# STORMS

> District Court, D. New Jersey · May 26, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11362591

## Case

- **Full name:** Michael Storms, et al. v. David M. Carcieri, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** May 26, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11362591

## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MICHAEL STORMS, ef al.,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Action No. 25-1262 (MAS) (RLS)
. MEMORANDUM OPINION
DAVID M. CARCIERI, et al,
Defendants.

SHIPP, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon two motions to dismiss the Complaint (ECF
No. 1): (1) a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants David M. Carcieri (“Carcieri”) and Somerset
County Young Men’s Christian Association, Inc. Greater Somerset County! (“SC YMCA” and
collectively with Carcieri, “SC YMCA Defendants”) (ECF No. 10); and (2) a motion to dismiss
filed by National Council of Young Men’s Christian Associations of the United States of America’
(“Y-USA” and collectively with SC YMCA Defendants, “Defendants”) (ECF No. 16). Plaintiffs
Jesus Christ and Michael Storms (“Storms” and “Plaintiff’) opposed both motions. (ECF Nos. 15,
20.) Defendants replied. (ECF Nos. 17, 21.) Thereafter, Storms filed supplemental correspondence
addressing Defendants’ arguments in favor of dismissal. (ECF No. 22.) The Court has carefully
considered the parties’ submissions and reaches its decision without oral argument under Local
Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons below, Defendants’ motions are granted.

' The entity was improperly pled in the Complaint as “Greater Somerset County YMCA.” (See SC
YMCA Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 1, ECF No. 10.)
The entity was improperly pled in the Complaint as “YMCA of the USA.” (See Y-USA’s Mot. to
Dismiss 1, ECF No. 16.)

I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background?
Plaintiff's Complaint is premised upon allegations that “[t]he Y[-USA] used a
discriminatory [diversity, equity, and inclusion (“DEI’)] program to usurp a volunteer’s faith that
Jesus Christ alone can forgive sins.” (Compl. *1°.) According to Plaintiff, he has been harmed
because, “[s]ince Jesus Christ started his ministry 1,997 years ago, intermittently selfish elites have
devalued Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit who together permit[] each of us a direct relationship
with our Creator.” (/d.)
“The Y[-USA] is a nonprofit organization whose mission is to put Christian principles into
practice through programs that build healthy spirit, mind[,] and body for all.” (/d. J 1.) “Each year
the Y[-USA] receives over $600[ million] in government grants which is distributed to the
[nJation’s 2,650 local Y[-USA branches].” (/d.) Storms is an individual who has maintained a paid
membership with Somerset Hills YMCA, which was later incorporated into SC YMCA, for over
twenty years. (Id. J 2.) During this time, “[Plaintiff] never received any charitable benefits from
the Defendants[,]” but he participated in many volunteer activities, such as serving as a “[s]}wim
official” and an “[a]dventure [g]uide leader[.]” Ud.) Storms was also invited to serve as a board
member for SC YMCA in March 2023, and he attended regular meetings thereafter. (/d. )

For the purpose of considering the instant motions, the Court accepts all factual allegations in the
Complaint as true. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008).
* The Court finds that Jesus Christ is not a proper plaintiff and proceeds in its analysis with Storms
as the sole plaintiff in this matter. See Christ v. Pennsylvania, No. 22-1084, 2023 WL 11983163,
at *1 n.1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2023) (noting that complaint identifies two plaintiffs, Jesus Christ and
Michael Scott Smith Jr., but determining that “Michael Scott Smith Jr.[] is the sole plaintiff in this
action”), R&R adopted, 2023 WL 11983158 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2023).
Page numbers preceded by an asterisk refer to the page number atop the ECF header.

On December 21, 2023, Plaintiff received e-mail correspondence from Margret Butler
(“Butler”)®, stating:
I am reaching out to you on behalf of . . . Carcieri, President and
CEO of [SC YMCA] in regards to completing the required
background checks, documents and/or trainings. These onboarding
requirements are policy set by the Board of Directors. To date, our
records indicate you have not completed “Understanding My
Biases.” PLEASE COMPLETE by DECEMBER 31, 2023!
(d. § 3 (emphasis in original).) The required course, “Advancing Equity: Understanding Biases[,]”
is an online course that takes approximately thirty minutes and “introduce[s] participants to the
concept of bias and explore[s] the positive and negative impact of bias in everyday
situations. ... The] course offers a framework for countering biases and invites [participants] to
explore [their] role in strengthening the foundations of community through a deeper understanding
of [their] own beliefs.” Ud. ¥ 4.)
On January 22, 2024, Plaintiff replied to Butler, stating:
Good afternoon Margret hope all is well. ’m not in compliance
with this requirement as it violates my deeply held religious
belief that only Jesus Christ can forgive my sins. I am asking that
this DEI requirement be removed immediately due to its violation
of anti-discrimination laws. Kate Russo [(“Russo”)] [District VP of
Operations] was made aware of this last year and I’m surprised that
the [SC] YMCA still has persisted in maintaining this
discriminatory Anti-Christian requirement part of our policy.
(Ud. { 5 (second alteration and emphasis in original).)
Hours later, Carcieri replied, stating that:
The Y is dedicated to helping all people grow in spirit, mind and
body. Small day to day actions can create a more diverse, inclusive
and welcoming environment. Understanding and adjusting for
implicit bias is one of those actions. For this purpose, the Board of
Directors adopted the policy that all board members and fulltime
staff complete the Understanding My Biases training. Objectives for
Plaintiff does not allege facts as to who Margret Butler is or her role with either or both of
Defendants. (See generally Compl.)

the training include: 1) Understanding the concept of implicit bias;
2) Reflecting on instances that you exhibit implicit bias; and
3) Identifying areas of the YMCA that may be impacted by implicit
bias. Since you feel these objectives don’t align with your beliefs,
then apparently this isn’t the right fit.
(Ud. 6 (emphasis in original).) The next day, January 23, 2024, Carcieri sent follow-up e-mail
correspondence stating that “[a]ll new board members should complete the Y-USA Understanding
My Biases Training within [ninety] days of their appointment to their first term on the Board of
Directors or a Branch Board.” Ud. §7.) The correspondence also noted that the training
requirement was approved by the SC YMCA’s Board of Directors on June 9, 2021. (/d.)
Thereafter, on January 24, 2024, Russo sent e-mail correspondence to Plaintiff, stating:
We appreciate your expressed interest in serving as a Board Member
for [SC] YMCA. Currently, in order to align with the standards set
by the [SC YMCA] Board of Directors, completion of the required
trainings is essential. Unfortunately, as this step has not been
fulfilled, we are regrettably unable to extend an invitation to the
[SC] YMCA Branch Board meetings at this time. However, we
value your enthusiasm and commitment, and should you complete
the necessary trainings and still maintain an interest in joining the
Branch Board, we eagerly anticipate hearing from you. Your
dedication to fulfilling these requirements is highly appreciated, and
we look forward to the possibility of your future involvement.
(ld. 8.)
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed the Complaint on February 12, 2025, alleging six causes
of action against Defendants: (1) violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
(“Count One”); (2) violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment (“Count Two”);
(3) violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (“Count Three”);
(4) violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI’) (“Count Four”); (5) violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”) (‘Count Five”); and (6) violation of the
New Jersey Civil Rights Act (the “NJCRA”), N.J.S.A. § 10:1-3, et seg. (‘Count Six”). (See

generally Compl.) Thereafter, Defendants filed two motions to dismiss the Complaint in its
entirety. (See generally SC YMCA Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss; Y-USA’s Mot. to Dismiss.) Plaintiff
opposed both motions. (See generally Pl.’s Opp’n to SC YMCA Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 15; Pl.’s
Opp’n to Y-USA’s Mot., ECF No. 20.) Defendants replied. (See generally SC YMCA Defs.’
Reply, ECF No. 17; Y-USA’s Reply, ECF No. 21.) Thereafter, Plaintiff filed correspondence
making further arguments opposing Defendants’ motions. (See generally Pl.’s Correspondence,
ECF No. 22.)
Il. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure’ 12(b)(1), a defendant may move to dismiss a matter
for want of standing “because standing is a jurisdictional matter.” Ballentine v. United States, 486
F.3d 806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). “When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged
under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff must bear the burden of persuasion.” Kehr Packages, Inc. v.
Fidelcor, Inc. , 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). A motion to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction may either “attack the complaint on its face .. . [or] attack the
existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, quite apart from any pleadings.” Mortensen v. First
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).
A facial challenge asserts that “the complaint, on its face, does not allege sufficient grounds
to establish subject matter jurisdiction.” Jwanowa vy. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 438
(D.N.J. 1999) (citations omitted). As such, a facial challenge “calls for a district court to apply the
same standard of review it would use in considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), i.e.,

7 All references to “Rule” or “Rules” hereafter refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

construing the alleged facts in favor of the nonmoving party.” Const. Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757
F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014). District courts considering a facial challenge, then, must construe
the allegations in the complaint as true and determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists.
Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891; Cardio-Med. Assocs., Ltd. y. Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr., 721 F.2d 68,
75 (3d Cir. 1983). “Thus, ‘[t]o survive a motion to dismiss [for lack of standing], a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter’ that would establish standing if accepted as true.” Jn re Horizon
Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 633 (3d Cir. 2017) (alterations in
original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
B. Rule 12(b)(6)
Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . .. claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
A district court conducts a three-part analysis when considering a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6). See Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). First, the court must
identify “the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” /gbal, 556 U.S. at 675. Second, the
court must identify all of the plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations, accept them as true, and
“construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The court can discard bare legal conclusions
or factually unsupported accusations that merely state the defendant unlawfully harmed the
plaintiff. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Third, the court must
determine whether “the [well-pleaded] facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that
the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (quoting /gbal, 556 U.S.

at 679). A facially plausible claim “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. at 210 (quoting /gbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Ona
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the “defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been
presented.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, 926
F.2d at 1409).
Il. DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety. For the
reasons discussed below, the Court agrees. The Court addresses each motion in turn.
A. Y-USA’s Motion to Dismiss
Y-USA argues that dismissal is appropriate because: (1) the Complaint fails to allege any
facts establishing that Y-USA took any action with respect to Plaintiff, had any role in the events
as alleged, or maintained a direct or supervisory relationship with SC YMCA; and (2) the Court
lacks personal jurisdiction over Y-USA. (See generally Y-USA’s Moving Br., ECF No. 16-1.)
The Court agrees with Y-USA that the Complaint is entirely devoid of allegations as to
Y-USA’s purported role in the conduct alleged. (See generally Compl.) Rather, the facts as alleged
in the Complaint identify actions that the other defendants—namely, the SC YMCA
Defendants——purportedly took. (See, e.g., Compl. {3 (alleging e-mail correspondence from
Butler, on behalf of Carcieri, the President and CEO of SC YMCA); id. 4¥f 6-7 (alleging
e-mail correspondence directly from Carcieri); id. § 8 (alleging e-mail correspondence from Russo
related to the SC YMCA).) Moreover, the Complaint is devoid of allegations regarding any control
over day-to-day operations, hiring, or decision-making of any local associations, including SC
YMCA, such that it would be appropriate to attribute SC YMCA Defendants’ conduct to Y-USA.
(See generally id.) Even construing Plaintiff's pro se Complaint liberally, see Beasley v. Howard,

623 F. Supp. 3d 434, 439 (D.N.J. 2022) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), the
Court finds Plaintiff's allegations against Y-USA are not sufficient to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. See Testa v. Hoban, No. 17-1618, 2018 WL 623691, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 30,
2018) (finding that plaintiff “failed to plead ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief? against [certain d]Jefendants” where plaintiff failed to plead any
allegations as to those defendants (citations omitted)); McLeod v. Fifth Jud. Dist. of Pa., No.
20-1362, 2022 WL 13986832, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2022) (“Pleadings that fail to identify each
defendant’s role for the alleged wrong are insufficient.” (citing Pushkin v. Nussbaum, No. 12-324,
2017 WL 1591863, at *7 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2017)); Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239,
245 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[P]ro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support
a claim.”).
All claims against Y-USA are, accordingly, dismissed.®
B. SC YMCA Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
SC YMCA Defendants argue that the Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety because
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (See generally SC YMCA
Defs.’ Moving Br., ECF No. 10-1.) The Court addresses each Count in turn. □
dL Counts One, Two, and Three
Plaintiff's Counts One, Two, and Three allege violations of Plaintiffs First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. (See Compl. 13-26.) SC YMCA Defendants argue that Counts One, Two,
and Three should be dismissed because SC YMCA Defendants are not state actors and their actions

As the Court finds that dismissal is appropriate because the Complaint is entirely void of
allegations as to Y-USA’s conduct, including any operations in this forum state (see generally
Compl.), the Court cannot and need not fully analyze Y-USA’s argument about personal
jurisdiction at this juncture.

were not taken under color of state law. (See SC YMCA Defs.’ Moving Br. 6-12.) The Court
agrees,
“To state a constitutional claim, [a plaintiff] must allege facts showing, inter alia, that the
misconduct involved ‘state action.’”? Sprauve v. West Indian Co., 799 F.3d 226, 229 (3d Cir. 2015)
(quoting Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)). “[T]he conduct allegedly causing
the deprivation of a federal right [must] be fairly attributable to the State.” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
There is “no simple line between states and private persons” so courts look to whether “there is
such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior
may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic
Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)). In answering that question,

[the Third Circuit has] outlined three broad tests generated by the
Supreme Court jurisprudence to determine whether state action
exists: (1) whether the private entity has exercised powers that are
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state; (2) whether the
private party has acted with the help of or in concert with state
officials; and (3) whether the state has so far insinuated itself into a
position of interdependence with the acting party that it must be
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.
Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation modified).
Here, the Complaint fails to allege any facts that could plausibly establish that the SC
YMCA Defendants are state actors or are carrying out state actions. (See generally Compl.) In
fact, the only allegations remotely tied to Defendants and the Government are the statements

This “state action” analysis is equivalent to the “under color of state law” analysis required for
claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Sprauve, 799 F.3d at 229 (“To state a [Section 1983
claim, [plaintiffs] must allege facts demonstrating, inter alia, that the misconduct they complain
of was ‘under color of state law.’ . .. The “under color of state law’ analysis is equivalent to the
“state action’ analysis.” (first citing Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir.
1995); and then citing Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005)).).

concerning SC YMCA Defendant’s co-defendant, which allege that “[Y-USA] receives over
$600] million] in government grants which is distributed to the [nJation’s 2,650 local Y[-USA
branches.” (/d. J 1, 20.) This is simply insufficient to plausibly allege that SC YMCA Defendants’
conduct involved “state action” or that SC YMCA Defendants are state actors. See Sprauve, 799
F.3d at 229,
Counts One, Two, and Three are, accordingly, dismissed.
2. Count Four
Plaintiff's Count Four alleges a violation of Title VI. (See Compl. {§ 27-29.) SC YMCA
Defendants argue that dismissal of this count is appropriate because: (1) Title VI does not permit
a claim based on a person’s religion; (2) Plaintiff does not allege he was denied participation in or
the benefits of a specific program offered by SC YMCA Defendants; and (3) Plaintiff fails to allege
that SC YMCA received federal funding. (SC YMCA Defs.’ Moving Br. 12-15.) The Court agrees,
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, “[nJo person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Here, the Complaint does not allege that Storms was discriminated against on
the ground of “race, color, or national original[.]” (See generally Compl.); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
Plaintiff also alleges that he was denied an opportunity to attend board meetings and serve as a
board member (see id. ¥ 8), but he does not otherwise allege that he was denied the benefits of his
membership with SC YMCA or his access to the SC YMCA facilities (see generally id.).

10

Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege that the SC YMCA Defendants received any federal funding.'°
(See generally id.) For at least these reasons, Plaintiff's claim must fail.
Count Four is, accordingly, dismissed.
3. Count Five
Plaintiff's Count Five alleges a violation of Title VII. (Compl. ff 30-31.) SC YMCA
Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to allege that he filed
a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”), as is required
in advance of bringing a Title VII claim. (SC YMCA Defs.’ Moving Br. 15-16.) The Court agrees.
“A plaintiff ‘must exhaust all required administrative remedies before bringing a claim for
judicial relief.’ To bring a claim under Title VU, a plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination
with the EEOC and procure a notice of the right to sue.” Mandel v. M&O Packaging Corp., 706
F.3d 157, 163 Gd Cir. 2013) (quoting Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1020-21 (3d Cir. 1997)).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege he exhausted his administrative remedies. (See generally Compl.)
This alone is enough to dismiss Count Five.!!
Count Five is, accordingly, dismissed.

'0 As discussed above, the Complaint alleges that Y-USA received some sort of federal funding,
but the Complaint does not allege facts regarding how that funding was used. (See Compl. #9 1,
20); Eisenberg v. Nat’l Dance Inst., No. 22-4521, 2023 WL 2966945, at *8 (D.N.J. Apr. 17, 2023)
(“Title V1 is limited to prohibiting intentional discrimination in a federally funded program, which,
importantly, applies only to programs ‘where a primary objective of the Federal financial
assistance is to provide employment.’” (citation omitted)).
Moreover, Title VII claims are limited to “employees.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (“It shall
be unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin[.]”). The Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff was an employee of SC
YMCA Defendants. (See generally Compl.)
11

4, Count Six
Plaintiff's Count Six alleges a violation of the NJCRA. (Compl. {§ 32-33.) SC YMCA
Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff does not allege that SC
YMCA Defendants are state actors and Plaintiff's Complaint is otherwise void of allegations to
plausibly allege a violation of the NICRA. (SC YMCA Defs.’ Moving Br. 16-18.) Once again, the
Court agrees.
The NJCRA provides, in relevant part that:
[aJny person who has been deprived of any substantive due process
or equal protection rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or any substantive rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of this
State, or whose exercise or enjoyment of those substantive rights,
privileges or immunities has been interfered with or attempted to be
interfered with, by threats, intimidation or coercion by a person
acting under color of law, may bring a civil action for damages and
for injunctive or other appropriate relief.
N.J. Stat. Ann. 10:6-2(c) (emphasis added).
As noted by the Court above, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to even suggest that SC
YMCA Defendants are state actors or are acting under the color of state law. (See generally
Compl.) For at least this reason, Count Six must be dismissed. See, e.g., Hottenstein v. City of Sea
Isle City, 793 F, Supp. 2d 688, 695 (D.N.J. 2011) (dismissing NJCRA claim because claim failed
for same reason that plaintiff's Section 1983 failed because plaintiff failed to allege defendant
acted under “color of law”); Cottrell v. Heritages Dairy Stores, Inc., No. 09-1743, 2010 WL
3908567, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. Sep. 30, 2010) (“Because [p]laintiffs have not alleged that [d]efendants
are state actors, [p|laintiffs[’] NJCRA claim is dismissed.”’).
Count Six is, accordingly, dismissed.

12

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motions are granted.!? The Court will issue an
Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.

MICHAEL A. stare
Ww UNITED STATES DisTRICT JUDGE
Dated: May 46 , 2026

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court will afford Plaintiff an opportunity to correct
the deficiencies identified in this Memorandum Opinion.
13

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11362591. Public record. Not legal advice.