# Young

> District Court, E.D. New York · June 9, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11363378

## Case

- **Full name:** Jamie E. Young v. Mark Lugo, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** June 9, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
‑‑‑‑‑‑‑-----------------‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑X
JAMIE E. YOUNG,

Plaintiff, ORDER
18-CV-4216 (JS)(JMW)

‑against‑

MARK LUGO, et al.

Defendants.
‑‑‑‑‑‑‑-----------------‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑X

APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff Frederick K. Brewington, Esq.
Jamie Young: Albert Darnell Manuel, III, Esq.
Cobia Malik Powell, Esq.
Law Offices of Frederick K. Brewington
556 Peninsula Boulevard
Hempstead, New York 11550

For Defendant
Dr. Carl Goodman: Greg M. Mondelli, Esq.
Amy E. Bedell, Esq.
Carl A. Formicola, Esq.
Jessica D. Klotz, Esq.
Lewis Johs Avallone Aviles, LLP
1377 Motor Parkway, Suite 400
Islandia, New York 11749

SEYBERT, District Judge:

Pursuant to Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Defendant Dr. Carl Goodman (“Dr. Goodman”) objects to
several portions of the February 6, 2026 Report and Recommendation
issued by Magistrate Judge James M. Wicks. (“R&R”, ECF No. 243.)
Specifically, Dr. Goodman objects to the R&R’s recommendation that
this Court deny his Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”, ECF No.
220) on claims “for Fourth Amendment violations, assault and
battery, medical malpractice, and false imprisonment” made by
Plaintiff Jamie Young (“Plaintiff”) related to a sedation and
rectal examination of Plaintiff while in law enforcement custody
on December 14, 2017. (See Obj., ECF No. 247; Supp. Obj., ECF No.

250; Reply, ECF No. 252.) Judge Wicks reached this conclusion by
finding Dr. Goodman conducted the examination under color of state
law and is not entitled to qualified immunity. Although this Court
agrees with Judge Wicks’s state-action analysis and conclusion, it
finds Dr. Goodman is entitled to qualified immunity. (See
generally R&R.) Dr. Goodman’s objections are thus SUSTAINED in
part and OVERRULED in part, such that Dr. Goodman’s Motion is
GRANTED, as provided for below.

BACKGROUND
I. Undisputed Facts

The Court draws all undisputed facts from the Rule 56.1
materials submitted by Plaintiff and Dr. Goodman (collectively,
the “Parties”). (See Pl.’s 56.1 Response, ECF No. 221-16, attached
to Opp’n; Defs.’ 56.1 Response, ECF No. 222-1, attached to Reply.)
On December 14, 2017, Parole Officer and Defendant Mark Lugo
(“Lugo”) arrested Plaintiff pursuant to a warrant for allegedly
violating his parole by fraternizing with Shati Roy (“Roy”), a
known parolee. (Pl.’s 56.1 Response ¶¶ 1-2.) Plaintiff was serving
parole for several convictions from 1996, including for multiple
drug-related crimes. (Pl.’s 56.1 Response ¶ 6; Certificate of
Incarceration, ECF No. 220-44, attached to Motion.) Plaintiff has
a history of cocaine abuse and has spent time in drug
rehabilitation, which is reflected in his medical records. (Pl.’s

56.1 Response ¶¶ 8, 52; Brookhaven Hospital Medical Records, ECF
No. 220-36, attached to Motion.) Lugo testified that, at the scene
of the arrest, Roy was searched and found to be in possession of
crack cocaine in his body. (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.)
After he was arrested and taken into custody, Lugo and
Parole Officer and Defendant Orrison McLean drove Plaintiff to the
Suffolk County Police Department’s Fifth Precinct. (Id. ¶ 5.)
During this car ride, Plaintiff became “fidgety in the back seat”

and allegedly “continued to move around.”1 (Id. ¶¶ 9, 11 (reciting
Lugo’s testimony).) After arriving at the Fifth Precinct, Lugo and
Parole Officer and Defendant Alberto Acevedo (“Acevedo”) asked
Plaintiff to bend down and squat after he had already removed his
clothes. (Id. ¶ 18.) During the search, Lugo observed something
in Plaintiff’s rectum resembling a “bubble.” (Id. ¶¶ 20-22.)

1 Plaintiff disputes that he put his hands in his pants during the
car ride, but does not dispute that he became “fidgety” or made
certain “movements” while in the car. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 11.)
Although Plaintiff maintained the “bubble” was a hemorrhoid, Lugo
believed it may have been a bag of drugs. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 26.)

After the search and at the direction of his supervisor,
Lugo transported Plaintiff to Brookhaven Memorial Hospital Medical
Center (“Brookhaven Hospital” or the “Hospital”), accompanied by
Parole Officer and Defendant Alonzo Payton (“Payton”). (Id. ¶¶ 28,
32.) Upon arriving in front of Brookhaven Hospital, Plaintiff
exhibited several instances of erratic and non-compliant behavior,
including: refusing requests from Lugo and Payton to exit the
vehicle (Id. ¶ 37); physically resisting attempts from Lugo and
Payton to pull him from the vehicle, including by kicking Lugo
(Id. ¶¶ 38-41); and screaming that he did not want to be there
(Id. ¶ 47). Plaintiff remained in law enforcement custody
throughout his time at Brookhaven Hospital. (Id. ¶ 43.) Once

Plaintiff entered the building, he continued yelling that he did
not want to be there and refused to check in during the intake
process. (Id. ¶ 47; Defs.’ 56.1 Response ¶ 4.)
As part of the intake process, Nurse Henry Hernandez
(“Hernandez”) created a triage note (the “Triage Note”) explaining
Plaintiff’s medical history, which included “hypertension, back
pain, Cocaine/dope abuse, and that he had undergone back surgery
with screws and plates, facial reconstruction, and left leg
surgery.”2 (Pl.’s 56.1 Response ¶ 52; see also Defs.’ 56.1 Response
¶ 13.) The Triage Note’s information on past cocaine abuse was
ultimately included in Dr. Goodman’s medical record. (Pl.’s 56.1
Response ¶ 88.) Following the intake, Plaintiff was taken into a
room in “Trauma 1” via a wheelchair, where he remained agitated
and refused treatment “at the top of his lungs.” (Id. ¶¶ 62-63

(citing Pl.’s Dep. Tr., ECF No. 220-11, attached to Motion).)
Dr. Goodman, an attending emergency physician at
Brookhaven Hospital, first observed Plaintiff being brought into
Trauma 1 accompanied by several uniformed and plain-clothes
officers with “a fair amount of commotion.” (Id. ¶¶ 58, 73 (citing
Goodman Dep. Tr., ECF No. 220-23, attached to Motion).) Later that
night, Plaintiff told Dr. Goodman he denied swallowing drugs or
putting anything in his rectum. (Id. ¶ 95.) On the other hand,

the officers told Dr. Goodman they believed Plaintiff had “a rectal
foreign body, possibly contraband.” (Id. ¶¶ 84-85.) It is
undisputed law enforcement provided the basis for Dr. Goodman’s
belief that Plaintiff may have had contraband in his rectum.3 (Id.
¶ 108.) Dr. Goodman testified, and Plaintiff also emphasizes in
his 56.1 materials, that he was calm at times while his agitation

2 The Parties dispute whether the information on “cocaine/dope
abuse” came from law enforcement or auto-populated from a previous
Hospital visit. (Id. ¶ 90.)
3 All of Dr. Goodman’s interactions with Plaintiff were conducted
with law enforcement present. (Id. ¶ 82.)
was “waxing and waning” throughout the night. (Id. ¶ 80; Defs.’
56.1 Response ¶ 12.)

Before conducting an examination, Dr. Goodman consulted
via telephone with the Hospital’s legal counsel, Jessica Terranova
(“Terranova”). (Pl.’s 56.1 Response ¶ 115.) Dr. Goodman told
Terranova he did not know how to proceed because he had a patient
in law enforcement custody, refusing treatment, and acting
agitated. (Id. ¶¶ 119-20.) Terranova asked Dr. Goodman whether
Plaintiff had capacity or was consenting; Dr. Goodman told her
Plaintiff did not consent. (Id. ¶ 124.) She then instructed Dr.
Goodman to have an informed consent discussion with Plaintiff and
to document the discussion in the chart. (Id. ¶ 125.) Terranova
further told Dr. Goodman “not to do the search of the patient at
the request of law enforcement, but to do whatever Dr. Goodman

felt within his professional medical judgment was necessary for
the care and treatment of the patient.” (Id. ¶¶ 126-27.) Dr.
Goodman never discussed any of his treatment plans with Terranova,
including sedation methods. (Id. ¶¶ 124-27.)
After the call with Terranova, Plaintiff was
subsequently transferred from a wheelchair to a gurney and
connected to a monitor and blood pressure cuff. (Id. ¶¶ 134, 140.)
Dr. Goodman then injected Plaintiff with ketamine to sedate him

while Lugo and Payton restrained Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 150, 155.)
Just prior to the injection, Plaintiff was still agitated. (Id.
¶ 150.) During the sedation, Plaintiff’s abdomen and pelvis were
x-rayed, and the results of the x-ray appeared to show no foreign
body. (Id. ¶ 166.) Despite knowing the x-ray appeared negative,
Dr. Goodman then externally examined Plaintiff’s rectum. (Id. ¶
168.) After this, he performed a manual rectal examination with a

lubricated and gloved index finger (the “Examination”). (Id. ¶¶
170-71.) The Examination revealed only hemorrhoids. (Id. ¶¶
175-76.) Plaintiff was discharged back into law enforcement
custody. (Id. ¶ 184.) There is no evidence Dr. Goodman performed
a psychological evaluation, or other diagnostic tests, before
conducting the sedation and Examination. (Defs.’ 56.1 Response ¶¶
10, 14.)
II. Disputed Facts

The Parties dispute whether Dr. Goodman’s actions
reflected his own medical judgment or were undertaken merely at
the behest of law enforcement. (Pl.’s 56.1 Response ¶ 129.) Other
purported interactions bearing on this point are also disputed.
For example, Plaintiff testified Dr. Goodman, Lugo, and Acevedo
had a pre-sedation “sidebar” conversation about 20-to-30 feet away
from him in the Hospital, which he could not hear; however, Dr.
Goodman testified he does not recall such a conversation. (Id. ¶¶

96–102.) Plaintiff states that, after the “sidebar,” Dr. Goodman
told him he would be “put to sleep,” to which Plaintiff responded,
“[d]on’t f***king touch me [ . . . ] I don’t want to be here,” and
continued to refuse examination. (Id. ¶¶ 105–06.) The Parties also
dispute the extent to which less invasive examination options,
short of ketamine administration and a rectal examination, were
available. (Id. ¶¶ 44, 94; Defs.’ 56.1 Response ¶ 22.)

Several other facts remain in dispute. For example,
during the car ride to the Fifth Precinct, the Parties disagree
about whether Lugo observed Plaintiff put his hands down the back
of his pants (Id. ¶ 10) or repeatedly bang his head against the
car window (Id. ¶ 36). Further, the Parties dispute whether the
information regarding Plaintiff’s alleged head-banging played a
role in Dr. Goodman’s subsequent decisions. (Id. ¶¶ 78, 83, 86.)
Although the Parties generally agree Plaintiff screamed throughout

his time at the Hospital with intermittent calm periods, they
disagree on some specifics: Dr. Goodman said Plaintiff’s agitation
made it difficult to communicate with him, while Plaintiff asserts
Dr. Goodman never attempted to interview him. (Id. ¶ 79.) Although
Dr. Goodman testified he attempted to validate information “to the
extent possible,” Plaintiff faults the Doctor for failing to order
either a psychological evaluation or toxicology screening, and for
not informing Terranova that he planned to use ketamine. (Pl.’s
56.1 Response ¶¶ 92, 110.)
III. Relevant Procedural Background

A. Commencement of Action and Substantive Claims Against
Dr. Goodman

On January 25, 2018, Plaintiff commenced this action
against several Defendants, including Dr. Goodman. (See Compl.,
ECF No. 1.) On December 27, 2021, Plaintiff filed the operative
Second Amended Complaint. (“SAC,” ECF No. 151.) The SAC generally
alleges Dr. Goodman acted jointly with law enforcement to violate
Plaintiff’s Constitutional rights and commit several state-level
torts. (See generally SAC.) Specifically, the SAC alleges Dr.
Goodman violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights by conducting
an unreasonable, warrantless, nonconsensual body cavity search and
using excessive force by sedating and restraining Plaintiff, and
further violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting
him to cruel and unusual punishment. (Id. ¶¶ 39-59; 78–84.)
Plaintiff also asserts state-law claims for assault, battery,
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress,
negligence, medical malpractice, and false imprisonment.4 (Id. ¶¶
92–126.)

4 The Constitutional claims are made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff also asserted claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, fabrication of evidence, and violation of substantive due
process rights, which have been voluntarily withdrawn against Dr.
Goodman. (R&R at 21-23, 25.)
B. Dr. Goodman’s Motion & Plaintiff’s Opposition

On February 29, 2024, Dr. Goodman served his motion for
summary judgment, advancing two principal arguments against the
constitutional claims in his Support Memo. (See generally Support
Memo, ECF No. 220-48, attached to Motion.) First, Dr. Goodman
contends that, as a private physician employed by a private
hospital, his actions are not attributable to the State and reflect
only his own medical judgment. (Support Memo at 4–10.) Second,
even assuming state action, Dr. Goodman argues he is entitled to
qualified immunity because: (1) his conduct was reasonable under
the circumstances; and (2) no clearly established authority would
place a reasonable physician on notice that his conduct was
unconstitutional. (Id. at 14-23.) Should the Court dismiss the
federal claims, Dr. Goodman contends it should also decline

supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. (Id. at 33.)
On March 29, 2024, Plaintiff served his Opposition,
arguing several factual disputes render summary judgment
inappropriate. (See generally Opp’n.) Plaintiff contends Dr.
Goodman’s conduct is fairly attributable to the State because it
was undertaken at the behest of, and in coordination with, law
enforcement to further law enforcement objectives. (Opp’n at
7-12.) Moreover, Plaintiff contends qualified immunity is

inapplicable because clearly-established precedent bars invasive
body cavity searches conducted without consent, a warrant, or
adequate justification, and because Dr. Goodman’s conduct was not
reasonable. (Id. at 14–17.) Plaintiff also maintains the state-law
claims should independently survive summary judgment. (See Id. at
22.)

C. Judge Wicks’s R&R

On April 4, 2025, this Court referred the Motion to Judge
Wicks for a Report and Recommendation, which was returned on
February 7, 2026. (See generally R&R.) The R&R recommends granting
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims for malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, fabrication of evidence, cruel and unusual
punishment, substantive due process, intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress, and negligence, while denying
summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claims and state-law
claims for assault and battery, medical malpractice, and false
imprisonment. (Id. at 44-45.) With respect to state action, Judge
Wicks recommends the Court find Dr. Goodman acted under color of
state law, as law enforcement officers initiated the investigation
into Plaintiff, supplied the information underlying the
Examination, and performed investigative activities typically
attributable to police at law enforcement’s request. (R&R at 14-
15.)
Judge Wicks further recommends against granting summary
judgment on qualified immunity, contending factual disputes exist
as to the necessity, purpose, and manner of the Examination,
including: whether Dr. Goodman possessed reasonable suspicion to
conduct the Examination; why the Examination proceeded despite the
negative x-ray; whether less invasive methods existed; why Dr.

Goodman did not inform Terranova of his intent to administer
ketamine before the Examination; and the extent to which the
Examination reflected Dr. Goodman’s medical judgment. (Id. at 16-
21.) As to probable cause, the R&R noted some of the information
law enforcement relayed to Dr. Goodman was disputed, including
whether Plaintiff banged his head on the car window and whether
officers observed Plaintiff reach into his pants in the police
vehicle. (Id. at 17-18.)

The R&R’s discussion regarding whether any precedent
clearly established Dr. Goodman’s conduct as illegal is much
briefer. Relying on Sloley v. VanBramer, 945 F.3d 30, 38 (2d Cir.
2019) and Sanchez v. Bonacchi, 799 F. App’x 60, 62 (2d Cir. 2020),
in a single sentence, the R&R explains that “the right to be free
from unreasonable body cavity searches without reasonable
suspicion has been clearly established under recent precedent from
this Circuit.” (Id. at 18.) However, shortly after the R&R issued,
the Supreme Court issued its decision in Zorn v. Linton, which
bears on the “clearly established” analysis and is addressed below.
146 S. Ct. 926 (2026).

D. Dr. Goodman’s Objections & Plaintiff’s Response

On March 20, 2026, Dr. Goodman filed his Objections to
the R&R, primarily objecting to Judge Wicks’s rulings on state
action and qualified immunity. (See generally Obj.) On April 7,
2026, at this Court’s directive, Dr. Goodman submitted a
Supplemental Objection addressing the applicability of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Zorn. (See generally Supp. Obj.) The
Supplemental Objection contends that, under Zorn, Dr. Goodman did
not violate clearly established law, as no relevant precedent had
the requisite “high degree of specificity” needed to clearly
proscribe Dr. Goodman’s conduct. (Supp. Obj. at 3-4 (citing Zorn,
146 S. Ct. at 931).)
On May 1, 2026, Plaintiff filed his Reply, asserting
Judge Wicks was correct on state action and qualified immunity.
(See generally Reply.) He further maintains Zorn does not alter
this conclusion, because existing precedent suffices to clearly

establish Dr. Goodman’s conduct as illegal, and because Zorn does
not require a case “directly on point.” (Id. at 10 (citing Zorn,
146 S. Ct. at 935 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting)).) Plaintiff also
argues remaining state-law claims and punitive damages issues are
properly reserved for trial. (Reply at 17–21.)
Discussion
I. Applicable Law, Generally

A. Reports and Recommendations

A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole
or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3).
A party objecting to an R&R “must lodge a specific objection to
some specific aspect of the R&R,” and “[w]hen a timely filed
objection raises and properly briefs arguments previously rejected
by the magistrate judge, the district judge must review those
arguments de novo.” Nambiar v. Cent. Orthopedic Grp., LLP, 158
F.4th 349, 361 (2d Cir. 2025). The Court need not review the
findings and conclusions to which no proper objection has been
made, and an objection “may not simply rest on the briefs
considered by the magistrate judge.” Id.; see also Thomas v. Arn,
474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985).
B. Summary Judgment

The Court shall grant summary judgment under Rule 56(a)
when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact is material for the purposes
of resolving a summary judgment motion “when it might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Adamson v. Miller,
808 F. App’x 14, 16 (2d Cir. 2020). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine’
if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. (quoting Jeffreys v. City
of N.Y., 426 F.3d. 549, 553 (2d Cir. 2005)).

“The movant bears the burden of ‘demonstrat[ing] the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.’” Nick’s Garage,
Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 875 F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 2017)
(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The
burden of persuasion may be satisfied by either: “(1) [ ]
submitting evidence that negates an essential element of the non-
moving party's claim, or (2) by demonstrating that the non-moving
party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element
of the non-moving party's claim.” Id. (further citation omitted).
Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party

must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts” and instead must offer “some hard
evidence showing that its version of the events is not wholly
fanciful.” Stein v. County of Nassau, 417 F. Supp. 3d 191, 197
(E.D.N.Y. 2019) (citations omitted).
“Summary judgment is inappropriate when the admissible
materials in the record make it arguable that the claim has merit.”
Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 545 (2d Cir. 2010)

(citations and quotation marks omitted). In reviewing the record,
the Court “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the
evidence” as such determinations are to be made by the jury, not
the judge. Id. (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)). Accordingly, where an issue as to a
material fact cannot be resolved without weighing the credibility
of a witness, summary judgment is improper. Id. at 545-46.

II. Defendant Was a State Actor
A. Applicable Law

“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege
the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Feingold
v. N.Y., 366 F.3d 138, 159 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). Courts generally apply three tests to
determine whether a private party may be treated as a state actor:
(1) the “compulsion” test, which asks whether the private party
acted pursuant to the State’s coercive power or control; (2) the
“joint action” or “close nexus” test, satisfied where the State
provides significant encouragement, the private party is a willful
participant in joint activity with the State, or the private
party’s functions are “entwined” with state policies; and (3) the
“public function” test, which considers whether the private entity

“has been delegated a public function by the State.” Rene v.
Mustafa, No. 16-CV-4072, 2024 WL 1332556, at *21 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
28, 2024) (quoting Sybalski v. Indep. Grp. Home Living Program,
Inc., 546 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 2008)).

State-action disputes often arise where public law
enforcement officers and private medical personnel interact. For
example, in Falls v. Pitt, a Southern District court determined a
private nurse acted under color of state law when she performed an
anal cavity search and x-ray at the direction of police officers,
who were searching for narcotics pursuant to a warrant. No.
16-CV-8863, 2021 WL 1164185, at *50-51 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2021).
The Court concluded that, although the nurse may have had a
competing medical interest in identifying contraband, she was
primarily performing a law-enforcement function. Id. at *50. By
contrast, in Williams v. City of N.Y., private hospital employees

were not deemed state actors where NYPD officers transported the
plaintiff to the hospital and relayed information to staff, who
then exercised independent medical judgment in determining
treatment. 2017 WL 4158903, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2017);
see also Fisk v. Letterman, 401 F. Supp. 2d 362, 376 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (“[c]ommunications between a private and a state actor,
without facts supporting a concerted effort or plan between the
parties, are insufficient to make the private party a state
actor”).
B. Application

This Court agrees with Judge Wicks’s state action
analysis and finds sound his application of Falls. (R&R at 13–14.)
As Judge Wicks explained:
So too here, based on the record before the
Court, Goodman would not have performed his
cavity search on Plaintiff had he not
discussed Plaintiff’s circumstances with law
enforcement prior. (See ECF No. 221-6, Goodman
Dep. Tr. at 149:22-25, 150:2-6 (Goodman
answering “yes” when asked if law enforcement
requested an examination for a foreign body);
68:7-19 (Goodman testifying that he obtained
Plaintiff’s medical history from law
enforcement before conducting the search)).
Notably, “[t]he police provided the basis for
Dr. Godman to think the Plaintiff had a
foreign body in his rectum.” (ECF No. 221-16
at ¶ 108; see also ECF No. 220- 23, Goodman
Dep. Tr. at 85:8-12 (establishing the “only
basis” of Goodman thinking Plaintiff had a
foreign body in his rectum was what the police
told him)). Further, in order for Plaintiff to
be “cleared for confinement,” law enforcement
needed to have the Hospital staff “check out”
the potential secretion inside of Plaintiff.
(See ECF No. 221-7, Lugo Dep. Tr. at
193:21-25, 194:2-18 (Parole Officer Lugo
testifying that he “asked the doctor” to check
out the concerns they had about the potential
for drugs inside Plaintiff, and “then the
doctor did the job they had do to”).
Similarly, to ensure Plaintiff’s “benefit and
safety,” Goodman needed to “validate the
information” presented by law enforcement by
performing the search he did. (See ECF No.
221- 16 at ¶¶ 110, 111.)
(R&R at 13-14.)
Dr. Goodman argues Falls is distinguishable because,
there, the nurse acted pursuant to a warrant, documented law
enforcement's directive in her notes, and told the plaintiff she
was authorized to search, while, here, Dr. Goodman purportedly
relied on independent medical judgment. (Obj. at 2-3 (citing
Falls, 2021 WL 1164185, at *50).) But viewing the

Examination-related facts in a manner most favorable to Plaintiff
—as we must have done at this stage—it is difficult to imagine the
Examination taking place without any input from law enforcement.
In addition to the dispute over whether Dr. Goodman used his own
judgment in ordering the Examination, there is no dispute that (1)
law enforcement supplied the information forming the basis for Dr.
Goodman’s suspicion of contraband, and (2) Dr. Goodman never
interacted with Plaintiff without law enforcement present. (See
Infra p. 5.) These undisputed facts establish the Doctor was a
willful participant in a joint activity with the officers, who are
state actors. This is sufficient to establish Dr. Goodman was

acting under color of State law. See Ciambriello v. County of
Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324 (2d Cir. 2002). Accordingly, the Court
OVERRULES Dr. Goodman’s objection on state action and ADOPTS Judge
Wicks’s recommendation on the same.
III. Defendant is Entitled to Qualified Immunity
A. Applicable Law

Qualified immunity shields state actors “performing
discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Where applicable, qualified immunity offers “ample protection to
all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.” Sacaza v. City of N.Y., 169 F.4th 363, 369 (2d Cir. 2026)
(quoting Dufort v. City of N.Y., 874 F.3d 338, 354 (2d Cir. 2017));
see also Torres v. Vill. of Sleepy Hollow, 379 F. Supp. 2d 478,
482 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)) (qualified immunity available to private
individuals acting under color of state law). “The issues on

qualified immunity are: (1) whether plaintiff has shown facts
making out violation of a constitutional right; (2) if so, whether
that right was ‘clearly established’; and (3) even if the right
was ‘clearly established’, whether it was ‘objectively
reasonable’” for the State actor to believe “the conduct at issue
was lawful.” Monroe v. Gould, 372 F. Supp. 3d 197, 204 (S.D.N.Y.
2019) (quoting Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 154
(2d Cir. 2013)). “Courts may use their discretion in deciding the
order in which to approach a qualified immunity analysis.” Sacaza,
169 F.4th at 370 (citing Coollick v. Hughes, 699 F.3d 211, 219-20
(2d Cir. 2012)). “To be entitled to qualified immunity at the
summary judgment stage of a case, a defendant must show that, even
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
the defendant’s actions did not violate clearly established law.”
Falls, 2021 WL 1164185, at *28 (citation omitted).

A right is clearly established only when it is
“sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have
understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Rivas-
Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (quoting Mullenix v.
Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). To find a right is clearly
established, courts ordinarily “need to identify a case where an
officer acting under similar circumstances was held to have
violated” the Constitution. Escondido v. Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 43
(2019) (further citation omitted); see also Zorn, 146 S. Ct. at

930 (citing Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S. at 5) (“[a] right is not
clearly established if existing precedent does not place the
constitutional question ‘beyond debate’”). “The relevant
precedent must define the right with a ‘high degree of
specificity,’ so that ‘every reasonable official would interpret
it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.’”
Zorn, 146 S. Ct. at 930 (citing District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583
U.S. 48, 63 (2018)). “Principles stated generally, such as that
‘an officer may not use unreasonable and excessive force,’ do not
suffice.” Id. (citing Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 105 (2021)).
Those acting under color of state law will receive qualified
immunity “unless they could have ‘read’ the relevant precedent
beforehand and ‘know[n]’ that it proscribed their specific
conduct.” Id. (citing City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan,
575 U.S. 600, 616 (2015)).

B. Application

In recommending denial of summary judgment, Judge Wicks
concluded “the right to be free from unreasonable body cavity
searches without reasonable suspicion has been clearly established
under recent precedent from this Circuit,” citing to Sloley and
Sanchez. (R&R at 18.) Neither decision, however, clearly
proscribes Dr. Goodman’s specific conduct or defines any purported
right against the Examination “beyond debate”.
In Sloley, two state troopers conducted a strip and
visual body cavity search of a plaintiff following his misdemeanor
arrest, which was prompted when a drug-sniffing dog showed interest
in his vehicle. 945 F.3d at 36. The Second Circuit denied summary
judgment because clearly established law required “a specific,

articulable factual basis supporting a reasonable suspicion to
believe the arrestee secreted evidence inside a body cavity,” and
factual disputes existed as to whether such suspicion was present.
Id. at 40 (citing People v. Hall, 10 N.Y.3d 303, 311 (2008)). The
Circuit emphasized that no undisputed facts suggested the
plaintiff was secreting drugs in his rectum, and no evidence
indicated he engaged in suspicious movements, fidgeting, or had a
history of rectally concealing drugs. Id. at 46.

In Sanchez, a post-trial ruling, the Second Circuit
applied Sloley and concluded a manual body cavity search undertaken
incident to arrest and without reasonable suspicion violated
clearly established law. 799 F. App’x. at 62. The Second
Circuit’s decision offered little factual discussion, but the
district court’s Sanchez opinion indicated the jury determined an
officer conducted a manual body cavity search while executing a
search warrant. See Sanchez v. Bonacchi, No. 5:14-CV-0452, 2018
WL 4275986, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2018), rev'd and remanded,
791 F. App’x 218 (2d Cir. 2019), opinion vacated and superseded,
799 F. App’x 60, and aff'd, 799 F. App’x 60 (2d Cir. 2020).5 The

Second Circuit determined this search was conducted without
reasonable suspicion. Sanchez, 799 F. App’x at 62.
The undisputed facts show Dr. Goodman faced
circumstances far different from those in Sloley and Sanchez. Even
viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, none of
the following high-level facts are disputed: Plaintiff arrived at
the Hospital behaving erratically, including by screaming “at the
top of his lungs”; medical records reflected a history of

5 The R&R did not cite to the district court’s Sanchez opinion.
Plaintiff’s “cocaine/dope abuse”; law enforcement officers
reported to Dr. Goodman their belief Plaintiff was rectally
concealing narcotics; and Plaintiff denied the assertions. (See
infra pp. 4-5.) This undisputed level of chaos, and allegations
pointing directly to Plaintiff’s rectum, are far different from
Sloley, where no facts pointed to the body cavity, and Sanchez,

which addressed a lack of reasonable basis to believe the detainee
was rectally concealing drugs. Sloley, 945 F.3d at 36; Sanchez,
799 F. App’x 60.
Moreover, neither Sloley nor Sanchez addressed a
scenario involving potential exigent medical circumstances in
addition to the law-enforcement interests. Even assuming the
Examination was conducted primarily for law-enforcement reasons,
the presence of supplemental medical considerations distinguishes

this case from precedent involving purely investigative searches:
here, there was the potential risk of a bag of drugs exploding,
which could have been fatal. Further creating distance from Sloley
and Sanchez is Dr. Goodman’s consultation with counsel before
beginning the Examination, which bolsters the reasonableness of
his conduct and demonstrates it was not clear to him, a reasonable
actor, that performing the Examination would violate Plaintiff’s
rights.
Nor does the previously-discussed Falls case clearly
establish Dr. Goodman’s conduct as illegal. Although Falls
concluded the defendant nurse was entitled to qualified immunity,
it declined to grant summary judgment due to a “he-said, she said”
factual dispute about whether the nurse used lubricant in the
search, and collected cases suggesting lubricant may be necessary

for a reasonable search. Falls, 2021 WL 1164185, at *53. No such
dispute exists here, as neither party disputes Dr. Goodman used
lubrication in his Examination. (Pl.’s 56.1 Response ¶ 179.)
Falls’s focus on lubricant also fails to render it an authority
Dr. Goodman “could have ‘read’ [ . . . ] beforehand and ‘know[n]’
that it proscribed [his] specific conduct,” including whether he
should have assessed other examination methods. Zorn, 146 S. Ct.
at 930 (citing Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63). Moreover, none of the
aforementioned precedents involve parolees, who “have severely
diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of their status
alone.” Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 (2006); see also

Rivera v. Madan, No. 10-CV-4136, 2013 WL 4860116, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 12, 2013) (“Courts must ‘examin[e] the totality of the
circumstances’ surrounding the search, which includes the
Plaintiff’s status as a parolee.”) (quoting United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112,118 (2001)).
In an attempt to show Dr. Goodman violated a clearly
established right, Plaintiff’s Reply cites several additional
cases beyond Sloley and Sanchez. These fare no better. For
example, Schmerber v. California is cited for the broad proposition
that “intrusions into the human body” must meet Fourth Amendment
standards of reasonableness. 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966). This is
far too amorphous a concept to define any right at issue with a
“high degree of specificity.” Zorn, 146 S. Ct. at 930 (citing

Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 105 (2021)) (“principles stated
generally” do not suffice to clearly establish a right). In any
event, Schmerber is not a qualified immunity case and did not
address body cavity searches.
The cases Plaintiff proffers that specifically involve
rectal searches are also distinguishable. Travis v. Village of
Dobbs Ferry, for example, involved a plaintiff who was subjected
to a strip search unsupported by any reasonable suspicion. 355 F.

Supp. 2d 740, 743-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Moreover, Travis addressed
extreme facts: Police spent two months monitoring the plaintiff,
who had no criminal record, for drug activity. Travis, 355 F.
Supp. 2d at 744. Police, who monitored the plaintiff based on an
uncorroborated tip, never observed her participate in drug
activity and did not find drugs in her car after she consented to
a search. Id. at 745-46. In her decision, Judge McMahon explained
the facts “of this particular case are as outrageous as any I have
seen. The behavior of the defendants was completely unreasonable.”
Id. at 754.
Similarly, Monroe v. Gould involved a plaintiff who,
after being arrested for misdemeanor drug and weapon charges, was
subjected to a body cavity search in a police station absent any
reasonable suspicion he “was concealing contraband inside his
body” and defendants did “not point to plaintiff’s physical
appearance, apparent discomfort, or any suspicious actions or

other articulable facts which might have suggested he was hiding
something inside his body.” 372 F. Supp. 3d 197, 204-05 (S.D.N.Y.
2019) (emphasis in original). Here, by contrast, Dr. Goodman was
informed Plaintiff might possess rectally-concealed narcotics
based on law enforcement’s own search, and independently observed
erratic conduct throughout the evening. (See infra pp. 4-5.)
Plaintiff’s reliance on Harris v. Miller, is likewise misplaced,
as it turned on a “violent and forceful” strip search of a female
inmate by male officers and focused its reasoning heavily on the
cross-gender nature of the search, which is not at issue here.6
818 F.3d 49, 60 (2d Cir. 2016).

6 Plaintiff also cites to United States v. Gonzalez, 111 F. Supp.
3d 416, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), a suppression case where a court
declined to find probable cause due to a non-credible witness. As
this Court may not make credibility judgments at this stage, this
precedent is also unavailing. In another case Plaintiff cites to,
Santiago v. City of Yonkers, No. 13-CV-1077, 2015 WL 6914799, at
*7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2015), a court declined to grant summary
judgment on a search-based claim due to a factual dispute about
whether an officer “inserted his fingers into plaintiff’s rectum
—in the context of either a sexual assault or a manual cavity.”
No such factual dispute is present here.
In short: Because the Supreme Court’s recent guidance in
Zorn requires far more than generalized Fourth Amendment
principles, and because Plaintiff identifies no precedent
proscribing the illegality of Dr. Goodman’s conduct with the
required “high degree of specificity,” the Court SUSTAINS Dr.
Goodman’s objection as to qualified immunity.

C. Remaining State Law Claims

Although federal courts have supplemental jurisdiction
over state law claims, “a district court ‘may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction’ if it ‘has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction.’” Kolari v. New York-
Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). District courts have wide latitude in
deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See Id.
at 122. Because there are no remaining claims for which this Court
has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims and
accordingly DECLINES TO ADOPT Judge Wicks’s R&R to the extent it
recommends exercising jurisdiction over the state-law claims.

IV. Unobjected Portions of the R&R

As Judge Wicks noted in the R&R, “failure to object
timely to a magistrate’s report operates as a waiver of any further
judicial review of the magistrate’s decision.” Caidor v. Onondaga
Cnty., 517 F.3d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 2008). The Court accordingly
ADOPTS the portions of Judge Wicks’s R&R that were not specifically
objected to.

Conclusion
For the stated reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Dr.
Goodman’s Objections are SUSTAINED in part and OVERRULED in part.
Accordingly:
I. The Court ADOPTS the Judge Wicks’s Report and
Recommendation to the extent it recommended granting
summary judgment as to the malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, fabrication of evidence, cruel and unusual
punishment, substantive due process, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, and negligence claims; and
II. The Court DECLINES TO ADOPT Judge Wicks’s Report and
Recommendation to the extent it recommends denying summary
judgment as to the Fourth Amendment, assault and battery,
medical malpractice, and false imprisonment claims.

Having adopted in part and rejected in part Judge Wicks’s
R&R, the Court rules in the following manner:
I. Because Dr. Goodman is entitled to qualified immunity, the
Court GRANTS his Motion for Summary Judgment as to the
remaining federal claims; and
II. Because there are no remaining federal claims, the Court
declines to take jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated: June 9, 2026
Central Islip, New York

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11363378. Public record. Not legal advice.