# Ramirez

> District Court, M.D. Tennessee · July 2, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11362201

## Case

- **Full name:** Jose Atanacio Ramirez v. Christopher Bullock, Field Office Director, New Orleans Field Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, in his official capacity, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Tennessee
- **Decided:** July 2, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

JOSE ATANACIO RAMIREZ, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) NO. 3:26-cv-00888
)
CHRISTOPHER BULLOCK, Field Office ) JUDGE RICHARDSON
Director, New Orleans Field Office, U.S. )
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, in )
his official capacity, et al., )
)
Respondents. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is the “Corrected Emergency Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction,”1 which was made “pursuant to Rule 65(b)2 of the

1 The Motion’s title suggests that Petitioner is seeking both a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and a
preliminary injunction via the Motion. However, the Court discerns that Petitioner, via his Motion, in
substance instead is requesting that the Court issue a TRO now and that the requested TRO (if granted)
later be converted to a preliminary injunction.

2 Although Petitioner asserts that the Motion is made pursuant to Rule 65(b)—which expressly relates
specifically and exclusively to TROs issued without notice—the Court discerns that the Motion in reality
is made pursuant to Rule 65 as a whole, which encompasses TROs issued with notice as well as TROs
issued without notice. That is, the Court finds that the Motion amounts to a request for a TRO to be issued
with notice, given that (1) Petitioner’s Counsel has certified that he has “caused a copy of [the Motion] to
be served, via electronic mail” on Respondents’ counsel (Doc. No. 6 at 11), (2) Petitioner’s counsel—
according to his sworn Declaration (Doc. No. 6-6)—has “conferred with Assistant U.S. Attorney Mercedes
Maynor and ERO Nashville leadership” (id. at 4), and (3) counsel for Respondents has appeared in this
action (Doc. No. 8).
As suggested above, to the extent that Rule 65 as a whole (as opposed to Rule 65(b) in particular)
addresses TROs (as opposed to preliminary injunctions), it does not contemplate only TROs being issued
without written notice. Indeed, Rule 65(c) refers to TROs, without limiting the reference to TROs issued
without notice. And nowhere does Rule 65 say either that the only kind of cognizable TRO is a TRO issued
without notice to the adverse party, or that a motion is not cognizable as one for a “TRO”—even if it
requests immediate temporary injunctive relief—unless it requests a TRO to be without such notice.
Moreover, Rule 65(b)(1)’s plain purpose is simply to prescribe rules specifically for when there is no notice,
and Rule 65(b)(1) thus has nothing to say about whether an order issued with notice properly can be
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Middle District of Tennessee Local Rule 65.01, and
Administrative Order No. 17” (Doc. No. 6, “Motion”), filed by Petitioner, Jose Luis Atanacio
Ramirez. The Motion is supported by a proposed order (Doc. No. 6-1, “Proposed Order”), the
Sworn Declaration of Aaron Dendy, Esq. (Doc. No. 6-6, “Declaration”), various exhibits (Doc.

Nos. 6-2 – 6-5 and 6-7, collectively the “Exhibits”), and a notice of supplemental authority (Doc.
No. 11, “Notice of Supplemental Authority”) accompanied by two exhibits thereto (Doc. Nos. 11-
1 – 11-2).
For the reasons described below, the Motion (Doc. No. 6) is DENIED.

considered a TRO rather than, say, a preliminary injunction. Furthermore, the other subsections of Rule
65(b) have the same purpose and likewise have nothing to say about whether an order issued with notice
properly can be considered a TRO. For example, Rule 65(b)(2) provides that “[e]very temporary restraining
order issued without notice must state the date and hour it was issued . . . [and] expires at the time after
entry—not to exceed 14 days.” Rule 65(b)(3) provides that “[i]f the order is issued without notice, the
motion for a preliminary injunction must be set for hearing at the earliest possible time.” And Rule 65(b)(4)
provides that “[o]n 2 days’ notice to the party who obtained the order without notice—or on shorter notice
set by the court—the adverse party may appear and move to dissolve or modify the order.” Each of these
subsections leaves open the possibility that an order can properly be a TRO even if it is issued with notice.
And each plainly implies that there is such a thing as a TRO issued with notice; after all, if there were no
such thing—i.e., if an order cannot be a TRO if it is issued with notice—why would these subsections make
plain that they are applicable only when a TRO is issued without notice?
All of this (as well as experience) tells the undersigned that there is such a thing as a TRO that is issued
with notice; this is commonly understood by courts. E.g., In re Reynolds, No. 23-22086, 2023 WL
11853230, at *3 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Sept. 1, 2023) (“A temporary restraining order is a temporary order
entered in an action, often without notice . . . .” (emphasis added)). In other words, a request can properly
be deemed a request for a TRO even if it is issued with notice.
These observations do raise one (important) question, however. As observed, TROs issued with notice
are not within the scope of Rule 65(b)’s provisions governing how long a TRO remains in effect, and only
Rule 65(b) says anything about how long a TRO can remain in effect (14 days before (1) expiring
completely; (2) being extended for good cause or by the consent of the party subject to the TRO; or (3)
being converted into a preliminary injunction). So, how long can a TRO issued with notice remain in effect?
At least for the purposes of this Motion, the Court will borrow, in its discretion, the 14-day maximum
duration provided in Rule 65(b)(2) and the other provisions in Rule 65(b) governing the duration for no-
notice TROs and apply it to TROs issued with notice (like that requested by Petitioner via the Motion).
Notably, this 14-day maximum duration is the same duration of time that Petitioner has provided for his
requested TRO (via the Proposed Order) to be enforceable. (Doc. No. 6-1 at 5). In other words, Petitioner’s
requested TRO, if it were granted, would be in effect, unless extended for good cause or by the consent of
the party subject to the TRO or otherwise transformed into a preliminary injunction, for a maximum of 14
days.
BACKGROUND3
1. Factual Background
On June 29, 2026, Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”)4 Nashville officials
detained Petitioner at a scheduled court appearance in Robertson County, Tennessee. (Doc. No. 6-

6 at ¶ 5). At 3:56 PM that same day, counsel for Petitioner submitted an urgent administrative
custody redetermination request to ERO Nashville leadership, citing Petitioner’s 11-year
continuous residence in Middle Tennessee, his active business ownership of White Electric LLC,
his derivative asylum claim, and his clean criminal record. (Id. at ¶ 6). At 4:27 PM counsel for
Petitioner “received an email response from Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer
(SDDO) Amber Elmasry, summarily asserting unproven administrative allegations of ‘document
fraud’ regarding employment to deny release.” (Id. at ¶ 7). Notably, Petitioner “has no criminal
charges or convictions for document fraud or any other felony,” and his “criminal record consists
exclusively of two minor, non-violent traffic citations from December 2025.” (Id. at ¶ 7).
At 4:58 PM, ERO Assistant Field Office Director (“AFOD”) Paul Gray (“Gray”) issued a

final email denial of release, wherein Gray made the following statement: “[Petitioner] has resided
in the United States by your account for more than 1 year and is just now filing for Asylum.” (Id.
at ¶ 8 (quoting Doc. No. 6-2 at 1)). Thereafter, Petitioner filed the “Emergency Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief” (Doc. No. 1 “Petition”)—wherein Petitioner “contest[ed] the capricious and unlawful

3 The following facts asserted by Petitioner are, unless somehow qualified herein (as for example by
“Petitioner alleges that”), taken as true for purposes of the Motion (though not necessarily for any future
purposes in this litigation), because they are either: (1) (a) evidentially supported at least to some degree by
Petitioner; and (b) plausible; or (2) subject to judicial notice. The Court notes that it is erring on Petitioner’s
side when accepting for present purposes that an alleged fact is true merely because it is plausible.

4 Notably, ERO is one of the operational directorates within U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
administrative imprisonment of [Petitioner], as well as the immediate, bad-faith efforts by U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) to relocate him from this judicial district to a
remote Louisiana site.” (Id. at 1). Via his Petition, Petitioner asserted three claims: (1) “Violation
of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause & Statutory Right to Counsel (Right to Counsel of

Choice and Interference with Pending Administrative Relief)” (Count I) (“Right to Counsel
Claim”); (2) “Violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause under Lopez-Campos v.
Raycraft[, 175 F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 2026)] (Unlawful Mandatory Detention of a Long-Term Interior
Resident)” (Count II) (“Due Process Claim”); and (3) “Abuse of Discretion and Arbitrary and
Capricious Agency Action” (Count III) (“Abuse of Discretion Claim”). (Id. at 6-7). The filing of
the Petition was followed by the filing of the initial motion for TRO (Doc. No. 2), which was
denied—via the Court’s June 30 order (Doc. No. 5)—without prejudice due to procedural defects.
On June 30, 2026, the Memphis Immigration Court clerk’s office rejected Petitioner’s
initial bond motion. (Doc. No. 6-6 at ¶ 11). The formal rejection notice (Doc. No. 6-7, “Rejection
Notice”) stated that the filing was rejected because the court was “UNABLE TO LOCATE IN

THE DETAINED LOCATOR DUE TO RESP BEING MINOR.” (Doc. No. 6-6 at ¶ 11 (quoting
Doc. No. 6-7)). According to counsel for Petitioner, the rejection was a result of two compounding
administrative errors: (1) the clerk’s office mistakenly categorizing Petitioner as a “minor,” and
(2) a lag in ICE’s Online Detainee Locator.5 (Id.). Counsel for Petitioner immediately—and that
same day—refiled the corrected bond package, which clarified Petitioner’s correct age, verified
Petitioner’s physical detention location, and noted that online database lags do not limit the court’s
jurisdiction. (Id. at ¶ 12).

5 More specifically, counsel for Petitioner asserted that “[Petitioner’s] public profile at the time displayed
‘Call ICE For Details’ rather than listing his actual physical facility, despite him being in ERO physical
custody since June 29.” (Doc. No. 6-6 at ¶ 11(b)).
ICE is currently executing a rapid transit operation to relocate the Petitioner from
Tennessee, with the intention of transporting Petitioner overland or via air to a remote contract
detention facility in Louisiana. (Id. at ¶ 13, Doc. No. 6 at 3). As for Petitioner, he “suffers from
severe, chronic medical conditions, specifically Type 2 Diabetes, Hypertension, and High

Cholesterol [3]” and “requires strict, uninterrupted daily medication and monitoring.” (Doc. No.
6-6 at ¶ 15).
2. Relief Sought via the Motion and Accompanying Filings
Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion (Doc. No. 6). Via the Motion, Petitioner
moves for the immediate entry of a TRO enjoining the Respondents, their officers, agents, and all
persons acting in active concert or participation with them, from:
1. Transferring, moving, or transporting the Petitioner, Jose Luis Atanacio Ramirez
(A-Number: A262-360-276), outside the geographic jurisdiction of the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee or the jurisdiction of the
Memphis Immigration Court;

2. Relocating the Petitioner to any facility that disrupts his immediate face-to-face
legal access to and communication with his Nashville-based counsel of record,
Aaron Dendy, Esq.; and

3. Taking any administrative action that would interfere with, moot, or foreclose
his pending Motion for Custody Redetermination currently filed before the
Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”), Memphis Immigration Court.

(Id. at 1-2). The Proposed Order requests additionally that the Court order Respondents to show
cause as to “why this Court should not enter a Preliminary Injunction.” (Doc. No. 6-1 at 5).
LEGAL STANDARD
A “TRO is an extraordinary and drastic remedy . . . .” Ahrouch v. Boulakhrif, No. 2:25-
CV-02535-SHL-CGC, 2025 WL 1490494, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. May 23, 2025) (quoting Proctor &
Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 226 (6th Cir. 1996)). Those seeking a TRO (or, for
that matter, a preliminary injunction)6 must meet four requirements.7 They must show a likelihood
of success on the merits; irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction; the balance of equities

6 The standards for evaluating a request for both a TRO and a preliminary injunction are the same. G.S. ex
rel. Schwaigert v. Lee, 558 F. Supp. 3d 601, 607 (W.D. Tenn. 2021). Thus, in addressing Petitioner’s request
for a TRO, the Court will, at times, invoke case law that addresses requests for preliminary injunctions
rather than requests for TROs.

7 Published Sixth Circuit case law stands unmistakably for the proposition that these four items are factors
rather than requirements, except that irreparable harm is a requirement (and, if it exists and thus keeps the
possibility of a TRO alive, thereafter becomes a factor to be balanced along with the other three factors).
See, e.g., D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Sch., 942 F.3d 324, 326–27 (6th Cir. 2019). Alas, this case law is inconsistent
with other (including more recent) Sixth Circuit case law and with Supreme Court cases (including Winter)
that describe these as all being requirements (i.e., things that must be established. See, e.g., id. at 328, 329
(Nabaldian, J., concurring) (noting that “[Winter]’s language seems clear—a plaintiff must establish the
factors” and questioning “whether the balancing analysis itself aligns with Winter.”).
Notably, other courts have likewise treated the four items as requirements (prerequisites), rather than as
factors. E.g., Southern Poverty Law Ctr. V. United States Dep’t Homeland Sec., No. 18-760 (CKK), 2020
WL 3265533, *10 (D.D.C. June 17, 2020); Transatlantic, LLC v. Humana, Inc., 8:13–CV– 1925–T–
17TBM, 2013 WL 3958361, *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2013).
The Court believes that it needs to choose between the two approaches—even if the substance or the
outcome of the Motion does not turn on such choice—because the approach does dictate how a court goes
about explaining its analysis and decision on a motion for preliminary injunction. And the Court believes
that it should follow the latter line of cases, i.e., those that treat the standard as involving requirements
rather than factors.
First, explaining and applying the standard in terms of requirements is substantially more straightforward
than the alternative—which is to explain that the four items are factors to be balanced, except that, well,
that’s only partially true because actually irreparable harm is a requirement (but also, if it exists, then a
factor to be balanced along with the other factors) and likelihood of success (at least to some minimal
extent) is also required. D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Sch., 942 F.3d 324, 326–27 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Thus, although
the extent of an injury may be balanced against other factors, the existence of an irreparable injury is
mandatory.”); S. Glazer’s Distribs. of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co., 860 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir.
2017) (noting that it is reversible error for a district court to issue a preliminary injunction “where there is
simply no likelihood of success on the merits (quoting Winnett v. Caterpillar, Inc., 609 F.3d 404, 408 (6th
Cir. 2010))). Second, it is easier to articulate a conclusion as to whether requirements are satisfied (which
is done in simple yes/no, or satisfied/unsatisfied, terms) than to articulate the outcome of some so-called
“balancing” of (mismatched) factors. This is especially true given that case-specific balancing apparently
is based in part on some inscrutable sliding scale of required likelihood of success on the merits that depends
on the strength of the other three factors. See, e.g., In re DeLorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 (6th
Cir.1985) (“[T]he degree of likelihood of success required may depend on the strength of the other
factors.”).
The Court notes that herein it quotes some case law that refers to these items as “factors” and describes
them in language that befits factors more than requirements—as for example by referring to the issue of
whether issuing the injunction would harm others (factor-style language) rather than the requirement that
the balance of equities favors the movant, or the issue of where the public interest lies (factor-style
language) rather than the requirement that the public interest favors an injunction. In so doing, the Court is
confident that the astute reader readily will be able to translate the factor-style language into the
favors them; and that the public interest favors an injunction. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555
U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Sisters for Life, Inc. v. Louisville-Jefferson County, 56 F.4th 400, 403 (6th Cir.
2022).
Those seeking a TRO may not merely rely on unsupported allegations, but rather must
come forward with more than “scant evidence” to substantiate their allegations.8 See, e.g.,

Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted, 751 F.3d 403, 417 (6th Cir. 2014); Cameron v. Bouchard,
815 F. App’x 978, 986 (6th Cir. 2020) (vacating preliminary injunction when plaintiffs made no
evidentiary showing on some elements of their claim, but instead made mere allegations regarding
the treatment of COVID-19 in prisons); McNeilly v. Land, 684 F.3d 611, 614 (6th Cir. 2012)
(upholding denial of preliminary injunction when plaintiff made only a “small showing” of
evidence); United States v. Certain Land Situated in City of Detroit, No. 95-1118, 1996 WL 26915,
*1 n.1 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 1996) (noting a lack of evidence to support speculative allegations); Dates
v. HSBC, 721 F. Supp. 3d 616, 624 (S.D. Ohio 2024) (noting that a plaintiff seeking a TRO “may
not merely rely on unsupported allegations, but rather must come forward with more than ‘scant

evidence’ to substantiate their allegations.” (quoting Patel v. AR Grp. Tenn., LLC, No. 3:20-cv-52,
2020 WL 5849346, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 1, 2020) (collecting cases))); Boulding v. Corr. Med.
Servs., No. 1:06-CV-811, 2008 WL 2095390, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 11, 2008), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 1:06-CV-811, 2008 WL 2095387 (W.D. Mich. May 15, 2008)
(“Plaintiff did not marshal any evidence in support of his motion [for a preliminary injunction].

corresponding language of requirements for purposes of following the Court’s analysis herein. The Court
also notes that even in some opinions where the court clearly treats the four items as requirements, the court
therein at times refers to them as “factors.” Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 677 (N.D.
Tex. 2016).

8 As noted in a footnote above, however, the Court for present purposes (to promote expediency) treats
Petitioner as having established certain facts based merely on allegations that are plausible.
Plaintiff’s unsupported allegations do not suffice.” (citations omitted)). In deciding a motion for a
TRO, a court may consider the entire record, including affidavits and other hearsay evidence.
Sterling v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 368 F. Supp. 3d 723, 725 (S.D. N.Y. 2019); J.S.R. by &
through J.S.G. v. Sessions, 330 F. Supp. 3d 731, 738 (D. Conn. 2018).

In conducting the TRO analysis, the Court is not limited to the four corners of the complaint
but rather may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be admissible evidence
for a permanent injunction, if the evidence is appropriate given the character and objectives of the
injunctive proceeding. Express Franchise Servs., L.P. v. Impact Outsourcing Sols., Inc., 244 F.
Supp. 3d 1368, 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2017); Action NC v. Strach, 216 F. Supp. 3d 597, 629 (M.D.N.C.
2016) (explaining that district courts may look to, and indeed in appropriate circumstances rely
on, hearsay or other inadmissible evidence when deciding whether a preliminary injunction is
warranted).
It is often stated that a district court has discretion to grant or deny TROs. See, e.g., Ohio
Republican Party v. Brunner, 543 F.3d 357, 361 (6th Cir. 2008). If that is the case, then it follows

that the district court has the discretion to grant or deny a TRO even if the movant has shown (by
satisfaction of the four requirements) that it is at least eligible for a TRO;9 otherwise,
the district court’s heralded discretion to deny a TRO would be illusory (indeed non-existent)
because the district court would have no discretion to deny a TRO to any movant that is eligible
for one and of course would have no discretion to grant a TRO where the movant is not eligible
for one (i.e., where the requirements are not satisfied).

9 It only makes sense for the district court to have such discretion. After all, a TRO is an extraordinary
remedy, one with a particular primary purpose (preserving the status quo). It stands to reason that a district
court should have discretion in deciding whether—even if it can check the box on each of the four
requirements—such an extraordinary remedy is unjustified by the circumstances as a whole and/or would
fail to preserve the status quo (and instead would change the status quo).
The Court’s conclusion that it has the discretion to deny a TRO even if the movant has
shown it is eligible for a TRO is buttressed by caselaw from federal circuit courts (although not as
yet the Sixth Circuit), as well as numerous other district courts. See e.g., RJ’s Int’l Trading, LLC
v. Crown Castle S., LLC, No. 23-10453, 2024 WL 1509156, at *2 (11th Cir. Apr. 8, 2024) (“Even

in those cases where the requirements of a permanent injunction have been met, a court maintains
broad discretion to deny permanent injunctive relief.”); Bethesda Softworks, L.L.C. v. Interplay
Ent. Corp., 452 F. App’x 351, 353 (4th Cir. 2011) (“‘whether to grant the injunction still remains
in the ‘equitable discretion’ of the [district] court’ even when a plaintiff has made the requisite
showing.” (quoting Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 (4th Cir.
2007))); Franciscan All, Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp.3d 660, 677 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (finding that
even when the movant satisfies the four preliminary injunction factors, “the decision whether to
grant or deny a preliminary injunction remains discretionary with the district court.”). See also
Winter, 555 U.S. at 32 (“An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow from
success on the merits as a matter of course.”).

ANALYSIS
1. Requirements
As noted above, a party seeking grant of a TRO (or a preliminary injunction) must show:
(1) whether the movant has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the
movant will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of relief; (3) whether the balance of equities
favors the movant; and (4) whether the injunction would serve the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S.
at 20.
i. Likelihood of Success on the Merits10
To start, the Court will assess the likelihood of success on the merits of each of Petitioner’s
three claims.
First, with respect to both Petitioner’s Right to Counsel Claim and Abuse of Discretion

Claim (i.e., Counts I and III), the Court finds that Petitioner has not sufficiently demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits. Notably, “[t]he [movant] bears the burden of demonstrating
his entitlement to a preliminary injunction, and his burden is a heavy one.” Adams v. Tennessee
Dep't of Corr., No. 1:15-CV-00115, 2018 WL 896902, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 11, 2018), report
and recommendation adopted sub nom. Adams v. Tennessee Dep't of Correction, No. 1:15-CV-
00115, 2018 WL 895330 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 14, 2018). If a party seeking a TRO is to demonstrate
the likelihood of his success on a claim, naturally the party must explain the legal and factual
underpinnings of his claim. Petitioner has failed to provide such an explanation as to Petitioner’s
Right to Counsel Claim and Abuse of Discretion Claim.
As it relates to Petitioner’s Abuse of Discretion Claim (i.e., Count III), the Petition devotes

just one paragraph to his Abuse of Discretion Claim, and the Court finds that such paragraph does
not provide a sufficient legal basis from which the Court could find Petitioner likely to succeed.
(Doc. No. 1 at 7). Moreover, the Court discerns that Petitioner is not even attempting to rely on
his Abuse of Discretion Claim as grounds for granting the Motion, because Petitioner does not
appear to even bring up this claim in the Motion. (See Doc. No. 6).

10 In this section, the Court states various facts in an unqualified manner, for ease of reading. But to be
clear, these statements are based on the current state of the record and certain assumptions the Court is
making for present purposes, are subject to change, and do not reflect the Court’s final conclusion as to the
applicable facts. Instead, they represent only the Court’s view, based solely on the current record and
assumptions made arguendo, of facts that are likely to be established.
Regarding Petitioner’s Right to Counsel Claim (i.e., Count I), the Court finds that Petitioner
likewise fails to establish a likelihood of success. In his Petition, Petitioner alleges that “ICE is
violating [his Fifth Amendment] protections by transferring Petitioner out of this district while he
has pending applications for relief and an active bond motion,” asserting that “[r]elocating a

detainee far from counsel and family severely infringes upon the right to counsel, causing
irreparable constitutional injury.” (Doc. No. 1 at 6). But notably Petitioner wholly fails to cite any
legal support for such assertions, and in the absence of such support, the Court cannot find that
Petitioner has sufficiently established a likelihood of success on the Right to Counsel Claim. In
support of his Right to Counsel Claim, Petitioner relies on his allegation that the planned transfer
of Petitioner (allegedly) violates certain ICE policies governing transfer of certain ICE detainees.
(Doc. No. 6 at 5-6). Even if that allegation were true, it would not assist Petitioner in establishing
a likelihood of success as to his Right to Counsel Claim; that claim of course was brought in a
petition under § 2241, and such a petition can be used to challenge custody as being violative of
“the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3), as opposed to
violative of an agency’s mere internal administrative operating procedures.11

11 For the sake of clarity, the Court emphasizes that—via his Due Process Claim (Count II)—Petitioner
does challenge his custody itself (specifically, being in custody without a bond hearing) as violative of the
Constitution.
The Court’s point above is cabined to Petitioner’s argument which attempts to transmute purported
violations of ICE policy (i.e., those presented by Petitioner’s impending transfer) into violations of
Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment rights:

The Petitioner has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits of his
underlying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. . . Second, the
proposed transfer violates ICE’s own binding regulatory mandates. ICE Policy Directive
11022.1, Detainee Transfers (Jan. 4, 2012), sets forth clear, self-imposed limitations on
the agency’s transfer authority. Under Section 5.2 of the Directive, ERO is prohibited
from transferring a detainee who has an attorney of record within the sending Area of
Responsibility (“AOR”), immediate family within the AOR, or pending bond or removal
proceedings within the AOR, unless approved in writing at the AFOD level or higher
with documented justifications in the detainee's A-File . . . By executing an expedited
Moreover, when addressing in his Proposed Order the likelihood of his success on the
merits, Petitioner focused solely on assertions related to the likelihood of success as to his Due
Process Claim (i.e., Count II). (Doc. No. 6-1 at 2). This further showcases Petitioner’s failure to
show, for purposes of ruling on this Motion, a likelihood of success on the merits on his Right to

Counsel Claim and his Abuse of Discretion Claim.
But, for the reasons discussed below, the Court does find that Petitioner has sufficiently
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits as to his Due Process Claim (i.e., Count II), and
notably, “to obtain injunctive relief, [the movant] need only demonstrate a likelihood of success
on the merits of one of their claims.” Tennessee v. United States Dep’t of Educ., 615 F. Supp. 3d
807, 837 (E.D. Tenn. 2022) (citing Hoover Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Frye, 77 F. App’x 776, 781 (6th
Cir. 2003) (“If [the moving party] can show a likelihood of success on the merits of any of the
claims, an injunction may issue, subject to consideration of the other factors.”)), aff’d sub nom.
State of Tennessee v. Dep’t of Educ., 104 F.4th 577 (6th Cir. 2024).
Via his Due Process Claim Petitioner asserts that “[u]nder the Sixth Circuit’s binding

precedent in Lopez-Campos, 175 F.4th at 721, [Petitioner’s] civil detention is governed exclusively
by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a),” and that he “is constitutionally and statutorily entitled to a localized bond
hearing where the government must justify his continued detention.” (Doc. No. 6 at 5). Notably,

transfer driven by an informal email and without the required written AFOD justifications
entered into his A-File, ERO is acting ultra vires and in direct violation of its own
binding policy.

(Doc. No. 6 at 5-6). But Petitioner does not articulate how his impending transfer, even if violative of ICE
policies, would also be violative of “the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3), and thereby suitable for challenge via a § 2241 petition. Relatedly, Petitioner does not explain
why the referenced ICE policies create any substantive rights for him such that he could complain about
their denial.
Accordingly, even if his planned transfer would violate ICE policies, that would not assist Petitioner in
establishing a likelihood of success as to his Right to Counsel Claim (Count I) or indeed as to either of his
other claims.
in Lopez-Campos, the Sixth Circuit affirmed multiple district courts’ holdings12 that detentions
without bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) were unlawful and violated due process.
175 F.4th at 732, 734. The court reasoned that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention
scheme, which does not provide for individualized bond hearings, does not apply to people who

are not seeking admission or lawful entry into the United States, because they are already in the
United States. See id. at 732. The court also concluded that detention without a bond hearing of
individuals who are already in United States and who have spent a “significant time . . . within the
interior of the United States” constitutes a deprivation of liberty in violation of the Due Process
Clause. Id. at 734.
The record demonstrates that Petitioner was already residing in the United States when he
was taken into ICE custody and that he has been residing in the United States for the past eleven
(11) years. (Doc. No. 6-6 at ¶¶ 5-6). Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner clearly falls into the
category of individuals contemplated by Lopez-Campos, meaning that he has a high likelihood of
success on the merits as to his Due Process Claim, whereby he asserts that his detention without a

bond hearing constitutes a deprivation of liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.
Thus, the Court finds that Petitioner is likely to succeed on his Due Process Claim (i.e.,
Count II).
ii. Irreparable Harm
Next, the Court must consider whether Petitioner will suffer irreparable injury without the
requested TRO. “Rule 65(b) is clear that the possibly drastic consequences of a restraining order
mandate careful consideration by a trial court faced with such a request.” Westfield Ins. Co. v.

12 The undersigned himself held likewise prior to the issuance of Lopez-Campos. See Cardona v. Ladwig,
No. 25-CV-01451, 2025 WL 3722009, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 23, 2025). The Court notes that for some
reason, Westlaw has ascribed to the order in Cardona an incorrect date (December 3, 2025).
Pavex Corp., No. 17-14042, 2017 WL 6407459, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 15, 2017). Before a court
may issue a TRO, “it should be assured that the movant has produced compelling evidence of
irreparable and immediate injury.” Id.
When asserting that he will suffer irreparable harm without the requested TRO, Petitioner

asserts—first and predominantly—that if he is transferred to Louisiana, he will be deprived of his
right to a § 1226(a) bond hearing (to which he is allegedly entitled). This is so, according to
Petitioner, because contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Lopez-Campos, the Fifth Circuit “has
endorsed mandatory, bond-ineligible detention for interior unadmitted residents under Buenrostro-
Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026),” and “[u]nder the Board of Immigration Appeals’
(BIA) January 2026 Nationwide Guidance and Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA
2025), local Louisiana Immigration Judges routinely refuse to conduct federal court-ordered §
1226(a) bond hearings, claiming they lack jurisdiction over unadmitted interior residents.” (Doc.
No. 6-1 at 3; Doc. No. 6 at 7-8 (asserting that Louisiana Immigration Judges “routinely refuse to
conduct federal court-ordered § 1226(a) bond hearings, claiming they lack jurisdiction over

unadmitted interior residents under [Fifth Circuit Precedent].”)). Put simply, Petitioner’s argument
is that unless the Court issues an order preventing his transfer to Louisiana, any eventual order of
this Court granting Petitioner’s underlying Petition and ordering a bond hearing would “be
rendered a practical nullity” due to Fifth Circuit precedent and the routine practices of Louisiana
Immigration Judges (“IJ”). (Id. at 8).
The Court disagrees. If the Petition is meritorious (as the Court has found likely at least as
to Count II), then the Court will issue an order (or judgment) that directs Respondents either (1) to
promptly release Petitioner outright or (2) either (a) provide Petitioner with a § 1226(a) bond
hearing within a specified (short) time period or (b) promptly release Petitioner outright. In either
scenario, Petitioner will either get the desired bond hearing or (even better) be released without
even the need for a bond hearing. This is true even if (as Petitioner contends) an IJ in Louisiana
would refuse to conduct a § 1226(a) bond hearing ordered by this Court pursuant to option (2)13
because such an event would result in Respondents being required to release Petitioner. Why?

Because any order of the Court would be clear: if for any reason—which would include an IJ in
Louisiana refusing to hold a bond hearing—Petitioner does not receive a bond hearing, then
Petitioner must be released. In sum, the transfer to Louisiana will not impair his ability to quickly
receive a bond hearing or (better still) get released outright, if his Petition proves meritorious.
Therefore, this claim of irreparable harm fails.14
In further support of his claim that he will suffer irreparable injury absent entry of the
requested TRO, Petitioner asserts that the transfer to Louisiana will cause irreparable injury by:
(1) permanently derailing his pending, renewed motion (filed in Immigration Court in Tennessee)
for a bond redetermination hearing; (2) unconstitutionally burdening the established attorney-
client relationship; and (3) imposing risk to Petitioner’s physical health. (Doc. No. 6 at 8-9). But

none of these alleged irreparable injuries are sufficient, either.
First, although Petitioner asserts that the transfer to Louisiana would permanently derail
his pending, renewed motion for bond redetermination hearing, this appears to no longer be a

13 The Court notes that it has serious doubts that a Louisiana IJ would flout an order of this Court directing
that a § 1226(a) bond hearing be held.

14 Petitioner filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority, apparently in further support of his assertion that the
transfer would result in irreparable injury. (Doc. No. 10 at 2 (asserting that the Notice of Supplemental
Authority “provide[s] absolute, uncontroverted proof of certain, irreparable harm that requires this Court's
immediate intervention”)). More specifically, the Notice of Supplemental Authority provides both legal
authority and factual circumstances that would tend to further support Petitioner’s assertion that his transfer
to Louisiana would result in any hypothetical bond hearing being held by an IJ in Louisiana in particular.
But even assuming arguendo that this assertion is correct, that still would not establish that Petitioner would
suffer irreparable harm, for the same reasons explained above.
viable claim of irreparable injury in light of Petitioner’s Notice of Supplemental Authority,
wherein Petitioner seems to admit that Petitioner’s renewed motion for bond redetermination
hearing was denied. (Doc. No. 10 at 2 (“Today, July 1, 2026, the Memphis Immigration Court
clerk’s office rejected Petitioner’s re-filed Motion for Custody Redetermination a second time.”)

(emphasis original)). Therefore, this allegation of irreparable injury fails.
Second, the assertion that Petitioner will be irreparably injured by virtue of the
unconstitutional burden the transfer would (allegedly) impose on the established attorney-client
relationship likewise fails. This claim of irreparable injury would seem most closely tied to
Petitioner’s Right to Counsel Claim (i.e., Count I)—a claim for which this Court found Petitioner
failed to show a likelihood of success (supra Section 1.i). But irrespective of which claim(s) this
alleged irreparable injury is tied to, the Court nonetheless finds that the record does not sufficiently
establish that any such harm would actually be suffered by Petitioner. Notably, the record does not
indicate the degree to which communication after the transfer would actually be worse than it is
now. This is especially true considering that counsel does not appear to be able to communicate

with Petitioner currently. (Doc. No. 6-6 at 1 (“Because of [Petitioner’s] sudden detention, his
isolation, and ERO Nashville’s strict limits on communication during overnight transit, he is
physically inaccessible to me.”)). Moreover, there is no showing that consultation with Petitioner
is necessary to adequately litigate this particular case, considering that it is a case that seems (a)
likely to be resolved very promptly, based on the currently prescribed deadlines and the
undersigned’s history of promptly resolving these kinds of cases, (b) not in need of further factual
enhancement; and (c) one likely to be resolved (promptly) based on undisputed facts. To the extent
that Petitioner contends that the situation in this regard is different from what the Court perceives,
Petitioner has provided nothing to support that contention or otherwise explain why the TRO is
actually in this case (as opposed to merely hypothetically or potentially) necessary to prevent
irreparable injury in the form of impaired communications caused by a transfer of Petitioner to
Louisiana. Therefore, the Court finds that this allegation of irreparable injury also fails.
Finally, the assertion that the transfer would irreparably harm Petitioner by virtue of

imposing risk to Petitioner’s physical health also fails. For various reasons upon which the Court
need not herein expound, the issues raised in support of a motion for a TRO should be related to
the merits of the movant’s underlying claims. See, e.g., Suber v. Khune, No. 2:25-CV-391, 2025
WL 1367216, at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 12, 2025) (recommending denial of a motion for TRO in part
because “Plaintiff raises issues in his motion for a TRO/preliminary injunction that are unrelated
to the merits of the claim presented in his Complaint.”), report and recommendation adopted, No.
2:25-CV-391, 2025 WL 1642673 (S.D. Ohio June 10, 2025); Kinard v. Rubitschun, No. 05-74131,
2007 WL 2121910, at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 24, 2007) (denying motion for a TRO in part because
“[t]he subject matter of Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction is therefore unrelated to his
underlying cause of action.”).

The Court finds that the health concerns are not sufficiently related to the alleged violations
(or for that matter the relief requested) in the Petition. The alleged violations are not based on
Petitioner’s health status, and Petitioner does not claim entitlement to relief that is based in any
way on his health status.
All told, none of Petitioner’s asserted irreparable injuries warrant issuance of the requested
TRO. Thus, the Court concludes that Petitioner—although showing a likelihood of success on one
of his claims—has not satisfied one of the requirements for his requested preliminary injunctive
relief: a demonstration that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm absent his requested injunctive
relief. Therefore, the Court will deny the Motion (Doc. No. 6). However, the Court intends to
resolve the Petition promptly, in accordance with the current (compressed) schedule.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court DENIES the Motion (Doc. No. 6).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Cli Rucherdseanr
ELI RICHARDSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11362201. Public record. Not legal advice.