# Falu

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · May 29, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11363768

## Case

- **Full name:** Zenaida Falu v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** May 29, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ZENAIDA FALU, : NO. 4:25-CV-01550
Plaintiff, :
: (MUNLEY, D.J.)
v. :
: (CAMONI, M.J.)
FRANK BISIGNANO, :
Commissioner of Social Security, :
Defendant. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Zenaida Falu brought this action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security denying her claim for disability benefits
under Title II of the Social Security Act. See Transcript, doc. 7-3 at 7.
Falu argues that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred in
assessing her residual functional capacity (RFC) by failing to develop the
record and improperly assessing her pain symptoms. See Pl.’s Br., doc. 12
at 8, 13. Because the ALJ’s determination is supported by substantial
evidence, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court affirm
the decision of the Commissioner.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On February 6, 2020, Falu applied for disability insurance benefits
under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging disability as of August
31, 2013. Doc. 7-3 at 2. Following an initial denial, Falu exhausted the
administrative appeals and filed a prior civil action in this Court. See
Falu v. Kijakazi, No. 21-2061, doc. 1. The Court issued an order to

remand the case for further proceedings. See doc. 7-13 at 52; id. at 48-49
(explaining that the ALJ discounted all medical opinions and relied upon
his own lay interpretation).

After remand, the ALJ conducted a new hearing and determined
that Falu is not disabled. Doc. 7-12 at 20, 29. Falu filed a request for
review of the ALJ’s decision, which the Appeals Council denied. Id. at 2.

The ALJ’s decision, therefore, became the final decision of the
Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pending before this Court is Falu’s
action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision. Complaint,

doc. 1. This case is fully briefed (docs. 12-14) and ripe for resolution.
B. The Disability Determination Process

To determine whether a claimant is disabled under the Social
Security Act, an ALJ applies a “five-step sequential evaluation process.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ assesses whether the claimant:
1. has engaged in substantial gainful activity since the
onset of the alleged disability;
2. had a severe medically determinable impairment;
3. suffered from an impairment listed in the regulations as
presumptively disabling;
4. could return to his past work; and
5. could perform other available work in the national
economy.

See § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v).

Between steps three and four, the ALJ also determines whether the
claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC) allows the claimant to
continue his previous employment. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). RFC “is the most
[a claimant] can still do despite” impairments. § 404.1545(a)(1). The
claimant bears the burden of persuasion through step four, while at step

five, the burden shifts to the Secretary to show that the claimant can
perform substantial gainful employment other than the claimant’s past
relevant work. Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1181 (3d Cir. 1992),
citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).

C. Issues on Appeal

After following the five-step sequential analysis, the ALJ
determined that Falu “was not under a disability . . . at any time from
August 31, 2013, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2018, the
date last insured.” Doc. 7-12 at 20. Although the ALJ determined that

Falu has the medically determinable severe impairment of “degenerative
disc disease of the spine and a history of atrial septal defect,” the ALJ
assessed that Falu has the RFC to perform light work: “except the

claimant can lift 25 pounds occasionally and frequently with occasional
overhead with the dominant right upper extremity. The claimant can sit,
stand, and walk 6 hours each in an 8-hour workday.” Id. at 13 (step-two

analysis), 15 (RFC finding).
Falu raises two issues, arguing that the ALJ erred at the RFC stage
by: (1) failing to fully develop the record; and (2) making errors with

symptom evaluation. Doc. 12 at 8, 13. Adhering to the deferential
standard of review outlined below, the undersigned respectfully
recommends that the Court affirm the decision of the Commissioner.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
In reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision denying a claimant’s

application for benefits, the Court is limited to determining whether the
findings of the final decision-maker are supported by substantial
evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (incorporating 42

U.S.C. § 405(g) by reference); Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d
198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D.

Pa. 2012). Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court examines an
existing administrative record and asks whether it contains sufficient
evidence to support the agency’s factual determinations. Biestek v.

Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019). Substantial evidence does not mean a
large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Id. at 103; see also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565
(1988). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence
but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

(1971). A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ
ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by
the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). In an
adequately developed factual record, however, substantial evidence may
be “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of

drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent
[the ALJ’s decision] from being supported by substantial
evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “In

determining if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.” Leslie v.

Barnhart, 304 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). In reviewing the
record for substantial evidence, “[n]either the district court nor [the Third
Circuit] is empowered to weigh the evidence or substitute its conclusions

for those of the fact-finder.” Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182. To reverse the
ALJ’s findings and decision, the Court “must find that the evidence not
only supports [a contrary] conclusion but compels it.” Immigr. &

Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992).
The question before the Court, therefore, is not whether Falu is
disabled, but whether the Commissioner’s finding that Falu is not

disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based
upon a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No.
12-2417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been
held that an ALJ’s errors of law denote a lack of substantial
evidence.”); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F. Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa.

1981) (“The [Commissioner]’s determination as to the status of a claim
requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright
v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of

review on legal matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 536 (“[T]he
court has plenary review of all legal issues decided by the

Commissioner.”). In determining that question, the Court must evaluate
whether the ALJ’s decision meets the burden of articulation necessary to
enable judicial review; that is, the ALJ must articulate the reasons for

his decision beyond stating bare conclusions. Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000).
III. ANALYSIS

Falu argues two issues on appeal. She contends that the ALJ erred
at the RFC stage by: (1) failing to fully develop the record; and (2) making
errors with symptom evaluation. Doc. 12 at 8, 13. The undersigned

addresses each argument in turn.
A. The ALJ fully developed the record at the RFC stage.

The crux of Falu’s argument is that the ALJ found persuasive the
medical opinion of Dr. Tedesco, who did not review two relevant MRIs.
See id. at 10-11. And because Dr. Tedesco did not review these MRIs, the
ALJ improperly dismissed the MRIs when he concluded that they are “far

removed from the date last insured.” Id. at 12. The undersigned finds this
argument unpersuasive for two reasons.

First, the ALJ’s burden of articulation at the RFC stage is not high.
The ALJ “may consider many factors yet base a decision on just one or
two.” Zaborowski v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 115 F.4th 637, 639 (3d Cir.

2024). The ALJ need only explain the “dispositive reasons for their
decisions, not everything else that they considered.” Id. “[I]n most cases,
a sentence or short paragraph would probably suffice.” Cotter v. Harris,

650 F.2d 481, 482 (3d Cir. 1981). The ALJ here satisfied his burden of
articulation at the RFC stage by explaining his reasoning for finding Dr.
Tedesco’s opinion persuasive while affording less weight to the MRIs,

which fell outside the relevant period of disability. See doc. 7-12 at 17-18.
In finding Dr. Tedesco’s opinion persuasive, the ALJ properly
explained that Dr. Tedesco “had the benefit of reviewing the objective
records from the alleged onset date through the date last insured.” Id. at
18 (emphasis added). As for the two MRIs that Falu contends Dr. Tedesco

should have reviewed, the ALJ explained that they fell outside the
relevant disability period. Id. at 17.
For a claim of disability insurance benefits, as Falu applied for in

this case, it is the claimant who bears the burden of establishing
disability “between the onset date of disability and the date that her

insured status expired.” Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 612 (3d Cir.
2014); see 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.131. Evidence
generated after a claimant’s date last insured can relate to the conditions

during the insured period, but that evidence does not necessarily compel
the Commissioner to find that the claimant’s condition during the
insured period was as severe as it became after the date last insured. See

Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 614. “Further, a medical condition which begins
during a claimant’s insured period, but does not become disabling until
after its expiration, may not be the basis for qualification for disability

benefits under the Act.” Capoferri v. Harris, 501 F. Supp. 32, 36 (E.D. Pa.
1980), aff’d, 649 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1981).
Here, Falu had the burden of establishing her disability between
August 31, 2013, and December 31, 2018. See doc. 7-12 at 16. The ALJ

accurately noted that many of the records received since the hearing prior
to the Court’s remand order post-date the date last insured. Id. In fact,
the two MRIs that Falu argues should have been considered by Dr.

Tedesco was taken more than a year after the date last insured. See doc.
12 at 11 (noting cervical MRI taken February 2, 2020, and lumbar MRI

taken October 15, 2020). While the MRIs may relate to Falu’s conditions
prior to the date last insured, the Commissioner was not required to
make a disability finding based on these MRIs. See Pearson v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 839 F. App’x 684, 689 (giving minimal weight to evidence
generated after a claimant’s date last insured); see also Gillhooley v.
Kijakazi, No. 22-1581, 2023 WL 7170641, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2023),

citing Ortega v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 232 F. App’x 194, 197 (3d Cir. 2007)
(noting that evidence post-dating a claimant’s date last insured is less
relevant because a claimant must prove disability in the relevant time

period).
Second, Falu confusingly argues that “the ALJ failed to consider
that Dr. Tedesco did have have [sic] the opportunity to review pertinent
diagnostic studies.” Pl.’s Reply Br., doc. 14 at 3.1 And she further assumes
that the ALJ, who was not qualified, reviewed the MRIs to assess Falu’s

RFC, because the ALJ remarked that the MRIs were far removed from
the date last insured and could not be clinically correlated with Ms. Falu’s
relevant period. Id. at 4. But the ALJ did not enter a lay opinion to assess

the MRIs for their medical information.
Rather, the ALJ followed the regulation and observed that because

the MRIs fell outside the relevant disability period, he would not give
them significant weight in determining Falu’s disability. That was not
error, and Falu does not persuade otherwise. Instead, it appears she is

asking the Court to independently make a factual finding that those
MRIs relate significantly to the disability conditions during the relevant
period, and that the Court should remand for further consultative

examinations. See doc. 12 at 12-13. Under the deferential standard of

1 Dr. Tedesco’s evaluation reveals that he in fact received medical records
post-dating the date last insured and incorporated them into his RFC
finding. See doc. 7-3 at 10-11 (noting receipt of reconsideration evidence
dating 9/17/20, 9/8/20, and 5/15/20), 15-16 (RFC explanation). True, Dr.
Tedesco did not base his RFC findings on the MRIs that post-date the
date last insured. Still, Dr. Tedesco reviewed other reconsideration
evidence as far out as July 21, 2020, which noted that Falu’s physical
examination was “essentially normal.” Id. at 16.
review, the Court cannot make such a finding. Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182
(noting that the Court is not “empowered to weigh the evidence or

substitute its conclusions for those of the fact-finder.”).
Falu further argues that Dr. Tedesco, not the ALJ, should have
considered the two MRIs because “lumbar degeneration is not a sudden

illness but a slow, decades-long decline of spinal discs.” See doc. 14 at 4.
The ALJ, however, never denied Falu’s lumbar degeneration, and had

already found a severe degenerative disc disease of the spine at step two.
Doc. 7-12 at 13. Likewise, Dr. Tedesco considered Falu’s degenerative
disc diseases of both the cervical and lumbar spines to determine the

RFC. Doc. 7-3 at 15.
On the record before him, the ALJ correctly assessed the RFC based
on a thorough review of years of treatment records and Dr. Tedesco’s

medical opinion, which he found persuasive. Even accepting, as Falu
contends, that Dr. Tedesco’s opinion was based on an incomplete record,
the ALJ himself “did consider the complete record and determined that

it was consistent with [Dr. Tedesco’s] conclusion, and the ALJ, not
physicians or consultants, must make the ultimate disability
determinations.” Scouten v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 722 F. App’x 288, 290-91
(3d Cir. 2018), citing Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361
(3d Cir. 2011). Thus, the ALJ did not err in his RFC determination by

failing to further credit the MRIs that fell outside the relevant disability
period. See Manzo v. Sullivan, 784 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (D.N.J. 1991)
(“Evidence of an impairment which reached disabling severity after the

date last insured, or which was exacerbated after this date, cannot be the
basis for the determination of entitlement to a period of disability and

disability insurance benefits, even though the impairment itself may
have existed before plaintiff's insured status expired.”).
“If substantial evidence exists, [the Court] must affirm the ALJ’s

interpretation of the evidence even if [the Court] might have interpreted
the evidence differently in the first instance.” Balsavage v. Dir., Off. of
Workers’ Comp. Programs, 295 F. 3d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation

modified). The ALJ’s factual findings are supported by substantial
evidence, and so the undersigned recommends that the Court affirm the
decision of the Commissioner.

B. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s symptom
evaluation.

Falu next argues that the ALJ made multiple errors with symptom
evaluation that compel reversal. Doc. 12 at 13. Not so. The Court “defers
to the ALJ's assessment of credibility” provided that the ALJ “specifically
identif[ied] and explain[ed] what evidence he found not credible and why

he found it not credible.” Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 612-13. The ALJ here did
just that. He explained that Falu’s testimony concerning the severity of
her symptoms was not entirely credible because it conflicted with the

treatment notes, the medical opinion evidence, and her activities of daily
living. See doc. 7-12 at 17, 19.

The Court ordinarily defers to an ALJ's credibility determination
because he or she has the opportunity at a hearing to assess a witness’s
demeanor. Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 380 (3d Cir. 2003), citing

Atl. Limousine, Inc. v. NLRB, 243 F.3d 711, 718 (3d Cir. 2001). “The
credibility determinations of an administrative judge are virtually
unreviewable on appeal.” Hoyman v. Colvin, 606 F. App’x 678, 681 (3d

Cir. 2015), citing Bieber v. Dep't of the Army, 287 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed.
Cir. 2002). Here, the ALJ appropriately weighed the record evidence,
including Falu’s hearing testimony, and concluded that her statements

concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the
symptoms were less than fully persuasive “to the extent they are
inconsistent with the . . . [RFC].” Doc. 7-12 at 18.
Because the ALJ considered all the evidence and adequately
explained the decision for including or discounting certain limitations as

established by the evidence, the undersigned finds no error with the
decision. Under the deferential standard of review that applies to appeals
of Social Security disability determinations, the undersigned concludes

that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's evaluation of this case,
and recommends that the Court affirm the Commissioner’s decision.2

IV. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that:
1. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Falu’s
benefits under the Social Security Act be AFFIRMED; and

2. The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to CLOSE this case.

2 The undersigned has considered Falu’s remaining arguments as to the
ALJ’s errors in symptom evaluation and find them to be unavailing. See
doc. 14 at 5-9 (listing six ways the ALJ erred in evaluating Falu’s
symptoms). The undersigned flags one argument in particular because
Falu’s attorney mischaracterizes the record. Falu argues that the ALJ
erred in considering her “provid[ing] extensive care for [her] husband
during the period at issue,” because the ALJ “failed to enquire what this
care entailed[.]” Doc. 12 at 13-14. The hearing transcript says otherwise.
The ALJ specifically asked Falu at the oral hearing, “Your husband was
unwell, and you were providing care for him. What kind of care did you
do for him?” Doc. 7-12 at 35. Falu responded that she provided
medications, took him to the bathroom, made his bed, and tried to put
him in the bed. See id. at 36. Thus, the record clearly supports the ALJ’s
decision, which considered Falu’s role in taking care of her husband.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule
72.3:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed
findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter
described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation
for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition
within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof.
Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the
magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall
specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings,
recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis
for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local
Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination
of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion
or where required by law, and may consider the record developed
before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination
on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further
evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions.

Date: May 29, 2026 s/Sean A. Camoni
Sean A. Camoni
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11363768. Public record. Not legal advice.