# Hoffman

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · June 15, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11362480

## Case

- **Full name:** Joey Dean Hoffman v. Prime Care Medical, Inc. et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** June 15, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOEY DEAN HOFFMAN, : Civil No. 1:25-CV-01176
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. :
:
PRIME CARE MEDICAL, INC. et al., :
:
Defendants. : Judge Jennifer P. Wilson
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the court is motion to dismiss the amended complaint filed
by Defendants Kyle Brim, PA-C and Adina M. Lightner, LPN. (Doc. 22.) Joey
Dean Hoffman (“Plaintiff”), a self-represented litigant currently housed at Dauphin
County Prison proceeding in this action in forma pauperis, also filed a motion for
appointment of counsel. (Doc. 25.) The court will grant the motion to dismiss the
amended complaint, dismiss the amended complaint, and deny the motion for
appointment of counsel.
BACKGROUND
On June 27, 2025, the court received and docketed a complaint naming
Prime Care Medical, Inc as the sole defendant. (Doc. 1.) The alleged facts in the
complaint consisted of the following paragraph:
My medical request slips were ignored for over 3 months demanding
help getting medical bottom bunk status. And when I sprained my ankle
it took 6 days for a x-ray and longer to see anyone (PA) to look at it.
And 6 months later its still not right and hurts all the time. And medical
ignores me. I have written records and 40+ copies of request slips.

(Doc. 1.)
On September 23, 2025, the court dismissed the complaint for failing to state
a claim for which relief may be granted. (Docs. 9, 10.) Specifically, the court
determined that a private corporation contracted by a prison to provide health care
for inmates cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior theory, but only for
constitutional violations if it has a custom or policy exhibiting deliberate

indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. (Doc. 9.) The court granted
Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 10.)
The court received and docketed Plaintiff’s amended complaint on

November 18, 2025. (Doc. 14.) This amended complaint names three defendants:
(1) Prime Care Medical, Inc.; (2) Kyle Brin (“Brim”)1, a Physician’s Assistant; and
(3) Adena (“Lightner”)2, a nurse. (Id.) On December 18, 2025, the court screened
the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), dismissed all

claims against Prime Care Medical, Inc., and served the individual defendants with
a copy of the amended complaint. (Doc. 16.)

1 Defendant Brim’s name was corrected in his motion to dismiss the amended complaint. (Doc.
22.)

2 Defendant Adina M. Lightner’s name was corrected in her motion to dismiss the amended
complaint. (Doc. 22.)
On January 2, 2026, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. (Doc. 22.)
The second amended complaint alleges a refusal to treat his injured ankle by

Defendants Brim and Lightner. (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff states that on
December 19, 2024, he was walking down the steps for lunch trays when he rolled
his ankle on the last step. (Id., p. 3). Plaintiff alleges that his cellmate carried him

up the stairs to his cell. (Id., p. 4.) He states that he showed his ankle to non-party
prison officials, expressing that he needed medical attention, and was told to wait.
(Id., p. 4.) He states that at 8:07, Nurse Lightner gave him extra pills including
Motrin and Tylenol. (Id., p. 5.) He alleges that she stated that she had the slip for

his bottom bunk status, but she had not turned it in, and it was on her cart all day.
(Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that on December 21, 2025, Nurse Mallory stated that he

was prescribed Tylenol and Motrin, but that he could not get the Motrin because it
was too much for his stomach with his already prescribed medications. (Id.) He
states “so Adena never checked my meds.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that on
December 27, 2024, he asked Defendant Lightner to see the doctor and was told

there were no openings. (Id.) He alleges that on the evening of December 28,
2024, he asked Leann, and she told him that he had stretched his ligaments or
tendons and “wrote me into the computer to see medical.”
Plaintiff states that on December 30, 2024, he “seen medical for the first
time. Severe ankle sprain. X-ray they did few days ago looks good ordered x-ray

of knee. Finally says I can do Ice Packs and ordered an ankle wrap. Gave me perm.
bottom bunks status.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that he only got one ice pack and an
ankle wrap on January 1, 2025. (Id.)

Based on these alleged facts, Plaintiff brings Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claims against Defendant Brim in his role as the head physician for
Prime Care Medical, Inc. at Dauphin County Prison and against Defendant
Lightner, who he identified as the nurse who was responsible for giving him

medications without checking his chart, dragging out the process of his bottom tier
status, and withholding medical knowledge that could have prevented “all this.”
(Doc. 21).

Defendants Brim and Lightner filed the instant motion to dismiss the second
amended complaint on February 17, 2026. (Docs. 17, 22.) Plaintiff filed a brief in
opposition to the motion to dismiss on March 2, 2026. (Doc. 24.) He then filed a
motion to appoint counsel on June 8, 2026. (Doc. 25).

The court will now address the pending motion to dismiss and the motion for
appointment of counsel.
STANDARD
In order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept all well pleaded allegations as

true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Doe
v. Univ. of the Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2020). The pleadings of self-
represented plaintiffs are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by attorneys and are to be liberally construed. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d. Cir. 2011). Self-
represented litigants are to be granted leave to file a curative amended complaint
even when a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend, unless such an amendment

would be inequitable or futile. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
245 (3d Cir. 2008).
DISCUSSION
Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they act with deliberate

indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 104–05 (1976). To sustain a constitutional claim under the Eighth Amendment
for inadequate medical treatment, a plaintiff must make (1) an objective showing
that his medical needs were serious, and (2) a subjective showing that the

defendants were deliberately indifferent to those medical needs. See Pearson v.
Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017). A serious medical need is
“one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or is so obvious

that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”
Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst'l Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346–47 (3d Cir.
1987) (citation omitted). A prison official is deliberately indifferent when he or
she “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
However, “[p]rison medical authorities are given considerable latitude in the
diagnosis and treatment of medical problems of inmates and courts will ‘disavow

any attempt to second guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of
treatment . . . which remains a question of sound professional judgment.’” Byrd v.
Shannon, No. 1:09-CV-1551, 2010 WL 5889519, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2010)
(quoting Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d
Cir.1979)). Mere disagreement over proper treatment does not state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990);

Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst'l Inmates, 834 F.2d at 346 (“Courts, determining what
constitutes deliberate indifference, have consistently held that mere allegations of
malpractice do not raise issues of constitutional import. . . Nor does mere

disagreement as to the proper medical treatment support a claim of an eighth
amendment violation.”).
A. All Deliberate Indifference Claims Against Defendant Brim Will Be
Dismissed.
Plaintiff fails to allege any involvement on the part of Defendant Brim
beyond his role as a supervisor within the prison medical system. He never alleges

that Defendant Brim saw him for his ankle injury or that he sought treatment from
Defendant Brim. (Doc. 21.) “A defendant in a civil rights action must have
personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable, and cannot be held
responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor

approved.” See Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007). Without
specific allegations of deliberate indifference on the part of Defendant Brim, the
court must dismiss all deliberate indifference claims raised against him.

Likewise, his role as a supervisor does not necessarily create liability.
Supervisory liability under § 1983 utilizes the same standard as municipal liability.
See Carter v. City of Philadelphia,181 F.3d 339, 356 (3d Cir. 1999). A supervisor
will only be liable for the acts of a subordinate if he fosters a policy or custom that
amounts to deliberate indifference towards an individual’s constitutional rights.

See Id. at 357. To establish supervisory liability, a plaintiff must show that (1) a
superior officer failed to employ a specific supervisory practice; (2) the existing
custom created an unreasonable risk of injury in the absence of the specified

supervisory practice; (3) the supervisor was aware that the risk existed; (4) the
supervisor was indifferent to the risk; and (5) the underlying violation resulted
from the failure to employ the supervisory practice. Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp.,
269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118

(3d Cir. 1989)). Nothing alleged in the second amended complaint triggers
liability under Carter. Therefore, all Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
claims against Defendant Brim raised in the second amended complaint will be

dismissed.
B. All Deliberate Indifference Claims Against Defendant Lightner Will
Be Dismissed.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lightner erroneously gave him medications
without checking his current medications list, drug out the process for his bottom
tier status, and withheld medical knowledge that could have prevented “all this.”

(Doc. 21, p. 2.) Nothing in these allegations amounts to deliberate indifference.
As stated above, “Courts, determining what constitutes deliberate
indifference, have consistently held that mere allegations of malpractice do not
raise issues of constitutional import. . . Nor does mere disagreement as to the
proper medical treatment support a claim of an eighth amendment violation.”

Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst'l Inmates, 834 F.2d at 346. Here the administration of
Motrin at his request for treatment may be an allegation of malpractice, but not an
allegation of an Eighth Amendment violation, especially where Plaintiff does not

allege any harm as a result of the oversight. Furthermore, it is unclear how
Defendant Lightner delayed the processing of his bottom tier status, when he
alleges that she kept the paperwork for his bottom bunk on her cart all day. There
is no allegation that he was forced to use a top bunk and that the use of a top bunk

resulted in injury. Additionally, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Lightner
withheld any medical knowledge that could have prevented the injury to his ankle
or the delay in treatment of his ankle. Therefore, the deliberate indifference claim

against Defendant Lightner will be dismissed.
C. Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel Will Be Denied.
Plaintiff has filed a motion for appointment of counsel that was received and
docketed by the court on June 8, 2026. (Doc. 25.)

Although prisoners have no constitutional or statutory right to appointment
of counsel in a civil case, the court has discretion to “request an attorney to
represent any person unable to afford counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); see
Houser v. Folino, 927 F.3d 693, 697 (3d Cir. 2019). The appointment of counsel is
a privilege, not a statutory or constitutional right. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d
187, 192 (3d Cir. 2011); Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993).

However, representation by counsel may be appropriate under certain
circumstances after a finding that the plaintiff’s case has arguable merit in fact and
law. Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155. If the court finds that the plaintiff has crossed this

threshold inquiry, the court should consider the following factors in deciding
whether to request a lawyer to represent an indigent plaintiff:
(1) the plaintiff’s ability to present his or her own case;
(2) the complexity of the legal issues;
(3) the degree to which factual investigation will be necessary and the
ability of the plaintiff to pursue such investigation;
(4) the plaintiff’s ability to retain counsel on his or her own behalf;
(5) the extent to which a case is likely to turn on credibility
determinations, and;
(6) whether the case will require the testimony of expert witnesses.

Tabron, 6 F.3d at 155-57. This list of factors is non-exhaustive, and no single
factor is determinative. Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 499 (3d Cir. 2002)
(citing Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 1997)). Instead, these
factors serve as guideposts for the district courts to ensure that the precious
commodity of volunteer attorney time is not “wasted on frivolous cases.” (Id.)
Since the second amended complaint failed to state a claim for which relief
may be granted, Plaintiff has not made the threshold showing that the case has
arguable merit in fact and law. Therefore, the motion will be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, the court will grant Defendants’ motion to

dismiss the second amended complaint and dismiss the remaining claims against
Defendants Brim and Lightner. The court will not grant Plaintiff any further
opportunity to cure the defects in his pleadings. This is Plaintiff’s third attempt at
pleading Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims associated with the

ankle injury he sustained at Dauphin County Prison. Considering Plaintiff’s
repeated unsuccessful attempts, the court finds that further attempts to bring such
claims would be futile. As such, the court will dismiss the complaint with

prejudice.
Because there are no operable claims in the matter, the court will deny
Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel.
An appropriate order follows.

s/Jennifer P. Wilson
JENNIFER P. WILSON
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: June 15, 2026

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11362480. Public record. Not legal advice.