# Hayes-Williams

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · May 26, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11362346

## Case

- **Full name:** Vanessa Hayes-Williams v. Groveport Madison Local School District
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** May 26, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

VANESSA HAYES-WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case Number 2:24-cv-3741
Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson
GROVEPORT MADISON LOCAL
SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Groveport Madison Local School District’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 24.) Plaintiff Vanessa Hayes-Williams filed a
response in opposition (ECF No. 30), and Groveport filed a reply (ECF No. 31). For the reasons
stated below, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 24) is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Ms. Hayes-Williams is an African American female over the age of 40. (Compl., ECF
No. 1, ¶ 8.) She was a substitute teacher employed by Educational Service Center of Central
Ohio and assigned to Groveport Madison Local School District (“Groveport”). (Hayes-Williams
Dep., ECF No. 24-1, 23:9–17.) Ms. Hayes-Williams is suing Groveport under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq., and Title 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code.
(ECF No. 1.) She alleges that she was treated differently than her Caucasian coworkers under the
age of 40; that she was terminated and not selected for permanent positions because of her
gender, race, and age; and that she was retaliated against for reporting disparate treatment. (Id. ¶¶
16, 24, 30, 36, 43, 48.)
I. Factual Background
Educational Service Centers (“ESCs”) are public education agencies established under
the Ohio Revised Code to provide educational and support services to local school districts.

(Grube Aff., ECF No. 24-2, Ex. A-1, PageID 288.) See Ohio Rev. Code § 3312.01(C). Groveport
contracts with ESC for various services, including substitute teaching services. (See, e.g., Grube
Aff., Exs. A-1, A-2, PageID 285–90.) Ms. Hayes-Williams began working as a substitute teacher
through ESC in 2022 at Groveport Madison Middle School South. (Hayes-Williams Dep.,
24:18–20.)
Ms. Hayes-Williams has a bachelor’s degree in liberal arts from Indiana University and a
master’s degree in public management administration from Indiana Wesleyan University. (Id.
15:8–24.) At all times relevant to this lawsuit, she maintained a valid Ohio substitute teaching
license. (Grube Aff., Ex. A-3, PageID 292–93.) After her time at Groveport, Ms. Hayes-

Williams received an Alternative Administrative Principal License that was effective starting
July 2023 and expired in June 2025. (Id. PageID 291–92.)
During the 2022–2023 academic year, Ms. Hayes-Williams was assigned to Groveport
Madison High School as a “building substitute,” meaning she reported to the same school every
day. (Hayes-Williams Dep., 46:18–23; 51:16–21; Bland Dep., ECF No. 24-5, 25:5–13.)
Additionally, she was directly employed by Groveport for two limited assignments: (1) as a
summer school teacher in the summer of 2022 and (2) as an assistant volleyball coach in the fall
of 2022. (Hayes-Williams Dep., 23:23–24:3; Ex., PageID 165; Ex., PageID 172.)
Ms. Hayes-Williams’s Complaint alleges six incidents that form the basis of her disparate
treatment claims:
1. She was denied the opportunity to be a test administrator for state testing
although she served as a test administrator while employed as a substitute
teacher in prior years;
2. She was sent home for violating a schoolwide “stay put” directive;
3. She was not given access to enter grades although other teachers had access;
4. She was not compensated for acting as an advisor for the school’s Black History
Month production while a Caucasian teacher was paid for his work on the same
production;
5. She was not compensated for grading, while other teachers were compensated
for grading; and
6. She volunteered to act as advisor for multiple student activities, such as “Fairy
Godmother,” but was denied.

(Compl., ¶ 16.) Ms. Hayes-Williams also alleges that she applied for three permanent positions at
Groveport, “Business CTE, Summer Coordinator, and Assistant Principal,” but Groveport hired
Caucasians who were under the age of 40 to fill those roles. (Id. ¶ 19.) Ms. Hayes-Williams also
alleges that she experienced issues with the head volleyball coach, a Caucasian female under the
age of 40. (Id. ¶¶ 17–18.) Lastly, she alleges that she was “terminated” from Groveport due to
her sex, race, and age and as retaliation for reporting disparate treatment. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 30, 36, 43,
48.)
On summary judgment, the Parties discuss only three of the above incidents: the
volleyball situation, the Black History Month production, and the stay-put order. The Court
provides a summary of the three incidents.
First, the volleyball situation: Ms. Hayes-Williams states that the head volleyball coach,
Bailey Church, intentionally excluded Ms. Hayes-Williams from participating as a coach. (Opp.,
ECF No. 30, PageID 419.) Ms. Hayes-Williams testified in her deposition that Ms. Church acted
in a “derogatory” manner towards Ms. Hayes-Williams on several occasions. (Hayes-Williams
Dep., 76:16–17.) According to Ms. Hayes-Williams, Ms. Church called her a “backstabber” in
front of students and staff members (id. 76:3–14); intentionally failed to introduce Ms. Hayes-
Williams at a parent meeting but introduced two other coaches (id. 77:20–78:5); and, with
another staff member, mocked Ms. Hayes-Williams’s education and work experience (id. 79:14–
19; 80:22–81:9). Ms. Hayes-Williams also testified that Ms. Church excluded Ms. Hayes-

Williams from participating in making decisions and eventually relieved Ms. Hayes-Williams of
her coaching duties. (Id. 83:12–15; 84:13–24.) Ms. Hayes-Williams reported the situation to the
interim principal, Duane Bland, and asked for her limited-assignment contract to be terminated.
(Id. Ex., PageID 166.) Groveport asserts that even though Ms. Hayes-Williams stopped
participating in volleyball activities “long before the season ended,” she was still paid the full
$3,528 set forth in her limited-assignment contract. (Mot., PageID 67 (citing Grube Aff., PageID
282); Hayes-Williams Dep., 111:2–13.)
Second, Ms. Hayes-Williams contends that she experienced racial discrimination while
directing the school’s Black History Month production. (Opp., PageID 419–20.) Ms. Hayes-

Williams states that she applied to be a member of the school’s Culture and Diversity Committee
but was denied in favor of three Caucasian applicants. (Id.; see also Hayes-Williams Dep.,
68:21–69:17.) Despite not being on the Committee, Ms. Hayes-Williams agreed to direct the
school’s Black History Month program after students asked her to serve as the advisor. (Id. 70:1–
20.)
According to Ms. Hayes-Williams, both she and the students involved in the production
experienced hostility from staff members during preparations for the event. Ms. Hayes-Williams
testified that one staff member refused to allow the group to rehearse on the theater stage during
their scheduled rehearsal time (id. 118:11–16); another staff member locked her classroom door
so the students could not change into costumes in that classroom and accused the students of
taking candy from her desk (id. 117:21–24); and the choir teacher asked the students why they
were participating “in that Black production” instead of another production going on at the time.
(id. 118:18–21).
Despite these incidents, both Parties agree that the production was a success, and Mr.

Hayes-Williams and the students were commended for their work in the school’s newsletter. (Id.
70:21–23; Ex., PageID 174.) Additionally, Ms. Hayes-Williams asserts that she was not paid for
her work on the program but another ESC employee, Brandon Lively, who did the audiovisual
work on the show, was paid. (Id. 71:3–20.)
Third is the stay-put incident that resulted in Ms. Hayes-Williams being sent home early.
On April 28, 2023, the vice principal informed school staff that no hall passes were to be issued
that day due to “lack of security team members in the building and teacher absences” unless
there was an emergency. (Hayes-Williams Dep., Ex., PageID 176.) Later that day, when a
student had a medical emergency, the school was placed on a stay-put order, which means

everybody must stay in the classrooms until further notice. (Smathers Dep., ECF No. 24-3,
46:23–47:15.)
Julia Barnhouse, one of the assistant principals, was monitoring the hallways during the
stay-put and encountered a student in the hall. (Barnhouse Dep., ECF No. 24-4, 8:5–10; 32:8–
12.) Ms. Barnhouse asked what the student was doing in the hall and the student responded that
Ms. Hayes-Williams told the student to come to her classroom and showed Ms. Barnhouse a text
message from Ms. Hayes-Williams. (Id. 32:11–33:9.) The student became argumentative when
Ms. Barnhouse told her to go back to class. (Id.) Ms. Hayes-Williams testified that she heard the
argument and opened her classroom door to intervene and calm the student down. (Hayes-
Williams Dep., 127:5–23.) After the student left, Ms. Barnhouse asked to speak with Ms. Hayes-
Williams but according to Ms. Barnhouse, Ms. Hayes-Williams refused to speak with her.
(Barnhouse Dep., PageID 34:17–35:8.) Later that day, Ms. Hayes-Williams’s was sent home
early for violating the stay-put directive. (Hayes-Williams Dep., 129:24–130:2; 143:16–17;
Bland Dep., 17:17–21.) Ms. Hayes-Williams was paid through the rest of the academic year but

did not return to work after the incident. (Id. 144:5–7; Smathers Dep., 39:10–12.)
In August 2023, at the beginning of the 2023–2024 academic year, Ms. Hayes-Williams
received an email from human resources informing her that she “will not be on the building
substitute teacher list this year or returning to the high school as a building substitute teacher”
because the school “decided to move in a different direction with this position.” (Hayes-Williams
Dep., Ex., PageID 161.) Groveport asserts it did not welcome back Ms. Hayes-Williams because
she violated the stay-put order, had “difficulty getting along with administrators and teachers,”
and “overstepped her role as a substitute teacher.” (ECF No. 31, PageID 430; Smathers Dep.,
12:16–20; 36:19–37:4.)

II. Procedural Background
In July 2023, Ms. Hayes-Williams filed a discrimination charge with the United States
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (Hayes-Williams Dep., Ex., PageID
228–29.) No EEOC action was taken, and the EEOC issued Ms. Hayes-Williams a right-to-sue
letter on her Title VII claims. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID 12.) The EEOC also informed Ms. Hayes-
Williams that a right-to-sue letter is not required for claims under the ADEA. (Id. PageID 10.)
In July 2024, Ms. Hayes-Williams sued Groveport alleging the following: (1) sex
discrimination under Title VII and Ohio Revised Code Title 4112; (2) race discrimination under
Title VII and Ohio Revised Code Title 4112; (3) age discrimination under the ADEA and Ohio
Revised Code Title 4112; (4) retaliation under Title VII and Ohio Revised Code Title 4112; and
(5) retaliation under the ADEA and Ohio Revised Code Title 4112. (ECF No. 1.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The

movant has the burden of showing that the non-moving party lacks evidence to support an
essential element of its claim. Berryman v. SuperValu Holdings, Inc., 669 F.3d 714, 716–17 (6th
Cir. 2012); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). The burden then shifts to the
non-moving party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). When
evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the factual evidence in a light
most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.
Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 511 (6th Cir. 2009).
A genuine issue of material fact exists if the non-moving party can present “significant

probative evidence” to show that there is more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” Anwar v. Dow Chem. Co., 876 F.3d 841, 851 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Moore v. Philip
Morris Cos., 8 F.3d 335, 340 (6th Cir. 1993)). In other words, “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Frenchko v. Monroe, 160 F.4th
784, 795 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248); see also Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (concluding that summary judgment
is appropriate when the evidence could not lead the trier of fact to find for the non-moving
party).
ANALYSIS
I. Sex, Race, and Age Discrimination
Discrimination claims relying on indirect evidence of discrimination under Title VII and
the ADEA are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Redlin v.
Grosse Pointe Pub. Sch. Sys., 921 F.3d 599, 606 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973)); Willard v. Huntington Ford, Inc., 952 F.3d 795,
807 (6th Cir. 2020). Claims brought under Title 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code are evaluated
under the same standard. Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 332 (6th Cir. 2008).
Under the burden-shifting framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing that he or she (1) was a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified
for the job; (3) suffered an adverse employment decision; and (4) was replaced by a person
outside the protected class or treated differently than similarly situated non-protected employees.
Redlin, 921 F.3d at 606–07 (6th Cir. 2019); Willard, 952 F.3d at 808.
Groveport argues that Ms. Hayes-Williams cannot establish a prima facie case of

discrimination because she (1) was not qualified for the positions she applied for, (2) did not
suffer an adverse employment action, and (3) was not treated differently than a similarly situated
non-protected employees. (Mot., ECF No. 24, PageID 70–78.)
Ms. Hayes-Williams does not address Groveport’s arguments against her discrimination
claims, thereby abandoning those claims. See Brown v. VHS of Michigan, Inc., 545 F. App’x
368, 372 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[A] plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned a claim when a plaintiff
fails to address it in response to a motion for summary judgment.”) (collecting cases). But on
summary judgment, the Court’s analysis does not end there. The Court must review the portions
of the record submitted by Groveport to determine whether Groveport carried its burden to show
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. See Evans v. Plummer, 687 F. App’x 434, 446 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[A] district court cannot
grant summary judgment in favor of a movant simply because the adverse party has not
responded.”) (quoting Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 455 (6th Cir. 1991)).
Groveport asserts that Ms. Hayes-Williams was not qualified for a full-time teacher or

principal position because she did not have a teacher’s or principal’s license. (Mot., PageID 72–
73; see Grube Aff., Ex. A-3, PageID 291–96.) As for the Culture and Diversity Committee
position, Groveport asserts that Ohio law requires it to give qualified district employees the
opportunity to fill such positions before offering it to non-district employees, which is why Ms.
Hayes-Williams did not get the position. (ECF No. 31, PageID 432 (citing Ohio Rev. Code
§ 3313.53(D)(1).)
Groveport also argues that Ms. Hayes-Williams did not suffer an adverse employment
action. (Mot., PageID 70–71.) An adverse employment action is a “materially adverse change in
the terms and conditions of a plaintiff’s employment.” White v. Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry.

Co., 364 F.3d 789, 797 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97
F.3d 876, 885 (6th Cir. 1996)). An “employment action is adverse if it leaves the employee
‘worse off respecting employment terms or conditions.’” McNeal v. City of Blue Ash, 117 F.4th
887, 900 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 355 (2024)).
Groveport identifies two events that it argues are not adverse employment actions: the
volleyball situation and it not welcoming Ms. Hayes-Williams back for the 2023–2024 academic
year. Regarding the volleyball situation, Groveport emphasizes that the head volleyball coach
had no authority to dismiss Ms. Hayes-Wiliams, and further, Ms. Hayes-Williams was still paid
the full amount of the contract even though she stopped performing the duties of the role. (Mot.,
PageID 71.) For the second event, Groveport argues that Ms. Hayes-Williams was not
guaranteed an ongoing assignment with Groveport, and it exercised its discretion to not welcome
her back after it evaluated her performance and found it lacking. (Id.)
Groveport next argues that Ms. Hayes-Williams cannot establish that she was treated
differently than similarly situated non-protected employees because the people she compares

herself to were qualified for the positions they received and she lacked the requisite
qualifications. (Mot., PageID 74–75.) For example, the applicant who received the Assistant
Principal position had a traditional principal’s license, while Ms. Hayes-Williams did not. (Id.
PageID 75; Grube Aff., PageID 282–83.) As for Ms. Hayes-Williams’s allegation that she was
not paid for working on the Black History Month production, but Mr. Lively was, Groveport
states that Mr. Lively was paid because he had a limited-assignment contract as the school’s
auditorium manager for the 2022–2023 academic year and his work on the program fell under
the duties of his contract. (Mot., PageID 76; Grube Aff., Ex. A-5, PageID 299.)
Considering the evidence presented by Groveport and unrebutted by Ms. Hayes-

Williams, the Court finds that Ms. Hayes-Williams cannot establish a prima facie claim of
discrimination based on sex, race, or age. Accordingly, Groveport’s Motion on the
discrimination claims is GRANTED.
II. Retaliation
Claims of retaliation under Title VII, the ADEA, and Title 4112 of the Ohio Revised
Code based on indirect evidence, like discrimination claims, are governed by the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework. Kenney v. Aspen Techs., Inc., 965 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir.
2020); Fox v. Eagle Distrib. Co., 510 F.3d 587, 591 (6th Cir. 2007); Greer-Burger v. Temesi,
879 N.E.2d 174, 180 (Ohio 2007). A plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation
by showing (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) the defendant knew that she exercised her
protected rights; (3) an adverse employment action was subsequently taken against her; and
(4) her protected activity was the but-for cause of the adverse employment action. Kenney, 965
F.3d at 448 (citing Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 730–31 (6th Cir. 2014)).
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, “the burden of production of evidence shifts

to the employer to ‘articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason’ for its actions.” Morris
v. Oldham Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 201 F.3d 784, 792–93 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 802). If the employer satisfies its burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
demonstrate “that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision.” Id.
(quoting Canitia v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1064, 1066 (6th Cir. 1990)).
Ms. Hayes-Williams contends that Groveport retaliated against her by terminating her as
a building substitute for reporting unequal and discriminatory treatment. (Opp., PageID 415.)
She asserts that she engaged in protected activity by making complaints of discriminatory
behavior on three occasions: a report about the volleyball situation and about the Black History
Month production, as well as a “report to Groveport Madison School District.”1 (Id. PageID

425.) Ms. Hayes-Williams appears to attribute all three complaints to her “termination” from the
school. (Id. PageID 425–26.) Ms. Hayes-Williams contends that Groveport began gathering

1 Ms. Hayes-Williams does not provide the complaints to the Court, cite to them in the record, or
specify their substance. Nor does she provide the dates of her complaints, which is relevant to the
Court’s analysis. Regarding the report to the district office, she states she “reported the
[volleyball and Black History Month production] incidents along with her removal from the
school on April 23, 2023 [sic] to the District Offices.” (ECF No. 30, PageID 420.) Groveport
appears to concede that Ms. Hayes-Williams lodged complaints in August 2022, February 2023,
and April 2023. (ECF No. 31, PageID 434.) Accordingly, the Court will consider those months
to be the relevant periods that Ms. Hayes-Williams engaged in protected activity.
documentation to terminate her after her complaint to the district office. (Opp, PageID 420–22,
425–26.) As support, she cites the following deposition testimony from Ms. Barnhouse:
Q: What was the purpose in preparing this email, Miss Barnhouse?
A: After the stay put incident, I was told that Mrs. Hayes-Williams had gone
and made a complaint over at district, and I was asked to collect
documentation.
. . .
Q: Sure. I guess I’m just trying to understand kind of what the scope of what
you were asked to find information out about was, what that scope was?
A: I think they were trying to provide documentation, and if they did not want
to have her back in the building as a substitute.
(Barnhouse Dep., 27:3–8; 61:19–62:1.)
Groveport does not appear to dispute that Ms. Hayes-Williams’s complaints constitute
protected activity. (See ECF No. 31.) Instead, Groveport argues that it did not take an adverse
employment action against Ms. Hayes-Williams because she was not a Groveport employee and
it did not terminate her. (Id. PageID 433.) It also disputes the temporal proximity and causal
connection between her protected activity and any alleged retaliation. (Id. PageID 437.) Further,
it asserts that it had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. (Id. PageID 438.)
A. Prima Facie Case of Retaliation
The Court starts with the threshold matter of whether Ms. Hayes-Williams was an
employee of Groveport. “The determination of whether a plaintiff qualifies as an employee . . . is
a mixed question of law and fact that a judge normally can make as a matter of law.” Weary v.
Cochran, 377 F.3d 522, 524 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation modified). “Under the joint employer
doctrine,2 ‘an entity that is not the plaintiff’s formal employer may be treated . . . as if it were the

2 Although neither Party frames their arguments within the joint employer doctrine, the Court
finds it is the appropriate framework based on the circumstances of this case.
employer for purposes of employment laws.’” Parks v. Lyash, No. 22-5841, 2023 WL 6237062,
at *5 (6th Cir. Apr. 12, 2023) (quoting Sanford v. Main St. Baptist Church Manor, Inc., 449 F.
App’x 488, 491 (6th Cir. 2011)). “In determining whether an entity is the plaintiff’s joint
employer, the major factors include the ‘entity’s ability to hire, fire or discipline employees,
affect their compensation and benefits, and direct and supervise their performance.’” Nethery v.

Quality Care Invs., L.P., 814 F. App’x 97, 103 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Skanska USA
Bldg., Inc., 550 F. App’x 253, 256 (6th Cir. 2013)).
Ms. Hayes-Williams was placed at Groveport after applying to ESC and then undergoing
a “review” with Groveport. (Hayes-Williams Dep., 39:11–22.) As a building substitute, Ms.
Hayes-Williams reported to the same Groveport school every day. (Id. 51:16–21.) According to
the ESC handbook, Ms. Hayes-Williams had to follow Groveport’s rules, policies, and
procedures (id. 38:20–39:2; Ex., PageID 187–88) and she attended meetings and trainings at
Groveport (id. 39:2–3). Ms. Hayes-Williams reported her hours to Groveport but her paychecks
and W-2 were issued by ESC. (Id. 41:6–9; Ex., PageID 156.) Although the Parties dispute

whether Ms. Hayes-Williams was “terminated,” there is no dispute that Groveport had the
authority to evaluate Ms. Hayes-Williams and determine whether it wanted her to continue
working at its schools. (Mot., PageID 65; ECF No. 31, PageID 433.) Viewed in a light most
favorable to Ms. Hayes-Williams, the evidence is sufficient to establish that Groveport acted as
Ms. Hayes’s joint employer for purposes of employment discrimination laws.
Next, Groveport argues that it did not take an adverse employment action against Ms.
Hayes-Williams because it did not terminate her since she “remained eligible to serve as a
substitute for other school districts” through ESC. (ECF No. 31, PageID 431, 433.) In a
retaliation context, an adverse employment action is an action that a reasonable employee would
have found to be materially adverse, meaning it “might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Laster, 746 F.3d 714, 719 (6th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006)). Because the Court
has determined that Groveport acted as a joint employer of Ms. Hayes-Williams, its decision to
“terminate” her placement at the high school constitutes an adverse action that affected her

employment at Groveport, regardless of how it affected her employment with ESC, and would
have dissuaded a reasonable employee from making a complaint. See E.E.O.C. v. Skanska USA
Bldg., Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 766, 775 (W.D. Tenn. 2015) (finding that a joint employer took an
adverse employment action against an employee by permanently removing the employee from
the worksite). Thus, Groveport took an adverse employment action against Ms. Hayes-Williams.
Next, Groveport argues that Ms. Hayes-Williams fails to establish a causal connection
between her protected activity and the adverse employment action. (ECF No. 31, PageID 437.) It
emphasizes that it took no adverse action against Ms. Hayes-Williams after her August 2022 and
February 2023 complaints. (Id.) As for the April 2023 complaint, it contends that the temporal

proximity is not enough and Ms. Hayes-Williams fails to couple temporal proximity with other
evidence of retaliatory conduct. (Id.)
To establish a causal connection, “a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence from
which an inference could be drawn that the adverse action would not have been taken had the
plaintiff not” engaged in the protected activity. Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563
(6th Cir. 2000). One way a plaintiff can establish a causal connection by showing a “very close
temporal proximity” between the adverse employment action and the protected activity. Taylor v.
Geithner, 703 F.3d 328, 339 (6th Cir. 2013). “But where some time elapses between when the
employer learns of a protected activity and the subsequent adverse employment action, the
employee must couple temporal proximity with other evidence of retaliatory conduct to establish
causality.” Wilson v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 579 F. App’x 392, 399–400 (6th Cir. 2014).
Ms. Hayes-Williams argues that temporal proximity alone is sufficient here. (Opp.,
PageID 425–26.) She incorrectly asserts that her termination was “just weeks” after her protected
activity. (Id. PageID 426.) Rather, her last complaint was in April 20233 and her termination

from Groveport was on August 8, 2023. (Hayes-Williams Dep., Ex., PageID 161.) The Court
finds that an approximately three-and-a-half-month period between the protected activity and
adverse employment action is not “very close” and thus, insufficient to establish a causal
connection in this case without other evidence of retaliatory conduct. See Basch v. Knoll, Inc.,
619 Fed. App’x 457, 461 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding a three-month period to be insufficient to
establish a causal connection absent other evidence of retaliation); Kenney v. Aspen Techs., Inc.,
965 F.3d 443, 449 (6th Cir. 2020) (finding a two-and-a-half month period, standing alone, to be
insufficient); see also Hamilton v. Gen. Elec. Co., 556 F.3d 428, 435–36 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding
that a three-month period plus heightened scrutiny were sufficient to establish causation).

Ms. Hayes-Williams argues that Ms. Barnhouse’s deposition statements establish that
Groveport gathered documentation after her complaint to retaliate against her. (See Opp., PageID
420–22, 425–26.) The Court is not convinced. First, Ms. Barnhouse’s stated that she thought the
reason for gathering documentation was to determine whether Groveport wanted Ms. Hayes-
Williams to return. Without further testimony of Ms. Barnhouse’s actual knowledge on the
matter, her testimony is too speculative to establish evidence of retaliation. See Jennings v. Cty.
of Monroe, 630 F. App’x 547, 555 (6th Cir. 2015) (“A party cannot defeat summary
judgment with conclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions.” (citation

3 See supra note 2.
modified)). Second, Groveport may have gathered documents and conducted an investigation for
a number of reasons, including to investigate the allegations in Ms. Hayes-Williams’s complaint,
as is standard practice after such a complaint is made.
Accordingly, because the temporal proximity alone is insufficient here, and Ms. Hayes-
Williams presents no other evidence of retaliatory conduct, Ms. Hayes-Williams fails to establish

a prima facie case of retaliation.
B. Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reasons and Pretext
Even if Ms. Hayes-Williams could establish a prima facie case of retaliation, she cannot
overcome Groveport’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her.
Groveport asserts that Ms. Hayes-Williams had “issues with interpersonal relationships,
communication, collaboration, and getting along with other staff members” during her time at its
schools. (Id. PageID 76–77 (citing Smathers Dep., 34:18–21; 36:19–24; 37:1–9; 37:16–23).)
Groveport states that it tolerated Ms. Hayes-Williams’s interpersonal conflicts but ultimately
chose not to welcome her back after she violated a school safety protocol by asking a student to

come to her classroom during the stay-put directive. (ECF No. 31, PageID 430–31, 434, 435–
36.) These are legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating an employee. See Goldblum
v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 62 F.4th 244, 252 (6th Cir. 2023) (finding interpersonal conflicts and
failure to follow policies to be legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for asking an employee to
resign); Yazdian v. ConMed Endoscopic Techs., Inc., 793 F.3d 634, 651 (6th Cir. 2015) (stating
that insubordination and unprofessional behavior are legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
terminating an employee). The burden thus shifts to Ms. Hayes-Williams to show pretext.
“To establish pretext, the employee must show ‘that the employer’s proferred reasons
(1) have no basis in fact; (2) did not actually motivate the action; or (3) were insufficient to
warrant the action.’” Hrdlicka v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 63 F.4th 555, 569 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting
Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., 681 F.3d 274, 285 (6th Cir. 2012)).
Ms. Hayes-Williams asserts that the incidents of her inability to get along with others “all
stemmed from incidents where she complained of disparate treatment.” (Opp., PageID 426.) But
she says nothing about Groveport’s ultimate reason for terminating her—the stay-put incident.

(See id.) As a result, she fails to establish pretext by showing that Groveport’s stated reason for
the termination, her violating a school policy, had no basis in fact, did not actually motivate the
action, or was insufficient to warrant termination.
Because Ms. Hayes-Williams cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation, and
further cannot establish pretext, Groveport’s Motion on her retaliation claims is GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, (ECF No. 24) Defendant Groveport Madison Local School
District’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Accordingly, the settlement
conference, trial date, and corresponding deadlines in this case are VACATED. (ECF No. 32.)

The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment and terminate this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
5/26/2026 s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
DATE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11362346. Public record. Not legal advice.