# Opinion

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · June 4, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11361751

## Case

- **Full name:** Estate of Jacqueline Abrams by Reynaldo Marcano, Administrator v. Crestbrook Insurance Company
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** June 4, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

| IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
| FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
| ESTATE OF JACQUELINE ABRAMS : No. 3:23cv307
| BY REYNALDO MARCANO, ;
| ADMINISTRATOR, : (Judge Munley)
Plaintiff, :
| V.
CRESTBROOK INSURANCE :
| COMPANY, :
| Defendant ;

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Reynaldo Marcano, as Administrator of the Estate of Jacqueline
| Abrams, brings this insurance coverage dispute against Defendant Crestbrook
Insurance Company (“Crestbrook”) arising from the denial of a claim under
Jacqueline Abrams’s (“Decedent”) homeowner's insurance policy. For context,
| Decedent was Marcano’s spouse. Plaintiff advances claims for breach of
| contract and bad faith.
| Following discovery, Crestbrook now moves for summary judgment under
| Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on both claims. (Doc. 33). For
|the reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
Background
This insurance coverage dispute stems from extensive water damage
! discovered at plaintiff's property located at 207 Park St., Honesdale, PA 184371

("PA Property”). At the center of the dispute are competing factual and legal
| questions concerning when the damage occurred, whether the property qualified
as a covered “residence premises” under the homeowner policy (“Policy”), and
| whether the claimed loss resulted from a sudden pipe burst or long-term seepage
| or leakage. Marcano contends that Crestbrook wrongfully denied coverage and
acted in bad faith, while defendant maintains that coverage is barred under the
| terms and conditions of the Policy.
On or about June 10, 2022, a representative of Decedent discovered
extensive water damage throughout the insured property.’ (Doc. 33-3, SOF 4).
|The parties agree that the Policy was in effect on the date when the water
damage occurred. (Id. {| 5). The Policy identified the PA Property as a “residence
| premises.” 2 (Id.) Following discovery of the water damage, Marcano submitted a
claim for coverage to Crestbrook under the Policy.
Apparently, the water damage was caused by a burst pipe or valve
servicing the second-floor bathroom shower. (Id. {| 6). Defendant contends that

Unless noted otherwise, the court cites to the defendant's statement of material facts
(“SOF”), (Doc. 33-3), for facts which the plaintiff admitted in his responses to the SOF, (see
Doc. 37, “RSOF”). All facts from the record are construed in a light most favorable to plaintiff
as the nonmoving party. See Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 776 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir.
2015) (citation omitted).

2 Crestbrook insured the PA Property under the Policy from June 24, 2020, through June 24,
2021. (Doc. 33-4, Ex. D, Policy, DEF 1461- 1517). According to the renewal policy
declaration, the Policy was renewed for the period June 24, 2021 through June 24, 2022. (Id., □
Ex. C, Policy, DEF 1-55).

neither plaintiff nor Decedent resided at the Property in 2021 when the damage
occurred. (Id. J] 7). Marcano testified that, beginning in December 2019 and
| continuing until Decedent’s death, Decedent lived exclusively in Florida (“FL
Property”) and never resided at the PA Property.* (Doc. 33-4, Ex. E, Marcano
Dep. at 107:15-108:12). Marcano, however, maintains that he and the Decedent
resided at the FL Property during the winter months and at the PA Property
during the summers. (Doc. 37, RSOF § 7). According to plaintiff, both locations
were listed as insured’s residences under the Policy. (Id.) Marcano further
asserts that, because of her age, weather conditions, and Covid-19 restrictions,
Decedent was unable to travel to the PA Property during the summers of 2020
and 2021.4 (Id.)
The record reflects unusually high water usage at the PA Property during
the relevant time period. Between January 25, 2021, and February 23, 2021,

| 140,000 gallons of water were used at the PA Property. (Doc. 33-3, SOF J 8).
Between February 23, 2021, and March 23, 2021, approximately 152,700 gallons
of water were used. (Id. 7 9). According to plaintiff, the flooding continued after

3 The FL Property is located at 270 Palmetto Ln, West Palm Beach, FL 33405.
According to the complaint, the Decedent passed away on April 11, 2022. (Doc. 1, Compl. J
1). That detail is not disputed by the defendant.
|

| February 23, 2021 and persisted into March and even April 2021. (Doc. 37,
| RSOF 7).
| Plaintiff testified that he had no explanation for that level of water usage
| other than a burst pipe. (Doc. 33-3, SOF 4 10). Marcano further testified that he
| first became aware in June or July of 2022 that a pipe had burst in or around late
| January 2021, causing water to leak throughout the PA Property. (Id. J 11).
| Defendant's expert, Stuart Morrison, P.E., concluded, based on the water
| meter readings, that water had been flowing for approximately twenty-five days
before February 23, 2021, and that the loss could not have occurred only two
days before the meter reading. (Doc. 33-3, SOF 4] 12). Plaintiff similarly testified

that the Aqua water bill demonstrated that the pipe burst before February 23,
)2021. (Doc. 33-4, Ex. E, Marcano Dep. at 79:3-20).
| The PA Property had last been winterized in 2019. (Doc. 33-3, SOF ¥ 14).
The pipes were not drained because, according to plaintiff, the boiler heating
system remained on and the thermostat was set at 70 degrees. (Doc. 37, RSOF

| 14). Marcano asserts that the pipes could not have been fully drained because
the boiler system required circulating hot water to remain operational. (Id.)
| At this stage, the parties agree that the 140,000 gallons of water usage
recorded in February indicated that the water problem began before February 23,
| 2021. (Doc. 33-3, SOF | 16). Plaintiff nevertheless emphasizes that the flooding

| did not stop in February and instead continued into April 2021. (Doc. 37, RSOF 4]
| 16).
On July 19, 2022, Crestbrook retained Gallinger Environmental
Management Corp. (“GEM”) to inspect the PA Property. (Doc. 33-3, SOF 21).
GEM concluded that: (1) significant visible mold growth and water damage were

| present throughout the house; (2) the water damage was extensive and not
| recent; and (3) the water intrusion was caused primarily by plumbing leaks
| originating from the second-floor bathroom area, which caused water to flow
downward, collapsing the television room ceiling and flooding the basement. (Id.)
Notably, the parties dispute the nature of the water loss. Crestbrook

| characterizes the loss as resulting from the “seepage or leakage of water,”
| whereas, Marcano describes it as a “deluge from burst pipes,” which plaintiff
| contends is materially different from seepage or leakage. (Id. {J 23; Doc. 37,
| RSOF 23).
| Based on the record, it appears that Marcano filed a claim for property
| damage sometime in June 2022. (Doc. 33-4, Ex. N, Dec. Letter at DEF 315).

| Thereafter, Crestbrook issued a reservation of rights letter dated June 14, 2022.
(Doc. 33-3, SOF J 25). The letter identified potential coverage issues,
specifically that Crestbrook was not waiving any policy conditions or exclusions
| and that it reserved its rights to deny coverage under the terms of the Policy. (Id.)

| The letter also referenced the Policy provision requiring any legal action to be
brought within two years of the date of loss or damage. (Id.)
Crestbrook formally denied the claim in a letter dated December 2, 2022,
| sent to Marcano. (Id. {| 28). The denial letter asserted that the PA Property did
| not qualify as the Decedent's “residence premises,” citing applicable Policy
exclusions; and again it referenced the Policy provision requiring suit to be filed
within two years of the date of loss or damages. (Id.) The letter further stated
that Crestbrook’s review of the water usage records raised concerns regarding
the timing of the alleged loss. (Id. J 30).
Marcano initiated this action on February 21, 2023. Plaintiff contends that
defendant's refusal to indemnify the claimed losses constitutes a breach of
contract and further alleges that defendant acted in bad faith in denying
coverage. (Doc. 1, Compl. fff 16, 24, 25).
Jurisdiction
The court has jurisdiction pursuant to the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. §
| 1332. As alleged, there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties
and the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional limit. (Doc. 1, Compl. J
3). The Decedent's estate was probated in Pennsylvania. (Id. J 1). Crestbrook is

a casualty insurance company based in Arizona. (Id. J 2). See 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(“district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter

|in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
| costs, and is between ... citizens of different states[.]”).
As a federal court sitting in diversity, the court applies state substantive
law. Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)). Pennsylvania law applies in this

| case.
Legal Standard
| Summary judgment is proper when there Is no genuine issue of material
: fact in the case and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

| Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); see also
FED.R. Clv. P. 56(a). “A fact is material if its resolution ‘might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law,’...[a]nd a dispute is genuine ‘if the evidence
| is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ ”
| Mall Chevrolet, Inc. v. Gen. Motors LLC, 99 F.4th 622, 631 (3d Cir. 2024)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
At this stage, the judge's function is not “to weigh the evidence and

| determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine
| issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. All “facts in dispute,” Daniels, 776
| F.3d at 187, and all “inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must

| be viewed in the light most favorable to the [opposing] party[,]” Matsushita Elec.

|

| Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (cleaned up).
“[W]hen there is a disagreement about the facts or the proper inferences to be
| drawn from them, a trial is required to resolve the conflicting versions of the
| parties.” Peterson v. Lehigh Valley Dist. Council, United Bhd. of Carpenters &
Joiners, 676 F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir. 1982). Furthermore, “a court’s role remains
| circumscribed in that it is inappropriate for a court to resolve factual disputes and
to make credibility determinations.” Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc.,
974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). “[W]here the non-moving
party's evidence contradicts the movant’s, then the non-movant's must be taken

as true.” Id. (citations omitted).

| A motion for summary judgment may also be granted where a moving party
| demonstrates that the nonmoving party “has not made ‘a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case ... on which
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’ ” Mall Chevrolet, Inc., 99 F.4th at
| 630 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 332 (1986) (emphasis
| removed)). After a moving party carries their burden to show the absence of a

| genuine, material factual dispute, Rule 56 flips the burden onto “the nonmovant

| to ‘go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the depositions,

| answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Daubert v. NRA Grp., LLC, 861
|

| F.3d 382, 391 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324). The non-
moving party must “do more than ‘simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S.
at 587).
If a party fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required
| by Rule 56, the court may “grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting
materiale —analuding the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is
| entitled to it [.]” Feb. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3). Summary judgment is appropriate where
les moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anchorage Assocs. v.
i Islands Bd. of Tax Rev., 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 1990).
Analysis
| Crestbrook contends that plaintiff's breach of contract and bad faith claims
| fail as a matter of law. The court will address each claim in turn.
| 1. Breach of Contract
| Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff asserting a breach of contract claim

| must establish “(1) the existence of a contract, including its essential terms, (2) a

| breach of a duty imposed by the contract [,] and (3) resultant damages.” Meyer,
| Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck, P.L.L.C. v. L. Firm of Malone Middleman,
P.C., 137 A.3d 1247, 1258 (Pa. 2016).

To evaluate Marcano’s breach of contract claim, the court must determine
the scope of coverage afforded under the Policy. Under Pennsylvania law,
insurance policies are interpreted according to ordinary principles of contract
interpretation because “at base, an insurance policy is nothing more than a
contract between an insurer and an insured.” Gallagher v. GEICO Indem. Co.,
201 A.3d 131, 137 (Pa. 2019) (citation omitted). If the policy language is clear
and unambiguous, courts must give effect to that language according to its plain
and ordinary meaning, unless doing so would violate a clearly established public
policy. Kurach v. Truck Ins. Exch., 235 A.3d 1106, 1116 (Pa. 2020) (citation
| omitted). Where policy terms are ambiguous, or “subject to more than one

| reasonable interpretation when applied to a particular set of facts[,]” the provision
must be construed “in favor of the policyholder and against the insurer, as the

| insurer drafted the policy and selected the language which was used therein.” Id.
(citations omitted and quotation marks removed). With these principles in mind,
the court will later examine the Policy provisions relevant to the coverage
| dispute.
Crestbrook advances three theories in support of dismissal of the plaintiff's
breach of contract claim. First, defendant contends that Marcano failed to
| commence this action within two years of the date of loss or damage, as required
| 10

| by the Policy. Second, Crestbrook asserts that the PA Property did not qualify as
| the “residence premises” and therefore was not covered under the Policy. Third,
defendant argues that plaintiff's claim is barred by the Policy’s exclusion for
| continuous seepage or leakage from a plumbing system. These arguments are
unconvincing.
a. Statute of Limitations
Crestbrook contends that Marcano’s breach of contract claim is barred by
the two-year suit limitations provision contained in the Policy. Specifically,
| Crestbrook points to water usage records showing that 140,000 gallons of water
used in February 2021 and to an expert opinion concluding that a plumbing
leak occurred in February and March of 2021. (Doc. 33 § 24).
Under Pennsylvania law, breach of contract claims are generally subject to
| a four-year statute of limitations. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5525(a). The
insurance contract at issue here, however, contains a shorter contractual
limitations period. Specifically, the Policy provides: “8. Suit Against Us: “No
action can be brought against us unless there has been full compliance with the
| policy provisions. Any action must be started within two years after the date of
or damage.” (Doc. 33-4, Ex. D, Policy at DEF 1507).
Pennsylvania law permits contracting parties to shorten the applicable
limitations period so long as the shortened period “is not manifestly
11

unreasonable.” Palmisano v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. CIV.A. 12-886,
WL 3595276, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2012) (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
5501). Notably, “[t]his Commonwealth has long recognized the validity of a
| policy provision limiting the time of bringing suit under its terms and rendering the

normal statute of limitations for the cause of action in question inapplicable.”
Commonwealth v. Transamerican Ins., 341 A.2d 74, 76 (Pa. 1975). In this
regard, Pennsylvania courts as well as federal courts applying Pennsylvania law,
| have routinely upheld contractual limitations periods as short as one year as

| reasonable. Id. at *9 (collecting decisions). See, e.g., Gen. State Auth. v. Planet
| Ins. Co., 346 A.2d 265, 267 (Pa. 1975) (“The law is clear that such a clause,
| setting time limits upon the commencement of suits to recovery on a policy, is
| valid and will be sustained”); Reinhart v. Erie Ins. Co., No. 2034 MDA 2014, 2015
| WL 6159391, at *6 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2015) (“The validity of the one-year
| limitation of suit provision in fire insurance policies has been consistently upheld
| by Pennsylvania Courts”), Pratts v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 3:16-CV-
| 2385, 2019 WL 1952875, at *5 (M.D. Pa. May 2, 2019) (“Such contractual
| provisions shortening the period for an insured to file a claim are permissible
| under Pennsylvania law.”).

| Marcano does not dispute the enforceability of the Policy's limitations
provision. (See Doc. 38, Br. in Opp. at 5-8). Instead, plaintiff argues that this

| 12

action was commenced within the two-year contractual limitations period
because the loss or damage continued into April 2021. (Id.) Plaintiff also
contends that Crestbrook waived reliance on the limitations provision. (Id. at 12-
20).
Plaintiff commenced this action on February 21, 2023, by filing a complaint
in this court. (Doc. 1). According to plaintiff, Crestbrook’s own investigation an
thi rt. (Doc. 1). A ding to plaintiff, Crestbrook’ tigati d
| expert report indicated that the water flooding continued through at least April
2021. (Id.)
| In its December 2022 denial letter, Crestbrook stated that “[wjater usage
statements showed 140,000 gallons used in February of 2021, 152,700 gallons
|in March of 2021, and 36,900 gallons in April of 2021. This resulted in further

concerns regarding the timing of the reported loss.” (Doc. 33-4, Ex. N, Dec.

| Letter at DEF 315). The letter further stated that “Crestbrook’s investigation,
| including review of water bills and the findings of independent experts, revealed
a plumbing leak occurred in February, March, and April of 2021.” (Id. at DEF
318).
| Similarly, defendant’s expert, Stuart Morrison, P.E., noted in his report:
| The records indicate a normal usage at the property of 200-
| 300 gallons per month from January 28, 2020, up through
January 25, 2021. The following meter reading on
| February 23, 2021, showed a usage of 140,000 gallons.
| The following months reading on March 23, 2021 had a
total usage of 152,700 gallons, for the 28 days from
| 13

| February 25th until March 25th. The following month
showed usage of 35,900 gallons, until the water service
| was shut off for non-payment on April 19, 2021.
(Doc. 33-4, Ex. H., Morrison Report at 5).
Based on this evidence, a genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding
timing and duration of the loss. Specifically, the record does not permit a
precise determination as to when the loss or damage began. Nor does it resolve
whether the loss or damage continued through March or April 2021.
Crestbrook relies on Pratts v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 3:16-CV-
| 2385, 2019 WL 1952875, at *6 (M.D. Pa. May 2, 2019), in support of its position.
In Pratts, the plaintiff argued that the limitations period began to run only when
her realtor discovered the water damage at the property. Id. The court rejected
| that argument, explaining that “the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has rejected
| that proposition on at least two occasions.” Id. (citing Lardas v. Underwriters Ins.
Co., 231 A.2d 740 (Pa. 1967) and Gen. State Auth., 346 A.2d at 265)). The court
concluded that the “date of loss” is an objective fact and does not depend upon
when the insured became aware of the damage. Id.
| Unlike the plaintiff in Pratts, Marcano does not invoke the discovery rule or
| argue that the limitations period began when he discovered the damage.°®

| In Pratts, the evidence permitted the court to identify the latest possible date of loss with
| relative precision. There, the property’s water bill reflected no water usage between December

| Rather, plaintiff contends that the date of loss or damage itself extended into
2021 because the water intrusion and resulting damage continued until that
time. Thus, while Pratts is instructive, it is not dispositive of the issue presently

| before the court.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Marcano, a reasonable
could conclude that the loss or damage continued through April 2021. If so,
then plaintiff's February 2023 complaint would fall within the Policy's two-year
contractual limitations period.° Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to summary
judgment on Marcano’s breach of contract claim on this basis alone.
| 9, 2014 and January 7, 2015, but showed 134,700 gallons used during the next billing cycle,
| resulting in a charge of $ 1,479.78. 2019 WL 1952875, at *3. Moreover, the water company
| notified the plaintiff by letter dated January 27, 2015 that water service to the property had
been shut off. Id. at *6. Based on that evidence, the court had reason to conclude that the loss
occurred well before March 14, 2015, notwithstanding the plaintiff's contention that March 14,
| 2015 was the date of loss. See id.
| Crestbrook further relies on Condi v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 3:13CV1100, 2013 WL 4520852,
| at *5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2013), to support its position. In Condi, the date of loss was readily
| ascertainable because the plaintiffs’ property sustained damage during a severe storm on
| September 7, 2011. Id.
| This case presents a different factual scenario. Unlike Pratts, the record does not establish
| with any degree of certainty when the water intrusion began or if the resulting damage ceased
| in February 2021. And unlike Condi, the alleged loss was not tied to a single storm or other
| discrete event occurring on a known date. Accordingly, the court cannot determine when the
| loss or damage occurred here.
| Marcano also argues that Crestbrook waived reliance on the Policy’s contractual limitations
| provision. Specifically, Marcano contends that Crestbrook repeatedly represented in
| correspondence that the date of loss was June 10, 2022. (Doc. 38, Br. in Opp. at 6). Because
| the court concludes that genuine disputes of material fact exist regarding both the timing and
duration of the loss, disputes that bear directly on the timeliness of the complaint, it need not
‘ie

| b. Residence Premises
Crestbrook also contends that there is no coverage for the loss alleged in
| the complaint because the PA Property was not the “residence premises” under
| the Policy. (Doc. 33, 30). Specifically, defendant maintains that, at the time of
in loss and damage occurred, neither the named insured, i.e., Decedent, nor
| Marcano resided at the PA Property. (Doc. 33-1, Br. in Supp. at 10-11).
Marcano testified that no one had physically lived at the PA Property since
| December 2019, more than two-and-a-half years before plaintiff discovered the
water damage. (Id.) It is likewise undisputed that no one continuously occupied
the PA Property during the Policy period when the loss or damage allegedly
| occurred in January or February 2021.” (Id.)
5
| address plaintiff's alternative argument that Crestbrook waived the Policy’s two-year
| contractual limitations period.
| 7 Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that Crestbrook denied the claim based on a “lack of
| residence, and/or that fraud in the application occurred.” (Doc. 1, Compl. 19). Crestbrook,
| however, maintains that there is no evidence that the claim was denied because of fraud in the
| insurance application. (Doc. 33-1, Br. in Supp. at 15). In its reply brief, Crestbrook further
| asserts that the claim was not denied solely based on alleged material misrepresentations, but
rather for several reasons discussed throughout the briefing. (Doc. 39, Reply Br. at 12).
According to Crestbrook, there is no genuine dispute that it had a reasonable basis to
conclude that plaintiff made material misrepresentations during the claim investigation. (Doc.
39, Reply Br. at 12).
The record suggests that Marcano’s statements during two recorded interviews contradicted
| his later sworn testimony regarding the last time he was present at the PA Property and
| whether he winterized that same property. (Doc. 33-4, Ex. N, Denial Letter at DEF 315-16).
| The parties did not meaningfully develop the misrepresentation issue in their submissions. In
| any event, the court need not address that issue here because it is not central to the matters
presently before the court.
16

| The Policy provides, inter alia as follows:
COVERAGE A—DWELLING
| 1. We cover:
| a. The dwelling on the residence premises used mainly as your private
residence including attached structures.

| (Doc. 33-4, Exhibit D, Policy at DEF 1493) (bold type in original).
According to the Policy:
| 1. You and Your refer to:
| a. The named insured shown in the Declarations; and
b. The spouse of the named insured if a resident of the
| same household. If the spouse ceases to be a
| resident of the same household during the policy
period or prior to the inception of this policy, the
spouse will be considered you and your under this
| policy, but only until the earlier of:
(1) The end of 90 days following the spouse's change
| of residency;
(2) The effective date of another policy listing the
| individual as a named insured; or
(3) The end of the policy period....
| 15. Insured location means:
a. the residence premises;
17. Residence Premises means:
| a. the one-family dwelling where you reside .. .
c. That part of any other building where you reside and
which is shown as the residence premises in the
Declarations;
(Doc. 33-4, Ex. C, Policy at DEF 28, 31) (bold type in original).
| 17

Marcano does not dispute that coverage under the Policy is conditioned

upon the insured residing at the Property. Rather, plaintiff argues that the Policy
itself reflects that the couple maintained two residences. (Doc. 38, Br. in Opp. at
| 8). Specifically, the renewal policy declarations for the periods spanning June
24, 2020 through June 24, 2021, and June 24, 2021 through June 24, 2022,
| identify the PA Property, as the “Residence Premises[.]” (Id. at DEF 4, 1464).
| The declarations further list the FL Property under “Additional Residences and
Insured Locations[.]” (Id. at DEF 5, 1465).
Although the Policy does not define the term “reside,” the Third Circuit
| Court of Appeals, applying Pennsylvania law, has defined the term as “to settle
| oneself or thing in a place; to be stationed; remain; stay.” St. Paul Fire & Marine
| Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 935 F.2d 1428, 1431 (3d Cir. 1991); see Krager v. Foremost
| Ins. Co., 450 A.2d 736, 738 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (“Residence [is defined as
| one’s] factual place of abode"). Courts applying Pennsylvania law have
consistently held that the term is unambiguous, even when left undefined in the

| policy itself. Gerow v. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Co., 346 F. Supp. 3d 769, 778-79
(W.D. Pa. 2018) (collecting cases).
At the same time, “[o]ccasional, sporadic, and temporary contacts are
| insufficient.” Lewis, 935 F.2d 1432. Rather, residency requires “some measure
of permanency or habitual repetition.” Erie Ins. Exch. v. Weryha, 931 A.2d 739,
18

| 744 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). Intention alone is not dispositive. Wall Rose Mut. Ins.
| Co. v. Manross, 939 A.2d 958, 965 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). In determining
whether an individual “physically lives” at a particular location so as to reside
there, courts must examine the totality of the circumstances and reach a
common-sense conclusion. Id. The insured bears the burden of establishing
| coverage under an insurance policy. Erie Ins. Exch. v. Transamerica Ins. Co.,
A.2d 1363, 1366-67 (Pa. 1987).
| Pennsylvania courts have also recognized that an individual may reside in

| more than one location. In Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., the
| Pennsylvania Superior Court explained that dual residency may exist where an

| individual consistently divides time between multiple locations. 545 A.2d 343, 348
| (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (citation omitted). Moreover, “if there is more than one
| reasonable inference to make from the evidence regarding residency, the
question of residency is a question of fact for the jury to decide.” Allstate Ins. Co.

| v. Naskidashvili, No. CIV.A.07-4282, 2009 WL 399793, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16,
| 2009); see Isenberg v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 604 F. Supp. 3d 322, 329
(W.D. Pa. 2022) (“Because Pennsylvania law recognizes that Pennsylvania
| citizens may have more than one residence, and because, here, dual residency
exists, the Court finds that Defendant's insurance policy provides coverage to the
| residence named on its declarations page — namely the Property.”).

19

This case, like many residency disputes, presents competing factual
narratives. See Menzies v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., No. 2:23-CV-79-NR, 2024 WL
1677486, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 2024) (“There is a genuine dispute of material
| fact about whether [plaintiff] resided in the property because the evidence
submitted by the parties requires a factfinder to resolve the parties’ differing
views of the facts.”). Although Marcano does not dispute that he and Decedent
| spent most, if not, all of their time in the FL Property during the relevant period,
| plaintiff contends that the couple nevertheless maintained two residences: the PA
| Property as their summer residence and the FL Property as their winter

| residence. (Doc. 33-4, Ex. M., Marcano Testimony at 36:2-25, 87:11-25).
| According to Marcano, the couple intended to return to the PA property but
| were unable to travel from Florida to Pennsylvania due to Decedent's age,
| declining health, and the Covid-19 pandemic. (Id.) Plaintiff further asserts that
| the couple continued heat, electricity, and water service at the PA Property
| because they anticipated eventually returning there.® (Doc. 38, Br. in Opp. at 8-
| 9).

8 With respect to whether someone else had access to the PA Property, Crestbrook’s expert,
| Stuart Morrison, P.E., noted in his report that Marcano stated no one besides him had keys to
| the home. (Doc. 39-2, Def. Ex. O, Morrison Report at 4). Morrison further noted that Guy
| Daro, plaintiff's friend who had been working around the PA Property, reportedly returned his
| key to plaintiff in December 2020. (Id.) Morrison therefore concluded that it was unknown who
| accessed the property around February 2021 to restore heat to the home. (Id.) Morrison also
7 observed that gas bills reflected high usage in March and April 2021, but no significant usage
20

| Marcano also points out that premiums continued to be paid on both

| properties and that the Policy itself identified the PA Property as the “Residence
| Premises” while listing the FL Property as an “Additional Residence... and
| Insured Locations [.]” (Id. at DEF 4, 5, 1464, 1465).
Although intention is not a relevant consideration, the evidence
nonetheless creates a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the couple
| maintained dual residency. At this juncture, it is not the role of the court at

summary judgment to weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations. If a

afterward, suggesting that someone may have turned the heat off. (Id.) At most, this evidence
| creates a genuine dispute of material fact for the jury.
| The parties also dispute whether heat was being maintained at the PA Property at the time of
| the pipe burst. Marcano’s expert, Joseph D. Hudak, P.E., noted in his report that Marcano
| stated that electricity and gas service to the house remained on between December 2020 and
| March 2021. (Doc. 37-6, Pl. Ex. F, Hudak Report at 3). Hudak further opined that, at the time
| of the pipe burst, it would be reasonable to conclude that there had been a power outage or
| that the electrical service had been disconnected by PPLC Electric Utilities. (Id.)

| Crestbrook’s expert, Morrison, P.E., reached a different conclusion. Morrison agreed with
| Hudak’s assessment “that the loss occurred between January 25 and February 2, [2021]
| based upon the water usage records.” (Doc. 39-2, Def. Ex. O, Morrison Report at 4).
Nonetheless, Morrison noted that utility and fuel records showed little gas usage during
| November 2020, December 2020, or January 2021, and only moderate usage in February
| 2021. (Id. at 1). According to Morrison, the lack of gas usage suggested that the boilers were
| not operating and that the heat was not being maintained during that period. (Id.) Morrison
| further stated that gas usage from November 2020 through February of 2021 was roughly
| consistent with normal summer usage, indicating that only the boiler pilots were likely
consuming gas. (Id. at 4). Morrison ultimately concluded that there was no indication that the
gas had been shut off, but also no indication that the boilers were actively heating the home
before the February gas bill. (Id.) In Morrison’s view, this suggested that heat was not being
| maintained at the PA Property at the time of loss or damage. (Id.)
| Accordingly, whether heat was being maintained at the PA Property remains a disputed issue
| of fact for the jury to decide.
| 21

| reasonable juror could review the record and conclude that the couple
maintained dual residency, summary judgment is inappropriate. Accordingly,
| whether the couple resided at the PA Property at the time of the pipe burst is an
| issue for the jury to resolve at trial. 9

c. Continuous or Repeated Seepage or Leakage
Next, Crestbrook argues that plaintiff's claim is excluded under the Policy’s □
exclusion for continuous or repeated seepage or leakage of water occurring over

period of weeks, months, or years from a plumbing system. (Doc. 39, Reply Br.
at 8-9).
The Policy provides, in relevant part:

| 1. Unless noted otherwise, we do not insure for loss caused
| directly or indirectly by any of the following. Such loss is
| excluded regardless of any other cause or event

|° The court finds support for its decision in several cases addressing residency determinations
under insurance policies. See, e.g., Hudspeth v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. CV 24-
| 169, 2025 WL 2097606, at *3 (W.D. Pa. July 25, 2025) (denying summary judgment on breach
| of contract claim where, despite extended hospital and nursing facility stays following a fall, the
| plaintiff-insured continued paying utilities for her longtime home and arranged for its regular
| upkeep); Isenberg, 604 F. Supp. 3d at 329 (denying the insurer's motion for summary
| judgment where the plaintiff temporarily rented an apartment while extensively renovating the
| insured property, supporting a finding that she continued to reside there); Naskidashvili, 2009
| WL 399793, at *4 (denying summary judgment motion where competing evidence created a
| genuine issue of material fact as to whether an individual was a resident of the insured
household); Strouss v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 03-5718, 2005 WL 418036, at *11-
12 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2005) (finding the record insufficient to determine as a matter of law
| whether a college student resided in his parents’ household and proceeding to bench trial on
| the residency issue); Kaylor v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1068 WDA 2012, 2013 WL
| 11272836, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2013) (holding that an insured remained a resident of
| the household for UIM coverage purposes despite temporarily residing in a personal care
| home while recovering from surgery, where she continued receiving mail, kept her belongings
| and pets, and maintained that permanent home as her residence).
| 22

| contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.
| These exclusions apply whether or not the loss event
| results in widespread damage or affects a substantial area

t. Continuous or repeated seepage or leakage of water
| or steam over a period of weeks, months or years from
a:
(1) Heating, air conditioning or automatic protective
sprinkler system;
| (2) Household appliance;
| (3) Plumbing system; or
(4) Water, steam or sewer pipes, or storm drains
| located off the residence premises.
| A plumbing system or household appliance does not
| include a sump pump, sump pump well or other
system designed to remove subsurface water drained
from the foundation area. However, any ensuing loss
| to property described in Coverage A, B and C not
| precluded by any other provision in this policy is
| covered. In addition, if loss caused by water or steam
is not otherwise excluded, we will cover the cost of
| tearing out and replacing any part of the building
necessary to repair or replace the system or
appliance. We do not cover loss to the system or
| appliance from which the water or steam escaped.
| (Doc. 33-4, Ex. C, Policy at DEF 38, 40-41) (bold type in original).
Crestbrook contends that the water usage data and expert opinions
| conclusively establish that water leaked throughout the PA Property for weeks or
| months before plaintiff discovered the damage. According to defendant,
hundreds of thousands of gallons of water leaked between January and April
2021, thereby triggering the exclusion. (Doc. 33-1, Br. in Supp. at 13).
| 23

| Marcano disputes that characterization. According to plaintiff, the exclusion
does not apply because the damage was not caused by a slow or gradual water
| trickle, but rather by a sudden pipe burst that caused a substantial flood
pone the home." (Doc. 38, Br. in Opp. at 9).

| Plaintiff's expert, Joseph Hudak, P.E., opined that “the damage to the pipes

| and valve is because of pipes that froze causing the pipes and val[v]e to burst,
thus releasing substantial water.” (Doc. 37-6, Ex. F, Hudak Report at 3).

| Likewise, Marcano’s other expert, Shane Elllis, P.A., noted that “the loss was
caused by a valve rupture and bathroom pipes rupture and, after close
inspection, both failures were from freezing expansion .. . The fractures caused
| water to burst out and flood the 2" floor, 18‘ floor and basement.” (Doc. 37-4, Ex.
D., Ellis Report at 1).
| Plaintiff cursorily suggests that the exclusion is ambiguous, although he
does not identify any specific term within the exclusion that is susceptible to
multiple reasonable interpretations. (Doc. 38, Br. in Opp. at 9). Alternatively,
Marcano argues that the evidence creates a genuine dispute of material fact as

| to whether the damage resulted from gradual seepage or leakage, as opposed to

10 Plaintiff argues that Crestbrook bears the burden of proof with respect to the applicability of
| the “seepage or leakage” exception. (Doc. 38, Br. in opp. at 9). The court disagrees. Under
| Pennsylvania law, the insured bears the burden of establishing coverage under an insurance
| policy. See Erie Ins. Exchange, 533 A.2d at 1366-67.
24

| a sudden flood or caused by a pipe burst. (Id.) The court finds Marcano’s first
argument unpersuasive but agrees that a genuine dispute of material fact exists
as to the second issue.
Under Pennsylvania law, when “the language of the contract is clear and
| unambiguous, a court is required to give effect to that language.” Liberty Mut. Ins.
| Co. v. Sweeney, 689 F.3d 288, 293 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Standard Venetian
Blind Co. v. Am. Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 563, 566 (Pa. 1983)). Conversely,
ambiguous policy provisions are generally construed in favor of the insured.
Gardner v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 544 F.3d 553, 558 (3d Cir. 2008). A
| provision is ambiguous only if it is reasonably susceptible to more than one
| interpretation." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The court agrees with Crestbrook that the “continuous or repeated seepage
| or leakage” language is not ambiguous. For instance, at least one sister court
| concluded that the policy’s failure to define the phrase “continuous or repeated
| seepage or leakage” which “occurs over a period of time” does not render the
| provision ambiguous. Brodzinski v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. CV 16-6125,
2017 WL 3675399, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2017); see Fifth v. State Farm Ins.

| Co., No. 11-7440, 2014 WL 1253542, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2014) (finding

11 If possible, courts must interpret an insurance policy in a manner that avoids ambiguity and

| cn to all of its provisions. Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Murray, 658 F.3d 311, 321 (3d Cir.

exclusion for “continuous or repeated seepage or leakage of water. . . which
occurs over a period of time” to be unambiguous and concluding that leakage
| occurring over the course of one month fell within the exclusion); see also Simon
Wrecking Co. v. AIU Ins. Co., 350 F. Supp. 2d 624, 636 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (“The
| mere fact that a term used in the policy is not defined does not make the policy

| ambiguous.”). Rather, “[w]here critical terms are left undefined in a policy,
| Pennsylvania case law instructs that ‘words of common usage in an insurance
| policy are to be construed in their natural, plain, and ordinary sense .. . and we
| may inform our understanding of these terms by considering their dictionary

| definitions.’ ” Canal Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 435 F.3d 431,
| 435-36 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Madison Const. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co.,
735 A.2d 100, 108 (Pa. 1999)).
Courts interpreting similar language have concluded that the exclusion

| applies to damage caused by ongoing or repeated leakage over time, as
| opposed to damage caused by a single, abrupt event. See Brodzinski, 2017 WL
3675399, at *5 (“There is nothing that is ambiguous about the phrase ‘over a
period of time’ when read in the context of the entire exclusion.”) (citing Fifth v.
State Farm Ins. Co., 2014 WL 1253542, at *5)).
In Brodzinski, the plaintiff sought coverage for water damage allegedly
| caused by a leaking air-conditioning unit. Id. at 1. Although the court granted

26

summary judgment on the plaintiff's bad faith claim, it observed that the
competing expert opinions created a factual dispute as to whether the damage
| resulted from repeated seepage over time or from a “one time occurrencef.]” Id.
at 6. The court therefore recognized that such a dispute could present a triable
| issue regarding coverage under the policy. '
Although the exclusion itself is unambiguous, the evidence here creates a
| factual dispute as to whether the damage resulted from a gradual leakage “over
| a period of weeks, months or years” or from a sudden pipe burst caused by
freezing conditions. Marcano’s experts characterize the event as a sudden
rupture that caused flooding throughout the home, while defendant's evidence
| suggests prolonged leakage over an extended period. See Laszlo v. State Farm
| Fire & Cas. Co., No. 23CV21529 (EP) (JRA), 2025 WL 2611317, at *12 (D.N.J.
Sept. 10, 2025) (“Because [plaintiffs] have presented admissible expert testimony

| to dispute whether the break [in the PVC pipe] occurred abruptly or not, State
Farm's responsibility under the Policy is still up for debate.”); see also Brodzinski,
2017 WL 3675399, at *6. Those disputes of material fact as to coverage under

| the Policy preclude summary judgment on this basis.

2 Defendant in Brodzinski moved for summary judgment only as to the plaintiff's bad faith
claim, not the breach of contract claim. 2017 i at *1.

| In sum, Crestbrook’s motion for summary judgment will be denied with
| respect to Marcano’s breach of contract claim.
| 2. Bad Faith
| Defendant also contends that plaintiff cannot meet his burden of proving
bad faith by clear and convincing evidence. (Doc. 33, {| 48). According to
| defendant, the record establishes that it had a reasonable basis for denying
| plaintiff's claim.
| Under Pennsylvania law, bad faith includes “any frivolous or unfounded
refusal to pay proceeds of a policy[.]” Terletsky v. Prudential Prop. and Cas. Ins.
Co., 649 A.2d 680, 688 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary
139 (6th ed. 1990)). Bad faith imports “a dishonest purpose” or a breach of a
| known duty through “some motive of self-interest or ill will [.]” Keefe v. Keefe v.
| Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 218, 225 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting
Terletsky, 649 A.2d at 688)). Mere negligence or bad judgment does not
constitute bad faith. Id.

| To prevail on a statutory bad faith claim under 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8371,
| a plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the insurer: (1)
| lacked reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy; and (2) knew of or

28

recklessly disregarded its lack of a reasonable basis.'? Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Babayan, 430 F.3d 121, 137 (3d Cir. 2005); W.V. Realty, Inc. v. N. Ins. Co., 334
F.3d 306, 312 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Keefe, 203 F.3d at 225)). The clear and
convincing standard requires evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty and

| convincing” as to permit a clear conviction, without hesitation, that the insurer
acted in bad faith. Polselli v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 747, 752 (3d
Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); Terletsky, 649 A.2d at 688 (finding that bad faith
must be proven and “not merely insinuated.”); see also J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co.
Pilosi, 393 F.3d 356, 367 (3d Cir. 2004) ("Thus, the plaintiff's burden in
| opposing a summary judgment motion is commensurately high in light of the
| substantive evidentiary burden at trial.”) (citation omitted)).
| Upon review of the record, the court concludes that Marcano has failed to
| produce clear and convincing evidence that Crestbrook acted in bad faith.
Specifically, plaintiff has not shown that Crestbrook lacked a reasonable basis for
its handling of the claim or knowingly or recklessly disregarded the absence of
| such a basis.
The record reflects that Marcano discovered the water damage in June
| 2022. Shortly after receiving notice of the claim, Crestbrook issued Marcano a

| ‘5 Under Pennsylvania's bad faith statute, courts may award interest, punitive damages, costs
and attorneys’ fees, in actions arising under an insurance policy, if it is determined that the
| insurer has acted in bad faith towards the insured. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8371.
| 29

| reservation of rights letter dated June 14, 2022, identifying potential coverage
| issues, reserving its rights under the Policy, and advising plaintiff of the Policy
| provision requiring suit to be filed within two years of the date of loss or damage.
| (Doc. 33-4, Ex. L, Reservation Letter at DEF 327-31).
Crestbrook then conducted an extensive investigation. On June 20, 2022,
defendant retained professional engineer Rober Monaco, who inspected the PA
| Property in the presence of Marcano and a representative from defendant's
Special Investigation Unit. (Doc. 33-4, Ex. J, Engineering Report at DEF 79).
| Monaco concluded that the significant increase in water usage in February and
| March 2021 indicated “a severe water supply line leak”. (Id. at DEF 80).
On July 19, 2022, Crestbrook retained GEM to inspect the PA Property.
| (Doc. 33-4, Ex. K, Gallinger Report at DEF118). GEM observed extensive mold

| growth and water damage throughout the house and concluded that the damage
wae not recent. (Id.) GEM further determined that the primary source of the

| water damage was plumbing leaks originating primarily from the second floor
| bathroom area and concluded, based on the water bills, that the plumbing failure
occurred in February 2021. (Id. at DEF 119).
| A month later, Crestbrook retained another professional engineer, Stuart
| Morrison, P.E., to inspect the PA Property. (Doc. 33-4, Ex. F., Cause of Loss
Report at DEF 96). Morrison concluded that the damage was caused primarily

| 30

by a failed water valve serving the second-floor bathroom, as well as an

| additional waterflow from radiators on the second floor. (Id. at DEF 95). He

| further noted that the mold growth resulted from the failure to timely mitigate the
water damage. (Id.)
In a supplemental report dated December 9, 2022, Morrison opined that the
| failed quarter-turn ball valve caused the damage throughout the PA Property and

| that the water utility records showed water flowing for approximately twenty-five
days before the February meter reading. (Doc. 33-4, Ex. H, Supplemental Report
at ECF p. 171-72). Based on these records, Morrison concluded that the loss
| likely began around January 30, 2021, rather than two days before the February
23, 2021 meter reading. (Id.)
| The record therefore demonstrates that Crestbrook conducted a thorough
investigation before denying plaintiff's claim. See Condio v. Erie Ins. Exch., 899
| A.2¢ 1136, 1142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (“Bad faith conduct also includes lack of

| good faith investigation into facts.” (citation omitted)). There is likewise no
| evidence that Crestbrook’s denial was frivolous, unfounded, or motivated by self-

| interest or ill will. Terletsky, 649 A.2d at 688 (citation omitted). Rather, the
| evidence reflects that Crestbrook relied on inspections, expert evaluations, water
| usage records, and the Policy language in reaching its coverage determination.

31

| Crestbrook also provided Marcano with a written denial letter explaining the
factual basis for the denial and identifying the specific Policy provisions upon
which it relied.
Plaintiff further contends that Crestbrook acted in bad faith because both
the PA Property and the FL Property were covered under the Policy and because
defendant failed to adequately consider the travel limitations created by
Decedent's age, health, and the Covid-19 pandemic. (Doc. 38, Br. in Opp. at 10).
These arguments, however, fall short.
Although plaintiff's expert disputes some of the defendant’s experts’
conclusions—particularly regarding whether the damage resulted from a sudden
| pipe burst or prolonged leakage—that disagreement creates a factual dispute
regarding coverage, not bad faith. At most, the parties disagree as to the proper
interpretation and application of the Policy provisions. But “mere negligence” or
“bad judgment” is insufficient to establish bad faith. Terletsky, 649 A.2d at 688
(citation omitted); see also Bostick v. ITT Hartford Grp., Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 580,
| 587 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (“Bad faith cannot be found where the insurer's conduct is in
| accordance with a reasonable but incorrect interpretation of the insurance policy
| and the law.”) (citation omitted).
| Plaintiff has failed to present clear and convincing evidence that Crestbrook
acted unreasonably or knowingly disregarded a lack of reasonable basis for
| 32

| denying the claim. Given the record and the heightened clear and convincing

| evidentiary burden applicable to statutory bad faith claims, no reasonable jury
could conclude that Crestbrook lacked a reasonable basis for its assessment and
| denial of plaintiff's claim, or that Crestbrook knowingly or recklessly disregarded
| the absence of such a basis. Accordingly, plaintiff's bad faith claim cannot
| survive summary judgment.
Conclusion
| Crestbrook’s motion for summary judgment will be granted in part and
| denied in part. (Doc. 33). The motion will be granted as to plaintiff's bad faith
: claim and denied as to the breach of contract claim. An appropriate order

| follows. This matter will be scheduled for a pretrial conference by way of a
| separate order.

Date: b i □
| JULIA K. MU □
ie States TY

On

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11361751. Public record. Not legal advice.