# Warden

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · June 11, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11362297

## Case

- **Full name:** Keeni Octavio Zapata Arzu v. Warden, Pike County Correctional Center, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** June 11, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KEENI OCTAVIO ZAPATA ARZU,
Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-CV-01241
v.
(MEHALCHICK, J.)
WARDEN, PIKE COUNTY
CORRECTIONAL CENTER, et al.
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner, Keeni Octavio Zapata Arzu (“Arzu”), a Honduran citizen, brings this
petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1). On May 8, 2026, Arzu filed the instant petition,
requesting that Respondents Todd Lyons, Markwayne Mullin, Todd Blanche, and the
Warden of the Pike Correctional Facility1 release him from custody at the Pike Correctional

1 The proper respondent in this case is Craig Lowe (“Lowe”), Warden of Pike County
Correctional Center. See Conde v. Lowe, et al., No. 3:26-CV-01202, 2026 WL 1507699, at *1
n.1 (M.D. Pa. May 29, 2026) (recognizing Lowe as the Warden of Pike County Correctional
Center and the proper respondent for petitions filed by Pike County inmates). “The federal
habeas statute straightforwardly provides that the proper respondent to a habeas petition is
‘the person who has custody over [the petitioner].’” Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 434 (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2242); 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (“[t]he writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the
person having custody of the person detained”); see Anariba v. Dir. Hudson Cnty. Corr. Ctr., 17
F.4th 434, 444 (3d Cir. 2021) (“if a § 2241 petitioner does not adhere to the immediate
custodian rule, then the district court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the petition”). As Arzu is
detained at Pike, Lowe is the proper respondent. (Doc. 1, at 1; Doc. 4, at 1); see Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. at 434; see also Phan, 2026 WL 1080390, at *1 n.1. As such, all respondents except for
Lowe are DISMISSED. However, the government will be bound by the Court’s judgment
because Lowe is acting as an agent of the federal government by detaining Arzu on behalf of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). See Madera v. Decker, 18 Civ. 7314, 2018
WL 10602037, at *9-*10 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 28, 2018) (finding the warden acts as an agent of the
ICE regional director when ICE makes initial custody determinations including setting of a
bond and review of conditions of release); Santana-Rivas v. Warden of Clinton Cnty. Corr.
Facility, 3:25-cv-01896, 2025 WL 3522932, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025), adopted in part,
rejected in part, 2025 WL 3513152 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (finding same).
Facility (“Pike”) in Lords Valley, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1). On May 15, 2026, Lowe filed a
response to Arzu’s petition, and on May 26, 2026, Arzu filed a traverse. (Doc. 4; Doc. 5). For
the following reasons, Arzu’s petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED, and Lowe is ORDERED to
release Arzu from custody.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The following background derives from Arzu’s petition, Lowe’s response, and the
exhibits thereto. (Doc. 1; Doc. 4). Arzu is a citizen of Honduras who was removed from the
United States to Honduras on May 18, 2011. (Doc. 4, at 3). On or about September 8, 2024,
Arzu entered the United States and was admitted. (Doc. 1, ¶ 10). Pursuant to an arrest warrant
dated April 15, 2025, Arzu was arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
arrested Arzu in New York, New York during a routine check-in appointment. (Doc. 1, ¶ 13;
Doc. 4, at 3; Doc. 4-4, at 2). Since then, Arzu has remained in immigration custody and is
currently detained at Pike. (Doc. 1, ¶ 14). On April 14, 2026, the Immigration Judge denied

Arzu’s protection from removal applications and ordered him removal to Honduras. (Doc. 4-
6, at 2-5). On May 13, 2026, Arzu filed a timely appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”). (Doc. 5-1, at 2-8).
On May 8, 2026, Arzu filed his petition. (Doc. 1). On May 15, 2026, Lowe filed a
response. (Doc. 4). On May 26, 2026, Arzu filed a traverse. (Doc. 5). Accordingly, this matter
is ripe and ready for disposition.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 2241 governs district courts’ power to grant the writ of habeas corpus.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b), the writ of habeas corpus extends to petitioners “in custody for

an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or
decree of a court or judge of the United States.” Claims where non-citizens challenge
immigration enforcement-related detention “fall within the ‘core’ of the writ of habeas corpus
and thus must be brought in habeas.” Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025) (quoting
Nance v. Ward, 597 U.S. 159, 167 (2022)). “For ‘core habeas petitions,’ ‘jurisdiction lies in

only one district: the district of confinement.’” J. G. G., 604 U.S. at 672. While reviewing a
noncitizen’s habeas petition, courts evaluate whether the government complied with
regulatory, statutory, and constitutional protections for noncitizens. See Martinez v. McAleenan,
385 F. Supp. 3d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding ICE failed to comply with regulatory and
constitutional notice requirements prior to detaining a non-citizen petitioner and granting the
petitioner’s habeas petition). A court may order a bond hearing or release if the Court
determines that a noncitizen habeas petitioner is entitled to such relief under relevant
constitutional or statutory protections. See A.L. v. Oddo, 761 F. Supp. 3d 822, 827 (W.D. Pa.
2025) (finding that a noncitizen habeas petitioner was entitled to a bond hearing under the

due process clause of the Fifth Amendment); see Cantu-Cortes v. O’Neill, No. 25-cv-6338, 2025
WL 3171639, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025) (finding a habeas petitioner was entitled to a
bond hearing under relevant statutory protections); see also Alexey Kashranov v. J.L. Jamison, et
al., No. 2:25-CV-05555, 2025 WL 3188399 at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2025) (finding that the
appropriate remedy when the government detains a petitioner under an inapplicable statute,
violating due process, is release from custody).
III. JURISDICTION
“[F]ederal courts ‘have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter
jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.’” Hartig Drug Co. Inc. v.

Senju Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S.
500, 514 (2006)). 28 U.S.C. § 2241 empowers federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus
where a petitioner is “in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States . . . in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1),
(3). Recently, in Khalil v. President, United States, 164 F.4th 259, 273 (3d Cir. 2026), the Third

Circuit determined that the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) strips district courts of
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear claims arising from removal actions or proceedings, when
the claims could be addressed on a petition for review of a final order of removal (“PFR”).
However, the Third Circuit clarified that district courts retain jurisdiction over habeas
petitions presenting “now or never” questions of law, that cannot be meaningfully reviewed
later on a PFR. Kahlil, 164 F.4th at 273-74.
Habeas actions based on whether a petitioner is detained pursuant to the appropriate
statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) or 8 U.S.C. § 1226, and is entitled to a bond hearing, are “now or
never” legal questions that remain in the jurisdiction of district courts. See Kahlil, 164 F.4th at

274-77; see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018) (finding 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)
does not present a jurisdictional bar to challenges unrelated to review of an order of removal,
the government’s decision to detain in the first place, and the process by which removability
will be determined). A determination of whether § 1225(b) or § 1226(a) applies to a petitioner
also determines whether that petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing. See Matter of Yajure
Baptiste, 29 I. & N. Dec. 126 (BIA 2025) (holding immigration judges lack authority to hear
bond requests for noncitizens detained under § 1225(b)); see Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399 at
*5 (citing § 1226(a)) (finding § 1226(a) allows for detainees to be released on conditional parole
or bond). Such claims do not arise from removal proceedings, they arise “now.” If left to be

raised on a PFR, the petitioner will never get the opportunity for an immigration judge to
determine their eligibility for bond during removal proceedings. See Kahlil, 164 F.4th at 274-
77 (“when [noncitizens] raise claims that courts cannot ‘meaningfully’ review through the
PFR process, those claims do not ‘aris[e] from’ the ‘action[s] taken’ or ‘proceeding[s] brought’
to remove them”). Thus, the Court retains jurisdiction over Arzu’s habeas petition because

the legal questions of whether § 1225(b) or § 1226 applies to Arzu and whether Arzu is entitled
to a bond hearing are wholly collateral to his removal proceedings and cannot be
meaningfully reviewed on a PFR. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 294; Kahlil, 164 F.4th at 274-79.
IV. DISCUSSION
In his petition, Arzu claims unlawful detention and violations of his due process rights
under the Fifth Amendment. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 24-55). In response, Lowe argues that 8 U.S.C. §
1231 authorizes Arzu’s detention. (Doc. 4, at 4-7). The Court will first address whether Arzu
should be properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The Court will then assess whether
Arzu’s detention violates due process.

A. ARZU’S DETENTION FALLS UNDER 8 U.S.C. § 1226(A).
Arzu avers that he should be detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which entitles him to
a bond hearing. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 36-37; Doc. 5, at 2). Lowe contends that Arzu is detained pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and “is mandatorily detained during the 90-day ‘removal period.’”2 (Doc.
4, at 1) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)).

2 Section 1231 of the INA provides for the detention of noncitizens with final orders of
removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231, “when an alien is ordered removed,
the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90
days.” Noncitizens convicted of certain criminal offenses and noncitizens whom the Attorney
General finds to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with an order of removal
may be detained beyond the 90-day removal period. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). Here, § 1231 does
not apply because there is no final order of removal. Arzu sought review of The Immigration
Judge’s April 14, 2026 decision (Doc. 5-1, at 2-8), and the BIA received the Notice of Appeal
on May 26, 2026. The case is currently pending.
The INA is a comprehensive statute regulating immigration, which Congress has
repeatedly reworked since its enactment in 1952. Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *1. Before
1996, the INA provided that noncitizens who presented themselves at ports of entry were
subject to mandatory detention during exclusion proceedings, while noncitizens who evaded

inspection by entering elsewhere were afforded the opportunity to obtain release during
deportation proceedings. Matter of Yajure Correa, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 222-223 (BIA 2025)
(citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a); 1251 (1994)). In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) amended the INA to include § 1225 and § 1226, in
part, to end the preferential treatment of noncitizens who evaded inspection when entering
the United States. OMNIBUS CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1997, PL
104–208, September 30, 1996, 110 Stat 3009; H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, at 225 (1996); see Correa,
29 I. & N. Dec. at 223. With the IIRIRA, Congress eliminated separate exclusion and
deportation hearings and combined them into a single removal proceeding, regardless of

where the noncitizen entered the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Since 1996, only
noncitizens who are admitted are subject to deportation, while noncitizens who have never
been formally admitted are deemed inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) of the INA provides that “in the case of an alien who is an
applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained
[pending removal hearings].” Pursuant to this provision, noncitizens are subject to mandatory
detention while their removal proceedings are pending, but they may be released “for urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (citing §
1182(d)(5)(A)); Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *1. To trigger § 1225(b)(2)(A), an examining
immigration officer must determine that an individual is (1) an applicant for admission, (2)
seeking admission, and (3) not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted. Martinez v.
Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d, 211, 214 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025), Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at
*6. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to a noncitizen who is both an “applicant for

admission” and “seeking admission.” Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6; Soto v. Soto, 807
F. Supp. 3d 397, 408 (D.N.J. 2025) (collecting cases).
The INA defines an applicant for admission as a noncitizen who is “present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” § 1225(a)(1);
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 286. The phrase “alien seeking admission” is not defined in § 1225, so
the Court must construe the phrase based upon its ordinary meaning and statutory context.
See Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6; see also J.A.M. v. Streeval, No. 4:25-cv-34 2, 2025 WL
3050094, at *5 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2025). District courts in the Third Circuit and across the
country have found that “seeking admission” describes active and ongoing conduct, such as

physically attempting to come into the United States at a border or port of entry. Kashranov,
2025 WL 3188399, at *6; Del Cid v. Bondi, No 3:25-cv-00304, 2025 WL 2985150, at *16 n. 7
(W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2025); J.A.M., 2025 WL 3050094, at *3; Ochoa Ochoa v. Noem, No. 25 CV
10865, 2025 WL 2938779, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2025); see Cantu-Cortes, 2025 WL 3171639,
at *2 (quoting Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 25-cv-01542, 2025 WL2676082, at *13 (D. Nev. Sept. 17,
2025)) (finding a noncitizen who has already been residing in the United States cannot be
characterized as “seeking entry” consistent with the ordinary meaning of that phrase). This
reading comports with the Supreme Court’s finding in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583, U.S. 281,
285 (2018), that § 1225(b) “applies primarily to aliens seeking entry into the United States,”

those who are “seeking admission into the country.” See Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 407. This
reading also preserves a distinction between “seeking admission” and the separate term
“applicant for admission,” ensuring that each phrase carries independent meaning. Kashranov,
2025 WL 3188399, at *6.
Section 1226 of the INA applies to noncitizens who are not seeking admission but are

already present in the United States. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288-89. Section 1226(a) provides
that “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” The
Attorney General may release a noncitizen on bond or conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a)(2). Pursuant to § 1226(a), “[i]mmigration authorities make an initial custody
determination, after which the noncitizen may request a bond hearing before an immigration
judge.” Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *1 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1)). At their
bond hearing, a noncitizen “may secure his release if he can convince the officer or
immigration judge that he poses no flight risk and no danger to the community.” Nielsen v.

Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397-98 (2019); see Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *1.
On July 8, 2025, ICE and the Department of Justice announced a new practice, in
which all applicants for admission, regardless of when the noncitizens were apprehended, are
now subject to the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A). Interim Guidance
Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission,
https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-
for-applications-for-admission (last visited June 10, 2026). On September 5, 2025, the BIA
adopted the DOJ’s new position, holding that immigration judges have no authority to
consider bond requests for any person who entered the United States without admission,

finding all applicants for admission are subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and are
ineligible for release on bond. Matter of Yajure Correa, 29 I. &N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). District
courts across the country, including courts in the Third Circuit, reject this new policy and the
application of § 1225(b)(2)(A) to noncitizens who have been residing in the United States for
a period of time before they are detained by ICE pending removal proceedings. Cantu-Cortes,

2025 WL 3171639, at *2 (finding that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), is applicable to a
petitioner who resided in the United States for approximately 25 years before ICE detained
him); Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *1 (finding “mandatory detention only applies for
aliens who are “seeking admission,” and petitioner who lived in the United States for almost
two years was not seeking admission but was “already here”); Del Cid v. Bondi, 2025 WL
2985150 at *14-17 (finding noncitizens who had been in the United States for over two years
when arrested are subject to § 1226(a), not § 1225); Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 408 (collecting
cases). The Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have similarly found
that § 1226 and not § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to noncitizens detained after residing in the
country for an extended period of time.3 See Cunha v. Freden, No. 25-3141-PR, 2026 WL

1146044 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 2026); see also Castanon-Nava v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 25-
3050, 2026 WL 1223250, at *21 (7th Cir. May 5, 2026); see also Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden,
Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami, No. 25-14065, 2026 WL 1243395, at *21 (11th Cir. May 6, 2026)
Section 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to Arzu’s detention. Arzu should have
been detained under § 1226(a) because he was arrested by immigration officers and detained
after he had been in the United States for seven months and ICE arrested him pursuant to a

3 The Court acknowledges that the Fifth Circuit and Eighth Circuit recently issued
decisions in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 503 (5th Cir. 2026) and Avila v. Bondi,
170 F.4th 1128, 1138 (8th Cir. 2026) respectively, both holding that under the INA an
“applicant for admission” is necessarily someone who is “seeking admission.” However,
Buenrostro-Mendez and Avila are not binding on the Court.
warrant consistent with the language of § 1226(a). (Doc. 4, at 3; Doc. 4-4, at 2); see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) (stating “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested
and detained”); see also Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (“U.S. immigration law authorizes the
Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1)

and (b)(2) . . . [and] to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of
removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c)”); see also Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 403. Section
1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to Arzu because Arzu is not seeking admission into the United
States, and Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to noncitizens who are applicants for admission and
are seeking admission to the United States. See Martinez, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 214; see Kashranov,
2025 WL 3188399, at *6; see also Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d 397, at 408. Arzu is not actively
attempting to come into the United States. Arzu has lived in the United States since 2024.
(Doc. 1, ¶ 10; Doc. 4, at 3). Based on the plain meaning of the phrase “seeking admission,”
Arzu sought admission when he entered the United States in 2024. (Doc. 4, at 3). Instead, §

1226(a) applies to applicants for admission, like Arzu, who are not actively seeking admission
but who have been residing in the United States for an extended period. See e.g. Kashranov,
2025 WL 3188399, at *1 (finding “mandatory detention only applies for aliens who are
‘seeking admission,’” and petitioner who lived in the United States for almost two years was
not seeking admission but “already here”). Accordingly, Lowe should have detained Arzu
under § 1226(a).
B. LOWE VIOLATED ARZU’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY IMPROPERLY SUBJECTING
HIM TO MANDATORY DETENTION.

Lowe’s continued mandatory detention of Arzu violates his procedural due process
rights. Arzu avers that Lowe detaining him without any individualized custody hearing
violates his procedural due process rights. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 48-49).
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment “applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including [noncitizens],
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis,

533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). To determine whether a government action violates due process,
courts apply the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). The
Mathews balancing test weighs: (1) the private interest implicated by the government action;
(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation and the probable value of additional safeguards; and
(3) the government’s interest, including administrative burdens of additional procedures.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334.
The first factor, private interest implicated by the government action, weighs heavily
in Arzu’s favor because Lowe has deprived Arzu of his physical liberty through improper
detention without the possibility of bond under § 1226(a). Hamdi v. Rumsfield, 542 U.S. 507,

529 (2004) (“[T]he most elemental of liberty interests [is] the interest in being free from
physical detention by [the] government.”); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (“Freedom from
imprisonment-from government custody, detention, or forms, of physical restraint-lies at the
heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects”); Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 409. The
second factor, risk of erroneous deprivation and probable value of additional safeguards, also
weighs heavily in Arzu’s favor because he remains erroneously detained without the
possibility of release on bond pursuant to § 1226(a). See Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 409 (citing
Barrios v. Shepley, No. 1:25-cv-00406-JAW, 2025 WL 2772579, at *11 (D. Me. Sept. 29,
2025)); see also Zumba v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-14626, 2025 WL 2753496, at *10 (D.N.J. Sept. 26,

2025)) (finding the second Mathews factor weighs in petitioner’s favor when subject to
erroneous detention without a showing from the government that petitioner presented a
public safety or flight risk); see also Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *5 (finding the lack of
any individualized assessment creates a high risk of error). The third Mathews factor, the
government’s interest, also weighs in Arzu’s favor. Generally, the government’s interest in

detaining noncitizens is to ensure the appearance of noncitizens at future immigration
proceedings and to prevent danger to the community. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Soto, 807 F.
Supp. 3d at 409-10. Here, Lowe does not allege that Arzu poses a flight risk or danger to the
community. (See Doc. 4). Rather, the record shows that Arzu complied with ICE’s directives
by reporting to his check-in appointments. (Doc. 1, ¶ 13). As each Mathews factor weighs in
Arzu’s favor, Lowe’s mandatory detention of Arzu violates Arzu’s procedural due process
rights. Accordingly, Arzu’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED, and Lowe is
ORDERED to release Arzu from custody.
V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Arzu’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED.
(Doc. 1). Lowe is ORDERED to release Arzu from custody. Arzu may move to reopen this
matter if the government seeks to detain him under § 1226(a) and fails to schedule a timely
bond hearing. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this matter.
An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

Dated: June 11, 2026 /s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11362297. Public record. Not legal advice.