# Schwarcz

> District Court, M.D. Florida · March 30, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11364323

## Case

- **Full name:** Sandra Beth Schwarcz v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts U.S., Inc.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** March 30, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11364323

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION

SANDRA BETH SCHWARCZ,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:25-cv-640-JSS-RMN

WALT DISNEY PARKS AND
RESORTS U.S., INC.,

Defendant.
__________________________________/
ORDER
Defendant moves for summary judgment. (Dkt. 33; see Dkt. 39.) Plaintiff
opposes the motion. (Dkt. 37.) Upon consideration, for the reasons outlined below,
the court denies the motion.
BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff has had permanent disabilities since 2012. (Dkt. 38-1 ¶ 2.) She suffers
from mast cell activation syndrome (MCAS) and postural orthostatic tachycardia
syndrome (POTS) and also requires an electric convenience vehicle (ECV), or mobility
scooter, to move from place to place. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 4.) MCAS “makes [Plaintiff] hyper-
allergic.” (Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff defines POTS as “a neurological condition affecting the
control of the autonomic nervous system[,] including regulation of pulse and blood
pressure,” and she explains that POTS can cause her “heart to beat faster than normal”
when she “transition[s] from lying to sitting or sitting to standing up or maintain[s] an

1 In setting forth the background facts, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to
upright posture.” (Id. ¶ 2.) According to Plaintiff, “POTS is exacerbated by warm or
hot temperatures and, as such, requires that [she] recover in a cool temperature
following any physical activity.” (Id. ¶ 3.)
Plaintiff has visited Defendant’s Yacht Club Resort in the Orlando, Florida area

“two to three times a year since 2009.” (Id. ¶ 5.) Starting in 2016, Plaintiff would
contact the resort before each visit to “review [her] needs for accommodations,” and
“[f]or years,” the resort’s employees would “work[] with [her] to accommodate [her]
needs so that [she] could enjoy” Defendant’s facilities to the fullest. (Id. ¶ 6.)
However, on October 29, 2022, Plaintiff discovered upon arrival that “the necessary

adjustments had not been made to the thermostat in [her] room.” (Id. ¶ 8.) When
Plaintiff “requested a technician to make the appropriate changes,” the manager on
duty told her that the room could not reach the lower temperature, even though
Plaintiff had stayed in the same room before and the temperature had then been
lowered at her request. (Id. ¶¶ 8–9.) Plaintiff states that the manager “provided

incredulous reasons” for not changing the temperature, including that Defendant had
implemented an environmental initiative and “was not going to make any further
accommodations and if they were needed, guests would be told to go elsewhere.” (Id.
¶ 10.) According to Plaintiff, the manager “concluded by telling [her] that if [she] did
not like the temperature in the room, [she] was free to leave the hotel and never

return.” (Id. ¶ 11; accord Dkt. 38-2 at 1 (showing a message to the manager from
Plaintiff stating: “You[] said [that] I could accept the temperature or not stay at the
hotel and that I can return home.”).) Because the room temperature had not been
adjusted, Plaintiff awoke the next morning “well before [her] alarm was set to go off,
with dizziness, shortness of breath, and [her] heart racing in the 140s.” (Dkt. 38-1
¶ 12; accord Dkt. 38-3 at 1, 3.) Plaintiff called Defendant’s attention to her medical
condition, and Defendant responded by adjusting the room temperature. (Dkt. 38-1

¶ 13.)
In April 2023, someone claiming to be a representative of Defendant contacted
Plaintiff and indicated that the representative would discuss the room temperature
accommodation with the resort’s general manager. (Id. ¶ 15.) The representative
“promise[d] to respond the next day.” (Id. ¶ 16.) However, she did not, so “nearly a

week” later, Plaintiff “followed up with an email on May 12, 2023.” (Id.) The
representative responded via email that evening; the email stated that the
representative had spoken with the resort directly and had noted Plaintiff’s room
temperature requests on her booking but could not guarantee a temperature
adjustment. (Id.; Dkt. 38-4 at 1.) Plaintiff reports that “[l]ess than [twenty] minutes

later[,] [she] responded asking for a phone call as had been promised,” and “[r]eceiving
no response, [she] immediately called the main lobby office” for the resort. (Dkt. 38-
1 ¶ 17.) The resort employee with whom Plaintiff spoke had not heard from the
representative, had not heard of the department to which the representative claimed
to belong, and “did not see any notations on [Plaintiff’s] booking regarding the air

conditioning.” (Id. ¶ 18.) According to Plaintiff, she was “deeply concern[ed]”
because “it was clear [to her] that [she] had been lied to by someone unknown to the
[resort] and there were no assurances” that Defendant would provide the room
temperature accommodation even though she had mere “days before [her] scheduled
departure.” (Id. ¶ 19.)
When Plaintiff arrived at the resort from Pennsylvania on May 17, 2023, she
discovered that the room temperature accommodation had not been provided. (Id.

¶ 20.) Plaintiff “made approximately six requests of lobby personnel to have someone
adjust the air conditioner” and “was eventually told that no one was being sent as the
air conditioning had been adjusted.” (Id. ¶ 21.) A record from Defendant for May 15,
2023, states: “We are contacting the resort and getting the engineer to adjust
[Plaintiff’s] room so her [air conditioning] does turn off while she is at [one of

Defendant’s theme] park[s].” (Dkt. 33-1 at 39 (emphasis modified).) Plaintiff
contacted the manager on duty to explain the situation, and “[a]pproximately three
hours after [her] arrival,” she was told that someone was being sent to her room. (Dkt.
38-1 ¶ 22.) At that point, “[a]n electrician arrived simply to tell [Plaintiff] that all the
air conditioner technicians had called out sick” so “no one was available to make the

necessary adjustments to the air conditioner.” (Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff explained to the
electrician that she had “observed many times” the “relatively simple” process of
“overriding the thermostat” to adjust the temperature, and “[w]ith this explanation,
the electrician eventually agreed to make the override.” (Id. ¶ 24.)
Plaintiff notes that throughout her May 2023 visit to the resort, unlike during

prior visits, various resort employees followed her. (Id. ¶ 25.) Resort employees were
also less willing to assist Plaintiff than they had been before and did not treat her as
well as they had before. (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff had eaten at the resort’s steakhouse many
times without a problem, but during the May 2023 visit, she was initially prohibited
from bringing her ECV into the restaurant. (Id. ¶ 27.) The hostess three times
instructed Plaintiff to leave the ECV outside. (Id.) Plaintiff then spoke with the
manager, who initially refused her ECV request but ultimately “agreed to seat [her] in

a cordoned off part of the restaurant.” (Id.) Further, when parking on May 26, 2023,
Plaintiff asked a valet for parking options given that “there were no handicapped
parking spots remaining,” and instead of providing Plaintiff with parking options, the
valet spoke with a manager who then came outside to keep “eyes on [Plaintiff’s] party”
of guests. (Id. ¶ 28; see Dkt. 38-6 at 1 (a record from Defendant indicating that the

“[v]alet ask[ed] for eyes on the . . . party” because of where the party asked to park).)
At Defendant’s Animal Kingdom theme park, a large bird in a bird show
expelled its waste on Plaintiff to the extent that Plaintiff needed to wash her clothes.
(Dkt. 38-1 ¶ 29.) Plaintiff asked to use a washing machine in one of Defendant’s
vacant timeshare properties because her allergies, exacerbated by MCAS, prevented

her from using a laundromat instead. (Id.) Defendant initially denied her requests,
stating that no rooms were available. (Id.) However, a Yacht Club Resort manager
ultimately permitted Plaintiff to wash her clothes. (Id.)
In the evening of May 26, 2023, Plaintiff attempted to access the resort’s Club
Level (a level of exclusive access available to Defendant’s guests for a fee) and was

denied entry. (Id. ¶ 30; see Dkt. 38-6 at 1 (a record from Defendant emphasizing that
Plaintiff was not to be granted Club Access).) Plaintiff states: “With more than twenty
minutes before the Club Level closed, I went to the lobby desk and asked [the
employees there] to fix my room card to allow for access to the Club Level as I had
paid for that service.” (Dkt. 38-1 ¶ 30.) Defendant denied the request multiple times
until a manager “agreed that access should be granted and then escorted” Plaintiff’s
party to the Club Level. (Id. ¶ 31.) On the way, the manager stated that employees

had been instructed “to leave the food out and to bring some other items out.” (Id.
¶ 32.) Nonetheless, Plaintiff reports, “[u]pon arrival, . . . nearly all the food was put
away.” (Id.) When Plaintiff asked about the food situation, an employee informed
her that contrary to the manager’s statement, no instruction to leave the food out had
been given. (Id. ¶ 33.) At that point, Plaintiff considered leaving the resort and drove

with her mother to explore Defendant’s Animal Kingdom Lodge as an alternative
hotel. (Id. ¶ 34.) However, concerns about the lodge’s ability to accommodate her
medical conditions prompted Plaintiff to remain at Yacht Club Resort. (Id.)
On May 27, 2023, Plaintiff informed a manager at the resort about the
difficulties that Plaintiff had encountered in receiving accommodations and about

Plaintiff’s “perception—and discomfort—of being followed and watched by staff” at
the resort. (Id. ¶ 35.) The manager “confirmed [Plaintiff’s] perception of being
followed and watched” and indicated that Defendant had declined in quality. (Id.
¶ 36; see Dkt. 38-10 at 36 (the manager’s deposition testimony acknowledging that the
manager could have told Plaintiff that Defendant had changed).) A few hours later,

law enforcement issued a trespass warning to Plaintiff and advised her that Defendant
was banning her from its properties. (Dkt. 38-1 ¶ 37.) When Plaintiff asked for the
reason for the ban, a manager informed her that Defendant implemented the ban due
to her “conduct during this visit and previous visits.” (Id. ¶ 38.) Months later, through
her efforts to remove the trespass warning, Plaintiff learned that someone had falsely
accused her of putting her hand on the shoulder of an employee at the resort’s Club
Level. (Id. ¶ 39.) Plaintiff explains: “I have a well-documented history of disallowing

any contact with others due to my allergies. I would never be physically aggressive
towards anyone, risking my allergies and jeopardize not only my ability to return to
[Defendant’s theme] parks but to uphold my future license to practice medicine.” (Id.
¶ 40.)
Defendant uses a four-level system to categorize its significant guests. (See Dkt.

38-8 at 1; Dkt. 38-9 at 1; Dkt. 38-11 at 13.) High-ranking government officials, titans
of industry, celebrities, and executives for Defendant belong to the first, VIP-1 level.
(See Dkt. 38-8 at 1; Dkt. 38-9 at 1; Dkt. 38-11 at 13.) Celebrities, government officials,
and executives of lesser rank belong to the second, VIP-2 level. (See Dkt. 38-8 at 1;
Dkt. 38-9 at 1; Dkt. 38-11 at 13.) The third, VIP-3 level includes repeat guests with

complimentary stays, couples getting married on Defendant’s properties, and other
guests whom Defendant prioritizes above the average guest. (See Dkt. 38-8 at 1; Dkt.
38-9 at 1; Dkt. 38-11 at 13.) The guests in the fourth, VIP-4 level are officially described
as “special attention guests” but in fact consist of problem guests with histories of
“excessive demands for compensation,” unpaid balances, “aggressive behavior,

aggressive language, [and] excessive amounts of time taken from resort leadership.”
(Dkt. 38-11 at 13–14; see Dkt. 38-8 at 1; Dkt. 38-9 at 1.) The decision to place a guest
in the VIP-4 level involves collaboration among “[t]he resort operations team, project
management, a few . . . resort executives, and . . . the legal department.” (Dkt. 38-11
at 16.) Defendant’s records show that it classified Plaintiff as a VIP-3 guest on May
13 and 14, 2023 (before her May 2023 stay), but as a VIP-4 guest on May 26 and 27,
2023 (at the end of her stay). (Dkt. 38-8 at 1; Dkt. 38-9 at 1.) Plaintiff asserts that

Defendant reclassified her as a VIP-4 guest because she requested accommodations for
her disabilities during her stay. (Dkt. 38 at 11.)
Dissatisfied with Defendant’s alleged mistreatment, Plaintiff initiated this case
on April 10, 2025, by filing a two-count complaint under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). (Dkt. 1.) Plaintiff sues Defendant for discrimination (count

one) and interference, coercion, or intimidation (count two). (Id. at 11–13.) She seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief, including recission of the trespass, as well as
reasonable attorney fees and other legal costs. (Id.) Defendant denies liability as to
both counts. (Dkt. 19.) Discovery closed in this case on October 3, 2025. (Dkt. 15 at
1.) This case is set for a bench trial starting May 18, 2026. (See Dkt. 41 at 1; Dkt. 44.)

APPLICABLE STANDARDS
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When a party “assert[s] that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed,” the party “must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular

parts of materials in the record . . . or . . . [by] showing that the materials cited do not
establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute[] or that an adverse party cannot
produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “The court
need consider only the cited materials” when resolving the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(3); see HRCC, Ltd. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int’l (USA), Inc., 703 F. App’x 814, 817 (11th
Cir. 2017) (“This rule was implemented so that a court may decide a motion for
summary judgment without undertaking an independent search of the record.”

(quotation omitted)).
A factual dispute is “genuine” only if “a reasonable [factfinder] could return a
verdict for the non[-]moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A fact is “material” if the fact could affect the outcome of the lawsuit under
the governing law. Id. The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those

portions of the record showing a lack of a genuine factual dispute. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260
(11th Cir. 2004). If the movant shows that no evidence supports the non-moving
party’s case, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to show that there are, in fact,
genuine factual disputes which preclude judgment as a matter of law. Porter v. Ray,

461 F.3d 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006).
To satisfy its burden, the non-moving party “must do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, the non-moving party must
go beyond the pleadings and “identify affirmative evidence” that creates a genuine

dispute of material fact. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998); see also HRCC,
703 F. App’x at 816–17 (“Presenting arguments in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment is the responsibility of the non-moving party, not the court.” (alteration
adopted) (quoting Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. Weitz, 913 F.2d 1544, 1550 (11th
Cir. 1990))). In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the court
must view the evidence and draw all factual inferences in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party and must resolve any reasonable doubts in that party’s favor.

Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007). The court will not weigh
the evidence or make findings of fact. Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 924
(11th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment should be granted only “[w]here the record
taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non[-]moving
party.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.

ANALYSIS
The court addresses counts one and two in turn.
A. Count One
Count one seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, including recession of the
trespass, for Defendant’s alleged discrimination against Plaintiff in violation of Title

III of the ADA. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 64–66.) Title III provides: “No individual shall be
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of
public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a
place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). As relevant here, (see Dkt. 37

at 19–20), Title III generally prohibits denying disabled individuals opportunities “to
participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of an entity” on the basis of the individuals’ disabilities, as well as
giving disabled individuals opportunities to participate or benefit that are “not equal
to” the opportunities “afforded to other individuals,” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i)–
(ii). To succeed on a Title III claim, a plaintiff must satisfy three elements: (1) “the
plaintiff is disabled,” (2) “the defendant owns, leases, or operates a place of public

accommodation,” and (3) “the defendant denied the plaintiff—on the basis of the
disability—full and equal enjoyment of the premises.” Price v. City of Ocala, 375 F.
Supp. 3d 1264, 1269 (M.D. Fla. 2019) (quotation omitted).
For purposes of the instant motion, Defendant does not dispute the first or
second element. (Dkt. 33 at 17 n.13.) Instead, Defendant maintains that Plaintiff

cannot satisfy the third element because Defendant did not deny her access to its
properties based on her disabilities but rather accommodated her and because the
trespass was not based on her disabilities but on her own misconduct involving one of
Defendant’s employees. (Id. at 18–21.) Defendant also asserts that rescission of the
trespass is not a reasonable accommodation because the trespass resulted from

Plaintiff’s own misconduct, not from her disabilities. (Id. at 21–22.) Plaintiff responds
that Defendant denied her “the benefits of a room with a conditioned air temperature
that permitted [her to] sleep” and denied her “access to a restaurant with an ECV . . . ,
access to the Club Level[,] and ultimately[,]” access to all of Defendant’s properties
through the trespass. (Dkt. 37 at 20.) Plaintiff also denies the misconduct asserted as

the basis for the trespass and contends that the false accusations are pretextual and
motivated by Defendant’s desire to “no longer have to deal with accommodating” her.
(Id. at 12–13.)
Regarding Title III discrimination, the Eleventh Circuit has explained:
[T]he definition of discrimination provided in Title III covers both
tangible barriers, that is, physical and architectural barriers that would
prevent a disabled person from entering an accommodation’s facilities
and accessing its goods, services[,] and privileges, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), and intangible barriers, such as eligibility
requirements and screening rules or discriminatory policies and
procedures that restrict a disabled person’s ability to enjoy the defendant
entity’s goods, services[,] and privileges, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii).

Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., 294 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002). In addition, Title III
“recognizes that an intangible barrier may result as a consequence of a defendant
entity’s failure to act, that is, when it refuses to provide a reasonable auxiliary service
that would permit the disabled to gain access to or use its goods and services.” Id. n.7
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii)).
When viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, with all reasonable
inferences drawn in her favor, evidence permits a reasonable factfinder to conclude
that Defendant denied her the full and equal enjoyment of its properties on the basis
of her disabilities through tangible and intangible barriers covered under Title III. See
id. at 1283 & n.7. For example, evidence supports that despite Defendant’s prior
knowledge of Plaintiff’s air conditioning and mobility needs, Defendant initially
denied her room temperature and ECV accommodations. (Dkt. 38-1 ¶¶ 5–6, 8–9, 20–
24, 27; see Dkt. 33-1 at 39.) In addition, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that
Defendant’s asserted basis for the trespass is a pretext for discrimination and that
Defendant wanted Plaintiff to leave its properties so that it was no longer required to
accommodate her disabilities. Evidence supports that Defendant came to view
Plaintiff as a problem guest—prompting it to reclassify her from VIP-3 to VIP-4 level—
during her May 2023 stay, when she made multiple requests for accommodation of
her disabilities. (Dkt. 38-8 at 1; Dkt. 38-9 at 1; Dkt. 38-11 at 13–14, 16.) Evidence
also supports that Defendant wanted Plaintiff to leave and took steps to make her

uncomfortable. Plaintiff declared under penalty of perjury that during her October
2022 visit, a manager told her that “if [she] did not like the temperature in the room,
[she] was free to leave the hotel and never return.” (Dkt. 38-1 ¶ 11; see Dkt. 38-2 at 1.)
Regarding the May 2023 visit, although Defendant claims that the “does turn off”
record demonstrating its intent to turn off Plaintiff’s air conditioning in her absence

contrary to her medical needs is a clerical error that actually demonstrates the opposite
intent through the inadvertent omission of the word “not,” (Dkt. 39 at 2; see Dkt. 33-1
at 39), the court must view the record in Plaintiff’s favor, see Skop, 485 F.3d at 1136,
as indicating Defendant’s animosity toward Plaintiff.
Moreover, according to Plaintiff, Defendant’s employees followed and

monitored her party in a way that caused her discomfort, and they did not assist her
as much as they could. (Dkt. 38-1 ¶¶ 25–26, 35–36; see id. ¶ 29.) Evidence also
supports that Defendant lied to Plaintiff: for example, her party was told to expect food
at the Club Level that was not, in reality, there. (Id. ¶¶ 31–33.) Further, a reasonable
factfinder could find pretext in discrepancies among the original reason given for

banning Plaintiff from Defendant’s properties (her conduct during not only the May
2023 visit but also prior visits), the primary basis for the trespass (Plaintiff’s alleged
touching of an employee), Plaintiff’s prior VIP-3 status (suggesting that Defendant
previously prioritized her above the average guest), and Plaintiff’s documented history
of not touching others given her allergies as exacerbated by MCAS. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 38–40;
Dkt. 38-8 at 1; Dkt. 38-9 at 1; see Dkt. 38-1 ¶ 29.) In other words, a reasonable
factfinder could deem “unworthy of credence” Defendant’s nondiscriminatory

justification for banning Plaintiff based on “weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, incoherencies, [and] contradictions” supported by the record. See
Combs v. Plantation Patterns, Meadowcraft, Inc., 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997).
Because issues of fact concerning whether Defendant denied Plaintiff the full
and equal enjoyment of its properties on the basis of her disabilities and whether

Defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory basis for banning Plaintiff is pretextual
remain, summary judgment on count one is improper. See Campbell v. Moon Palace,
Inc., No. 11-60274-CIV, 2011 WL 6951846, at *3, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151402, at
*11 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2011) (“[The p]laintiff’s deposition testimony is sufficient
evidence to survive summary judgment on the claims relating to [the alleged] barriers

based on [the d]efendant’s arguments that [he] was not denied full and equal use of
[its] facility, that the alleged barriers did not affect him personally, and that the alleged
barriers did not actually prevent or imped his use of the facility. Any factual disputes
surrounding these claims will be determined at trial.”); see also Kennedy v. Nat’l Career
Fairs, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:18-CV-4655-RWS, 2020 WL 10181656, at *3–5, 2020

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 256452, at *6–12 (N.D. Ga. July 22, 2020) (denying a defendant’s
summary judgment motion regarding a Title III discrimination claim when the
defendant did not dispute the plaintiff’s disability or the defendant’s public
accommodation status, and explaining that factual disputes remained as to whether
the plaintiff was denied full and equal enjoyment based on her disability); Access 4 All,
Inc. v. Atl. Hotel Condo. Ass’n, No. 04-61740-CIV-COHN, 2005 WL 5632057, at *7–8,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41600, at *22–24 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2005) (rejecting the

defendant hotel companies’ argument that the plaintiffs were not denied full and equal
treatment based on the disabled plaintiff’s disability, and denying summary judgment
“based upon [that p]laintiff’s testimony of his experience” at the hotel).
B. Count Two
Count two alleges Defendant’s interference, coercion, or intimidation of

Plaintiff in violation of the ADA’s anti-interference provision. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 67–71.) The
ADA prohibits a person from “coerc[ing], intimidat[ing], threaten[ing], or interfer[ing]
with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having
exercised or enjoyed, . . . any right granted or protected by” the ADA. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12203(b). The Eleventh Circuit has “not yet had occasion to explain the proper

standard for evaluating” a claim based on this provision. Atchison v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. Sys. of Ga., 802 F. App’x 495, 508 (11th Cir. 2020); accord Miller-Brown v. RV
Behav., LLC, No. 1:23-cv-04608-ELR-JEM, 2025 WL 4058264, at *9 (N.D. Ga. June
26, 2025) (“The Eleventh Circuit has not squarely addressed the proper standard for
an ADA interference claim.” (quotation omitted)), report and recommendation adopted

by 2025 WL 4056843, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 19, 2025). However, persuasive
authority supports that to prevail on an ADA interference claim, a plaintiff must satisfy
three elements: (1) “the plaintiff exercised a right protected by the ADA,” (2) “the
defendant coerced, intimidated, threatened, [or] interfered with the plaintiff’s
enjoyment of his or her ADA rights,” and (3) “the defendant’s actions were motivated
because the plaintiff exercised a right protected by the ADA.” Callahan v. Emory
Healthcare, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-1367-WMR-JSA, 2022 WL 18927486, at *14 (N.D. Ga.

Nov. 10, 2022) (alterations adopted) (quoting Mosley v. AM/NS Calvert, LLC, No. CV
1:20-00517-KD-M, 2022 WL 843773, at *8 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 21, 2022)), report and
recommendation adopted by 2023 WL 2334987, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 16, 2023), aff’d,
No. 23-10604, 2024 WL 3027684, at *9 (11th Cir. June 17, 2024). Persuasive authority
also supports that the ADA’s anti-interference provision prohibits only

“discriminatory conduct that is so severe or pervasive that it will have the effect of
causing a protected person to abandon the exercise of his or her ADA rights.” Mosley,
2022 WL 843773, at *9 (alteration adopted and emphasis and quotation omitted).2
Defendant contends that its purported misconduct is insufficiently severe or
pervasive to cause reasonable individuals to abandon the exercise of their ADA rights

because Defendant exceeded its obligations under the ADA when accommodating
Plaintiff’s requests and because Plaintiff did not abandon the exercise of her ADA
rights. (Dkt. 33 at 24–25.) Defendant further maintains that the trespass “could not
have served as a threat or coercion to make [Plaintiff] abandon her rights” because “at
that point[,] she was not even going to be permitted” on Defendant’s properties. (Id.

2 Plaintiff argues that a severe or pervasive conduct requirement has “no place in a retaliation claim,”
(Dkt. 37 at 16), and cites caselaw on retaliation, (id. at 16–17). However, Plaintiff sues for interference
under 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b), not for retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 67–71; see Dkt.
39 at 6 n.3.) Indeed, the complaint does not mention retaliation. (See Dkt. 1.)
at 25.) Additionally, Defendant argues, Plaintiff cannot establish that it acted out of
animus toward her requests for accommodation. (Id.) In response, Plaintiff asserts
that Defendant committed actionable misconduct when it did the following: “refus[ed]
to adjust the air conditioner in October 2022 and [told her] that if she did not like the

temperature in the room, she was free to leave the hotel and never return,” informed
her “in April 2023 that her air conditioning needs could not be guaranteed” even
though the accommodation was medically necessary, failed to “adjust[] the air
conditioning upon her arrival on May 17, 2023,” directed its resort employees to
follow her and monitor her, “denied [her] the ability to access a restaurant with an

ECV,” “denied [her] Club Level access,” “designated [her] a . . . problem guest,” and
through the trespass, removed her and banned her from all of Defendant’s properties.
(Dkt. 37 at 18.)
As indicated above, evidence supports each of Plaintiff’s assertions as to
Defendant’s actions. (See, e.g., Dkt. 33-1 at 39; Dkt. 38-1 ¶¶ 8–11, 15–25, 27–28, 30–

33, 35–40; Dkt. 38-4 at 1; Dkt. 38-6 at 1; Dkt. 38-8 at 1; Dkt. 38-9 at 1; Dkt. 38-11 at
13–14.) The court cannot conclude as a matter of law that Defendant’s conduct fails
to meet the requisite level of severity or pervasiveness, as the conduct—at least
collectively—could “caus[e] a protected person to abandon the exercise of his or her
ADA rights.” See Mosley, 2022 WL 843773, at *9; see also Brown v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co., 770 F. Supp. 3d 1355, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 2025) (denying summary
judgment on an ADA interference claim in the employment discrimination context
because “overly scrutiniz[ing the p]laintiff’s restroom break[s]” and “once follow[ing
her] to the restroom while timing her” could “constitute interference”); cf. Collins v.
DeKalb County, No. 1:24-cv-1252-LMM-CMS, 2026 WL 623676, at *21, 2026 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2454, at *48–49 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 7, 2026) (recommending denying
summary judgment in an employment discrimination case and explaining: “[T]here is

evidence giving rise to factual issues related to [the plaintiff’s] interference claim,
including, for example, whether [the d]efendant interfered with [his] ADA rights when
(1) [a supervisor] publicly scolded [him] for not returning to the office five days a week
while [his] accommodation request was pending and told [him] that he was required
to return to the office because the [chief executive officer] had ordered everyone to

return to work in person and (2) [the d]efendant put [the plaintiff] in the tricky position
of having to provide either proof of his medical restrictions to continue to pursue his
ADA accommodation request or a release from a doctor clearing him to return to work
full duty without any restrictions. Upon consideration, a reasonable jury might find
that such conduct could cause a reasonable person to abandon his ADA rights.”

(cleaned up)), report and recommendation adopted by 2026 WL 623676, at *5, 2026 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 44955, at *14–15 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 27, 2026).
Further, given the evidence of pretext in the record, (see, e.g., Dkt. 38-1 ¶¶ 4, 29,
38–40; Dkt. 38-8 at 1; Dkt. 38-9 at 1), a reasonable factfinder could regard Defendant’s
actions as part of a strategy to get Plaintiff to leave Defendant’s properties and could

deem the strategy to be motivated by Defendant’s desire to avoid further
accommodating Plaintiff’s disabilities. The extent to which Defendant complied with
the ADA with respect to Plaintiff’s requests for accommodation remains to be
determined, as does the issue of whether Defendant used a pretext to justify
discriminating against Plaintiff in violation of the ADA, including by banning her from
its properties based on her disabilities. For the above reasons, Defendant is not entitled
to summary judgment as to count two.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 33) is
DENIED.
ORDERED in Orlando, Florida, on March 30, 2026.

JUFIE S. SNEED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record

-19-

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11364323. Public record. Not legal advice.