# KRASLEY

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · May 6, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11363219

## Case

- **Full name:** Michael Krasley, Ryan Krasley, Kevin Krasley, Anthony Iademarco and Rocco D’Alessandro v. Janine Darby and Montgomery County
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** May 6, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MICHAEL KRASLEY, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION
v. NO. 25-6758
COUNTY OF MONTGOMERY, et al.,
Defendants.
Pappert, J. May 6, 2026
MEMORANDUM
Michael Krasley, Ryan Krasley, Kevin Krasley, Anthony Iademarco and Rocco
D’Alessandro sued Janine Darby and Montgomery County under federal and state law
alleging Darby fired or constructively discharged them from their municipal jobs
because of their race. Darby and the County move to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint
for failure to state a claim. The Court grants their motion in part, denies it in part and
allows the plaintiffs to amend.
I
The plaintiffs—who are white—worked as “transporters” for the Montgomery

County Coroner’s Office. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3–4, 24, Dkt. No. 7.) Transporters carry
deceased individuals from where they died to the morgue. See (id. ¶¶ 9, 10). As lead
transporter, Michael Krasley supervised the other plaintiffs, (id. ¶ 4), making job
assignments “for the removal of bodies at crime scenes” and other places, (id. ¶ 9). He
also trained other transporters. (Id. ¶ 11.) None of the plaintiffs had ever received an
adverse review. See (id. ¶ 15).
In 2023, Dr. Janine Darby—who is black—was elected to serve as coroner for
Montgomery County. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 24.) Her campaign focused on diversity, equity and
inclusion. See (id. ¶ 12). She stressed that if elected she would be a “champion” for
Montgomery County residents “from historically and systematically marginalized

communities,” and she promised to “elevate those who have been marginalized.” (Id.)
She also said she would educate others about diversity. (Id.)
After she took office, Darby treated a black transporter, Augustus Davis,
differently than the plaintiffs. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 18, 20, 24.) Several people—coroner
investigators, police officers and family members of the deceased—had complained
about Davis’s attitude and his inability to cooperate with others. (Id. ¶ 21.) Darby,
however, did not discipline Davis and permitted him to report directly to her instead of
Michael Krasley, the lead transporter. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 25.) Davis also accused Ryan
Krasley and Kevin Krasley of being racist, leading Darby to threaten and chastise
them. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 26.) Ryan Krasley and Kevin Krasley later resigned. (Id. ¶ 29.)

In December of 2024, Darby fired Michael Krasley, Anthony Iademarco and
Rocco D’Alessandro “because of budgetary reasons, even though the Coroner’s budget
had been prepared and approved for the coming year months before.” (Id. ¶ 30.)
Immediately after firing these plaintiffs, Darby replaced them with a black owned and
operated body removal service. (Id. ¶ 32.) As a result, the Coroner’s Office faced
increased costs for transporting bodies. See (id. ¶ 33).
The plaintiffs sued Darby and the County under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) and the Pennsylvania Constitution. They allege
Darby fired or constructively discharged them because they are white in violation of
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and the
Pennsylvania Constitution.
II

The Court assesses the sufficiency of a pleading before discovery under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12. Rule 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint “must contain
. . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). And Rule 12(b)(6) permits a district court to dismiss a
complaint that fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Id. 12(b)(6).
Taken together, the two rules require a plaintiff to allege sufficient “facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007). The first step in determining whether a plaintiff has stated a plausible
claim is to “tak[e] note of the elements” underlying her claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 675 (2009); Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 129–30 (3d Cir.

2010). The second step is to examine the plaintiff’s complaint and determine whether
the factual allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679.
Plausibility requires the plaintiff to plead sufficient facts to allow “the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. at 678. The reasonableness of an inference depends on common sense and the
strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct. Connelly v. Lane
Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786–87 (3d Cir. 2016); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682. Plaintiffs do
not meet the plausibility burden when the facts alleged are “merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability” or show nothing “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). In gauging the
plausibility of a claim, the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual
allegations, construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw

reasonable inferences from them. Connelly, 809 F.3d at 786 n.2.
III
A
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “discharge” or “otherwise . . .
discriminate” against “any individual” “because of such individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1). The defendants argue the plaintiffs fail to allege facts to show they
complied with Title VII’s exhaustion requirement. Before a plaintiff may sue to enforce
Title VII, he must exhaust his “administrative remedies.” Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d
1018, 1020 (3d Cir. 1997). Title VII requires claimants to present their claims to the
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission so the agency may decide

whether to take legal action on their behalf. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Only after
the EEOC chooses not to act—or after 180 days pass—may the plaintiff proceed to
federal court. See id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). To pursue his claim in federal court, a plaintiff
must file his complaint within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC.
See id.
The plaintiffs do not meaningfully address the defendants’ exhaustion argument.
After they filed their original complaint, the defendants moved to dismiss on
exhaustion grounds. The plaintiffs immediately amended their complaint mooting the
defendants’ motion but again did not allege facts relating to exhaustion. And now the
plaintiffs state they “purposely do not argue defendants’ Title VII objection.” (Pls.’
Mem. of L. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 12, Dkt. No. 10-1.) The plaintiffs thus
concede the Title VII claims.
B

Section 1983 makes “liable” “[e]very person” who “under color of” state law
“subjects” another person “to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution” and federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (A person under § 1983
includes a municipality. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690
(1978).) Section 1983 contains no substantive rights. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
393–94 (1989). It merely provides a cause of action for vindicating rights found in the
United States Constitution or another federal law. See id. The plaintiffs argue Darby
and the County violated their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause1 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37–44); (id. at 10.)
1

“No state,” the Fourteenth Amendment says, “shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
An equal protection employment discrimination claim shares the same elements as a
Title VII claim. See Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 915 n.5 (3d Cir.
1983). Thus, the plaintiffs must show Darby fired or constructively discharged them
because of their race. See Starnes v. Butler Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 50th Jud. Dist.,
971 F.3d 416, 426 (3d Cir. 2020); Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d
Cir. 2006).

1 The plaintiffs also purport to argue the defendants violated their rights under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But they fail to articulate any due process theory.
The allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint permit the reasonable inference
Darby fired Michael Krasley, Anthony Iademarco and Rocco D’Alessandro because of
their race. Before Darby (a black woman) took over as Montgomery County’s coroner,
the plaintiffs (white men) worked for the office as transporters, and none of them had

ever been written up. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3–4, 12, 15, 24.) Darby focused her campaign on
diversity stressing she would be a champion for historically marginalized communities
and promising to elevate members of those communities. (Id. ¶ 12.) She also promised
to educate others about diversity. (Id.) Once she took office, Darby treated one black
transporter differently than the plaintiffs. (Id. ¶¶ 17–27.) For example, after
numerous individuals—including police officers and family members of the deceased—
complained about this employee’s work performance, Darby permitted him to report
directly to her, instead of Michael Krasley, the lead transporter. (Id.) Then Darby fired
Michael Krasley, Anthony Iademarco and Rocco D’Alessandro for budgetary reasons.
(Id. ¶ 30.) The plaintiffs allege Darby’s proffered reason for their firing was false

because the Coroner Office’s budget had already been approved. (Id.) And after she
fired the three plaintiffs, Darby replaced them with a black owned and operated body
transport service. (Id. ¶ 32.) As a result, the Coroner’s Office has faced increased costs
for transporting bodies. (Id. ¶ 33.) These allegations, taken as true, permit the
reasonable inference Darby fired Michael Krasley, Anthony Iademarco and Rocco
D’Alessandro because they are white. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,
514 (2002) (holding a plaintiff stated a plausible national-origin discrimination claim by
alleging, among other facts, the “nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons
involved with his termination”); Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 164 (3d Cir. 1999)
(holding a reasonable jury could find racial discrimination because a plaintiff showed,
among other things, his employer made statements demonstrating racial preferences in
employment before firing him); Shropshire v. Gallaway, 855 F. App’x 853, 855 (3d Cir.
2021) (per curiam) (holding a plaintiff stated a plausible claim for racial discrimination

by alleging, among other facts, his employer held members of another race to lower
performance standards); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148
(2000) (explaining evidence an employer’s stated reason for firing an employee is false
is probative of discrimination); McCarthy v. City of Cordele, 111 F.4th 1141, 1146–47
(11th Cir. 2024) (holding a white plaintiff stated a plausible claim for racial
discrimination by alleging, among other facts, his employer made statements
demonstrating a preference for black employees and then fired and replaced him with a
black employee).
Michael Krasley, Anthony Iademarco and Rocco D’Alessandro also state equal
protection claims against the County. Section 1983 does not allow plaintiffs to hold a

municipality automatically liable for the unlawful actions of its employees under a
theory of vicarious liability. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Plaintiffs can hold municipalities
liable “only for their own illegal acts.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011)
(citation omitted). When a municipal officer harms a private party, therefore, that
party must connect the officer’s conduct to a municipal policy or custom. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). A single employment
decision, such as termination, qualifies as a municipal policy if the decisionmaker
possessed final authority with respect to the action. Fletcher v. O’Donnell, 867 F.2d
791, 793 (3d Cir. 1989); see also McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 368 (3d Cir. 2005);
Porter v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 2020). The plaintiffs allege
Darby—the elected coroner—had final authority to fire individuals from the Coroner’s
Office because her employment decisions are unreviewable. (Am. Compl. ¶ 31); see, e.g.,
Misjuns v. City of Lynchburg, 139 F.4th 378, 385 (4th Cir. 2025). Thus, because they

allege sufficient facts to permit the inference Darby fired them because they are white,
Michael Krasley, Anthony Iademarco and Rocco D’Alessandro also state a claim against
the County.
Kevin Krasley’s and Ryan Krasley’s equal protection claims for constructive
discharge against Darby and the County are a different matter. To succeed, they must
allege Darby “knowingly permitted conditions of discrimination in employment so
intolerable that a reasonable person subject to them would resign.” Gross v. Exxon Off.
Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984). The plaintiffs allege Davis falsely accused
Kevin Krasley and Ryan Krasley of being racist, causing Darby to chastise and
threaten them and subject them to a hostile work environment. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26,

29.) Because of the hostile work environment, the plaintiffs allege, Kevin Krasley and
Ryan Krasley resigned. (Id. ¶ 29.) But these vague, conclusory allegations do not
suffice. Without additional facts, Kevin Krasley and Ryan Krasley fail to plausibly
allege Darby permitted conditions of discrimination so intolerable a reasonable person
subject to them would resign.
2
Section 1981 provides “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right in every State and Territory . . . to the full and equal benefit
of all laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981. This language prohibits a public employer from firing or
constructively discharging an employee because of his race. McCarthy, 111 F.4th at
1146; Fenter v. Mondelez Global, LLC, 574 F. App’x 213, 216–17 (3d Cir. 2014). The
“substantive elements” of an employment discrimination claim under § 1981 are
“identical to the elements of an employment discrimination claim under Title VII.”

Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 181–82 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Anderson v.
Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2010). Thus, the plaintiffs must
show Darby fired or constructively discharged them because of their race. See
Iadimarco, 190 F.3d at 163. Plaintiffs may bring a § 1981 claim against a municipality
under § 1983 in accordance with Monell. See Massey v. Borough of Bergenfield, 169
F.4th 188, 202 (3d Cir. 2026). As explained, Michael Krasley, Anthony Iademarco and
Rocco D’Alessandro state termination claims against Darby and the County, but Kevin
Krasley and Ryan Krasley fail to state constructive discharge claims against the
defendants.
C

The plaintiffs also purport to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and the
Pennsylvania Constitution. Section 1985(3) requires, among other things, a conspiracy
between two or more people. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). But the plaintiffs do not allege facts
to permit the inference Darby conspired with any other person.
The plaintiffs also fail to state a claim under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
They do not cite any specific constitutional provision, leaving the Court unable to assess
whether they have made a “showing” they are “entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). Moreover, the plaintiffs cannot seek damages for violations of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. Pocono Mountain Charter Sch. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 442 F.
App’x 681, 687 (3d Cir. 2011) (“No Pennsylvania statute establishes, and no
Pennsylvania court has recognized, a private cause of action for damages under the
Pennsylvania Constitution.”); Rega v. U.P.M.C. Cmty. Health Choices, No. 194 WDA
2022, 2023 WL 4116006, at *6 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 22, 2023) (“[T]here is no recognized

private cause of action for monetary damages for alleged violations of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.”).
IV
Finally, the defendants ask the Court to strike the plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive
damages against the County. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) permits a court to
“strike from a pleading” any “immaterial” or “impertinent” “matter.” A matter is
immaterial if it has “no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief.”
Conklin v. Anthou, 10-CV-02501, 2011 WL 1303299, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 2011). And
a matter is impertinent if it does not “pertain,” or is “not necessary,” to the claims for
relief. Id. Because § 1983 does not permit plaintiffs to seek punitive damages against

local governments, Doe v. County of Centre, 242 F.3d 437, 455 (3d Cir. 2001), the
plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages against the County has no essential
relationship, or does not pertain, to their § 1983 claims against the County.
V
A court should “freely give leave” to amend “when justice so requires.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(2). If a “civil-rights complaint fails to state a claim,” a court “must grant
leave to amend the complaint unless amendment would be futile or inequitable.”
Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Ass’n, 903 F.3d 100, 113 (3d Cir. 2018).
Amendment is futile if no new facts could fix the original complaint’s problems.
Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 292 (3d Cir. 1988). And
amendment is inequitable if the plaintiff unduly delays, shows bad faith or if
amendment would unfairly prejudice the defendant. Curteon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 2001).

It would be futile for the plaintiffs to amend their claim under the Pennsylvania
Constitution because they have no cause of action to bring such a claim. But it would
not be futile or inequitable for the plaintiffs to amend their § 1983 constructive
discharge or due process claims or § 1985(3) conspiracy claim. The plaintiffs may be
able to allege facts to fix the problems with these claims. And the plaintiffs have not
unduly delayed or showed bad faith and amendment would not unfairly prejudice the
defendants. If the plaintiffs choose to amend all or some of their claims, the defendants
will have to defend against the same claims, just based on new facts.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:

_/_s_/ _G_e_r_a__l_d_ J__. _P_a__p_p_e_r_t_ __
Gerald J. Pappert, J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11363219. Public record. Not legal advice.