# Warden

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · June 11, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11362311

## Case

- **Full name:** Tejas Vishnubhai Parekh v. Warden, Pike County Correctional Facility
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** June 11, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11362311

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TEJAS VISHNUBHAI PAREKH,

Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-CV-01375
v.
(MEHALCHICK, J.)
WARDEN, PIKE COUNTY
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,

Respondent.
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner, Tejas Vishnubhai Parekh (“Parekh”) brings this petition for writ of habeas
corpus. (Doc. 1). On May 19, 2026, Parekh filed the instant petition, requesting that
Respondent Warden, Pike County Correctional Facility1 release him from custody at the Pike
County Correctional Facility in Lords Valley Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1, at 8). On May 21, 2026,
the Court issued an order to show cause, ordering Lowe to respond to Parekh’s petition and
to not transfer Parekh without further order of the Court. (Doc. 4). On May 28, 2026, Lowe
filed a response to Parekh’s petition. (Doc. 7). Parekh did not file a timely traverse. On June

1 Pursuant to the “immediate custodian rule,” the proper respondent in this case is Craig
A. Lowe (“Lowe”), Warden of Pike County Correctional Facility. “The federal habeas statute
straightforwardly provides that the proper respondent to a habeas petition is ‘the person who
has custody over [the petitioner].’” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434 (2004) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2242); 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (“[t]he writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the
person having custody of the person detained”); see Anariba v. Dir. Hudson Cnty. Corr. Ctr., 17
F.4th 434, 444 (3d Cir. 2021) (“if a § 2241 petitioner does not adhere to the immediate
custodian rule, then the district court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the petition”). However,
the government will be bound by the Court’s judgment because Lowe is acting as an agent of
the federal government by detaining Parekh on behalf of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”). See Madera v. Decker, 18 Civ. 7314, 2018 WL 10602037, at *9-*10
(S.D.N.Y. Sep. 28, 2018) (finding the warden acts as an agent of the ICE regional director
when ICE makes initial custody determinations including setting of a bond and review of
conditions of release); Santana-Rivas v. Warden of Clinton Cnty. Corr. Facility, 3:25-cv-01896,
2025 WL 3522932, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025), adopted in part, rejected in part, 2025 WL
3513152 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (finding same).
5, 2026, Lowe filed an emergency motion to rescind the Court’s no transfer order. (Doc. 10;
Doc. 11). For the following reasons, Parekh’s petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED and Lowe’s
emergency motion to rescind the Court’s no transfer order (Doc. 10) is GRANTED.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following background is derived from Parekh’s petition, Lowe’s response, and the
exhibits thereto. (Doc. 1; Doc. 7). Parekh is a citizen of India, who was admitted to the United
States on or about November 22, 2017, after marrying a United States citizen. (Doc. 1, at 5;
Doc. 7, at 2). On March 30, 2020, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
adjudicated a claim of marriage fraud against Parekh and his wife, determining that Parekh
and his wife never resided together at their claimed marital address and that Parekh’s wife
was in a relationship with another man, who she had a child with while married to Parekh.
(Doc. 7, at 3). On January 12, 2026, Parekh pled guilty to criminal attempt theft by deception

in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas. (Doc. 7, at 3). On February 25, 2026, ICE
took Parekh into custody and served him with a notice to appear, which charged Parekh as
removable for his failure to report a change of address to the Department of Homeland
Security, marriage fraud, and aggravated felony conviction. (Doc. 7, at 3-4). On April 20,
2026, an immigration judge ordered Parekh removed to India. (Doc. 7, at 4). Parekh has been
in immigration detention for fifty-one days since receiving a final order of removal. (Doc. 7,
at 4).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 2241 governs district courts’ power to grant the writ of habeas corpus.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b), the writ of habeas corpus extends to petitioners “in custody for
an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or
decree of a court or judge of the United States.” Claims where non-citizens challenge
immigration enforcement-related detention “fall within the ‘core’ of the writ of habeas corpus
and thus must be brought in habeas.” Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025) (quoting
Nance v. Ward, 597 U.S. 159, 167 (2022)). “For ‘core habeas petitions,’ ‘jurisdiction lies in

only one district: the district of confinement.’” J. G. G., 604 U.S. at 672. While reviewing a
noncitizen’s habeas petition, courts evaluate whether the government complied with
regulatory, statutory, and constitutional protections for noncitizens. See Martinez v. McAleenan,
385 F. Supp. 3d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding ICE failed to comply with regulatory and
constitutional notice requirements prior to detaining a non-citizen petitioner and granting the
petitioner’s habeas petition). A court may order a bond hearing or release if the Court
determines that a noncitizen habeas petitioner is entitled to such relief under relevant
constitutional or statutory protections. See A.L. v. Oddo, 761 F. Supp. 3d 822, 827 (W.D. Pa.
2025) (finding that a noncitizen habeas petitioner was entitled to a bond hearing under the

due process clause of the Fifth Amendment); see Munoz-Saucedo v. Pittman, 789 F. Supp. 3d
387, 400 (D.N.J. 2025) (finding petitioner’s continued detention without reasonably
imminent removal is unreasonable and ordering release).
III. JURISDICTION
“[F]ederal courts ‘have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter
jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.’” Hartig Drug Co. Inc. v.
Senju Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S.
500, 514 (2006)). 28 U.S.C. § 2241 empowers federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus
where a petitioner is “in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States . . . in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1),
(3). Recently, in Khalil v. President, United States, 164 F.4th 259, 273 (3d Cir. 2026), the Third
Circuit determined that the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) strips district courts of
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear claims arising from removal actions or proceedings, when
the claims could be addressed on a petition for review of a final order of removal (“PFR”).

However, the Third Circuit clarified that district courts retain jurisdiction over habeas
petitions presenting “now or never” questions of law, that cannot be meaningfully reviewed
later on a PFR. Kahlil, 164 F.4th at 273-74.
Habeas actions based on whether a petitioner is subject to unconstitutionally lengthy
detention remain in the jurisdiction of district courts. Kahlil, 164 F.4th at 277-79 (holding
detention-specific claims, like length and conditions-of-confinement claims, do not arise from
removal proceedings and can be addressed by district courts); see Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281, 294 (2018) (finding 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) does not present a jurisdictional bar to
challenges unrelated to review of an order of removal, the government’s decision to detain in

the first place, and the process by which removability will be determined); see also Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001) (“We conclude that § 2241 habeas corpus proceedings remain
available as a forum for statutory and constitutional challenges to post-removal-period
detention.”). The question of whether a petitioner’s detention has been unconstitutionally
long is wholly collateral to removal proceedings and cannot be meaningfully reviewed on a
PFR. Kahlil, 164 F.4th at 278-79 (finding that length of confinement claim “does not get
channeled into the PFR review process”). Thus, the Court retains jurisdiction over the legal
question of whether Parekh’s detention after his order of removal became final has become
unconstitutionally prolonged and unrelated to the purpose of removal. Jennings, 583 U.S. at
294; Kahlil, 164 F.4th at 274-79; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688.2
IV. DISCUSSION
Parekh contends that ICE’s detention of him without a clear basis is unlawful because

he entered the United States lawfully via the CBP One process and had lawful permanent
resident status in the United States. (Doc. 1, at 5). Lowe counters that Parekh’s request for
relief is premature because his detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 has not become unreasonable.
(Doc. 7, at 10). Lowe avers that Parekh is also subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c) because of Parekh’s marriage fraud and felony conviction. (Doc. 7, at 13-14). Lowe
further submits that the Court lacks the authority to direct him to not transfer Parekh, and as
such, the Court’s do not transfer order (Doc. 4) should be lifted. (Doc. 7, at 16). In Lowe’s
emergency motion, he reasserts that the Court’s do not transfer order (Doc. 4) should be lifted
because ICE counsel advised that Parekh will be removed to India on or about June 25, 2026.

(Doc. 10; Doc. 11, at 3; Doc. 11-2, at 2).
Section 1231 of the INA provides for the detention of noncitizens with final orders of
removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231, “when an alien is ordered removed,
the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90
days.” Noncitizens convicted of certain criminal offenses and noncitizens whom the Attorney

2 Parekh’s petition is focused on his immigration detention without a clear basis. (Doc. 1,
at 6). However, to the extent Parekh requests to remain in the United States, the Court does
not have jurisdiction to review Parekh’s order of removal. (Doc. 1, at 5). 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)
and § 1252(g) strip district courts of jurisdiction to review claims arising from removal actions
or proceedings. Kahlil, 164 F.4th at 273-74. Parekh’s request to remain in the United States is
directly related to his removal proceedings, which can be properly reviewed on appeal to the
Board of Immigration Appeals or with a PFR to the Third Circuit. Kahlil, 164 F.4th at 273-
74.
General finds to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with an order of removal
may be detained beyond the ninety-day removal period. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690-91 (2001), the Supreme Court found that
indefinite detention of a noncitizen with a final order of removal violates the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and that detention of a noncitizen with a final order of
removal must be limited with a definite endpoint. The Supreme Court determined that to
discern whether such post-order of removal detention comports with the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, habeas courts must ask whether the detention “exceeds a period
reasonably necessary to secure removal.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699. The Supreme Court
found that detention post-order of removal is presumed reasonable for a period under six
months. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. After the presumptively reasonable six-month period runs
and the detained noncitizen “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond

with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. As the period of
confinement grows, what counts as reasonably foreseeable future conversely shrinks.
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. If removal is ultimately not reasonably foreseeable, habeas courts
should hold continued detention unreasonable and order release. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699-
700.
Parekh has only been detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 for fifty-one days, while the
government has attempted to facilitate his removal to India. (Doc. 7, at 4). Accordingly,
Parekh’s ninety-day removal period has not yet run. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231. Even if Parekh’s
ninety-day removal period and presumptively reasonable six-month period of § 1231

detention had run, with the government’s designation of Parekh on a June 25, 2026 removal
flight, it is inarguable that there is a significant likelihood of Parekh’s removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699-700. As Parekh’s fifty-one days
of detention under § 1231 have not exceeded a period reasonably necessary to secure removal
and Lowe has demonstrated that Parekh’s removal is imminent, Parekh’s detention does not

violate the due process. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699. Accordingly, Parekh’s petition for writ
of habeas corpus is DENIED. (Doc. 1).
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Parekh’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
(Doc. 1). With the habeas action resolved, Lowe’s emergency motion to rescind the no
transfer order is GRANTED. (Doc. 10). The Court rescinds paragraph seven of its May 21,
2026 order, which directed Lowe to not transfer Parekh. (Doc. 4, at 2). The Clerk of Court is
directed to close this matter.

An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:

Dated: June 11, 2026 /s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11362311. Public record. Not legal advice.