# ACUNA-VIALES

> District Court, D. New Jersey · May 21, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11361958

## Case

- **Full name:** Edgar Acuna-Viales v. Timothy Pasquale, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** May 21, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

EDGAR ACUNA-VIALES,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 24-1048 (GC)(RLS)
OPINION
TIMOTHY PASQUALE, ef al
Defendants.

CASTNER, District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff Edgar Acuna-Viales’ Amended
Complaint (D.E.’s 15, 16, “Am. Compi.”), filed on March 7 and March 18, 2025. On July 2, 2024,
the Court granted Plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis and screened the original
Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), dismissing all claims. (D.E.’s 3, 4.) Some
claims were dismissed with prejudice—the 42 U.S.C, § 1983 damages claims against the State of
New Jersey, the injunctive relief claum seeking release or sentence modification, and the § 1983
claims against Judge Julie M. Marino—-and the remaining claims were dismissed without prejudice
as time-barred, with leave to amend. (/d.) Following an interlocutory appeal that the Third Circuit
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (D.E. 11), Magistrate Judge Singh granted Plaintiff an extension
of time to file the Amended Complaint (DE. 14), which Plaintiff timely filed. The Court now
screens the Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will permit certain constitutional claims to
proceed against Detective Timothy Pasquale, Robert Wood Johnson Hospital, Somerset County
and its personnel, and Sergeant Garcia, and will dismiss the remaining claims as set forth herein.

L BACKGROUND!

Plaintiff is a Costa Rican citizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States who,
at the time of the events alleged, operated two landscaping and cleaning businesses in Somerville,
New Jersey, employed approximately twenty-two workers, and maintained a clean criminal
record, (Am, Compl., D.E. 15 at 31.) Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested by Detective Timothy
Pasquale of the Somerville Police Department and another officer, Detective Alvarez, on May 12,
2020, at 341 Marion Street, Union, New Jersey, without a warrant, without being read his Miranda
rights, and without being permitted to contact his attorney or family. Ud. at 2.) Plaintiff further
alleges that at the time of the arrest, the Somerset County courts were closed due to the COVID-
19 pandemic and that no judge was available to sign orders. (Ud. at 31.)

During the arrest, Plaintiff alleges that Pasquale and Alvarez removed from his person his
cell phone, passport, social security card, permanent residency card, and the title to a trailer—the
estimated total value of which Plaintiff places at $8,100-——-without a warrant or his consent. (/d. at
7.) Weeks after the arrest, Plaintiff further alleges that Pasquale entered Plaintiff's apartment at
#1 Brookside Avenue, Apt. #6B, Somerville, New Jersey, without a warrant, without Plaintiffs
consent, and in Plaintiffs absence, and removed Plaintif{’s security camera system (a Cobra DVR
unit valued at $700), a photo camera valued at $150, and two USB drives that Plaintiff contends

The Court notes that the Am. Compl. contains internal pagination; however, that pagination
is inconsistent and, at times, illegible, Accordingly, for clarity and ease of reference, the Court
cites to the pagination generated by the Court’s CM/ECF system when referring to page numbers.

contained evidence in his favor and were subsequently used against him, (/d. at 7.) Plaintiff also
alleges that Pasquale and the Assistant Prosecutor were aware of video evidence on Plaintiff’s
phone showing an aileged attempted assassination of Plaintiff by his former wife, Hana Gomes,
and that Pasquale suppressed this evidence rather than reporting or investigating it. (/d. at 4.)

On May 12, 2020, Pasquale transported Plaintiff to the Somerville Police Station, where
Pasquale administered a buccal DNA test without a judge’s order, without Plaintiff's consent, and
without an attorney present. Ud. at 3.) On the same day, Pasquale directed a Somerville Police
officer to transport Plaintiff to Robert Wood Johnson Hospital at Somerset (“RWJ”’) without a
judge’s order and without Plaintiff's consent. Ud. at 3, 11.) Plaintiff alleges that he was conscious
and coherent upon admission, had no accidents, wounds, or mental health crisis, and had not
exhibited suicidal behavior. (/d. at 12.) Hospital staff restrained Plaintiff's hands and feet to a
hospital bed in handcuffs for four days and denied him the ability to contact family, friends, an
attorney, or a judge for more than ninety-four hours. (fd at 12, 14.) Hospital personnel did not
provide Plaintiff his prescribed thyroid medication for the duration of his stay and, without a valid
prescription, gave Plaintiff psychiatric medication—specifically haloperidol (Haldol)—which he
refused upon discovering it was not for his thyroid condition. Cd at 13.) Hospital staff also
compelled Plaintiff to sign documents in English without providing a translator, notwithstanding
his inability to read or write English. Vd} Somerville Police officers and Somerset County Jail
correctional officers were present at Plaintiff's bedside throughout his hospitalization and rotated
shifts. (/d. at 15-16.) Plaintiff was discharged from RWJ on May 16, 2020, and transferred to
Somerset County Jail. Ud. at 32.)

At Somerset County Jail, Plaintiff was placed in a medical observation cell for six days
without his consent. Ud at 22.) THe was denied all communication with family, friends, and

counsel for over 120 hours and was not brought before a judge within that period. Ud. at 22.) He
was later transferred to a COVID-19 quarantine unit for seven days, during which the jail
controlled his access to the telephone system and withheld his telephone contacts. (/d. at 23.)

On August 31, 2020, the State filed a motion—supported by an order later signed by Judge
Anthony F. Picheca, Jr.—to compel Plaintiff to submit to a second buccal DNA test. Ud. at 46.)
The order provided that defense counsel would be present during the test. (/d.) On September 10,
2020, Pasquale and another detective arrived at Somerset County Jail to administer the test. □□□□
at 37.) Plaintiffs attorney, Anthony Cowell, was not present. Vd.) Plaintiff refused on that basis.
Sergeant Garcia of the Somerset County Correctional Facility purportedly threatened Plaintiff,
stating that if he refused the test, he would face a third-degree charge and receive a sentence of
one year and six months, and also threatened that he would hang Plaintiff by his feet in a cell. Ud.
at 24, 37.) A female correctional officer held Plaintiff by the shoulders and forced him into a chair
while Pasquale administered the DNA test without Plaintiff's consent and without his attorney
present. Ud.) Plaintiff alleges that these events were recorded on video camera. (fd. at 37.)

Throughout Plaintiffs pretrial detention from May 2020 to approximately September
2022, Plaintiff alleges that Somerset County Jail: prohibited him from accessing the law library
for over two years; denied him access to § 1983 complaint forms or paralegal assistance; operated
only three telephones for forty inmates; cancelled phone recreation, religious services, and family
visits on multiple occasions citing COVID-19 as justification; maintained outdated video
conference equipment that impeded his ability to hear court proceedings; placed him in a
disciplinary unit on two occasions in late 2021—once for five days following a psychiatric
observation placement and again for ten days following his COVID-19 infection—each time
without notice, cause, or investigation; and exposed him to COVID-19 in November 2021 by

knowingly housing an infected inmate in Plaintiff's unit while denying him medical treatment and
instead placing him in a disciplinary segregation unit. (/d. at 22-27.)

Plaintiff retained private counsel Michaei Policastro in May 2021 for an agreed fee of
$5,000, Ud. at 40.) Plaintiff alleges Policastro failed to visit him in jail, failed to answer phone
calls for over a year, filed no motions, examined no witnesses, and met privately with prosecution
witnesses without Plaintiff's consent. (Jd. at 41-45.) Ata video court conference on January 5,
2022, Policastro allegedly provided information about those unauthorized meetings to Judge
Michael Rojers and Prosecutor Mueller in open court, argued against Plaintiff's position, and
threatened to abandon the case if Plaintiff did not accept a plea offer, Ud at 43.) Plaintiff
ultimately accepted a plea on or about March 2022 and was sentenced by Judge Julie M. Marino
on September 23, 2022, (/d. at 45.)

il. STANDARD OF REVIEW □

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (““PLRA”), Pub. L. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat.
1321-66 (Apr. 26, 1996), district courts must review prisoner complaints when the prisoner
proceeds in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The PLRA requires courts to sua sponte
dismiss claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Jd The
standard for dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B){ii) is the same as that applicable to motions to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 3d
Cir, 1999), A complaint survives dismissal if it contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Asherojt v. igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, draws
all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, and reads the complaint liberally. Shorter v.

United States, 12 F Ath 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Jgbal, 556
US. at 678, Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Higgs
Aff’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 Gd Cir. 2011).

Hi. DISCUSSION
A. Claims Dismissed with Prejudice in Prior Opinion
The Court’s July 2, 2024 Opinion dismissed the following claims with prejudice: (1) §
1983 damages claims against the State of New Jersey, because the State is not a “person” under §
1983, Will vy. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S, 58, 71 (1989); (2) the § 1983 injunctive
relief claim seeking release or a shorter sentence, which must be pursued through a habeas petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005); and (3) § 1983 claims
against Judge Marino arising from her conduct at Plaintiff's sentencing on the basis of absolute
judicial immunity, Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). The Amended Complaint does not
reassert direct claims against the State of New Jersey or Judge Marino, and to the extent any
allegations implicitly seek release from incarceration or modification of Plaintiffs sentence, those
requests remain barred in this action and are dismissed.

B, Equitable Tolling

The two-year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims in New Jersey, N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2A:14-2, would ordinarily bar most of Plaintiff's claims, which arise from events in 2020
and 2021, given that the original Complaint was filed on February 22, 2024. See Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Coello v. DiLeo, 43 F Ath 346, 352 (3d Cir. 2022). The Court previously
dismissed those claims without prejudice, expressly inviting Plaintiff to plead facts supporting
equitable tolling. (ECF No. 3 at 7.) The Amended Complaint now does so.

In New Jersey, equitable tolling applies, inter alia, where a plaintiff “in some extraordinary
way [has] been prevented from asserting his rights.” Hernandez vy, Montoya, 636 F. Supp. 3d 511,
517 (DN, 2022), Plaintiff alleges five distinct circumstances that together plausibly constitute
such extraordinary prevention: (1) from May 2020 through approximately mid-2022, he was
confined under strict COVID-19 quarantine protocols that locked him in his cell for close to two
years, permitted only ten minutes per day for showers, and cancelled all privileges including phone
time and recreation using COVID-19 as justification; (2) Somerset County Jail had no § 1983
forms and no paralegals available to assist with legal filings; (3) the law library was closed on
multiple occasions—and for extended periods totaling more than two years—citing COVID-19,
and when Plaintiff was finally permitted access after sentencing, it was only on three occasions for
thirty minutes each, and the library lacked any forms, remedies, or materials needed to file in
federal court; (4) the jail controlled the telephone system, withheld Plaintiff’s telephone contacts,
and denied him communication with counsel or family for prolonged periods; and (5) Plaintiff is
a Costa Rican citizen who cannot read or write English, rendering him unable to independently
research and understand applicable legal deadlines and procedures. (Am. Compl. at 28-29,}
At the pleading stage, dismissal on limitations grounds is appropriate only where the time
bar is “obvious from the face of the complaint and no development of the record is necessary.”
Ostuni v. Wa Wa’s Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 111-12 Gd Cir. 2013). Plaintiff's detailed allegations
of COVID-era lockdown conditions, systematic denial of law library access, unavailability of legal
forms, language barrier, and phone system manipulation present questions that cannot be resolved
without a developed factual record. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has adequately pled

_ equitable tolling for screening purposes and does not dismiss the surviving claims on timeliness

grounds at this time. Defendants may raise the limitations defense in an appropriate motion after
service.

C. Claims Against Detective Timothy Pasquate

Plaintiff raises several categories of constitutional claims against Pasquale in his individual
capacity under § 1983.

First, Plaintiff alleges that Pasquale arrested him on May 12, 2020 without a warrant and
without probable cause. A warrantless arrest violates the Fourth Amendment where the arresting
officer lacks probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed. See Harvard v.
Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 199 (3d Cir. 2020). Accepting Plaintiff's allegations as true, Plaintiff has
stated a plausible false arrest claim. This claim may proceed.
Plaintiff also alleges that Pasquale failed to advise him of his Miranda rights before and
during the arrest. The Court notes that a bare failure to administer Miranda warnings does not,
standing alone, give rise to a cognizable § 1983 damages claim. Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134,
140-41] (2022) (holding that a violation of Miranda v. Arizona does not constitute a violation of
the Fifth Amendment cognizable under § 1983), The remedy for an unwarned statement is
suppression at trial, not a standalone civil damages action. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff
asserts a freestanding § 1983 claim predicated solely on the failure to administer Miranda
warnings, that claim is dismissed with prejudice. Nothing in this ruling precludes Plaintiff from
asserting, in appropriate post-conviction proceedings, that any unwatned statements were
improperly used against him,

Second, Plaintiff alleges that at the time of his arrest Pasquale seized his cell phone,
passport, social security card, permanent residency card, and a trailer titke—and weeks later

entered his apartment without a warrant and removed his security camera system, a photo camera,
and two USB drives—-all without consent or judicial authorization. The Fourth Amendment
protects against unreasonable warrantless seizures of personal property. Soldal v. Cook County,
506 U.S. 56, 61-62 (1992). The warrantless entry into and search of the apartment likewise states
a per se Fourth Amendment violation absent an applicable exception. See Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). These claims may proceed.
Third, Plaintiff alleges that Pasquale administered a buccal DNA test on May 12, 2020 at
the Somerville Police Station without a warrant, without Plaintiffs consent, and without an
attorney present. A nonconsensual, warrantless extraction of a DNA sample implicates the Fourth
Amendment. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966). This claim may proceed.
Fourth, with respect to the second buccal DNA test on September 10, 2020, the Court notes
that a judicial order signed by Judge Picheca on August 31, 2020 authorized that test. (Am. Compl.
at 46.) However, the order expressly provided that defense counsel would be present, and
Plaintiff's attorney was absent. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that Pasquale, acting in concert with
Sergeant Garcia, obtained the sample through threats, intimidation, and physical coercion. The
existence of a court order does not insulate officers from liability where they allegedly exceed the
scope of that order or execute it in an unreasonable or coercive manner. See Estate of Smith v.
Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 505—06 (3d Cir, 2003) (qualified immunity does not apply where officers
violate clearly established constitutional rights); United States v. Tracey, 597 F. App’x 249, 253—
54 (3d Cir. 2016) (execution of judicial authorization must remain within its scope and comply
with the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement); Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757, 768-72
(bodily intrusions constitute searches that must be reasonable in both justification and manner of
execution); United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 403-06 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (buccal swab

is a search subject to Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis). Coutts in this district likewise
recognize that valid authorization does not permit unconstitutional execution of a search or seizure.
See Hodges y. Stanley, No. 15-3473, 2017 WL 1208423, at *6—7 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2017) (officers
may be liable under § 1983 for unreasonable or excessive execution of otherwise authorized
search), Accordingly, Plaintiff states a plausible Fourth Amendment and due process claim arising
from the manner in which the second DNA test was administered, and this claim may proceed.
Fifth, Plaintiff alleges that Pasquale was aware of and suppressed video evidence on
Plaintiff's cell phone showing an alleged attempted assassination of Plaintiff by his former wife,
Hana Gomes. There is no freestanding constitutional right to have police investigate a crime
cominitted against a plaintiff or to require that law enforcement report or act upon exculpatory
evidence in a civil rights context. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005).
This “criminal complicity of evidence” claim is dismissed without prejudice. To the extent
Plaintiff asserts a claim based on Defendants’ alleged failure to investigate or act upon exculpatory
evidence, such a theory is not independently cognizable under § 1983 absent allegations that the
conduct caused the initiation or continuation of a prosecution without probable cause.

D. Claims Against Robert Wood Johnson Hospital

RWI is a private entity and is therefore not ordinarily subject to liability under § 1983,
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982), Liability may nonetheless attach where a private
party is fairly deemed a state actor by virtue of joint participation with state officials or conduct
otherwise fairly attributable to the State. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941-42
(1982), Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S, 24, 27-28 (1980).

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit applies this principle through the “joint action”
framework, under which a private entity may be deemed to act under color of state law where it is
10

a willful participant in coordinated activity with state actors that results in a constitutional
deprivation. Cruz y. Donnelly, 727 F.2d 79, 81-82 (3d Cir. 1984); Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police
Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185, 195-96 (3d Cir. 2005). At the pleading stage, Plaintiff must allege facts
sufficient to support a reasonable inference of agreement or coordinated conduct; conclusory
allegations of parallel conduct or cooperation do not suffice. Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v.
Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2010).
Measured against that standard, Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient at screening to support
a plausible inference that RWJ acted jointly with state actors. Plaintiff alleges that on May 12,
2020, he was transported to RWJ by Somerville police officers without judicial authorization or
his consent. (Am. Compl. at 11-12.) He further alleges that during his four-day hospitalization,
Somerville police officers and Somerset County correctional officers maintained continuous
physical presence at his bedside, rotating custody and exercising ongoing supervisory control over
his confinement within the hospital setting. (@/d. at 12-16, 18, 20.) Plaintiff also alleges that his
hospitalization functioned as a de facto custodial detention during a COVID-19—disrupted arrest
and pre-arraignment process, during which judicial availability was limited, and law enforcement
coordinated the timing and conditions of his confinement. id.) Separately, Plaintiff alleges that
his admission was predicated on a false statement constructed in coordination with Pasquale, and
that RWJ personnel produced a psychiatric report characterizing his presentation in a manner he
alleges lacked clinical foundation and served as the operative basis for maintaining him in
continued involuntary confinement. (Am. Compl. at 14-15.)

Taken as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, as the Court must,
these allegations permit a plausible inference that RWJ did not merely provide medical services in
the presence of law enforcement but participated in a coordinated custodial arrangement in which
11

state actors and hospital personnel jointly maintained control over Plaintiff's liberty and bodily
integrity. That institutional participation allegedly extended beyond physical custody to the
production of medical documentation that served as the basis for the transfer to a psychiatric unit
and the continuation of involuntary confinement — a form of joint conduct qualitatively distinct
from passive presence in the facility. At this stage, Plaintiff is not required to identify each
individual RWJ employee where the pleaded facts plausibly attribute the alleged deprivation to
institutional participation in an integrated custodial setting. See Kost vy. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176,
185 (3d Cir, 1993).

Because Plaintiff has plausibly alleged state action, the Court turns to the constitutional
claims. As a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff's claims arise under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S, 520, 535-36 (1979). A detainee may not be subjected to
conditions amounting to punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt, nor deprived of liberty
interests without constitutionally adequate process. Jd; Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132
(1990).

Plaintiff alleges that he was involuntarily confined without judicial authorization or
meaningful procedural safeguards, restrained in handcuffs for an extended period without
individualized medical justification, and denied access to counsel, family, and a judicial officer for
more than ninety-four hours. (Am. Compl. at 11-17.) Significantly, the hospital’s own physician
progress notes—-submitted as exhibits to the Complaint—contemporaneously record that on
Hospital Day 2, Plaintiff was “repeatedly asking about wanting to talk to a lawyer and to call his
family,” that he denied any psychiatric issues or need for psychiatric treatment, and that he
requested evidence justifying his commitment, (Am, Compl. at 20 [Physician Progress Note,
5/14/2020].) Those records establish that RWJ personnel were contemporancously aware of
12

Plaintiff's invocation of his rights and his denial of psychiatric need, yet the denial of access
persisted notwithstanding that awareness. The denial of all access to counsel, family, and a judicial
officer for that period implicates multiple constitutional concerns. Prolonged detention without
judicial presentment is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See County of
Riverside y. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-57 (1991). To the extent adversarial proceedings had
commenced, restrictions on attorney communication may independently implicate the Sixth
Amendment. See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 198-200 (2008), The Third Circuit
has likewise recognized that interference with attorney communication may give rise to
constitutional injury where it meaningfully burdens access to counsel or the courts. See Bieregu v.
Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1455-56 (3d Cir, 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343 (1996). These allegations also state plausible procedural due process violations under the
Fourteenth Amendment.

Plaintiff further alleges deliberate interference with prescribed medical care. Specifically,
he contends that RWJ failed to provide prescribed thyroid medication during his detention and
instead administered haloperidol absent documented clinical justification or informed consent.
(Am, Compl. at 13.) The failure to provide prescribed medication, despite knowledge of an
existing treatment regimen, states a plausible claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs, See Estelle vy. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976) (deliberate indifference may be
manifested by intentional interference with prescribed treatment); Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr.
Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 Gd Cir. 2003) (finding deliberate indifference where defendants failed
to provide prescribed medication despite known medical need),
The alleged administration of antipsychotic medication without clinical basis or informed
consent independently implicates Plaintiff's protected liberty interest in bodily integrity and

13

medical decision-making in custodial settings. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22
(1990) (recognizing significant liberty interest in avoiding involuntary administration of
antipsychotic drugs); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134-35 (1992) (forcible medication
implicates due process and requires medical justification and procedural safeguards). At the
pleading stage, these allegations further support a plausible Fourteenth Amendment violation.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has adequately alleged that RWJ, acting in concert with state
officials, functioned as a state actor for purposes of § 1983, and that the asserted Fourteenth
Amendment violations are plausibly stated. These claims shall proceed past screening,
E. Claims Against Somerset County Jail and Its Personnel

As a threshold matter, Somerset County Jail is not subject to suit under § 1983 because it
is not an independent legal entity but part of the county government. Accordingly, claims asserted
against the jail itself are dismissed with prejudice, and the Court construes Plaintiff's allegations
regarding conditions of confinement and institutional practices as asserted against Somerset
County. See Padilla v. Twp. of Cherry Hill, 110 F. App’x 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2004).
As a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff's conditions-of-confinement claims are analyzed under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment. Hubbard v.
Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir, 2005). The Third Circuit has explained that pretrial detainees
are protected from punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt, and their claims are evaluated
under the Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment
standard. Id.; see also Bell, 441 U.S. 520,'535-37 (pretrial detainees may not be subjected to

2 The Amended Complaint does not allege a specific policy, custom, or widespread practice
attributable to Somerset County sufficient to support municipal liability. See Monell v. Dep't of
Soc. Servs,, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978), Accordingly, no municipal liability claim against
Somerset County proceeds at this time.
14

punishment). By contrast, post-conviction claims arising after Plaintiff's September 2022
sentencing are governed by the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.
See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345-47 (1981). Under that standard, conditions violate the
Constitution only where they result in the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” or deprive
an inmate of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” fd. at 347; Farmer v. Brenan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994),
Plaintiff alleges numerous violations by Somerset County Jail personnel. The denial of any
attorney contact for over 120 hours following his admission implicates the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protections. See County of Riverside vy.
McLaughlin, 500 US. 44, 56-57 (1991) (holding that detention beyond 48 hours without a judicial
determination of probable cause is presumptively unconstitutional). Restrictions that effectively
deny a detainee access to counsel during a critical period of detention may independently violate
the Sixth Amendment once adversarial proceedings have begun and may also support a due
process claim where they contribute to prolonged or unjustified detention. See Rothgery v.
Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 198-200 (2008) (right to counsel attaches at initiation of
adversarial proceedings); Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1455-56 (d Cir. 1995) (recognizing
constitutional implications of interference with attorney communication), abrogated on other
grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). Accordingly, this claim shall proceed.
The systematic denial of law library access for over two years, particularly where Plaintiff
was denied § 1983 forms, paralegal assistance, and meaningful access to legal resources states a
plausible claim for denial of access to the courts. To establish this claim, Plaintiff must ultimately
demonstrate “actual injury” by showing that the alleged deficiencies hindered efforts to pursue a
nonfrivolous legal claim, Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349-51; Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205-06 Gd
15

Cir. 2008). The Third Circuit has emphasized that actual injury is not established by mere denial
of access to a law library or legal assistance, but rather by showing that the deprivation frustrated
or impeded a specific, nonftivolous legal claim. /d. Plaintiff's equitable tolling allegations,
however, plausibly establish such injury at the pleading stage: if proven, the alleged law library
deprivation caused Plaintiff to miss the applicable two-year § 1983 limitations period, and the loss
of a timely opportunity to pursue a nonfrivolous civil rights action constitutes cognizable actual
injury under Lewis, See Lewis, 518 U.S, at 351-53 (requiring hindrance of nonfrivolous claim);
Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 177-78 (3d Cir. 1997) (recognizing access claim where prison
conditions allegedly caused loss of ability to litigate); Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1036-37
(3d Cir, 1988) (actual injury requirement satisfied where systemic deficiencies impede litigation).
This claim shall proceed.

Plaintiffs allegation that jail personnel knowingly admitted an inmate infected with
COVID-19 to his unit in November 2021 while denying Plaintiff medical care and then placing
him in a disciplinary segregation unit states a plausible deliberate indifference claim. Bistrian vy,
Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012). The Court notes that the applicable standard for deliberate
indifference claims brought by pretrial detainees may be purely objective following Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), though that question need not be resolved at screening. The
suspension of Plaintiff's prescribed thyroid treatment for over six months by the jail’s medical
staff states an independent deliberate indifference claim. Nafale, 318 F.3d at 582 (finding
deliberate indifference where failure to provide prescribed treatment could constitute serious
medical need and disregard thereof). These claims shall proceed.

Plaintiffs placement in disciplinary segregation on two occasions in late 2021—without
notice, cause, or investigation—traises due process concerns, though whether the conditions

16

imposed an “atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”
requires factual development. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). This claim may
proceed.

The mass cancellations of religious services for more than two years, family visits, phone
recreation, and other privileges—where imposed as a blanket restriction rather than a proportionate
response to legitimate penological or public health concerns—may implicate Plaintiff's First
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Prison regulations that burden religious exercise
are evaluated under the reasonableness standard set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91
(1987), and restrictions on religious practice must be reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348-50 (1987). At the pleading stage,
Plaintiff is not required to rebut potential justifications or affirmative defenses, including those
grounded in institutional security or public health; such issues are properly addressed on a
developed factual record. Accordingly, these claims are permitted to proceed for further factual
development,

As to Sergeant Garcia specifically, the allegations that he threatened to hang Plaintiff from
his feet in a cell and, in concert with a female correctional officer, physically restrained Plaintiff
by his shoulders to compel submission to a DNA test state plausible excessive force and coercion
claims. Because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time, this claim arises under the Fourteenth
Amendment and is governed by the objective unreasonableness standard, Kingsley, 576 U.S, at
396-97; see also Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 326-29 (3d Cir. 2016). These claims proceed
against Sergeant Garcia in his individual capacity.

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F. Claims Against Attorney Anthony Cowell

Plaintiff alleges that his public defender, Anthony Cowell, violated attorney-client
privilege, sought Plaintiff's cell phone password to help police obtain evidence, contacted
Plaintiff's family to disclose prosecution evidence without Plaintiffs consent, failed to file any
motions, never visited Plaintiff in jail, and repeatedly pressured Plaintiff to plead guilty. (Am.
Compl., D.E. 15 at 33-39.)

The threshold defect in these claims is the state-action requirement of § 1983. A public
defender does not act under color of state law when performing “a lawyer’s traditional functions
as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S, 312, 325
(1981). This is so even though the attorney is publicly paid and appointed by the state. Jd. at 321.
All the conduct alleged—including strategic choices, failure to file motions, communication
decisions, and plea advice-—falls squarely within the traditional functions of defense counsel. See
Dodson, 454 U.S, 312, 325 (public defenders do not act under color of state law when performing
traditional functions of counsel); see also Black v. Bayer, 672 F.2d 309, 320 (3d Cir, 1982) (same).
To the extent Plaintiff alleges that Cowell conspired with Pasquale and others to deprive him of
constitutional rights, those allegations are conclusory; the Amended Complaint docs not plead
specific facts showing an agreement or “meeting of the minds” between Cowell and state actors.
see Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984) (recognizing § 1983 liability for public defenders
only where they conspire with state actors); Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. y. Fox Rothschild
LEP, 615 F.3d 159, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2010) (requiring factual allegations showing agreement to
sustain a conspiracy claim). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim against Cowell.

To the extent Plaintiff's claims against Cowell amount to ineffective assistance of counsel,
such claims are not cognizable under § 1983 and must be pursued, after exhaustion of state post-
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conviction remedies, through a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 □□□□
475, 500 (1973). The § 1983 claims against Cowell are accordingly dismissed without prejudice.

G. Claims Against Attorney Michael Policastre

Plaintiff alleges that his retained private counsel, Michael Policastro, was similarly
ineffective: he failed to visit Plaintiff in jail, went on extended vacation without advising Plaintiff,
failed to answer phone calls for over a year, filed no motions, met privately with prosecution
witnesses without Plaintiff's consent, and argued against Plaintiff's position in open court while
threatening to abandon the case. (Am. Compl., D.E. 15 at 40-45,)

A privately retained attorney is no more a state actor than a public defender, as retained
counsel acts on behalf of the client rather than the government. Steward v. Meeker, 459 F.2d 669,
670 (3d Cir. 1972). Indeed, a private attorney, even one rendering services pursuant to a public
contract, does not act under color of state law. Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d
268, 277 Gd Cir. 1999) (citing Polk, 454 U.S, 312, 318). The Amended Complaint contains no
non-conclusory facts establishing that Policastro entered into an agreement with any state official
to deprive Plaintiff of constitutional rights. The § 1983 claims against Policastro are dismissed
without prejudice for the same reasons as those against Cowell.

Claints Against Judge Anthony F. Picheca, Jr.

Plaintiff alleges that Judge Picheca: signed the order granting the State’s motion for a
buccal DNA test; refused to allow Plaintiff to speak on the record at the February 2, 2021 video
conference; declined to act on Plaintiff's motion to remove Cowell; and had a conflict of interest
arising from his connections to Pasquale, Somerset County Jail, and RWJ. (Am. Compl., D.E, 15
at 5, 35-36, 39.)

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As the Court noted with respect to Judge Marino in its prior opinion, judges enjoy absolute
immunity from § 1983 damages claims for acts taken in their judicial capacity, regardless of
whether such acts are characterized as unfair, erroneous, or controversial. Mireles v. Waco, 502
USS. 9, 11-12 (1991); Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 769 (3d Cir. 2000). Immunity
is overcome only where a judge acts entirely outside his judicial role or in the complete absence
of jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S, at 11-12,

Each of the challenged acts by Judge Picheca were taken in his capacity as the presiding
judicial officer in Plaintiff’s criminal matter. Signing a court order on a motion in a pending case,
presiding over a video conference, ruling on a motion to substitute counsel, and declining to hear
Plaintiff on the record are quintessential judicial functions. The conclusory allegation of a conflict
of interest does not overcome absolute immunity. See Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443- □
44 (3d Cir. 2000). Accordingly, the § 1983 claims against Judge Picheca are dismissed with
prejudice.

Claims Against Assistant Prosecutor Annemarie Mueller

Plaintiff alleges that Prosecutor Mueller filed a motion for the DNA test based on false
statements by Hana Gomes, used witness testimony that she knew to be fabricated, and argued
against Plaintift in a manner that denied him a fair proceeding. (Am. Compl., D.E. 15 at 6.)

Prosecutors are absolutely immune from § 1983 damages lability for acts “intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” including initiating prosecutions and
presenting evidence to a court, Jinbler vy. Pachtman, 424 U.S, 409, 430-31 (1976). Absolute
prosecutorial immunity does not extend, however, to a prosecutor’s investigative or administrative
functions—that is, acts taken prior to the establishment of probable cause or outside the adversarial
process. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S, 259, 273-75 (1993).
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The conduct Plaintiff attributes to Mueller—filing a motion for a DNA test and relying
upon witness declarations in judicial proceedings—constitutes advocacy before the court, squarely
within the scope of absolute prosecutorial immunity. To the extent Plaintiff contends that Mueller
engaged in investigative conduct outside the advocacy function, those allegations are not pled with
sufficient factual specificity to plausibly remove the conduct from the scope of prosecutorial
immunity at this stage. The § 1983 claims against Mueller are therefore dismissed without
prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court disposes of the Amended Complaint as follows:

The following claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE: (1) any § 1983 damages
claims against the State of New Jersey and any injunctive relief claim seeking release or sentence
modification, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s prior opinion; (2) all § 1983 claims against
Judge Anthony F, Picheca, Jr. on the basis of absolute judicial immunity; (3) all claims against
Somerset County Jail, as it is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983; and (4) the freestanding
Fifth Amendment Miranda damages claim against Pasquale, as a failure to administer Miranda
warnings does not give rise to a § 1983 cause of action under Vega □□□ Tekoh.

The following claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE: (1) the § 1983 claims
against attorneys Anthony Cowell and Michael Policastro, because neither is a state actor under §
1983 and Plaintiff's allegations do not adequately plead a conspiracy with state officials; (2) the §
1983 claims against Assistant Prosecutor Annemarie Mueller for conduct falling within the scope
of absolute prosecutorial imnvunity; (3) the “criminal complicity of evidence” claim against
Pasquale for alleged suppression of exculpatory evidence obtained from Plaintiff’s cell phone; and

2]

(4) any standalone Sixth Amendment defense-obstruction theory, which Plaintiff may pursue in
habeas proceedings after exhausting state remedies.

The following claims PROCEED past screening: (1) Fourth Amendment claims against
Pasquale for warrantless arrest, warrantless seizure of personal property, warrantless entry into and
search of Plaintiff's apartment, the first warrantless buccal DNA test on May 12, 2020, and the
administration of the second DNA test in the absence of counsel and through allegedly coercive
means; (2) Fourteenth Amendment claims against RWJ—as a joint actor with state officials—for
forced hospitalization without due process, restraint in handcuffs, denial of communication with
counsel and family, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, transfer to a psychiatric unit
without consent or diagnosis, and participation in the alleged construction of a false psychiatric
report; and (3) Fourteenth Amendment claims against Somerset County personnel, including
Sergeant Garcia in his individual capacity, for denial of attorney and judicial access, excessive
force in connection with the September 10, 2020 DNA test, denial of access to courts through
alleged systemic law library deprivation, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
(including COVID-19 exposure and thyroid medication denial), improper disciplinary segregation,
and prolonged suspension of religious services, family visits, and related privileges.

An appropriate Order follows.

ORGETTE CASTNER
Uxited States District Judge
Dated: May 21, 2026

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11361958. Public record. Not legal advice.