# Fiore

> District Court, E.D. New York · May 26, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11361623

## Case

- **Full name:** Sarah Fiore v. North Shore Radiation Therapy and Northwell Health, Inc.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** May 26, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------------------------------
SARAH FIORE,
Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER
24-CV-3164 (MKB)
v.
NORTH SHORE RADIATION THERAPY and
NORTHWELL HEALTH, INC.,
Defendants.
---------------------------------------------------------------
MARGO K. BRODIE, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Sarah Fiore commenced the above-captioned action against Defendants North
Shore Radiation Therapy and Northwell Health Inc. on April 28, 2024, asserting claims of
disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation under both the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. (“ADA”) and the New York State Human Rights
Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq. (“NYSHRL”). (Compl., Docket Entry No. 1.) On January
16, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint asserting the same claims. (Am. Compl.,
Docket Entry No. 28.)
On June 2, 2025, Defendants moved jointly to dismiss the Amended Complaint in its
entirety for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.1 For the reasons explained below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

1 (Not. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mot.”), Docket Entry No. 32; Aff. of Lisa M.
Griffith, Esq. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot., Docket Entry No. 33; Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot.
(“Defs.’ Mem.”), Docket Entry No. 34; Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), Docket Entry No.
35; Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. (“Defs.’ Reply”), Docket Entry No. 36.)
I. Background
Plaintiff is a resident of New York, Suffolk County and was employed by Defendants at
all relevant times until her termination on September 30, 2021.2 (Am. Compl. ¶ 44.) Defendants
are New York domestic not-for-profit medical corporations located at 270 Pulaski Road,
Greenlawn, New York. (Id. ¶¶ 45–48.)

a. COVID-19 vaccine mandates
Beginning on August 2, 2021, Defendants begin requiring their employees to either (1)
test weekly for COVID-19, or (2) become vaccinated. (Id. ¶ 4.) If an employee chose to proceed
with weekly testing, a negative test was required to be permitted to work. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges
Defendants did not require their employees to test for COVID-19 or become vaccinated until
August 2, 2021. (Id. ¶ 3.)

2 In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “the district court is normally required to look only
to the allegations on the face of the complaint,” but “may consider documents that ‘are attached
to the complaint,’ ‘incorporated in it by reference,’ ‘integral’ to the complaint, or the proper
subject of judicial notice.” United States v. Strock, 982 F.3d 51, 63 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Roth
v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 509 (2d Cir. 2007)); see Pearson v. Gesner, 125 F.4th 400, 406 (2d
Cir. 2025) (citations omitted). In addition, “[i]t is well established that a district court may rely
on matters of public record in deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), including case
law and statutes.” Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 1998); see
Hudson Shore Assocs. LP v. New York, 139 F.4th 99, 104 n.1 (2d Cir. 2025) (citations omitted);
Goe v. Zucker, 43 F.4th 19, 29 (2d Cir. 2022) (first citing Territory of Alaska v. Am. Can Co.,
358 U.S. 224, 226–27 (1959); and then citing Kavowras v. N.Y. Times Co., 328 F.3d 50, 57 (2d
Cir. 2003)); see also Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 816 F. App’x 532, 534 (2d Cir. 2020)
(district courts “may consider public records that may be judicially noticed in ruling on motions”
(quoting Pani, 152 F.3d at 75)); McConkey v. Churchill Sch. & Ctr., No. 24-CV-6091, 2025 WL
2062195, at *4 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2025) (“Though the [c]ourt may take judicial notice of
‘documents in the public record at the [m]otion [t]o [d]ismiss stage, it considers them only to
establish their existence and legal effect, or to determine what statements they contained not for
the truth of the matters asserted.’” (citation omitted)). The Court may also take judicial notice of
“documents retrieved from official government websites.” Warner v. Garland, No. 20-2197,
2023 WL 3220459, at *1 n.2 (2d Cir. May 3, 2023) (summary order) (quoting Vill. Green at
Sayville, LLC v. Town of Islip, 43 F.4th 287, 299 n.7 (2d Cir. 2022)).
On August 26, 2021, New York’s Department of Health adopted an emergency rule
directing hospitals, nursing homes, hospices, adult care facilities, and other identified healthcare
entities to “continuously require” certain employees to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19
beginning on September 27, 2021 for “general hospitals” and nursing homes, and on October 7,
2021 for all other “covered entities” as defined by Title 10 of the New York Compilation of

Codes, Rules and Regulations, Section 2.61 (“Section 2.61”). (Id. ¶ 5; see Section 2.61 New
York State Vaccine Mandate, annexed to Am. Compl. as Ex. 1, Docket Entry No. 28-1.) See 10
N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. § 2.61 (2021) (repealed Oct. 4, 2023); We The Patriots USA, Inc.
v. Hochul (“We The Patriots I”), 17 F.4th 266, 274 (2d Cir. 2021), opinion clarified, 17 F.4th
368 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam), cert. denied sub nom., Dr. A. v. Hochul, 142 S. Ct. 2569 (2022).
Section 2.61 provided a medical exemption from vaccination:
If any licensed physician or certified nurse practitioner certifies that
immunization with COVID-19 vaccine is detrimental to the health
of member of a covered entity’s personnel, based upon a pre-
existing health condition, the requirements of this section relating to
COVID-19 immunization shall be inapplicable only until such
immunization is found no longer to be detrimental to such personnel
member’s health. The nature and duration of the medical exemption
must be stated in the personnel employment medical record, or other
appropriate record, and must be in accordance with generally
accepted medical standards, (see, for example, the recommendations
of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services [(“ACIP”)]3), and any

3 ACIP published generally accepted medical standards for COVID-19 vaccination
medical exemptions. (New York Dep’t of Health, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Regarding the August 26, 2021 – Prevention of COVID-19 Transmission by Covered Entities
Emergency Regulation (“FAQ”) 5, annexed to Defs.’ Mem. as Ex. 1, Docket Entry No. 34-1.)
The FAQ also states that the following conditions were “precautions” to COVID-19 vaccines:
[1] Current moderate to severe acute illness [—] This is a temporary
precaution, until the individual has recovered[;]
[2] History of an immediate allergic reaction to any other (not
COVID-19) vaccine or injectable therapy (excluding allergy
shots)[;]
reasonable accommodation may be granted and must likewise be
documented in such record.

(Am. Compl. ¶ 7 (emphasis omitted).) See We The Patriots I, 17 F.4th at 297–98 (quoting 10
N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. § 2.61(d)(1)). Section 2.61 also permitted covered entities to
grant exemptions and required them to document exemptions. (Id. ¶ 8.) See We The Patriots I,
17 F.4th at 297–98 (quoting 10 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. § 2.61(d)(1)).
Defendants implemented a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy to achieve
compliance with Section 2.61 that required all healthcare workers to receive their first dose of a
COVID-19 vaccine by September 27, 2021. (Id. ¶ 6.)
b. Plaintiff’s employment and termination
Plaintiff alleges she has “a profound autoimmune disease, [called] relapsing
polychondritis” (“Relapsing Poly”), (id. ¶ 13 (alteration in original) (quoting Vaccine Exemption
Request and Dr. Gee’s First Ltr. (“Dr. Gee’s First Ltr.”), annexed to Am. Compl. as Ex. 2,
Docket Entry No. 28-2)), which “causes inflammation and deterioration of cartilage,” (id.
(citation omitted)). “Relapsing Poly can cause hearing loss, pain and redness in the eyes, and

[3] History of myocarditis or pericarditis after receiving the first
dose of an mRNA COVID-19 vaccine[; and]
[4] A contraindication to one type of COVID-19 vaccine (e.g.,
mRNA COVID-19 vaccines) have precautions to another type of
COVID-19 vaccine (e.g., Janssen/Johnson & Johnson vaccine).
(Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted).) The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) stated
that most people with a precaution “‘can and should be administered vaccine,’ after conducting a
risk assessment with a healthcare provider.” We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul (“We The
Patriots I”), 17 F.4th 266, 289 n.28 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Centers for Disease Control &
Prevention, Interim Clinical Considerations for Use of COVID-19 Vaccines Currently Approved
or Authorized in the United States: Contraindications and Precautions (Oct. 25, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/covid-19/clinical-considerations/covid-19-vaccines-
us.html#Contraindications)), opinion clarified, 17 F.4th 368 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam), cert.
denied sub nom., Dr. A. v. Hochul, 142 S. Ct. 2569 (2022).
Plaintiff also attached the FAQ as an Exhibit. (See FAQ, annexed to Pl.’s Opp’n as Ex.
1, Docket Entry No. 35-1.) Because the exhibit is not paginated, the Court refers to the page
numbers assigned by the electronic case filing system.
difficulty breathing” and is “a disability that impairs multiple major life activities[,] [s]pecifically
breathing, seeing, and hearing.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Relapsing Poly constitutes a disability as
defined by the ADA. (Id. ¶ 14 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D)).)
On September 2, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a request for a medical exemption to
Defendants’ COVID-19 vaccine mandate with a letter from Dr. Christopher Gee attesting to

Plaintiff’s disease and stating in relevant part:
[Plaintiff] has been doing well but has had severe exacerbations with
profound swelling and facial and torso disfiguration from her
disease which have been triggered from immunizations in the past.
It is for this reason that she has not received the COVID vaccine and
is medically contraindicated as this could cause a significant flare
and trigger her underlying disease process . . . . A COVID vaccine
could spark a flare for [Plaintiff] that could last years.

(Id. ¶¶ 10, 15; Dr. Gee’s First Ltr. 2.) Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Gee’s letter “certified that
immunization with the COVID-19 vaccine is detrimental to the health of Plaintiff” and “satisfies
the requirements for a medical exemption pursuant to Section 2.61(d)(1).” (Am. Compl. ¶ 16.)
On September 22, 2021, Defendants denied Plaintiff’s medical exemption request
because “[e]xemption decisions are based on known COVID-19 vaccine safety risks,” and
Defendants found Plaintiff’s “stated reason for a medical exemption [was] not a contraindication
to COVID-19 vaccination.” (Id. ¶ 17; Exemption Denial Ltr., annexed to Am. Compl. as Ex. 3,
Docket Entry No. 28-3.) In Defendants’ exemption denial letter, they advised Plaintiff she could
submit supplemental documentation by September 24, 2021, and stated vaccination was “a
condition of continued employment.” (Exemption Denial Ltr.)
Plaintiff submitted to Defendants a second letter from Dr. Gee dated September 23, 2021
that “certified [for the second time] that immunization with the COVID-19 vaccine could result
in a life threatening reaction.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17–18; Dr. Gee’s Second Ltr., annexed to Am.
Compl. as Ex. 4, Docket Entry No. 28-4.) The second letter4 reiterated Plaintiff’s Relapsing Poly
symptoms and stated in relevant part:
[Plaintiff] has had triggers and flares of her disease from prior
vaccinations including the flu vaccine. Although she has not
received a COVID vaccine it is not unlikely, as the flu vaccine has
triggered her disease, that the COVID vaccine may as well trigger
her [Relapsing Poly] with possible subsequent throat closing.
[Plaintiff] has distinct possibility of having a severe life-threatening
reaction to the COVID vaccine.

(Am. Compl. ¶ 17; Dr. Gee’s Second Ltr.) Plaintiff alleges that instead of providing a medical
exemption to the COVID-19 and a reasonable accommodation, Defendants discriminated against
Plaintiff because of her disability and terminated her employment. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 26–35,
38.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants “retaliated against her for complaining about
discrimination.” (Id. ¶ 38.) Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts claims of disability
discrimination under the ADA, (id. ¶¶ 52–55), and NYSHRL, (id. ¶¶ 68–70); failure to
accommodate under the ADA, (id. ¶¶ 56–62), and NYSHRL, (id. ¶¶ 71–76); and retaliation
under the ADA, (id. ¶¶ 63–67), and NYSHRL, (id. ¶¶ 77–79). Plaintiff seeks injunctive and
declaratory relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and other legal and equitable relief. (Id.
¶ 40.)

4 Plaintiff alleges that she “received a [third] letter from a Rheumatologist, Dr. Douglas
Mund” that stated, “[i]t is my medical opinion that [Plaintiff] should not receive Covid-19
vaccination. She has had severe allergic reaction to other prior vaccinations including rash and
respiratory compromise.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 19; Dr. Mund’s Ltr., annexed to Am Compl. as Ex. 5,
Docket Entry No. 28-5.) Plaintiff does not state the date she “received” the letter or when/if she
provided the letter to Defendants, (see Am. Compl. ¶ 19); however, the letter is dated January 12,
2022, (Dr. Mund’s Ltr.). Defendants argue that Plaintiff obtained this letter three and a half
months after her employment ended, Plaintiff “does not suggest she ever provided it to
Defendants,” and “[i]n any case, . . . [the letter] does not identify any recognized contraindication
to the COVID-19 vaccine.” (Defs.’ Mem. 5 n.4.) Because the letter from Dr. Mund is dated
several months after Plaintiff’s termination, and Plaintiff does not plead that she provide the
letter to Defendants as part of her request for medical exemption, the Court does not consider the
letter from Dr. Mund.
c. Procedural background
Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”), and the EEOC issued a right-to-sue notice on February 1, 2024. (Id. ¶
49; see Pl.’s Right to Sue Ltr., annexed to Am. Compl. as Ex. 6, Docket Entry No. 28-6.) As a
result, Plaintiff alleges she “fully exhausted her administrative remedies and is entitled to file in [

] district court.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 51.)
Plaintiff filed her Complaint on April 28, 2024, (Compl.), within 90 days of the receipt of
the EEOC notice, (Am. Compl. ¶ 50). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint on
December 23, 2024. (Defs.’ Not. of Mot. to Dismiss, Docket Entry No. 23; Defs.’ Corrected
Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Not. of Mot. to Dismiss, Docket Entry No. 27.) In lieu of filing an
opposition brief to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (Am. Compl.;
see Order dated Jan. 17, 2025.) After the filing of the Amended Complaint, the Honorable
Nusrat J. Choudhury dismissed Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint as moot. (Order
dated Jan. 17, 2025.) Defendants then moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint, which the
parties fully briefed and filed on June 2, 2025. (See Order dated Mar. 24, 2025; Defs.’ Mem.;

Pl.’s Opp’n; Defs.’ Reply.)
On April 13, 2026, the case was reassigned to the undersigned. (Order dated Apr. 13,
2026.)
II. Discussion
a. Standard of review
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a court “must ‘construe [the complaint] liberally, accepting all factual allegations
therein as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff[’s] favor.’” Singh v. Deloitte
LLP, 123 F.4th 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., 9 F.4th 95, 106–07 (2d
Cir. 2021)); see also Vaughn v. Phoenix House N.Y. Inc., 957 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2020)
(“[The Second Circuit] review[s] de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the
complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” (quoting
Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002))). A complaint must plead

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Yerkyn v. Yakovlevich, 164 F.4th 224, 231 (2d Cir. 2026) (quoting
id.). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Matson v. Bd.
of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of N.Y., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009)); see Knapp v. Barclays PLC, 171 F.4th 166, 170 (2d Cir. 2026) (quoting
same); Roe v. St. John’s Univ., 91 F.4th 643, 651 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting Matson, 631 F.3d at
63); see also Salazar v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 118 F.4th 533, 544 (2d Cir. 2024) (“[T]he
plaintiff’s allegations must enable the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the

alleged misconduct.” (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 880 (2025); Emilee
Carpenter, LLC v. James, 107 F.4th 92, 99 (2d Cir. 2024) (“[S]urviv[ing] a motion to dismiss . . .
requires ‘factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)). Although all allegations
contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal
conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see Roe, 91 F.4th at 651 (“Although all factual allegations
contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this rule does not extend ‘to legal conclusions.
Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.’” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)).
b. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for disability discrimination in violation of the
ADA
Defendants argue, first, that Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim fails because
Plaintiff does not plausibly allege any inference of discrimination because the Amended
Complaint “includes no allegations whatsoever to suggest that Defendants discriminated against
her because of her purported disability . . . [such as] ma[king] discriminatory comments, [or] . . .
provid[ing] exemptions from its COVID-19 vaccination requirement (as mandated by the State
of New York) to non-disabled employees.” (Defs.’ Mem. 7.) Second, Defendants argue that
Plaintiff was no longer qualified for her position “by law, per [Defendants’] policy, and as a
matter of health and safety” after refusing to be vaccinated against COVID-19, and therefore
Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim for disability discrimination on that basis. (Id. at 8.) Third,

Defendants argue that Plaintiff abandoned her disability discrimination claim because her
opposition fails to oppose their arguments. (Defs.’ Reply 4.)
Plaintiff does not address her ADA disability discrimination claim in her opposition brief
and only presents arguments regarding her claims for failure to accommodate. (See generally
Pl.’s Opp’n.) The Court nevertheless addresses this claim, even though abandoned by Plaintiff.
The ADA “makes it unlawful for a covered employer to ‘discriminate against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability.’” Stanley v. City of Sanford, 606 U.S. 46, 51 (2025)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)); see Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 179 (2012) (“The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating

against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a))); Yerdon
v. Poitras, 120 F.4th 1150, 1156 (2d Cir. 2024) (explaining that the ADA prohibits covered
employers from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability”
(alteration in original) (quoting same)). “Claims alleging disability discrimination in violation of
the ADA are subject to the burden-shifting analysis originally established by the Supreme Court
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 [ ](1973).” McMillan v. City of New York,
711 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d
92, 96 (2d Cir. 2009)); see Parker v. Israel Disc. Bank of N.Y., Inc., No. 24-688, 2025 WL
1779219, at *1 (2d Cir. June 27, 2025) (summary order) (“ADA and [New York City Civil

Rights Law ‘NYCHRL’] discrimination claims are subject to the burden-shifting framework set
forth in [McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792].” (citing id.)); Bey v. City of New York, 999 F.3d
157, 165 (2d Cir. 2021) (“ADA claims are subject to the burden-shifting framework articulated
in [McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792].”); Forrester v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 651 F. App’x
27, 28 (2d Cir. 2016) (first citing McMillan, 711 F.3d at 125; and then citing Cortez v. MTA
N.Y.C. Transit, 802 F.3d 226, 231 (2d Cir. 2015)). There are three steps to this burden-shifting
analysis: (1) “[a] plaintiff must establish a prima facie case”; (2) “the employer must offer
through the introduction of admissible evidence a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the
discharge”; and (3) “the plaintiff must then produce evidence and carry the burden of persuasion

that the proffered reason is a pretext.” Blanton v. Educ. Affiliates, Inc., No. 21-1221, 2022 WL
1505124, at *2 (2d Cir. May 12, 2022) (summary order) (alteration in original) (quoting Sista v.
CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2006)); Genova v. Cnty. of Nassau, 851 F.
App’x 241, 242 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting same); see Parker, 2025 WL 1779219, at *1 (explaining
the burden-shifting framework (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802)); Porter v.
Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med. Ctr., 92 F.4th 129, 145–46 (2d Cir. 2024) (same (citing McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–07)).
“To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show
by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) his employer is subject to the ADA; (2) he was
disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (3) he was otherwise qualified to perform the essential
functions of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) he suffered adverse
employment action because of his disability.” Woolf v. Strada, 949 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 2020)
(citing Sista, 445 F.3d at 169); see Daly v. Westchester Cnty. Bd. of Legislators, No. 23-1220,
2024 WL 3264125, at *1 (2d Cir. July 2, 2024) (summary order) (citing id.); Gorbea v. Verizon
N.Y. Inc., No. 20-3486, 2021 WL 4851389, at *2 (2d Cir. Oct. 19, 2021) (summary order)

(quoting same); Jones v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 838 F. App’x 642, 643–44 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting
same); Adams v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 560 F. App’x 47, 48–49 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting
McMillan, 711 F.3d at 125); Kinneary v. City of New York, 601 F.3d 151, 155–56 (2d Cir. 2010)
(quoting Capobianco v. City of New York, 422 F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 2005)); Donkor v. Weill
Cornell Med. Coll., No. 23-CV-369, 2025 WL 639313, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2025) (quoting
same); see also Knope v. Garland, No. 20-3274, 2021 WL 5183536, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 9, 2021)
(summary order) (outlining requirements for a prima facie case under the ADA (quoting
Natofsky v. City of New York, 921 F.3d 337, 352 (2d Cir. 2019))). A plaintiff’s burden at this
stage is “minimal.” Banks v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 81 F.4th 242, 270 (2d Cir. 2023); see Trivedi v.

St. Peter’s Health Partners Med. Assocs., P.C., No. 23-7608, 2024 WL 5087524, at *1 (2d Cir.
Dec. 12, 2024) (summary order) (“[The plaintiff] bears the initial burden of establishing a prima
facie case, a burden that ‘has been frequently described as minimal.’” (quoting id.)); Kelleher v.
Fred A. Cook, Inc., 939 F.3d 465, 468 (2d Cir. 2019) (“[A] plaintiff’s burden to establish an
initial prima facie case is, by design, ‘minimal and de minimis.’” (quoting Woodman v. WWOR-
TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 76 (2d Cir. 2005))); Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir.
2008) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993)). “At the pleading
stage [of an ADA discrimination claim], a plaintiff need only ‘give plausible support to a
minimal inference of discriminatory motivation.’” Lewis v. Redline Hockey, LLC, No. 24-1342,
2025 WL 2629705, at *2 (2d Cir. Sep. 12, 2025) (summary order) (quoting Littlejohn v. City of
New York, 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2015)); see Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801
F.3d 72, 84 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting same).
The parties do not dispute that Defendants are subject to the ADA or that Plaintiff suffers
from a disability as defined by the ADA, but dispute whether Plaintiff was qualified to perform
her job and suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability.

Plaintiff fails to allege facts that give rise to an inference of discrimination based on her
alleged disability of Relapsing Poly. Plaintiff’s only allegation of discrimination in her
Amended Complaint relates to Defendants’ alleged failure to provide a medical exemption or
accommodation to COVID-19 vaccination, (see generally Am. Compl.), which supports that
Defendants terminated Plaintiff because she was no longer qualified for her position due to her
failure to be vaccinated, not because of her Relapsing Poly condition. Plaintiff does not allege
that Defendants treated non-vaccinated non-disabled employees more favorably or that
Defendants harbored animus. Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to support an inference of
discrimination under the ADA. See Kosiba v. Cath. Health Sys. of Long Island, Inc., No. 23-6,

2024 WL 3024652, at *1 (2d Cir. June 17, 2024) (summary order) (finding the plaintiff failed to
establish an ADA discrimination claim because the defendant’s COVID-19 vaccination policy
“required all employees whose jobs brought them into contact with other staff, patients, or
residents to comply” and the plaintiff “was not singled out” because of a perceived disability
(citation omitted)); Sorel v. N.Y.C Dep’t of Educ., No. 24-CV-7225, 2026 WL 879415, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2026) (finding the plaintiff failed to state an ADA discrimination claim
because “[the p]laintiff does not allege that [the d]efendants criticized his job performance in
degrading terms, that [the d]efendants made comments about other disabled persons, that [the
d]efendants gave more favorable treatment to non-disabled employees, or that he was replaced
by a non-disabled employee”), appeal docketed, No. 26-1174 (2d Cir. Apr. 30, 2026); Jeter v.
Mount Sinai Health Sys., No. 23-CV-7889, 2026 WL 818735, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2026)
(finding the plaintiff failed to plead an inference of discrimination because the defendant-hospital
implemented its COVID-19 vaccine policy that affected all employees before the plaintiff
informed the defendant of her purported disability and “therefore it is not reasonable to infer that
there was a causal connection between her alleged disability and the termination of her

employment”); Moore v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-6600, 2017 WL 35450, at *19 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 3, 2017) (“[Because the plaintiff did] not plead a single fact about individual comparators or
other specific evidence of disparate treatment . . . [his] pleadings [ ] fail[ed] to raise his ADA
claims beyond the level of speculation and cannot support a plausible inference of disability
discrimination in order to survive a motion to dismiss.”), report and recommendation adopted,
2017 WL 1064714 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2017); see also D’Cunha v. Northwell Health Sys., No.
23-476, 2023 WL 7986441, at *4 (2d Cir. Nov. 17, 2023) (summary order) (affirming district
court decision and holding the plaintiff failed to raise an inference of discrimination where she
alleged she was terminated for refusing to be vaccinated against COVID-19, and not because of

her protected class).
Moreover, Defendants terminated Plaintiff since she was no longer qualified for her
position because she was not vaccinated, not because of her disability. “Vaccination [against
COVID-19] is a condition of employment in the healthcare field.” We The Patriots I, 17 F.4th at
294; see Jeter, 2026 WL 818735, at *9 (finding the plaintiff failed to allege causal connection
between her purported disability and her termination to support an inference of discriminatory
because “[the p]laintiff fails to allege that but for her alleged disability, she would not have been
fired. Instead, the allegations in the [c]omplaint make clear that [the p]laintiff was terminated for
a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason: because she refused to comply with the [vaccine
m]andate after not receiving an exemption.” (citation omitted)); Brown v. S. Shore Univ. Hosp.,
762 F. Supp. 3d 191, 210 n.13 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (collecting cases); Abramov v. Northwell Health
Sys., No. 22-CV-6687, 2024 WL 4276171, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 24, 2024) (holding the
plaintiff’s ADA claim failed because her “choice to not get vaccinated (without a medical
exemption) ma[de] her per se unqualified for her position”), aff’d sub nom., Braccica v.
Northwell Health Sys., No. 24-2665, 2025 WL 2610704 (2d Cir. Sep. 10, 2025) (summary

order), petition for cert. filed, No. 25-963 (U.S. Feb. 17, 2026); D’Cunha v. Northwell Health
Sys., No. 22-CV-988, 2023 WL 2266520, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2023) (holding that a medical
resident who declined COVID-19 vaccination on medical and religious grounds was not
plausibly qualified for her position once her employer’s vaccine requirement came into effect),
aff’d, No. 23-476, 2023 WL 7986441 (2d Cir. Nov. 17, 2023) (summary order); see also
Bandalos v. Stony Brook Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 23-CV-135, 2025 WL 2402828, at *7 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 18, 2025) (“[W]here a hospital imposed a COVID-19 vaccination requirement as an
employment requirement and an employee failed to comply with that requirement, the employee
was not qualified for their position for purposes of bringing a Title VII employment

discrimination claim.” (quoting Brown, 762 F. Supp. 3d at 210 n.13)), appeal docketed, No. 25-
2284 (2d Cir. Nov. 22, 2025).
Further, Plaintiff abandoned her claim for failing to address Defendants’ arguments in
their motion to dismiss. See Linares v. Herrera, No. 22-CV-7272, 2025 WL 2720789, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Sep. 24, 2025) (finding the plaintiff abandoned her claim for failing to address the
defendant’s motion to dismiss arguments (citing Youmans v. Schriro, No. 12-CV-3690, 2013 WL
6284422, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2013))), appeal dismissed, No. 25-2695 (2d Cir. Dec. 3, 2025);
Flores v. City of New York, No. 21-CV-5861, 2025 WL 2548841, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 3, 2025)
(same); Campbell v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., 516 F. Supp. 3d 370, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2021)
(“Plaintiff has abandoned this claim by failing to brief the issue in response to Defendant’s
motion to dismiss.”); Youmans, 2013 WL 6284422, at *5 (“A plaintiff’s failure to respond to
contentions raised in a motion to dismiss claims constitutes an abandonment of those claims.”
(collecting cases)).
Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claim for disability discrimination under the
ADA because Plaintiff fails to allege facts that give rise to an inference of discrimination and

because Plaintiff abandoned her claim by failing to address Defendants’ arguments in their
motion to dismiss. Lewis, 2025 WL 2629705, at *2 (dismissing the plaintiff’s claims, inter alia,
because the plaintiff “did not plausibly suggest even a minimal inference of discrimination”).
c. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for failure to accommodate in violation of the
ADA
i. Defendants’ arguments
Defendants argue that they had a process in place for handling vaccine exemption
requests in accordance with the New York state mandate, but Plaintiff’s requests for exemption
were objectively unreasonable as matter of law. (Defs.’ Mem. 9.) First, Defendants argue
Plaintiff’s alleged condition of Relapsing Poly is not one of the “only two contraindications that
would support an exemption to the [vaccine] [m]andate” — “(1) a severe allergic reaction to a
prior dose or component of the COVID-19 vaccine or (2) an immediate reaction or diagnosed
allergy to a previous dose or component of the vaccine” — neither of which was identified in the
physician’s letters submitted by Plaintiff. (Defs.’ Reply 1–2.) Defendants contend that
Plaintiff’s first letter from Dr. Gee stated COVID-19 vaccination could cause a “flare” of
Relapsing Poly, and Dr. Gee’s second letter stated a flu vaccine had previously triggered

Plaintiff’s Relapsing Poly; however, neither of those requests fell into the contraindications
identified by ACIP in the generally accepted medical standards regarding contraindications.
(Defs.’ Mem. 9–10.) In addition, the FAQ states “‘[h]aving a prior autoimmune
condition/reaction to a prior vaccine’ was not considered a contraindication to the COVID-19
vaccination.” (Id. at 10 (alteration in original) (quoting FAQ 6).) Defendants argue Plaintiff had
a recognized “precaution” to the vaccine, but the “CDC determined that most persons to whom a
precaution applied ‘can and should be administered the vaccine,’ after conducting a risk
assessment with a healthcare provider.” (Id. at 3 n.2 (citation omitted); Defs.’ Reply 2 (citation

omitted).)
Second, Defendants argue the Second Circuit has held that the vaccine mandate
“‘afford[ed] no meaningful discretion’ to an employer to grant a non-conforming medical
exemption.” (Defs.’ Mem. 10 (alteration in original) (quoting We The Patriots I, 17 F.4th at
289).) As a result, Defendants were not legally permitted to grant Plaintiff’s non-conforming
exception request. (Id. at 10–11 (citing Ravenell v. Maimonides Med. Ctr., No. 23-CV-2320,
2024 WL 7033233 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL
7033342 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2024)).) Defendants argue this case is parallel to Ravenell, where a
radiation therapist submitted a request for medical exemption based on her history of Bell’s

Palsy, but had “not pleaded facts sufficient to show her entitlement to the medical exemption”
within the ACIP standards, and the court found the defendant lacked discretion to grant the
plaintiff a medical exemption based on the information she had provided. (Id. (quoting Ravenell,
2024 WL 7033233, at *15).) Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish
Ravenell fails because the plaintiff’s claims in Ravenell were dismissed because she did not
qualify for a medical exemption per the ACIP standards, regardless of whether the plaintiff had
submitted a doctor’s letter. (Defs.’ Reply 3 (citing Ravenell, 2024 WL 7033233, at *14).)
Third, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s request for exemption would have constituted
an undue hardship for Defendants. (Defs.’ Mem. 11–14.) Defendants argue that because
Plaintiff did not have a recognized contraindication to the COVID-19 vaccine, Defendants had
no discretion to grant her an exemption request, and both the Second Circuit and district courts
have held that “it would constitute an undue hardship for a healthcare entity to violate the
[vaccine] [m]andate.” (Id. at 12.) In addition to a potential legal violation, Defendants also
argue they faced health and safety risks in the workplace as a result of unvaccinated employees,
and a risk of civil liability to anyone infected by an unvaccinated employee. (Id. at 13.)

Defendants also contend that Plaintiff fails to rebut their argument about undue hardship in her
opposition brief. (Defs.’ Reply 3–4.)
ii. Plaintiff’s arguments
Plaintiff argues that she has a medical condition that prevented her from receiving the
COVID-19 vaccine, (Pl.’s Opp’n 9, 12), she submitted two letters from a physician supporting
medical exemption, (id. at 6–8, 13), she was qualified and able to perform the essential functions
of her job, with or without a reasonable accommodation, (id. at 9), and “Defendants [did not]
engage in any sort of interactive process with Plaintiff to determine whether Defendants could
reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s accommodation request,” (id.). First, Plaintiff argues she
qualified for a medical exemption because two physicians “affirmed that receiving the Covid-19

vaccine would be detrimental to the health of Plaintiff based upon a pre-existing condition.” (Id.
at 3, 12.) Second, Plaintiff argues that, under the vaccine mandate, personnel with medical
exemptions could continue their normal job responsibilities provided that they wore a mask. (Id.
at 3.) Plaintiff also argues that Defendants’ reliance on Ravenell is misplaced because the
plaintiff in that case never submitted a letter from a New York State licensed physician that
affirmed or supported an accommodation. (Id. at 13 (citing Ravenell, 2024 WL 7033233, at
*14).) Third, Plaintiff argues that the FAQ states that “it would not be an undue hardship for
personnel with medical exemptions to continue working with patients or in hospitals or in
emergency rooms,” (id. at 3 (citing FAQ)), and granting a medical exemption to Plaintiff “would
not have imposed an undue hardship because [ ] Defendants would not be violating [s]tate [l]aw”
or be “exposed [ ] to penalties or loss of license,” (id. at 14).
iii. Legal standard and discussion
To establish a prima facie case for failure to accommodate under the ADA, a plaintiff
must show:

(1) his employer is subject to the ADA; (2) he was disabled within
the meaning of the ADA; (3) he was otherwise qualified to perform
the essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable
accommodation; and (4) . . . his employer refused to make a
reasonable accommodation.
Tudor v. Whitehall Cent. Sch. Dist., 132 F.4th 242, 246 (2d Cir. 2025) (alteration in original)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Woolf, 949 F.3d at 93); see Lewis, 2025 WL 2629705, at *2
(quoting id.); Fox v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 918 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2019) (listing four-
pronged test to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on an employer’s failure to
accommodate (quoting McMillan, 711 F.3d at 125)). In addition, “the plaintiff must show ‘the
connections between (1) the failure to accommodate a disability, (2) the performance
deficiencies, and (3) the adverse employment action.’” Clark v. Coca-Cola Beverages Ne., Inc.,
No. 20-4040, 2022 WL 92060, at *4 (2d Cir. Jan. 10, 2022) (summary order) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Natofsky, 921 F.3d at 352); see Knope, 2021 WL 5183536, at *2 (citing id.).
“Where the employee’s disability is known to the employer, ‘[t]he ADA envisions an
“interactive process” by which employers and employees work together to assess whether an
employee’s disability can be reasonably accommodated.’” Stevens v. Rite Aid Corp., 851 F.3d
224, 231 (2d Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Jackan v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Lab., 205
F.3d 562, 566 (2d Cir. 2000)). A reasonable accommodation “may include ‘acquisition or
modification of equipment or devices’ and ‘other similar accommodations,’” Laguerre v. Nat’l
Grid USA, No. 20-3901, 2022 WL 728819, at *4 (2d Cir. Mar. 11, 2022) (summary order)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1211(9)(B)), but the creation of new positions and the elimination of a job’s
essential function are not reasonable accommodations under the ADA, Clark, 2022 WL 92060,
at *3. In addition, the “failure to engage in a good faith interactive process is not an independent
violation of the ADA.” Sheng v. M&TBank Corp., 848 F.3d 78, 87 (2d Cir. 2017); see Stevens,
851 F.3d at 231 (same). “That being said, the ADA imposes liability for, inter alia,

discriminatory refusal to undertake a feasible accommodation, not mere refusal to explore
possible accommodations where, in the end, no accommodation was possible.” McBride, 583
F.3d at 100.
Plaintiff fails to establish a failure to accommodate claim under the ADA because (1)
Plaintiff did not have a recognized contraindication to the COVID-19 mandate; and therefore (2)
Plaintiff’s request for accommodation was unreasonable for Defendants.
First, the Second Circuit has held that Section 2.61 provided that:
Under the generally accepted medical standards published by ACIP,
cognizable contraindications to the COVID-19 vaccines are limited
to “[s]evere allergic reaction (e.g., anaphylaxis) after a previous
dose or to a component of the COVID-19 vaccine” and
“[i]mmediate (within 4 hours) allergic reaction of any severity to a
previous dose or known (diagnosed) allergy to a component of the
COVID-19 vaccine.”

We The Patriots I, 17 F.4th at 289 n.28 (alterations in original) (quoting FAQ). The FAQ
clarifies that “[h]aving a prior autoimmune condition/reaction to a prior vaccine” is “generally
not considered [a] contraindication[] to the COVID-19 vaccination.” (FAQ 6.) While Plaintiff
provided letters from a physician attesting to her Relapsing Poly disease and that symptoms from
her disease “have been triggered from immunizations in the past,” (Dr. Gee’s First Ltr. 2),
including the flu vaccine, (Dr. Gee’s Second Ltr.), the letters do not specify a severe allergic
reaction to a previous COVID-19 vaccine or a component of the COVID-19 vaccine, and
therefore do not establish a contraindication that met the medical exemption standard set forth in
the Section 2.61 vaccine mandate. See Jeter, 2026 WL 818735, at *7 (holding that the plaintiff
failed to establish a failure to accommodate claim because the hospital-defendant determined that
the plaintiff “did not qualify for a medical exemption because her purported disability was not
one of the narrow contraindications for receiving the COVID-19 vaccine” and therefore, “[the
d]efendant could not exempt [the p]laintiff”); Ravenell, 2024 WL 7033233, at *15 (finding that

the plaintiff, a radiation therapist with Bell’s Palsy, failed to establish a claim for failure to
accommodate because the plaintiff “ha[d] not pleaded facts sufficient to show her entitlement to
the medical exemption” under the narrow contraindications set forth by ACIP standards).
Plaintiff argues that Ravenell is inapplicable because, unlike Plaintiff in this case, the plaintiff in
Ravenell failed to submit a certification from a qualifying health professional stating that receipt
of the COVID-19 vaccination would have been detrimental to her health due to a preexisting
condition. (Pl.’s Opp’n 13 (citing Ravenell, 2024 WL 7033233, at *14).) However, the court in
Ravenell also held that the plaintiff did “not claim[] how her claimed disabilities, namely Bell’s
Palsy and anxiety, fell within the purview of the ACIP standards which were incorporated by

reference into [Section 2.61].” Ravenell, 2024 WL 7033233, at *14 (citation omitted). Similar
to Ravenell, Plaintiff’s physician letters state in conclusory fashion that Plaintiff is “medically
contraindicated” without explaining how Relapsing Poly falls within ACIP’s recognized medical
contraindications, i.e., that a COVID-19 vaccine component could cause an adverse reaction in
Plaintiff. (See Dr. Gee’s First Ltr.; Dr. Gee’s Second Ltr.)
Plaintiff also argues that the physician letters show that the vaccine was detrimental to
her health and that this is sufficient to meet the standard for a medical exemption, (Pl.’s Opp’n
12–13), but Plaintiff overlooks the qualifications to Section 2.61’s medical exemption standard
which provided that “the medical exemption . . . must be in accordance with generally accepted
medical standards” and incorporates by reference the ACIP standards. Section 2.61(d)(1); We
The Patriots I, 17 F.4th at 289 (“[Section 2.61] provides for an objectively defined category of
people to whom the vaccine requirement does not apply: employees who present a certification
from a physician or certified nurse practitioner attesting that they have a pre-existing health
condition that renders the vaccination detrimental to their health, in accordance with generally
accepted medical standards, such as those published by ACIP.” (emphasis added)). Moreover,

the FAQ explicitly states that “[h]aving a prior autoimmune condition/reaction to a prior
vaccine” is “generally not considered [a] contraindication[].” (FAQ 6.) Other than the letters
from Dr. Gee, Plaintiff did not provide evidence supporting that her medical exemption fits
within generally accepted medical standards such that Defendants could conclude that Plaintiff
met Section 2.61’s standard for a medical exemption. Cf. Carnett v. TIAA Ins. Co., No. 24-CV-
9991, 2026 WL 35348, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2026) (denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss
the plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim because the plaintiff’s second accommodation
request to the COVID-19 vaccine outlined that the plaintiff’s medical condition of Parvo B-19
had a documented risk of developing myocarditis post COVID-19 vaccine, which was “widely

reported in peer review literature”). Since Plaintiff’s physician letters did not specify that
Relapsing Poly was a condition that fit into the recognized contraindications, Defendants could
not legally provide a medical exemption to the vaccine requirement because Section 2.61
“afford[ed] no meaningful discretion” to grant a non-conforming medical exemption. See We
The Patriots I, 17 F.4th at 289.
Without a medical contraindication to the COVID-19 vaccine, Defendants could not have
granted a medical accommodation without violating Section 2.61, We The Patriots I, 17 F.4th at
289; Jeter, 2026 WL 818735, at *7 (“[The defendant], having determined that [the p]laintiff did
not qualify for a medical exemption, would have had to violate New York State law to grant [the
p]laintiff’s accommodation request.”), and therefore, Plaintiff’s accommodation request was
unreasonable. See Jeter, 2026 WL 818735, at *7 (finding the plaintiff’s alternative proposed
accommodations of personal protective equipment and testing was unreasonable because it
would have placed the defendant in violation of Section 2.61 (citing Ravenell v. Maimonides
Med. Ctr., No. 23-CV-2320, 2025 WL 4718902, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2025))); Williams v.
NYC Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 24-CV-5467, 2026 WL 350876, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9,

2026) (“Several courts have determined that granting an accommodation [to Section 2.61] that
would violate the law constitutes an undue hardship such that refusing such an accommodation is
not in violation of the ADA.” (citing Algarin v. NYC Health + Hosps. Corp., 678 F. Supp. 3d
497, 509–10 (S.D.N.Y. 2023), aff’d, No. 23-1063, 2024 WL 1107481 (2d Cir. Mar. 14, 2024)
(summary order))); see also Montgomery v. N.Y. Presbyterian Hosp., No. 23-CV-9201, 2024
WL 4068786, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2024) (finding that in addition to violating the Section
2.61 mandate, the plaintiff’s accommodation request would “expose an unvaccinated healthcare
worker to vulnerable patients, creating substantial additional safety and liability risks for both
[the defendant-hospital] and its patients”), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL

4063776 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 4, 2024), superseded and report and recommendation adopted, 2025
WL 240733 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2025); D’Cunha, 2023 WL 7986441, at *3 (finding that the
defendant “could not have granted her religious-exemption request without violating the
[COVID-19 vaccine mandate], exposing itself to potential penalties, and thereby suffering an
undue hardship”).
Plaintiff’s only argument in support of her accommodation — that she qualified for a
medical exemption — would not constitute undue hardship, and therefore Plaintiff could
continue normal job responsibilities with an accommodation. (See Pl.’s Opp’n 14.) However,
this argument is unpersuasive. As discussed above, Plaintiff did not qualify for a medical
exemption because her alleged disability was not one of the narrow contraindications for
receiving an exemption to the COVID-19 vaccine mandate, and consequently, Defendants could
not exempt Plaintiff, and Plaintiff became unqualified for her position. A prima facie case for
failure to accommodate under the ADA requires, inter alia, that the plaintiff be “qualified to
perform the essential functions of [her] job, with or without reasonable accommodation.” Tudor,
132 F.4th at 246 (quoting Woolf, 949 F.3d at 93). Plaintiff fails to state a claim for failure to

accommodate because she could not perform her job without qualifying for a medical
contraindication. Having determined that Defendants lacked the discretion to grant Plaintiff a
medical exemption because Plaintiff’s Relapsing Poly does not qualify as a contraindication
under Section 2.61, providing Plaintiff an accommodation would constitute an undue burden.
See Williams, 2026 WL 350876, at *10 (“Several courts have determined that granting an
accommodation [to Section 2.61] that would violate the law constitutes an undue hardship such
that refusing such an accommodation is not in violation of the ADA.” (citing Algarin, 678 F.
Supp. 3d at 509–10)). Accordingly, the Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s ADA failure to
accommodate claim.

d. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for retaliation in violation of the ADA
Defendants argue, first, that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to allege plausible
causation between any alleged protected activity and termination. (Defs.’ Mem. 14–17.)
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s termination “was nothing more than [Defendants’]
enforcement of its pre-existing policy and compliance with [Section 2.61],” and this is not a
plausible claim for retaliation. (Id. at 16.) Second, Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot
“bootstrap[]” her retaliation claim onto her failure to accommodate claim by asserting the
retaliation claim based on the same underlying conduct — failure to make an accommodation.
(Id. at 15.) Third, Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for retaliation
because her retaliation claim is “simply a reiteration of her claim for disability discrimination.”
(Id.) Fourth, Defendants argue that Plaintiff abandoned her retaliation claim because her
opposition fails to oppose their arguments. (Defs.’ Reply 4.)
Plaintiff does not address her ADA retaliation claim in her opposition brief, and only
presents arguments regarding her claims for failure to accommodate. (See generally Pl.’s
Opp’n.) The Court nevertheless addresses this claim, although abandoned by Plaintiff.

“To state an ADA retaliation claim, an employee ‘must show that [s]he engaged in a
protected activity, that [s]he suffered an adverse employment action, and that a causal connection
exists between that protected activity and the adverse employment action.’” Johnson v. Maximus
Servs. LLC, No. 23-7672, 2025 WL 1561819, at *3 (2d Cir. June 3, 2025) (summary order)
(alterations in original) (quoting Fox, 918 F.3d at 72–73); Johnson v. Mount Sinai Hosp. Grp.,
Inc., No. 23-466, 2024 WL 3289475, at *2 (2d Cir. July 3, 2024) (summary order) (quoting
same); Ibela v. Allied Universal, No. 21-1995, 2022 WL 1418886, at *2 (2d Cir. May 5, 2022)
(summary order) (quoting same); Clark, 2022 WL 92060, at *5 (quoting same); see Norman v.
NYU Langone Health Sys., No. 20-3624, 2021 WL 5986999, at *4 (2d Cir. Dec. 17, 2021)

(summary order) (quoting Natofsky, 921 F.3d at 353). “A plaintiff bears only a minimal burden
in making this prima facie showing.” Perez v. City of New York, 843 F. App’x 406, 407 (2d Cir.
2021) (first citing Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2010); and then citing Treglia v.
Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir. 2002)).
“Activities protected by the ADA include complaints of ADA discrimination, including
complaints . . . that the employer’s actions violated the ADA, and requests for reasonable
accommodations.” Flieger v. E. Suffolk BOCES, 693 F. App’x 14, 18 (2d Cir. 2017); see Frantti
v. New York, 850 F. App’x 17, 21 (2d Cir. 2021) (“[A]ttempts to assert [ ] rights against
discrimination are protected activities.” (alterations in original) (quoting Treglia, 313 F.3d at
720)); Treglia, 313 F.3d at 720 (“[A]ttempts to assert . . . rights against discrimination are
protected activities . . . .”); see also Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 126–27 (2d Cir.
2013) (finding that the plaintiff’s “complaints to public safety and the school’s Equality Officer”
sufficed to establish that plaintiff engaged in a protected activity). “A complaint of
discrimination constitutes ‘protected activity’ only if (1) the plaintiff holds a good-faith belief
that he suffered discrimination because of a protected characteristic and (2) that belief is

reasonable.” Jagmohan v. Long Island R.R. Co., 622 F. App’x 61, 63–64 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing
Galdieri-Ambrosini v. Nat’l Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 292 (2d Cir. 1998)); see
Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159, 170 (2d Cir. 2024) (“An employee can
satisfy the protected activity requirement even if his condition was not a disability within the
meaning of the ADA so long as he can establish that he possessed a good faith, reasonable belief
that the underlying challenged actions of the employer violated the ADA.” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)). “Requesting a reasonable accommodation of a disability is an
ADA-protected activity.” Rodriguez v. Atria Senior Living Grp., Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 503, 512
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Weixel v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, 287 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir.

2002)); see Ibela, 2022 WL 1418886, at *2 (“Seeking a reasonable accommodation constitutes
protected activity under the ADA.”); Frantti, 850 F. App’x at 21 (quoting Weixel, 287 F.3d at
149); Weixel, 287 F.3d at 149 (“[The p]laintiffs . . . allege that they were seeking reasonable
accommodation [on the basis of] disability — which constitutes protected activity under [the
ADA].”).
To state a claim of retaliation under the ADA, a plaintiff must show “that a causal
connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Baum v. Rockland
Cnty., 161 F. App’x 62, 64 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives,
Inc., 183 F.3d 155, 159 (2d Cir. 1999)); see Johnson, 2024 WL 3289475, at *2 (quoting Fox, 918
F.3d at 72–73). To prove a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
action, “a plaintiff must prove ‘that “but for” the [protected activity], the adverse action would
not have been taken.” Tafolla v. Heilig, 80 F.4th 111, 125 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Natofsky, 921
F.3d at 352); Philbert v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 24-804, 2025 WL 3251187, at *1 (2d Cir.
Nov. 21, 2025) (summary order) (quoting Tafolla, 80 F.4th at 125). A causal connection in
retaliation claims can be shown: “(1) indirectly, by showing that the protected activity was

followed closely by discriminatory treatment, or through other circumstantial evidence such as
disparate treatment of fellow employees who engaged in similar conduct; or (2) directly, through
evidence of retaliatory animus directed against the plaintiff by the defendant.” Natofsky, 921
F.3d at 353 (quoting Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 319); Tafolla, 80 F.4th at 125 (quoting Gordon v.
N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2000)). The plaintiff must provide “sufficient
evidence of a causal nexus between [her] protected activity and the alleged adverse employment
actions [s]he suffered.” Clark, 2022 WL 92060, at *5 (quoting Fox, 918 F.3d at 73). “A
plaintiff can indirectly establish a causal connection to support a discrimination or retaliation
claim by showing that the protected activity was closely followed in time by the adverse

employment action.” Tafolla, 80 F.4th at 125–26 (quoting Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp.,
596 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir. 2010)); see Ibela, 2022 WL 1418886, at *2 (“[A] plaintiff can
indirectly establish a causal connection to support a . . . retaliation claim by showing that the
protected activity was closely followed in time by the adverse employment action.” (quoting
Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Co-Op Ext. of Schenectady Cnty., 252 F.3d 545, 554 (2d Cir. 2001)));
Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 224 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The causal
connection needed for proof of a retaliation claim can be established indirectly by showing that
the protected activity was closely followed in time by the adverse action.” (quoting Cifra v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 252 F.3d 205, 216 (2d Cir. 2001))); see also Ibela, 2022 WL 1418886, at *2 (finding
that a gap of two months between a protected activity and adverse action was sufficient to
plausibly allege causation); Pistello v. Bd. of Educ., 808 F. App’x 19, 21–22 (2d Cir. 2020)
(considering dates of protected activities in relation to adverse employment actions and
permitting the plaintiff’s ADA retaliation claim to proceed).
While requesting reasonable accommodation of a disability is an ADA-protected activity,
see Rodriguez, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 512, Plaintiff has provided no evidence to support that a causal

connection exists between her request for accommodation and her termination. Plaintiff’s only
allegations in support of her retaliation claim are two conclusory statements that Defendants
retaliated against her “for complaining about discrimination,” (Am. Compl. ¶ 38), and “in the
terms and conditions of her employment, on the basis of her disability,” (id. ¶ 64). However,
Defendants’ vaccine mandate stating continued employment was contingent upon vaccination
predated Plaintiff’s accommodation request. Since Plaintiff provides no contrary evidence to
show that her termination was nothing more than Defendants’ enforcement of their vaccine
policy, Plaintiff cannot support a retaliation claim. See Johnson, 2024 WL 3289475, at *2
(affirming district court dismissal of ADA retaliation claim because the plaintiff’s “protected

activity occurred only after [the defendant] implemented its COVID-19 employment policies”
(emphasis omitted)); Kosiba, 2024 WL 3024652, at *2 (affirming district court dismissal of
ADA retaliation claim because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a causal connection between
his opposition to the defendant’s COVID-19 vaccination policy and his termination since the
policy predated his opposition and applied to all employees); Sharikov, 103 F.4th at 171
(affirming dismissal of ADA retaliation claim because “rather than show [the plaintiff] was
terminated because of his protected activity [applying for a COVID-19 vaccination exemption],
the allegations in the [c]omplaint make clear that he was fired because of his failure to comply
with the company-wide vaccine policy. Because the policy applied to all employees regardless
of whether they had engaged in protected activity, [the plaintiff] has not plausibly pleaded a
connection between his invocations of the ADA and his termination.”); Evans v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Educ., No. 22-CV-7901, 2023 WL 8034449, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2023) (dismissing ADA
retaliation claim where the plaintiff failed to show a “causal connection between” his termination
and protected activity because the “COVID policy applied to all employees and [the plaintiff’s]
own pleadings show[ed] he was disciplined as a consequence of the refusal to comply with the

policy, rather than as retaliation for opposition to it”), aff’d, No. 23-8119, 2024 WL 4501963 (2d
Cir. Oct. 16, 2024) (summary order).
In addition, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim also fails because it is entirely premised on
Defendants’ alleged denial of reasonable accommodation. Courts in this Circuit have held that
this allegation supports a failure to accommodate claim, and not a claim of retaliation. Jusino v.
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 22-CV-853, 2026 WL 879237, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2026)
(“[F]ailure to make an accommodation . . . simply gives rise to a failure to a accommodate
[discrimination] claim and cannot be boostrapped into a viable disability retaliation claim.”
(second and third alterations in original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (quoting

Perez v. N.Y. Presbyterian/Weill Cornell Med. Ctr., No. 23-CV-6152, 2024 WL 1514216, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2024))); Robles v. Medisys Health Network, Inc., No. 19-CV-6651, 2020 WL
3403191, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2020) (quoting Missick v. City of New York, 707 F. Supp. 2d
336, 356 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)) (same).
Finally, like her disability discrimination claim, Plaintiff abandoned her retaliation claim
by failing to address Defendants’ arguments in response to the motion to dismiss. Linares, 2025
WL 2720789, at *5 (finding the plaintiff abandoned her claim for failing to address the
defendant’s motion to dismiss arguments).
The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s ADA retaliation claim.
e. State law claims
Because the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s ADA claims, the Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining claims for disability discrimination, failure
to accommodate, and retaliation under the NSYHRL. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“[D]istrict
courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim [if]. . . the district court has

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction[.]”); see also One Commc’ns Corp. v.
JP Morgan SBIC LLC, 381 F. App’x 75, 82 (2d Cir. 2010) (“If all of a plaintiff’s federal claims are
dismissed, a district court is well within its discretion to decline to assert supplemental jurisdiction
over any state law claims . . . .”); Kolari v. N.Y.-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir.
2006) (“[A] district court ‘may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction’ if it ‘has dismissed all
claims over which it has original jurisdiction.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3))). “[I]n the usual
case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be
considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine — judicial economy, convenience, fairness,
and comity — will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law
claims.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. ex rel. Saint Vincent Cath. Med. Ctrs. Ret. Plan v. Morgan

Stanley Inv. Mgmt. Inc., 712 F.3d 705, 727 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Valencia ex rel. Franco v.
Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 305 (2d Cir. 2003)); Chinniah v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 62 F.4th 700,
703 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt. Inc., 712 F.3d at 727) (same); see Haran
v. Orange Bus. Servs., Inc., 160 F.4th 51, 60 (2d Cir. 2025) (affirming district court decision
declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the NYCHRL claim after dismissing FMLA
claims); Russo v. Patchogue-Medford Sch. Dist., 129 F.4th 182, 187 (2d Cir. 2025) (upholding
dismissal of state law claims after the district court dismissed the Title VII employment
discrimination claims based on the defendant’s enforcement of the COVID-19 vaccine policy);
Blodgett v. 22 S. St. Operations, LLC, 828 F. App’x 1, 5 (2d Cir. 2020) (affirming district court’s
decision declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after dismissing
plaintiff’s ADA claims).
The Court also declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because the NYSHRL claims
would require “unnecessarily delving” into an unresolved issue of state law. See Norman, 2021
WL 5986999, at *6 (stating that the Second Circuit has “cautioned against unnecessarily delving

into non-federal legal issues in the absence of any continuing basis for federal question
jurisdiction” (quoting Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 754 (2d Cir. 2001))).
Historically, “claim[s] of disability discrimination under the [NYSHRL] . . . [were] governed by
the same legal standards as govern federal ADA claims.” Tafolla, 80 F.4th at 119 (second
alteration in original) (quoting Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., 457 F.3d 181, 184 n.3 (2d Cir.
2006)); see Lehey v. Northwell Health, Inc., No. 23-CV-4708, 2024 WL 1703697, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 14, 2024) (citing same), reconsideration denied, 2024 WL 2882941 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2024).
However, the NYSHRL “was amended in 2019 to ‘be construed liberally for the accomplishment
of the remedial purposes thereof,’ irrespective of the standards courts have applied to federal civil

rights laws,” and “is interpreted ‘to align with . . . the more liberal pleading standard’ applicable to
the New York City Human Rights Law (‘NYCHRL’).”5 Flanagan v. Girl Scouts of Suffolk Cnty.,
Inc., No. 23-7900, 2025 WL 1501751, at *3 (2d Cir. May 27, 2025) (summary order) (alteration
in original) (quoting Qorrolli v. Metro. Dental Assocs., 124 F.4th 115, 123 (2d Cir. 2024) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)); see N.Y. Exec. Law § 300 (requiring that the NYSHRL be

5 The amendments apply to claims accruing after August 12, 2019. See Edelman v. NYU
Langone Health Sys., 141 F.4th 28, 45 n.9 (2d Cir. 2025), and therefore apply to Plaintiff’s
claims as the events that give rise to her allegations occurred in 2021. See Flanagan v. Girl
Scouts of Suffolk Cnty., Inc., No. 23-7900, 2025 WL 1501751, at *3 (2d Cir. May 27, 2025)
(summary order) (applying August 12, 2019 effective date); Golston-Green v. City of New York,
123 N.Y.S.3d 656, 665 n.1 (App. Div. 2020) (same).
construed “liberally for the accomplishment of the remedial purposes thereof”); Belanger v. N.Y.
Univ., No. 21-CV-1644, 2025 WL 963308, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025) (discussing the
more liberal post-amendment standard under the NYSHRL); Acosta v. Kennedy Children’s Ctr.,
No. 24-CV-3358, 2025 WL 70141, at *8 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2025) (same). New York courts
have not definitively resolved the question “of how this amendment changes standards of

liability under the NYSHRL,” Cooper v. Franklin Templeton Invs., No. 22-2763, 2023 WL
3882977, at *3 (2d Cir. June 8, 2023) (summary order), but the Second Circuit has noted that the
New York Court of Appeals has “constru[ed] NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims together,”
Edelman v. NYU Langone Health Sys., 141 F.4th 28, 45 n.9 (2d Cir. 2025), in “[a]pplying this
mandate to interpret these laws broadly,” Syeed v. Bloomberg L.P., 41 N.Y.3d 446, 451 (Ct.
App. 2024), and lower courts have treated NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims as coextensive. See
Wright v. White Plains Hosp. Med. Ctr., 232 N.Y.S.3d 594, 596 (App. Div. 2025) (analyzing the
NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims together under both the McDonnell Douglas framework
traditionally applied to NYSHRL claims and the “newer mixed-motive framework” typically

applied to NYCHRL claims (citing Syeed, 41 N.Y.3d at 452)); Hunold v. City of New York, 216
N.Y.S.3d 550, 550 n.4 (Sup. Ct. 2024) (“Although post-amendment case law is limited, courts
interpreting discrimination claims under the NYSHRL have begun to turn to interpretations of
the NYCHRL for guidance.” (citations omitted)); see also Herrera v. Syracuse Univ., No. 24-
CV-245, 2025 WL 874734, at *15 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2025) (noting that “New York state
courts have recently treated [NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims] as coextensive” (citing Syeed, 41
N.Y.3d at 452)). Some courts in this Circuit, including this Court, see Passante v. Cambium
Learning Grp., No. 23-CV-4060, 2024 WL 4171026, at *5–7, *9–10 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 12, 2024),
“have interpreted the amendment as rendering the standard for claims closer to the standard of
the NYCHRL.” Cooper, 2023 WL 3882977, at *3 (citation omitted); Desiderio, 2025 WL
1285278, at *9 (collecting cases); see also Acosta, 2025 WL 70141, at *8 n.6 (explaining that
“case law . . . has not definitively resolved whether the effect of the 2019 amendment is to make
the NYSHRL’s standard identical to that of the NYCHRL — or merely closer to it”). Although
the Second Circuit has not yet “resolve[d] the impact of these amendments,” Cooper, 2023 WL
3882977, at *3, recent summary orders in the Second Circuit analyzed post-amendment claims

under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL together. See Brown v. Montefiore Health Sys., Inc., No.
24-3078, 2025 WL 2985389, at *2 n.4 (2d Cir. Oct. 23, 2025) (summary order) (stating the 2019
amendment “align[ed] the NYSHRL with the [NYCHRL]’s more liberal pleading standard.”);
Gehlaut v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 24-1741, 2025 WL 2586770, at *2 (2d Cir. Sep. 8, 2025)
(summary order) (applying “NYCHRL’s more liberal pleading standard” in analyzing the
plaintiff’s NYSHRL employment discrimination claim (quoting Qorrolli, 124 F.4th at 122–23));
Flanagan, 2025 WL 1501751, at *3 (applying “‘more liberal pleading standard’ applicable to”
NYCHRL claims to a NYSHRL discrimination claim (quoting Qorrolli, 124 F.4th at 123));
Valerio v. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. 24-1614, 2025 WL 686028, at *3 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 2025)

(summary order) (“We thus discuss both [the NYSHRL and NYCHRL] claims together while
recognizing that they are separate and independent claims.” (citation omitted)); Knight v. MTA -
N.Y.C. Transit, No. 19-CV-1428, 2026 WL 875339, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2026) (applying
Valerio and addressing NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims “together[,] while recognizing that they
are separate and independent claims” (alteration in original) (quoting Valerio, 2025 WL 686028,
at *3)).
“[I]n the absence of any remaining federal claims, the appropriate analytic framework to
be applied to discrimination claims based on a ‘disability’ as defined by New York state and
municipal law is a question best left to the courts of the State of New York.” Norman, 2021 WL
5986999, at *6 (alteration in original) (quoting Giordano, 274 F.3d at 754); see Sorel, 2026 WL
879415, at *7 n.9 (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after
dismissing ADA claims); Jeter, 2026 WL 818735, at *9–10 (dismissing NYSHRL and
NYCHRL state law claims after dismissing the plaintiff’s Title VII and ADA claims); Asemota
v. City of New York, No. 24-CV-7793, 2025 WL 2662301, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 16, 2025)
(declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over NYSHRL claims due to unsettled questions

of state law with respect to pleading standards and whether NYSHRL claims should be construed
like the NYCHRL (citing Valerio, 2025 WL 686028, at *3)); see also Cruz, 2025 WL 551809, at
*15 (granting summary judgment on federal disability discrimination claim and declining to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over “remaining . . . NYSHRL and NYCHRL [claims], which
are better suited for the state courts of New York”); Nikolakopoulos v. Macy’s Inc., No. 20-CV-
1641, 2022 WL 3903595, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2022) (declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims after dismissing ADA and
FMLA claims on summary judgment because the claims “implicate different and at times
uncertain legal frameworks and standards” and explaining the NYSHRL amendments as an

example of how the “legal frameworks” of the claim “diverge, often substantially, from those
governing [the federal] claims” (alteration in original) (quoting Williams v. Geiger, 447 F. Supp.
3d 68, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 2020))); Fitzgerald v. We Co., No. 20-CV-5260, 2022 WL 952963, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2022) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over NYSHRL and
NYCHRL claims after granting summary judgment on federal ADA, FMLA, and Title VII
claims because they “employ a different, more liberal substantive standard in resolving both
gender- and disability-based discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment claims”);
Brantman v. Fortistar Cap. Inc., No. 15-CV-4774, 2017 WL 3172864, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. July 22,
2017) (declining exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over NYHSRL claims following grant of
summary judgment on ADA and Title VII claims “[i]n the interest of comity” (citation omitted)).
Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s NYSHRL claims without prejudice.
f. Leave to amend the Amended Complaint
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[l]eave to amend should
be ‘freely give[n] . . . when justice so requires,’ but ‘should generally be denied in instances of
futility, undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by

amendments previously allowed, or undue prejudice to the non-moving party.’” United States ex
rel. Ladas v. Exelis, Inc., 824 F.3d 16, 28 (2d Cir. 2016) (second and third alterations in original)
(first quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); and then quoting Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc.,
551 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2008)); see MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Hereford Ins. Co.,
66 F.4th 77, 90 (2d Cir. 2023) (“A court should freely give leave when justice so requires, but it
may, in its discretion, deny leave to amend for good reason, including futility, bad faith, undue
delay, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.” (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)); Dalewitz v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. 22-CV-7323, 2025 WL 764023, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2025) (“[A]bsent a showing of prejudice or bad faith, practice in this Circuit
is to grant a motion to amend.” (citing Block v. First Blood Assocs., 988 F.2d 344, 350 (2d Cir.

1993))).
The Court denies Plaintiff leave to amend the Amended Complaint as it relates to her
ADA claims for disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation. First, Plaintiff
has already filed an Amended Complaint in response to Defendants’ first motion to dismiss, and
Plaintiff does not request leave to amend or indicate there are additional facts that could cure the
legal deficiencies identified by the Court in this Memorandum and Order. See Perez, 2024 WL
1514216, at *10 (denying leave to amend ADA claims for disability discrimination, failure to
accommodate, and retaliation because the plaintiff declined to fix deficiencies to her complaint
after notice of those deficiencies in the defendant’s initial motion to dismiss and the plaintiff did
not ask to amend or “otherwise suggest[] that she is in possession of facts that would cure the
deficiencies identified in this opinion”). In addition, Plaintiff abandoned her ADA claims for
disability discrimination and retaliation by failing to address Defendants’ arguments in their
motion to dismiss. See Chipkin v. Better Packages, Inc., No. 24-CV-1435, 2025 WL 2319994, at
*6 (D. Conn. Aug. 12, 2025) (denying leave to amend where the plaintiff failed to defend his

ADA claims); HAHA Glob., Inc. v. Barclays, No. 19-CV-4749, 2020 WL 13882092, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2020) (denying leave to amend federal claims because the plaintiff abandoned
them), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 4702690 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2020).
Second, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to support an inference of
discrimination or causation between her alleged disability and COVID-19 vaccination medical
exemption request and her termination. Her sole allegation of discriminatory conduct relates to
the denial of a medical exemption, which the Court has determined Defendants lacked the
discretion to grant. Construing the Amended Complaint liberally, Plaintiff’s allegations do not
suggest that her claims are merely “inadequately or inartfully pleaded” but rather that their

deficiencies are “substantive.” See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). As a
result, the Court declines to permit Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint. See Fernandez
v. Scanpan USA, Inc., No. 25-CV-1849, 2025 WL 2774113, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2025)
(declining the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to cure deficiencies in his ADA claim
because “any further amendment would be futile”); see Muslim v. Sagamore Children’s
Psychiatric Ctr., No. 22-CV-7850, 2024 WL 3431959, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2024)
(dismissing with prejudice the plaintiff’s Title VII and NYSHRL religious discrimination claims
given the undue hardship the employer would face if it granted the plaintiff’s requested
exemption from Section 2.61); Conde v. Mid Hudson Reg’l Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 22-CV-3085,
2024 WL 168282, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2024) (same); Moore v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., No.
22-CV-10242, 2023 WL 7280476, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2023) (denying pro se plaintiff leave
to amend Title VII discrimination claims because they would ultimately fail due to the undue
hardship the defendant would face in granting a Section 2.61 exemption).
Accordingly, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend her ADA claims.
III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss, dismissing
with prejudice Plaintiff’s ADA claims for (1) disability discrimination, (2) failure to
accommodate, and (3) retaliation. The Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
NYSHRL claims for (1) disability discrimination, (2) failure to accommodate, and (3) retaliation
and dismisses these claims without prejudice.
Dated: May 26, 2026
Brooklyn, New York
SO ORDERED:

s/ MKB
MARGO K. BRODIE
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11361623. Public record. Not legal advice.