# Printus

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · June 23, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11363326

## Case

- **Full name:** Guerdison Printus v. Craig Lowe
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** June 23, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GUERDISON PRINTUS,
A# 241 860 959,
Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-ev-00952

v. (SAPORITO, J.)
CRAIG LOWE,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM
On April 14, 2026, the Court received and filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, signed and mailed by the

pro se petitioner on April 9, 2026. Doc. 1. In this petition, Guerdison
Printus, a native and citizen of Haiti, challenges the legality of his pre-
removal immigration detention without an individualized bond hearing.
At the time of filing, Printus was being held in the custody of United
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at Pike County
Correctional Facility, located in Pike County, Pennsylvania.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Printus presented himself at the Gateway to the Americas Port of
Entry in Laredo, Texas, on August 1, 2022, requesting asylum. Resp. Ex.

1, Doc. 7-2. Printus was paroled into the United States for one year
pending ordinary removal proceedings under Section 240 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Resp. Ex. 1.
At the time of his release into the United States, Printus was served with

a Notice to Appear, which has not been included in the record before us,
but which would have directed him to appear for a hearing before an
immigration judge on a specified date. Jd.
On or about May 10, 2028, Printus filed an application for
temporary protected status (“TPS”), which was granted in December
2028 by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), with an
expiration date of August 3, 2024. Jd. On or about August 26, 2024,
USCIS received an application to renew TPS, which remained pending

as of June 25, 2025. Ja.
On August 26, 2024, an immigration judge entered an in absentia
order of removal. Jd.1

i The record provides no additional information regarding this
removal order, any subsequent proceedings, or its current status. We note
that the respondent has expressly stated that Printus 1s being detained
under § 1225(b)(2)(A) pending removal proceedings, and the exhibits
submitted by the respondent indicate that Printus is currently in the
midst of ongoing removal proceedings before an immigration judge.
(continued on next page)

“ 9 -

On June 24, 2025, Printus was among four individuals
apprehended by the Lancaster City Police Department. Jd, The other
three individuals were charged with retail theft, but Printus was not. Jd.
A records check, however, revealed his immigration status and,
apparently, an outstanding civil warrant for his arrest as a removable
alien. Id, After being contacted by the local police, an ICE officer
encountered Printus at the Lancaster Bureau of Police and took him into
federal immigration custody. Jd. Printus was initially transported to a
local ICE office for processing,? then to Moshannon Valley Processing
Center, where he was held in civil immigration detention for several
months, and later to Pike County Correctional Facility, where he remains

Although this December 2024 order by an immigration judge is
referenced in the respondent's brief and the attached exhibits, the
respondent nowhere suggests that Printus is being detained post-
removal under § 12381.
2 We note that Printus has appeared before the undersigned in a
federal criminal proceeding arising out of this brief period of detention at
the local ICE office in York County, Pennsylvania. Printus was charged
with destruction of government property in excess of $1,000. Following a
jury trial, Printus was convicted and sentenced to time-served,
restitution, and one year of supervised release. He remains on supervised
release at this time, and the case is currently pending on appeal to the
Third Circuit. See United States v. Printus, No. 1:25-cr-00188 (M.D. Pa.
judgment entered Nov. 26, 2025), appeal filed, No. 25-3395 (8d Cir. Dec.
5, 2025).

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in civil immigration detention today. He has been denied any opportunity
to post bond or to be released on other conditions while his removal
proceedings are pending.
II. DISCUSSION
Since the United States began restricting
immigration into this country in the late 19th century,
it has distinguished between those noncitizens seeking
entry into the country and those already residing
within it. Noncitizens “stopped at the boundary line”
who have “gained no foothold in the United States” do
not enjoy the same constitutional protections afforded
to persons inside the United States. But once a
noncitizen enters the United States, “the legal
circumstance changes,” for the constitutional right to
due process applies to all “persons” within our nation’s
borders, “whether their presence here is lawful,
unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” This distinction
between noncitizens who have entered and reside in
the United States and those who have not yet entered
“runs throughout immigration law.”
Quijada Cordoba v. Knight, 809 F. Supp. 3d 1113 (D. Idaho 2025) (first
quoting Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925); and then quoting
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 698 (2001)) (citations omitted).
Consistent with this distinction, “[tlwo statutory sections govern
the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of removal: 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225 and 1226.” Lepe v. Andrews, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1111 (E.D. Cal.
Sept. 23, 2025), appeal filed, No. 25-7429 (9th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025). As

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concisely summarized by the Supreme Court: “U.S. immigration law
authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission
into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the
Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the
outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).” Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (emphasis added).
Under § 1225, “an alien who ‘arrives in the United States, or ‘is
present’ in this country but ‘has not been admitted,’ is treated as an
‘applicant for admission.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287 (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(a)(1)). Applicants for admission may be detained pending removal
under two separate provisions: § 1225(b)(1) and § 1225(b)(2).
Section 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens who (A) are arriving in the
United States, see § 1225(b)(1)(A)G) (the “arriving aliens provision”), or
have been physically present in the United States for less than two years
without being admitted or paroled, see § 1225(b)(1)(A)Gii) (the
“designation provision”),? and (8B) are inadmissible either for

3 This so-called “designation provision” further limits this group of
aliens subject to expedited removal proceedings to certain categories of
aliens expressly designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, see
§ 1225(b)(1)(a)Gi), but the current scope of that designation is “the full
(continued on next page)
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misrepresenting a material fact while attempting to gain admission to
the United States or for lacking proper immigration documentation. See
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A); see also § 1182(a)(6)(C) (inadmissibility based

on misrepresentation); § 1182(a)(7) (inadmissibility for lack of
documentation). For these aliens, § 1225(b)(1) provides for expedited
removal proceedings without further hearing or review, unless the alien

expresses a fear of persecution or an intent to apply for asylum, in which

case the alien is subject to mandatory detention pending a final
determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have
such a fear, until removal. See § 1225(b)(1)(B). See generally Make the
Rd. N.Y. v. Wolf 962 F.3d 612, 618-20 (D.C. Cir, 2020) (summarizing
expedited removal provisions); Rodriguez-Acurio v, Almodovar, 811 F.
Supp. 8d 274, 291-92 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (same); Coal for Humane

scope of statutory authority,’ and thus all aliens who have not been
admitted or paroled into the United States and who have not been
physically present in the United States continuously for the two-year
period prior to determination of inadmissibility are subject to expedited
removal under § 1225(b)(1). See Designating Aliens for Expedited
Removal, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025); see also Make the Rd. N.Y. v.
Wolf 962 F.3d 612, 619-20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (providing a historic overview
of groups designated under § 1225(b)(1){a)Gi)); Coal. for Humane
Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 62-64 (D.D.C. 2025) (same),
appeal filed, No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 20285).

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Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 59-64 (D.D.C, 2025) (same),
appeal filed, No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cix, Aug. 11, 2025).
Section 1225(b)(2) is a “broader . . . catchall provision” that applies
to other “applicants for admission” who are “seeking admission” to the
United States.4 See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287.
Under § 1225(b)(2), an applicant for admission is placed into ordinary
(not expedited) removal proceedings. See § 1225(b)(2)(A); see also id.
§ 1229a (describing ordinary removal proceedings before an immigration
judge). With limited exceptions, however, an alien is subject to mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(2) while removal proceedings remain pending.
See § 1225(b)(2)(A); see also § 1182(d)(5) (authorizing the Secretary of
Homeland Security to grant humanitarian parole to aliens awaiting
removal proceedings); § 1225(b)(2)(C) (providing that aliens arriving on
land from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States may be
returned to that foreign territory pending removal proceedings, rather
than be detained); Quijada Cordoba, 809 F. Supp. 3d at 1118 (“Section
1225(b) mandates detention without bond hearings, except for narrow

4 The statute expressly provides that § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to
those to whom § 1225(b)(1) applies, as well as other categories not
relevant here. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(B).

_7-

humanitarian parole.”).
Meanwhile, as noted above, § 1226 “authorizes the Government to
detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of
removal proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289, Such aliens who are
already present in the United States may be detained pending removal
under two separate provisions: § 1226(a) and § 1226(c).
Section 1226(a) prescribes a discretionary detention framework for
these aliens when subject to removal proceedings, providing that: “On a

warrant issued by the Attorney General,!5! an alien may be arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from
the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The statute further provides that
such an alien may be released on bond while removal proceedings remain
pending. Jd. § 1226(a)(2). The relevant implementing regulations provide
that a § 1226(a) detainee may be released on bond upon showing “that
such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the
alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F. §§ 236.1(c)(8),

5 "This statutory authority to issue immigration arrest warrants has
been delegated to a number of supervisory immigration officials listed in
the applicable regulations. See 8 C.FR. § 287.5(e)(2); see also id.
§§ 236.1(b), 1236.1(b).

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1236.1(c)(8). Immigration authorities® are tasked with an initial bond or
custody determination, see id. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8), after which the
alien may request an individualized bond hearing before an immigration
judge, see id. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(€)(1); see also § 1003.19 (setting out
procedures for the review of bond determinations by immigration judges).
See generally Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397 (2019) (If the alien is
detained, he may seek review of his detention by an officer at the
Department of Homeland Security and then by an immigration judge
(both exercising power delegated by the Secretary); and the alien may

secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that
he poses no flight risk and no danger to the community.”) (citations
omitted). An adverse bond determination by the immigration judge can
be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 236.1(d)(8), 1236.1(d)(3). See generally Borbot v. Warden Hudson Cnty.
Corr, Facility, 906 F.3d 274, 275 (3d Cir. 2018) (summarizing § 1226(a)
bond procedures).
Finally, “Section 1226(c)... carves out a statutory category of

6 The same supervisory immigration officials authorized to issue
arrest warrants. See 8 C.ER. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(¢)(8).

-Q-

aliens who may not be released under § 1226(a).” Jennings, 583 U.S. at

289. This subsection specifies certain criminal histories that require
mandatory detention of aliens who would otherwise be eligible for a bond
hearing under § 1226(a). □□□ □ U.S.C. § 1226(c). Such criminal aliens may
only be released under very narrow circumstances imvolving a
determination by the Attorney General that the alien’s release is

necessary for witness-protection purposes and the alien does not pose a
flight risk or a danger to the community. See id. § 1226(c)(4); see also
Jennings, 583 U.S, at 289.
The petitioner in this case, Guerdison Printus, has been detained
by immigration authorities without a bond determination pending
disposition of his ordinary, § 1229a removal proceedings.’ Liberally
construing his pro se petition, Printus argues that, because he was
detained within the interior of the United States, he is not properly

7 The parties appear to agree that the petitioner has been putatively
detained without an opportunity for a bond determination pursuant to
§ 1225(b)(2). The respondent has identified no other basis for his
detention. Moreover, the petitioner has not been placed in expedited
removal proceedings, as would be expected for a § 1225(b)(1) detainee, he
has no predicate criminal convictions that would require mandatory
detention under § 1226(c), and immigration officials have refused to give
him a bond hearing, as required under § 1226(a).

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subject to mandatory pre-removal-order detention under § 1225(b)(2).
Rather, he may only be properly detained under § 1226(a), which requires
that he be given an opportunity for an individualized bond hearing. In
addition to this statutory argument, the pro se petition may be liberally
construed to include an argument that Printus’s prolonged detention
without an opportunity to be considered for release on bond violates his
Fifth Amendment due process rights.8
The respondent, on the other hand, purports to have detained
Printus pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), which provides for mandatory
detention without the opportunity for release on bond. But, liberally
construed, the pro se petition contends that Printus could only be
properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and under that statute, he is
entitled to an individualized bond hearing.
“[Flor section 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply, several conditions must be
met—in particular, an ‘examining immigration officer’ must determine

8 Having found a statutory basis for relief, we do not reach any
constitutional issues raised by the petitioner as alternative grounds for
relief. See generally Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485
U.S. 489, 445 (1988) (“A fundamental and longstanding principle of
judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional
questions in advance of the necessity of defending them.”).

-l1-

that the individual is: (1) an ‘applicant for admission’; (2) ‘seeking
admission’; and (3) ‘not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted.” Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 214 (D. Mass. 2025)
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)), appeal dismissed, No. 25-1902 (1st Cir.
Dec. 23, 2025); see also Kashranov v. Jamison, No. 2'25-cv-05555, 2025
WL 3188399, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2025) (citing Martinez); Ramirez-
Montoya v. Rose, No. 3:25-CV-02411, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (M.D. Pa.
Dec. 22, 2025) (citing Martinez and Kashranov); Carrero Romero v. Lowe,
No. 4:26-CV-00009, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2026) (citing
Ramirez-Montoya). Significantly, “Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to

an alien who is both an applicant for admission and ‘seeking admission.”
Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6 (emphasis in original); see also
Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (citing Kashranov and
Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d 397, 406 (D.N.J. 2025)); Carrero
Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting Ramirez-Montoya).
Section 1225 defines an “applicant for admission” as “[aln alien
present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives
in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Meanwhile, the phrase
“seeking admission” is not defined in § 1225, and the courts of this circuit

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have construed the plain language of “seeking admission” to describe
“active and ongoing conduct—physically attempting to come into the
United States, typically at a border or a port of entry.” Kashranov, 2025
WL 38188399, at *6; see also Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4
(citing Kashranov); Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (citing
Ramirez-Montoya). “This reading preserves the distinction between
‘seeking admission’ and the separate term ‘applicant for admission,’
ensuring that each phrase carries independent meaning.” Kashranov,
2025 WL 31883899, at *6; see also Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045,
at *4 (quoting Kashranov); Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4
(quoting Ramirez-Montoya). It also comports with the Supreme Court's
finding in Jennings that Ҥ 1225(b) applies primarily to aliens seeking
entry into the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297; Ramrrez-
Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (quoting Jennings); Carrero Romero,
2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting Jennings and Ramirez-Montoya). “In

sum, a plain reading of § 1225(b) demonstrates that it applies to
individuals who are attempting to enter the United States, not those
already within the country.” Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4; see
also Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *7 (considering the statutory

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context of § 1225(b)(2) and concluding that this provision “contemplates
inspection and detention at or immediately following border crossing”).
By contrast, as the Supreme Court has previously recognized,
“§ 1226 applies to aliens already present in the United States.” Jennings,
583 U.S. at 303; see also Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting
Jennings). “Section 1226(a) creates a default rule for those aliens by
permitting—but not requiring—the Attorney General to issue warrants
for their arrest and detention pending removal proceedings,” and it
“permits the Attorney General to release those aliens on bond.” Jennings,
583 U.S. at 303; see also Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting
Jennings); Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 8709045, at *5 (“Unlike
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), § 1226(a) provides for bond or conditional parole.”) (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)). “[Ulnder Section 1226(a) and its implementing
regulations, lan alien discretionarily detained pending removal
proceedings] is entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge
at which the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that he poses a danger to the community|] or... that he is a flight risk,
if it seeks to continue detaining him.” Gomes v. Hyde, 804 F. Supp. 3d

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265, 277 (D. Mass. 2025);9 see also YZ. v. Soto, 812 F. Supp. 3d 459, 462-
63 (D.N.J. 2025) (“‘Noncitizens who are arrested after having lived in the
United States for a while do not generally have to be detained. They are
instead entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration court.” (citing
Gomes) (citations and footnote omitted)). See generally Carrero Romero,
2026 WL 296215, at *4 “[I]f an individual is detained attempting to enter
the country illegally or while otherwise presenting themselves for
inspection and entry, they are subject to mandatory detention pursuant
to § 1225. If they are arrested after having already entered the country,
they are subject to detention under § 1226 and are entitled to a bond

9 We note that, applying First Circuit precedent, the Gomes court
stated that the government may prove that an alien is a danger to the
community by clear and convincing evidence, or that he is a flight risk by
the lesser preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. See Gomes, 804 F.
Supp. 3d at 277 (citing Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F4th 19, 41 (st Cir.
2021)). The Third Circuit, however, has held that the government must
prove either dangerousness or flight risk by clear and convincing
evidence. See German Santos v. Warden, 965 F.3d 203, 213-14 (8d Cir.
2020) (“When the Government seeks to take more than just money from
a party, we typically hold the Government to a standard of proof higher
than a preponderance of the evidence.”); see also Gayle v. Warden
Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst., 12 F.4th 321, 333 n.9 (8d Cir, 2021) ([It is
a ‘settled rule that when a party stands to lose his liberty, even
temporarily, we hold the Government to a ‘clear and convincing evidence’
standard in the context of civil detention... .”) (quoting German Santos);
Luciano-Jimenez v. Doll, 547 F Supp. 3d 462, 465 (M.D. Pa. 2021)
(quoting German Santos).

15 -

hearing.”).
Here, § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2){A), applies to the detention of
Printus. We find that Printus is no longer seeking admission into the
United States—at the time of his arrest and detention, he was not
actively attempting to come into the United States at a border or port of
entry. Rather, he is already here, having resided within the United States
for an extended period of time. See Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *1
(finding that petitioner who lived in the United States for almost two

years was not “seeking admission” but “already here”); Ramirez-
Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *5 (citing Kashranov). Thus, Printus may
only be properly detained pursuant to § 1226(a), and therefore he is
entitled to a bond hearing. See Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *5.
See generally Patel v, O'Neill, No, 3:25-cv-2185, 2025 WL 3516865, at *4
(M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (‘The overwhelming majority of federal district
courts that have addressed this issue have interpreted the INA to find
that persons similarly situated to Petitioner—noncitizens who previously
entered the United States and are currently residing in the United
States—are not subject to the mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) but instead are subject to the discretionary detention

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pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and accordingly are entitled to a bond
hearing.”); id, at *4 & n.7 (collecting Third Circuit district court cases).1¢
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the petitioner is
currently detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2), and thus he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing.
Accordingly, the petition will be granted, and the government will be

10 Accord Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61, 78, 75 (2d Cir.
2026) (“Section 1226(a) plainly applies to noncitizens, like Petitioner, who
are present in the United States, but charged as inadmissible for entering
the country without inspection and admission. ... Section 1225(b)(2)(A)
applies to those noncitizens who present themselves at a port of entry for
admission, or who cross the physical border into the United States but
are apprehended at the ‘threshold of initial entry.”); Castarion-Nava v.
U.S. Dept of Homeland Sec., 175 F.4th 828, 856 (7th Cir, 2026) (“[T]he
text, statutory context, legislative history, and long-standing Executive
practice all confirm that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to ‘applicants for
admission’ who are seeking lawful entry at the border or ports of entry
and not to noncitizens unlawfully living in the country’s interior.”);
Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, 175 F.4th 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2026)
(“The text and statutory structure of the INA, bolstered by the long
history of detention across our immigration laws and the congressional
purpose in passing ITRIRA, yield the conclusion that no-bond detention
generally applies to arriving aliens seeking lawful entry to the country,
and not to aliens who are simply present here.”); Lopez-Campos Vv.
Raycratt, 175 F4Ath 718, 732 (6th Cir. 2026) (holding that noncitizens
without lawful status who had lived in the United States for years were
not “seeking admission” and thus were not subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s
mandatory detention scheme).

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ordered to provide the petitioner with an individualized bond hearing
within twenty-one days or to release him from custody.
An appropriate order follows.

Dated: June_23 _, 2026 isecgt bi Mbgynrr F
6 CEPA E key via “ig
United States District Judge

. 18 ”

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11363326. Public record. Not legal advice.