# Vekaria

> District Court, M.D. Florida · March 25, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11363629

## Case

- **Full name:** Jignesh Purushottambhai Vekaria v. United States of America
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** March 25, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

JIGNESH PURUSHOTTAMBHAI VEKARIA

v. Case No. 8:23-cr-40-VMC-CPT
8:25-cv-867-VMC-CPT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

_______________________________/
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Jignesh
Purushottambhai Vekaria’s pro se construed 28 U.S.C. § 2255
Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (Civ. Doc.
## 1 & 1-1; Crim. Doc. ## 74 & 75), which was filed on February
6, 2025. The United States of America responded on May 16,
2025. (Civ. Doc. # 4). Mr. Vekaria filed a reply on June 13,
2025. (Civ. Doc. # 6). The Motion is denied.
I. Background
In July 2023, Mr. Vekaria pled guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to one count of conspiracy to commit money
laundering. (Crim. Doc. ## 31, 33, 36). During his plea
colloquy, the Magistrate Judge reviewed the plea agreement
with Mr. Vekaria, confirming that he understood the charge,
its elements, and possible punishments, and that he agreed
1
with the plea’s factual basis. (Crim. Doc. # 67 at 31-35, 43-
44, 49). Mr. Vekaria confirmed this and agreed that he had
sufficient time to review the case and the plea agreement
with his counsel, Jeffrey Brown. (Id. at 35, 43, 46). Mr.
Vekaria stated that he was freely and voluntarily pleading
guilty, without any threats or promises outside the plea
agreement having been made. (Id. at 15, 42-43).

Before sentencing, Mr. Brown made numerous objections to
the probation officer’s calculation of the guidelines in the
presentence investigation report on Mr. Vekaria’s behalf.
(Crim. Doc. # 51 at 22-25, 44-45). He also filed a sentencing
memorandum, reiterating Mr. Vekaria’s minor role in the
conspiracy and asking the Court to “appl[y] the same but not
additional specific offense enhancements than his Co-
Defendants.” (Crim. Doc. # 44). As relevant here, Mr. Vekaria,
through Mr. Brown, objected to (1) the two-level enhancement
under USSG § 2B1.1(b)(9)(A) for misrepresenting that he was
acting on behalf of a government agency and (2) the failure

to impose a two-level reduction to his offense level as a
minor participant under USSG § 3B1.2(b). (Crim. Doc. # 51 at
22-25).

2
In November 2023, the Court sentenced Mr. Vekaria to 51
months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release.
(Crim. Doc. ## 53-54). During the sentencing hearing, Mr.
Brown maintained the objection to the USSG § 2B1.1(b)(9)(A)
enhancement. (Crim. Doc. # 65 at 8-10). The Court overruled
this objection, finding it applicable relevant conduct even
though Mr. Vekaria had not personally represented himself as

a government agent and noting that the Court “did apply [this
enhancement] to the other person” sentenced. (Id. at 11-12).
Additionally, Mr. Brown argued that Mr. Vekaria should
receive a minor role reduction under USSG § 3B1.2(b): “When
you look at the conspiracy and what Mr. Shah and Mr. Patel
did – the vast amount of money; the knowledge that they had
that it was in India, the call center; and how all that
arranged itself – [Mr. Vekaria] was in this conspiracy for a
brief period of time in relation to the others. His monetary
proceeds were about $200 a day. So I – if we’re looking at
what everybody else did, I believe the minor role would be

applicable there.” (Id. at 10). The Court also overruled this
objection because Mr. Vekaria “was not among the minor
participants. He may not have been among the major
participants, but I don’t think his role deserves a reduction
3
based on him being substantially less responsible than the
other defendants involved.” (Id. at 15).
Mr. Vekaria appealed. (Crim. Doc. # 56). The Eleventh
Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence in November
2024. (Crim. Doc. # 72).
Subsequently, Mr. Vekaria filed two motions in his
criminal case in February 2025 that challenge his conviction

and sentence. (Crim. Doc. ## 74 & 75). The Court entered a
warning pursuant to Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375,
383 (2003), warning Mr. Vekaria that the Court intended to
construe the Motions as a single 2255 Motion. (Crim. Doc. #
79). The Court directed Mr. Vekaria to advise the Court
whether he sought to proceed on the claims in his construed
2255 Motion, amend his construed 2255 Motion, or withdraw his
Motion. (Id. at 2). The Court cautioned Mr. Vekaria that “if
he fails to file a timely response in compliance with this
order, which requires that he advise the Court that he wishes
to do one of the above, this cause shall proceed as an action

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, with the Court considering only those
claims in his original [Motions].” (Id. at 2-3).
Mr. Vekaria failed to respond to the Castro warning, so
the Court has construed his Motions as a single 2255 Motion
4
and opened this civil case. The United States responded to
the construed 2255 Motion (Civ. Doc. # 4), and Mr. Vekaria
replied. (Civ. Doc. # 6). The Motion is ripe for review.
II. Discussion
Mr. Vekaria raises claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. (Civ. Doc. ## 1 & 1-1). As stated in his 2255 Motion,
Mr. Vekaria faults his counsel for three alleged failures.

First, his counsel allegedly failed to advise him of the “fast
track” program under USSG § 5K3.1 that was in effect at the
time of sentencing. (Civ. Doc. # 1 at 1-2); see also USSG §
5K3.1 (“Upon motion of the Government, the court may depart
downward not more than 4 levels pursuant to an early
disposition program authorized by the Attorney General of the
United States and the United States Attorney for the district
in which the court resides.”). Second, he faults counsel for
failing to prevent the Court from imposing the USSG §
2B1.1(b)(9)(A) enhancement. (Civ. Doc. # 1 at 1-2; Civ. Doc.
# 1-1 at 1). Finally, he faults counsel for failing to procure
a minor-role reduction for Mr. Vekaria.1 (Civ. Doc. # 1 at 1-

2).

1 Mr. Vekaria’s reply (Civ. Doc. # 6) could be liberally
construed as asserting additional claims. For example, while
5
These claims have been timely raised and are cognizable.
(Civ. Doc. # 4 at 5-6). Mr. Vekaria bears the burden of proof
and persuasion on every aspect of his claims. Beeman v. United
States, 871 F.3d 1215, 1223-24 (11th Cir. 2017); Rivers v.
United States, 777 F.3d 1304, 1316 (11th Cir. 2015).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a petitioner must show that (1) his counsel’s

he argued in his Motion that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to advise him of the “fast track” program under USSG
§ 5K3.1, Mr. Vekaria changes his argument in the reply to
insist that counsel failed to “investigate whether the
government might consider a downward departure or variance
under USSG [§] 3553(a) for similarly situated non-citizen
defendants who receive harsher punishments due to immigration
consequences.” (Id. at 3). Another example: in his Motion,
Mr. Vekaria simply complains that counsel “did nothing to
stop the Court” from failing to apply the minor-role reduction
(Civ. Doc. # 1 at 1), but expands his claim in his reply to
insist that counsel performed ineffectively regarding the
minor-role reduction because he allegedly “lacked interest,”
communicated insufficiently with Mr. Vekaria in preparation
for his plea and sentencing, and failed to review every page
of discovery with Mr. Vekaria. (Civ. Doc. # 6 at 3-4). To the
extent the reply asserts additional claims, these claims are
waived. See McKiver v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 991 F.3d
1357, 1365 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[A]rguments raised for the first
time in a party’s reply brief are waived.”); Wallace v. United
States, No. 8:11-cr-287-SCB-MAP, 2014 WL 12605465, at *5
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 2014) (“Petitioner’s § 2255 motion did
not contend that appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to argue the Fourth Amendment issues, and this
ineffectiveness claim was raised for the first time in his
reply brief. . . . Arguments raised for the first time in a
reply brief are deemed waived.”).
6
performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance
prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984). To establish deficient performance, Mr.
Vekaria must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
“that particular and identified acts or omissions of counsel
‘were outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance.’” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1314

(11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). In other words, Mr.
Vekaria must show that “no competent counsel would have taken
the action that his counsel did take.” Id. at 1315. In
deciding whether an attorney’s performance was deficient,
courts are “highly deferential” and “indulge [the] strong
presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable and
that counsel made all significant decisions in the exercise
of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 1314 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
To satisfy Strickland’s second prong — prejudice — Mr.
Vekaria must show that “there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “[I]f
7
a claim fails to satisfy the prejudice component, the Court
need not make a ruling on the performance component.” Ortiz
v. United States, No 8:15-cr-409-VMC-JSS, 2017 WL 6021645, at
*2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2017).
Here, Mr. Vekaria does not argue that his counsel was
ineffective regarding the decision to plead guilty.2 Rather,
Mr. Vekaria complains about counsel’s performance at

sentencing.
These claims fail because counsel was not ineffective.
First, as Mr. Vekaria acknowledges (Civ. Doc. # 6 at 3), “the
fast-track program is only available to an eligible defendant
charged under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 with illegally re-entry after
having been previously removed from the United States.” (Civ.
Doc. # 4 at 7). Because Mr. Vekaria was convicted of

2 To the extent the Motion could be liberally construed as
asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
regarding the decision to plead guilty, such a claim would
fail on the merits. Mr. Vekaria has not met the heavy burden
of showing that his sworn statements during his plea colloquy
were false. See Winthrop-Redin v. United States, 767 F.3d
1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[B]ecause Winthrop–Redin made
statements under oath at a plea colloquy, ‘he bears a heavy
burden to show his statements were false.’” (citation
omitted)). Mr. Vekaria’s sworn statements establish that he
knowingly and voluntarily entered the guilty plea after
having ample time to discuss the case and the plea agreement
with Mr. Brown and without any threats or promises being made.
(Crim. Doc. # 67).
8
conspiracy to commit money laundering, he was not eligible
for this program. Thus, Mr. Vekaria’s counsel was not
ineffective for failing to discuss this program with Mr.
Vekaria or seek entry into this program. See Card v. Dugger,
911 F.2d 1494, 1520 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Counsel cannot be
labeled ineffective for failing to raise issues which have no
merit.”). And Mr. Vekaria has not established that he was

prejudiced by any such failure by counsel to explain a program
for which he was ineligible. See United States v. Winfield,
960 F.2d 970, 974 (11th Cir. 1992) (“[A] lawyer’s failure to
preserve a meritless issue plainly cannot prejudice a
client.”).
Even assuming the fast-track program could apply to a
defendant charged with conspiracy to commit money laundering,
Mr. Vekaria still has not established that he was prejudiced
by his counsel’s failure to discuss the program with him or
attempt to negotiate entry into the program with the United
States. The Court could only grant the four-level reduction

under USSG § 5K3.1 “[u]pon motion of the Government.” USSG §
5K3.1. But Mr. Vekaria has not met his burden of showing that
the United States would have been willing to move for such
reduction even if Mr. Vekaria’s counsel had sought it. See
9
Williams v. United States, 985 F.3d 813, 821 (11th Cir. 2021)
(“When a case turns on an issue of historical fact, the
available evidence, whether traffic footage or the legal
landscape of yesteryear, must satisfy the burden of proof on
the disputed issue. If the evidence is silent or in equipoise,
then the party with the burden fails.”).
Next, Mr. Vekaria complains that Mr. Brown should have

prevented the Court from imposing the USSG § 2B1.1(b)(9)(A)
enhancement. (Civ. Doc. # 1 at 1; Civ. Doc. # 6 at 1). Under
this guideline, “[i]f the offense involved . . . a
misrepresentation that the defendant was acting on behalf of
a charitable, educational, religious, or political
organization, or a government agency,” a two-level
enhancement applies. USSG § 2B1.1(b)(9)(A) (emphasis added).
According to Mr. Vekaria, “some of the alleged named
codefendants . . . did not receive[]” this enhancement (Civ.
Doc. # 1-1 at 1), although he never identifies them. Mr.
Vekaria faults Mr. Brown for not “present[ing] factual

evidence showing that the other co-defendants did not
receive[] the two-level enhancement under USSG §
2B1.1(b)(9)(A).” (Civ. Doc. # 6 at 1).

10
This argument fails. Mr. Brown was not ineffective
regarding the imposition of the USSG § 2B1.1(b)(9)(A)
enhancement. The plea agreement’s factual basis to which Mr.
Vekaria agreed states that the “overseas conspirators often
falsely and fraudulently identified themselves as federal law
enforcement officers, such as Social Security Administration
officials or Federal Bureau of Investigation agents.” (Crim.

Doc. # 31 at 18). Nevertheless, Mr. Brown objected to the
application of this enhancement, emphasizing that Mr. Vekaria
“made no such representations [personally] and [the
enhancement] should not be applied to [Mr. Vekaria] if none
of the other defendants received it.” (Crim. Doc. # 51 at
24). In his sentencing memorandum, Mr. Brown asked the Court
to “appl[y] the same but not additional specific offense
enhancements than his Co-Defendants,” expressing a concern
that Mr. Vekaria not face a sentencing disparity caused by
different application of enhancements. (Crim. Doc. # 44 at
3). Furthermore, at sentencing, Mr. Brown reiterated his

objection.
The Court overruled this objection because other members
of the conspiracy represented they were federal agents.
(Crim. Doc. # 65 at 11-12). That is, despite Mr. Brown’s
11
zealous advocacy, the Court determined that this enhancement
was appropriate under the evidence. The fact that the
objection was overruled does not establish that Mr. Brown
performed ineffectively in raising it. See Ward v. Hall, 592
F.3d 1144, 1164 (11th Cir. 2010) (“We have long held that the
fact that a particular defense was unsuccessful does not prove
ineffective assistance of counsel.”); Walker v. United

States, No. 2:11-cv-04-WKW, 2013 WL 1917381, at *3 (M.D. Ala.
May 8, 2013) (“[T]he court overruled the objection [at
sentencing], notwithstanding trial counsel’s vigorous
argument. The fact that Mr. Walker believes that his counsel
did not do enough to forestall the sentencing enhancement is
insufficient on this record to show that ‘counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.’” (citation omitted)). Even if Mr. Brown had
been ineffective, there was no prejudice because this Court
would have imposed the enhancement based upon the evidence
that other members of the conspiracy impersonated agents with

the FBI and Social Security Administration. (Crim. Doc. # 31
at 18; Crim. Doc. # 51 at 24-25); see Malara v. United States,
No. 8:21-cr-66-KKM-AAS, 2024 WL 4534184, at *7 (M.D. Fla.
Oct. 21, 2024) (finding no prejudice where a petitioner did
12
not “show a reasonable probability that the district court
would have sustained a relevant-conduct objection and imposed
a shorter sentence absent counsel’s allegedly deficient
performance”).
Third, counsel was not ineffective for failing to obtain
a minor-role reduction for Mr. Vekaria. Before and during
sentencing, Mr. Brown zealously argued that a minor-role

reduction should be awarded to Mr. Vekaria. (Crim. Doc. # 44;
Crim. Doc. # 51 at 22-23; Crim. Doc. # 65 at 10). Mr. Brown
highlighted exactly the facts that Mr. Vekaria faults him
with supposedly not presenting to the Court, including the
“comparative roles of co-defendants, [Mr.] Vekaria’s limited
duration and earnings, [Mr.] Vekaria’s lack of knowledge
regarding the conspiracy, [Mr.] Vekaria’s lack of managerial
authority and [Mr.] Vekaria’s subordinate, task-oriented
function as a driver only.” (Civ. Doc. # 6 at 3). Indeed, in
the sentencing memorandum, Mr. Brown wrote that Mr. Vekaria
worked as a driver and would “receive instructions from [an

organizer of the conspiracy] about picking up the runner
(Perez or Rivera), where to go, what the runner should tell
the bank tellers, and what to withdraw (stolen funds)” and
“where to take the stolen funds.” (Crim. Doc. # 44 at 2). The
13
sentencing memorandum noted that Mr. Vekaria was “paid
$200.00 per day” and only made seven driving trips over four
months despite the four-year length of the conspiracy. (Id.
at 2-3). The sentencing memorandum further emphasized that
“Mr. Vekaria had no decision-making authority and never
recruited anyone” and “was never involved in the call centers
or what they were doing or what they were saying.” (Id. at

3).
Despite counsel’s argument, the Court overruled this
objection, finding that Mr. Vekaria was not a minor
participant in the conspiracy even though there were also
participants with larger roles. (Crim. Doc. # 65 at 15).
Again, the overruling of Mr. Vekaria’s objection does not
establish that Mr. Brown was ineffective in seeking the minor-
role reduction on Mr. Vekaria’s behalf. See Walker, 2013 WL
1917381, at *3 (“[T]he court overruled the objection [at
sentencing], notwithstanding trial counsel’s vigorous
argument. The fact that Mr. Walker believes that his counsel

did not do enough to forestall the sentencing enhancement is
insufficient on this record to show that ‘counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.’” (citation omitted)). Mr. Vekaria also has
14
not shown prejudice because he cannot show a reasonable
probability that the Court would have sustained the minor-
role objection and imposed a shorter sentence absent
counsel’s allegedly deficient performance in arguing the
objection. See Malara, 2024 WL 4534184, at *7 (finding no
prejudice where a petitioner did not “show a reasonable
probability that the district court would have sustained a

relevant-conduct objection and imposed a shorter sentence
absent counsel’s allegedly deficient performance”).
Finally, Mr. Vekaria alludes in the title of his Motion
to “actual innocence,” although he does not develop such an
argument in the Motion. (Civ. Doc. # 1 at 1). The Court
emphasizes that “[a]ctual innocence is not itself a
substantive claim.” United States v. Montano, 398 F.3d 1276,
1284 (11th Cir. 2005). Rather, actual innocence is an
exception to procedural default or the statute of
limitations, but procedural default and the statute of
limitations are not issues here. Therefore, any freestanding

actual innocence claim Mr. Vekaria may be trying to assert
fails.
Even if a freestanding claim of actual innocence could
be asserted, such claim would fail. First, this claim, even
15
as elaborated on in the reply (Civ. Doc. # 6 at 1-2), is
conclusory such that relief cannot be granted. See Tejada v.
Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that
conclusory statements, unsupported by specific facts or the
record, are insufficient to demonstrate entitlement to habeas
relief). Second, Mr. Vekaria primarily argues that he is
“actually innocent of . . . [the] sentencing enhancement under

USSG § 2B1.1(b)(9)(A),” but does not argue that he is actually
innocent of the offense of conspiracy to commit money
laundering. (Civ. Doc. # 6 at 1). Third, Mr. Vekaria’s claim
of actual innocence is undermined by his under-oath
statements at his change of plea hearing. Again, he admitted
the truth of the factual basis for his plea during his plea
colloquy. (Crim. Doc. # 67 at 31-35). And Mr. Vekaria has not
met the heavy burden of showing that his statements during
his plea colloquy were false. See Winthrop-Redin v. United
States, 767 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[B]ecause
Winthrop–Redin made statements under oath at a plea colloquy,

‘he bears a heavy burden to show his statements were false.’”
(citation omitted)). Therefore, such a claim of actual
innocence would alternatively fail on the merits.
The Motion is denied.
16
III. Evidentiary Hearing
As the Court readily determined that Mr. Vekaria’s
Motion lacks merit, no evidentiary hearing is required. See
28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (stating that an evidentiary hearing is
not necessary if “the motion and the files and records of the
case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no
relief”); see also Hernandez v. United States, 778 F.3d 1230,

1232-33 (11th Cir. 2015) (“To establish that he is entitled
to an evidentiary hearing, Hernandez had to allege facts that
would prove that his counsel performed deficiently and that
he was prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance.”).
IV. Certificate of Appealability and Leave to Appeal In
Forma Pauperis Denied
The Court declines to issue a certificate of
appealability because Mr. Vekaria has failed to make a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right
as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor will the Court
authorize Mr. Vekaria to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis
because such an appeal would not be taken in good faith. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). Mr. Vekaria shall be required to pay
the full amount of the appellate filing fee pursuant to
Section 1915(b)(1) and (2).

17
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1) Jignesh Purushottambhai Vekaria’s pro se construed 28
U.S.C. § 2255 Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct
Sentence (Civ. Doc. ## 1 & 1-1; Crim. Doc. ## 74 & 75)
is DENIED.
(2) The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the
United States of America and against Mr. Vekaria and,
thereafter, to close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
25th day of March, 2026.

VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ*COVINGTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

18

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11363629. Public record. Not legal advice.