# Nunez

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · June 18, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11363099

## Case

- **Full name:** Maximo Felix Nunez v. Jessica Sage, Warden, FCI Lewisburg
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** June 18, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MAXIMO FELIX NUNEZ
Petitioner, | 3:26-cv-1106
: (JUDGE MARIANI)
Vv.
JESSICA SAGE, WARDEN, :
FCI LEWISBURG
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. BACKGROUND
On April 28, 2026, Petitioner Maximo Felix Nunez (“Petitioner”) a citizen of the
Dominican Republic and lawful permanent resident of the United States since 1984, filed a

pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). Petitioner
is detained within the Middle District of Pennsylvania and names as Respondent Jessica
Sage, Warden of FC! Lewisburg.
Petitioner alleges that his detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act and
due process. (Doc. 1 at 1). He further claims that his conditions of confinement violate the
Eighth Amendment and due process and appears to raise claims under the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (/d. at 1-2).
Petitioner also pursues a Bivens claim and a claim for negligence under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (“FTCA”). (Id. at 1-2).

Petitioner has been detained by Respondent since May 5, 2025, and an Immigration
Judge (“lJ”) ordered him removed to the Dominican Republic on January 8, 2026. (Docs. 6

at 3-4, 6-7). Petitioner's appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) remains
pending and, accordingly, his order of removal is not final. (Doc. 6-6). On April 16, 2026,

an lJ denied Petitioner's request for bond, finding that he failed to establish that he was not

a danger to the community.' (Doc. 6 at 4) (citing Doc. 6-5 at 2).
In the petition, Petitioner seeks his immediate release, another bond hearing, or
parole. (Doc. 1 at 8). Respondent opposes the petition, claiming that Petitioner's detention
is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and he “has received all proper due process, inclusive of

a bond hearing.” (Doc. 6 at 2).
Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Absent suspension, the Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas

corpus “to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art|, § 9, cl. 2). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a

1 Although Petitioner claims he “hasn't been in trouble since 1990,” (Doc. 1 at 4), the record in no way
supports that contention. Petitioner has numerous criminal arrests and convictions. (Doc. 6-2 at 4-6). In
1988, he was arrested and convicted of “Robbery — Street-Strongarm” and sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for 4 years and six months. (/d. at 4). In 1994, Petitioner was errested for “Resisting [an]
Officer.” (/d.). He was arrested for selling cocaine in 1997 and was convicted in 1998. (/d.). On April 12,
2007, Petitioner was arrested for Aggravated Assault with a Weapon, though the disposition of these charges
is unclear. (/d.). On November 9, 2007, Petitioner was arrested for Robbery, Kidnapping, and Homicide, but
those charges were later dismissed. (/d.). On June 24, 2024, Petitioner was arrested for “Harassing
Communications” and “Damage to Property,” and those charges appear to remain pending. (/d.). In his
traverse, Petitioner does not dispute any of these arrests, charges, and dispositions submitted by
Respondent in its response to the petition. (Doc. 7).

federal district court may grant a habeas petition where a petitioner's immigration detention
is “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the
legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been
strongest.” /.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Claims brought by immigration
detainees seeking relief from their confinement “fall within the core of the writ of habeas
corpus.” Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025). Itis well established that a federal
habeas corpus petitioner generally has the burden of proving facts entitling him to a
discharge from custody. Goins v. Brierley, 464 F.2d 947, 949 (3d Cir. 1972) (citations
omitted).
lll. ANALYSIS
Petitioner seeks his immediate release, parole, or another bond hearing before an lJ.
Although Petitioner claims he is being detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), he is
incorrect. If Petitioner was detained under Section 1226(c), he would not be entitled to a
bond hearing before an IJ. Because it is undisputed that Petitioner was provided with a
bond hearing before an IJ, the Court agrees with Respondent that Petitioner is detained
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (Doc. 6-5).
section 1226(a) provides:
(a) Arrest, detention, and release
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.

Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such decision, the Attorney
General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing
conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or
(B) conditional parole; but
(3) may not provide the alien with work authorization (including an ‘employment
authorized’ endorsement or other appropriate work permit), unless the alien
is lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise would (without
regard to removal proceedings) be provided such authorization.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). It is undisputed that Petitioner received a bond hearing before an IJ two
months ago and was denied bond after the IJ determined he was a danger to the
community. (Doc. 6-5).
To the extent that Petitioner challenges the thirteen-month duration of his civil
immigration detention, that claim fails. Duration alone cannot “sustain a due process
challenge by a detainee who has been afforded the process contemplated by § 1226(a) and
its implementing regulations.” Borbot v. Warden Hudson Cnty. Corr. Facility, 906 F.3d 274,
277 (3d Cir. 2018). “Unlike § 1226(c) detainees . . . who were detained for prolonged
periods without being given any opportunity to apply for release on bond,” here Petitioner
“was granted meaningful process prior to filing his habeas petition.” /d. at 279-80.
Moreover, Petitioner does not allege any constitutional infirmities with the procedures used
by the IJ at the bond hearing? Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to any habeas relief

2 To the extent Petitioner argues he is not a danger to the community or a flight risk, the Court lacks
jurisdiction to review the discretionary determinations of the lJ. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (“No court may set
aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention of any alien
or the revocation or denial of bond or parole.”); see also Chim v. Tsoukaris, 2026 WL 1650938, at *3 (D.N.J.

because he is lawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and he has failed to demonstrate
that his detention violates due process. See Gonzalez Hernandez v. Warden, 2026 WL
1725860, at *1 (M.D. Pa. June 15, 2026) (denying habeas relief where petitioner “already
received two bond hearings” under Section 1226(a) and “does not challenge the
constitutionality of those determinations themselves’).
Petitioner next claims that his conditions of confinement at Lewisburg violate the
Eight Amendment and due process. (Doc. 1 at 3-4). The Court agrees with Respondent
that his conclusory claims of inadequate medical care provide an insufficient basis for
habeas relief. (Doc. 6 at 11-12). Petitioner does not claim he is not receiving medical
treatment at FCI Lewisburg. Rather, he lists his medical conditions as a basis for habeas
relief and claims that Respondent's boilerplate actions and inactions constitute deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs. (Doc. 1 at 3-4). Without more detailed factual
allegations supporting his conditions of confinement claim, the Court cannot conclude that
his case constitutes an “extreme case” that warrants habeas relief based on his alleged

June 8, 2026) (Here, Petitioner's challenge to the !J’s denial of bond based on him being a flight risk is a
challenge to the IJ’s credibility determinations and weighing of the evidence, which are discretionary
determinations beyond the review of this Court.”) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)). While Petitioner has appealed
his removal order, there is no evidence that he exercised his right to challenge the lJ’s April 2026 bond
determination by appealing to the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(f}, 1003.38. If Petitioner can demonstrate
a material change in circumstances, he may seek a custody redetermination before an |J, not this Court. See
8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e) (“After an initial bond redetermination, an alien's request for a subsequent bond
redetermination shall be made in writing and shall be considered only upon a showing that the alien’s
circumstances have changed materially since the prior bond redetermination.”).

conditions of confinement at FC! Lewisburg. Hope v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d
310, 324 (3d Cir. 2020).
Petitioner's additional claims under the ADA, FTCA, and Bivens are separate causes
of action that fall outside the scope of a § 2241 habeas petition. See Broussard v. Ebbert,
2015 WL 6083541, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2015) (FTCA and Bivens claims “are not
cognizable in habeas since they do not challenge the legality or duration of Petitioner's
confinement, or the execution of his sentence.”) (citing Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532,
547 (3d Cir. 2002)). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the ADA, FTCA, and Bivens claims
raised in the petition because these claims are not cognizable in habeas.
Finally, Petitioner APA claim fails. While certain APA claims may be brought in
habeas, see Thieme v. Warden Fort Dix FCI, 154 F.4th 115, 123 (3d Cir. 2025), the Court's
review of the petition fails to indicate what final agency action, if any, Petitioner complains
about, and he has other adequate legal remedies. See Arias Gudino v. Lowe, 785 F. Supp.
3d 27, 37 n.3 (M.D. Pa. 2025) (declining to consider APA claims raised in § 2241 habeas
petition because “those claims may only be addressed after a final agency action for which
there is no other adequate remedy in a court.”) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704). Moreover, Petitioner
does not allege sufficient factual material raising a reasonable inference that Respondent
violated the APA. (Doc. 1 at 7). Rather, he simply claims in conclusory fashion that
Respondent violated the APA because his detention is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, and violated his constitutional rights. (/d.). But simply labelling Respondent's

actions as arbitrary and capricious and the like, without any factual content supporting that
contention, does not establish a violation of APA. Nor does it satisfy Petitioner's burden of
proving facts entitling him to habeas relief. See Goins, 464 F.2d at 949.
Upon careful consideration of the petition, the Court finds that Petitioner claims lack
merit, and he has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled habeas relief at this time.
Accordingly, the Court will deny the petition.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's habeas petition will be denied. A separate
Order follows. oo

Robert D. Mariani
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11363099. Public record. Not legal advice.