordinance-making powers
and religious-practice interests. Such circumstances are not
present in Proposed Intervenor’s case.
Hence, upon de novo review, the Court finds the

Magistrate Judge’s thorough Report to be free of clear error.
Therefore, overruling Proposed Intervenor’s objections to said
Report, the Court adopts Judge Shields’s recommendation.
CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the stated reasons, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED that Proposed Intervenor’s Objection is OVERRULED and
the Magistrate Judge’s R&R is ADOPTED in its entirety;
therefore,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Proposed Intervenor’s
Motion (ECF No. 26) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated: June 30, 2026
Central Islip, New York

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11364369. Public record. Not legal advice.