# Opinion

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · May 15, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11361572

## Case

- **Full name:** Cortez J. Jackson v. Rochelle Moore, Warden, Pickaway Correctional Institution
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** May 15, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS

CORTEZ J. JACKSON,

Petitioner, : Case No. 2:25-cv-00795
- vs - District Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz

ROCHELLE MOORE, WARDEN,
Pickaway Correctional Institution,

:
Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This habeas corpus case was brought pro se by Petitioner Cortez Jackson to obtain relief
from his conviction in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas on charges of felony murder,
tampering with evidence, and having weapons while under a disability and his consequent sentence
of imprisonment for eighteen years to life. The case is before the Court for decision on the merits
on the Petition (ECF No. 3), the State Court Record (ECF No. 8), the Return of Writ (ECF No.
10), and Petitioner’s Reply (ECF No. 15).

Litigation History
On August 26, 2021, a Franklin County grand jury returned an indictment charging
Petitioner with one count of purposeful murder, in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2903.02(A);
one count of felony murder, in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2903.02(B); one count of
domestic violence, in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2919.25; one count of tampering with
evidence, in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2921.12; and one count of having weapons while
under disability, in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2923.13. Both of the murder charges and the

tampering with evidence charge contained accompanying firearm specifications. The charges
arose from the August 19, 2021, death of Alyse Sharrae Edwards (Indictment, State Court Record,
ECF No. 8, Ex. 1).
A trial jury found Jackson not guilty of purposeful murder, but guilty of felony murder and
tampering with evidence. The trial judge found Jackson guilty of having weapons under disability
which was tried to the Court. He then sentenced Jackson to be imprisoned for eighteen years to
life (Judgment Entry, State Court Record, ECF No. 8, Ex. 6).
Jackson appealed to the Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals, pleading the single
assignment of error that the conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence and was against
the manifest weight of the evidence (Appellant’s Brief, State Court Record, ECF No. 8, Ex. 9,

PageID 80). The Tenth District affirmed, State v. Jackson, 2024-Ohio-2721 (Ohio App. 10th Dist.
Jul. 18, 2024); and the Ohio Supreme Court declined to exercise further appellate jurisdiction,
State v. Jackson, 175 Ohio St. 3d 1518 (Oct. 29, 2024).
On October 25, 2024, Jackson filed a pro se Application to Reopen his appeal pleading two
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel (State Court Record, ECF No. 8, Ex. 15). The
Tenth District denied the Application as untimely. Id. at Ex. 17. Jackson did not appeal to the
Ohio Supreme Court.
On August 4, 2025, Jackson filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pleading
one ground for relief, albeit with two sub-claims:

Ground One: The trial court erred and deprived Petitioner of due
process of law guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Ohio Constitution by
finding him guilty of murder and tampering with evidence, as those
verdicts were not supported by sufficient evidence and were against
the manifest weight of the evidence.

(Petition, ECF 3, PageID 38-43).

Analysis
Respondent argues that Petitioner’s second sub-claim – that the verdict is against the
manifest weight of the evidence – is not cognizable in habeas corpus. Petitioner agrees several
times in his Reply. And the Magistrate Judge agrees. Johnson v. Havener, 534 F.2d 1232 (6th Cir.
1986). Sub-claim two should be dismissed as non-cognizable.
Therefore the only claim before the Court is sub-claim one, to wit, that the State presented
insufficient evidence for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner had
committed each and every essential element of the offense of which he was convicted – felony
murder.
Petitioner spends a substantial portion of his Reply rebutting what he presumes is a lack of
exhaustion defense by Respondent (Reply, ECF No. 15, PageID 755-57, arguing compliance with
McMeans v. Brigano, 228 F.3d 674 (6th Cir. 2000)). This argument is unnecessary because
Respondent has not raised a lack of exhaustion defense nor has the State claimed Jackson has
procedurally defaulted his sufficiency of the evidence claim by not fairly presenting it to the state
courts. Instead, Respondent defends on the merits.
An allegation that a verdict was entered upon insufficient evidence states a claim under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Johnson v. Coyle, 200 F.3d
987, 991 (6th Cir. 2000); Bagby v. Sowders, 894 F.2d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 1990)(en banc). In order
for a conviction to be constitutionally sound, every element of the crime must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.

[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt . . . . This familiar standard gives full play to the
responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the
testimony, to weigh the evidence and to draw reasonable inferences
from basic facts to ultimate facts.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319; Smith v. Nagy, 962 F.3d 192, 205 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Jackson). This standard “must be applied with explicit reference to the substantive elements of the
criminal offense as defined by state law.” Id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324). This rule was
recognized in Ohio law at State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259 (1991). Of course, it is state law
which determines the elements of offenses; but once the state has adopted the elements, it must
then prove each of them beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, supra. A sufficiency challenge
should be assessed against the elements of the crime, not against the elements set forth in an
erroneous jury instruction. Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237 (2016).
In cases such as Petitioner’s challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and filed after
enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Pub. L. No 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214)(the “AEDPA”), two levels of deference to state decisions are required:
In an appeal from a denial of habeas relief, in which a petitioner
challenges the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence used to
convict him, we are thus bound by two layers of deference to groups
who might view facts differently than we would. First, as in all
sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges, we must determine
whether, viewing the trial testimony and exhibits in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.
Ed. 2d 560 (1979). In doing so, we do not reweigh the evidence, re-
evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute our judgment for
that of the jury. See United States v. Hilliard, 11 F.3d 618, 620 (6th
Cir. 1993). Thus, even though we might have not voted to convict a
defendant had we participated in jury deliberations, we must uphold
the jury verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found the
defendant guilty after resolving all disputes in favor of the
prosecution. Second, even were we to conclude that a rational trier
of fact could not have found a petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, on habeas review, we must still defer to the state appellate
court's sufficiency determination as long as it is not unreasonable.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

Brown v. Konteh, 567 F.3d 191, 205 (6th Cir. 2009). When reviewing a claim for sufficient
evidence, a federal habeas court must apply a twice-deferential standard.” Parker v. Matthews,
567 U.S. 37, 43 (2012) (per curiam).In a sufficiency of the evidence habeas corpus case, deference
should be given to the trier-of-fact's verdict under Jackson v. Virginia and then to the appellate
court's consideration of that verdict, as commanded by AEDPA. Tucker v. Palmer, 541 F.3d 652
(6th Cir. 2008); accord Davis v. Lafler, 658 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 2011)(en banc); Parker v.
Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 43 (2012). Notably, “a court may sustain a conviction based upon nothing
more than circumstantial evidence.” Stewart v. Wolfenbarger, 595 F.3d 647, 656 (6th Cir. 2010).
We have made clear that Jackson claims face a high bar in federal
habeas proceedings because they are subject to two layers of judicial
deference. First, on direct appeal, "it is the responsibility of the jury
-- not the court -- to decide what conclusions should be drawn from
evidence admitted at trial. A reviewing court may set aside the jury's
verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier
of fact could have agreed with the jury." Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.
S. 1, ___, 132 S. Ct. 2, 181 L. Ed. 2d 311, 313 (2011) (per curiam).
And second, on habeas review, "a federal court may not overturn a
state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge
simply because the federal court disagrees with the state court. The
federal court instead may do so only if the state court decision was
'objectively unreasonable.'" Ibid. (quoting Renico v. Lett, 559 U. S.
___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 176 L. Ed. 2d 678 (2010)).
Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651, (2012)(per curiam); Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 43
(2012) (per curiam). The federal courts do not make credibility determinations in reviewing
sufficiency of the evidence claims. Brooks v. Tennessee, 626 F.3d 878, 887 (6th Cir. 2010).
We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United States v. Farrad,
895 F.3d 859, 871 (6th Cir. 2018). “To test the sufficiency of the evidence, we ‘must determine
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Crump, 65 F.4th 287, 294 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting United
States v. Washington, 702 F.3d 886, 891 (6th Cir. 2012)). In so doing, we do not weigh the
evidence, assess credibility of the witnesses, or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder.

United States v. Hendricks, 950 F.3d 348, 352 (6th Cir. 2020).
The state court’s application “must be ‘objectively unreasonable,’ not merely wrong; even
‘clear error’ will not suffice.” Nagy, 962 F.3d at 199 (quoting White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419
(2014)). In other words, “relief is available under § 2254(d)(1)’s unreasonable-application clause
if, and only if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts that there
could be no ‘fairminded disagreement’ on the question.” Woodall, 572 U.S. at 427 (quoting
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)).
Together, Jackson and AEDPA’s two layers of deference dictate that “a federal court’s
‘review of a state-court conviction for sufficiency of the evidence is very limited.’” Tackett v.
Trierweiler, 956 F.3d 358, 367 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Thomas v. Stephenson, 898 F.3d 693, 698

(6th Cir. 2018)).
As the Supreme Court held in Winship, there must be sufficient evidence on every element
of the offense of conviction. Petitioner was convicted of tampering with the evidence and
challenged that conviction on appeal under the Jackson standard, but he makes no argument in
habeas that that conviction was upon insufficient evidence. Accordingly, the Court should defer
to the conclusion of the Tenth District that the tampering conviction was supported by sufficient
evidence.
Jackson’s principal conviction is for felony murder in violation of Ohio Revised Code §
2903.02(B). That statute provides “No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate

result of the offender's committing or attempting to commit an offense of violence.” In turn
felonious assault is forbidden by Ohio Revised Code § 2903.11(A)(1) which provides “No person
shall knowingly * * * [c]ause serious physical harm to another.” There is no dispute that the victim
in this case, Alyse Sharrae Edwards, died and that the cause of death was a bullet wound to her
abdomen. There is likewise no dispute that shooting someone in the abdomen, if done knowingly,
constitutes felonious assault. Petitioner’s case hinges on whether there was sufficient evidence to
conclude he acted knowingly.
The Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals decided the evidence on that element was
sufficient for conviction, It found:

As pertinent to this appeal, the following evidence was adduced at
trial.

{¶ 4} Three individuals who were near Edwards’ apartment when
she was shot testified. Onaee Sharp, a neighbor of Edwards
and Jackson, testified that, on the morning of August 19, 2021, she
heard “either a little screaming or a loud ‘[h]elp’ and a big bump.”
(Apr. 3, 2023 Tr. Vol. II at 139.) Her boyfriend, Terrence Thomas,
told her there was “a dead body” at her apartment door. (Tr. Vol. II
at 139.) She opened the door to find Edwards on the ground
and Jackson in the hallway with a shocked look on his face. Sharp
could see blood on her door from Edwards, and she looked
at Jackson and asked him “what the eff did he do to her.” (Tr. Vol.
II at 131.) Jackson gave no response, and Sharp immediately called
911 for help. Although Jackson initially was unresponsive to her,
when the police arrived “he [became] irate, he started punching on
the walls and everything instead of just answering the questions.”
(Tr. Vol II at 144.) Thomas testified that he first opened the
apartment door after hearing someone knock. When he opened it, he
saw Edwards on the ground with blood “all over the door, all over
the floor in the hallway.” (Tr. Vol. II at 157.) He shut the door and
informed Sharp someone was in the hall, and he thought she had
been shot. Damien O'Bryant, who was staying with a friend at a
neighboring apartment, testified that, when he reentered the
apartment building after smoking outside, he saw a severely injured
Edwards, who looked at him and said, “[h]elp.” (Tr. Vol. II at 170.)
Around the same time, he observed Jackson “come back into the
building.” (Tr. Vol. II at 180.) O'Bryant immediately called the
police.

{¶ 5} Columbus Division of Police Officers Michael Church, Darryl
Kerns, and Lucas Metz were dispatched to the scene. Officer Church
testified that, when they entered the apartment building, they
observed Edwards’ bloody body. Jackson was nearby screaming
that Edwards had been shot. Because Edwards’ head was leaning
against a door, Officer Kerns repositioned her so she was lying
completely flat. They observed a gunshot wound to her lower
abdomen and a trail of blood through the apartment.

Officer Church asked Jackson if he knew who had shot Edwards,
and he stated he did not know. Initially, Jackson seemed distraught
about Edwards being shot, and then he became upset at the officers,
claiming they were not doing their job or helping her. Officer Metz
testified that he had to physically remove Jackson from the area
where Edwards was and detain him because he was “agitated * * *
screaming, [and] not wanting to listen.” (Tr. Vol. II at 215.) Officer
Metz was concerned Jackson would interfere with the officers
helping Edwards.

{¶ 6} Donald Jones, a detective in the Crime Scene Search Unit of
the Columbus Division of Police, testified that while investigating
and processing the scene they found a spent shell casing, also called
a cartridge case, in the kitchen sink and a firearm in the water tank
behind the toilet in the bathroom. Once the top of that tank was
removed, the firearm was visible in the water. Keith O'Connor,
another detective for the Columbus Division of Police,
interviewed Jackson at police headquarters. Detective O'Connor
testified that Jackson was asked whether the shooting was an
accident, and he did not disclose anything about what happened,
other than denying that he shot Edwards.

{¶ 7} Forensic experts examined the recovered firearm,
cartridge case, and the gunshot residue samples taken
from Jackson's hands. Caleb Worley, a forensic scientist for the
Columbus Division of Police Crime Laboratory, testified that the
cartridge case was fired from the firearm found at the scene. Worley
further testified that, while he did not test the degree of force
necessary to pull the trigger of this firearm, he fired this particular
weapon and did not observe any remarkable deviation from the
average force needed to pull a trigger. Relatedly, he noted it is
“extremely difficult” for a modern firearm to fire unless the trigger
is pulled. (Tr. Vol. III at 295.) Ted Manasian, a gunshot residue
expert for the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation, testified that
the gunshot residue test kit applied to Jackson's hands soon after
the shooting did not reveal the presence of any gunshot residue.
Manasian noted that gunshot residue generally does not adhere well
to surfaces and easily can be washed off hands.

{¶ 8} Jackson testified in his own defense as follows. He and
Edwards lived together and had three children during their
relationship. Prior to the shooting, two of the children were in the
custody of Franklin County Children Services. Edwards
blamed Jackson and his family for those children being removed
from their home. At approximately 5:00 a.m., August 19, 2021, and
after Edwards was out partying, she returned to their apartment,
smelling like alcohol and marijuana. Edwards became angry
at Jackson when he told her he was going to take their daughter and
leave. She retrieved a firearm from a closet. Edwards
confronted Jackson with the weapon, and they physically
struggled. He grabbed her wrist trying to take the weapon from her,
the weapon discharged while in her hand, and then she dropped
it. Jackson picked up the firearm, took it into the bathroom, and
dropped it into the back of the toilet. He then called the police and
tried to apply pressure to the wound to Edwards’
abdomen. Jackson denied shooting Edwards, washing his hands
after the shooting, or otherwise placing his hands in water.

• * * * *

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

{¶ 14} Whether there is legally sufficient evidence to sustain a
verdict is a question of law. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,
386 (1997). Sufficiency is a test of adequacy. Id. The relevant
inquiry for an appellate court is whether the evidence presented,
when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, would
allow any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Mahone, 10th
Dist. No. 12AP-545, 2014-Ohio-1251, ¶ 38, citing State v. Tenace,
109 Ohio St.3d 255, 2006-Ohio-2417, ¶ 37.
{¶ 15} Here, the jury found Jackson guilty of one count of murder
and one count of tampering with evidence, and the trial court
found Jackson guilty of one count of having a weapon while under
disability.1 R.C. 2903.02(B) states that “[n]o person shall cause the
death of another as a proximate result of the offender's committing
or attempting to commit an offense of violence.” This offense is
known as “felony murder,” and felonious assault is an example of
an offense of violence. Under R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), “[n]o person
shall knowingly * * * [c]ause serious physical harm to another.” As
to the offense of tampering with evidence, R.C.
2921.12(A)(1) states “[n]o person, knowing that an official
proceeding or investigation is in progress, or is about to be or likely
to be instituted, shall * * * [a]lter, destroy, conceal, or remove any
* * * thing, with purpose to impair its value or availability as
evidence in such proceeding or investigation.”

{¶ 16} Jackson does not directly challenge the evidentiary
establishment of any specific element of these offenses; instead, he
argues Edwards’ death was the result of their physical struggle for
control of the firearm after Edwards angrily confronted Jackson for
suggesting their third child, like the other two, would be removed
from her care. Jackson acknowledges his DNA was found on the
firearm, but he explains this was because he picked up the firearm
and placed it in the toilet after Edwards was shot. Relatedly, he
asserts the absence of gunshot residue on his hands indicates he was
not near the firearm when it discharged, and therefore he did not pull
the trigger. When viewed in favor of the prosecution, however, the
evidence demonstrated all the elements of murder and tampering
with evidence.

{¶ 17} The evidence showed that Edwards was fatally shot one time
in the abdomen. Jackson testified that, although he was physically
struggling with Edwards when she was shot, he did not pull the
trigger of the firearm in Edwards’ possession. He suggests the
firearm may have been jostled enough to cause it to discharge the
projectile, without anyone pulling the trigger, or Edwards herself
pulled the trigger. But testimony indicated that it would be very
unlikely for the weapon to fire unless the trigger was pulled.
Immediately after being shot, Edwards begged for aid from others
in the area, knocking on the neighbor's door and saying “help” to
someone entering the apartment building. This reasonably indicated
she was trying to get away from Jackson after being shot. Although
no gunshot residue was found on Jackson's hands, this fact did not
necessarily establish that he did not fire the weapon, as the evidence
also demonstrated that his DNA was found on the weapon, gunshot
residue is easily washed off, and, immediately after the
shooting, Jackson placed the fired weapon inside the covered water
tank behind the apartment's toilet. Thus, the jury reasonably found
that Jackson knowingly pulled the trigger and shot Edwards, killing
her. Further, Jackson's placement of the firearm in the water tank
reasonably demonstrated his intent to hide the weapon used to shoot
Edwards, clearly a piece of physical evidence that would be
pertinent to an investigation of her death. In sum, the evidence
reasonably established all the elements of felony murder and
tampering with evidence.

{¶ 18} Thus, there was sufficient evidence to
support Jackson's convictions.

State v. Jackson, 2024-Ohio-2721 (Ohio App. 10th Dist. Jul. 28, 2024)(emphasis in original).
In arguing this Court should not defer to the Tenth District’s decision, Jackson does not
argue that that court applied the wrong legal standard, but rather that its findings of fact are
unreasonable. He states “The state appellate court plainly misstates material facts present in the
trial court record that are central to Petitioner's defense against the prosecution's theory in making
its findings that are presumed correct in this proceeding.” (Reply, ECF No. 15, PageID 754).
He begins by claiming the Tenth District sua sponte found "does not directly challenge the
evidentiary establishment of any specific element of these offenses; instead, he argues Edwards'
death was the result of their physical struggle for control of the firearm." (Reply, ECF No. 15,
PageID 754). But to show that this was a sua sponte conclusion, he cites to the Return of Writ,
not to any argument the State made before the Tenth District. Id. Examination of Jackson’s brief
on appeal shows that he did not focus on insufficiency of evidence on any specific element in that
brief (Appellant’s Brief, State Court Record, ECF No. 8, Ex. 9). In fact, the element on which he
now focuses – knowingly – does not occur in his brief on appeal. The Tenth District’s conclusion
that he did not directly challenge the evidentiary foundation of any specific element is correct.
Then Jackson essentially admits the “knowingly” element was not the focus of appeal, but
blames it on deficient performance of his appellate counsel and claims he cured that deficiency by
arguing the knowingly element in his pro se appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court (Reply, ECF No.
15, PageID 756). However, the Ohio Supreme Court did not take jurisdiction of the case and
render a decision on the merits; the last state court decision on the merits, the one as to which
deference is due, was that of the Tenth District.

Next Jackson argues that the Tenth District “completely ignores the factual material issue”
that a forensic report shows the DNA of both Jackson and the victim on the gun (Reply, ECF No.
15, PageID 757). The fact that the Tenth District did not mention this forensic report does not
mean its decision is not entitled to deference. None of the progeny of Jackson v. Virginia suggest
that a state court must recite every piece of evidence it considered to be entitled to deference. The
Tenth District specifically mentions that Jackson’s DNA was found on the weapon (¶ 17), a fact
established by the forensic report to which Jackson refers.
Next Jackson accuses the Tenth District of “ignore[ing] the testimony of Columbus Police
Crime Lab Technician, Caleb Worley, who provided testimony that a test was never performed on

the gun retrieved from the scene to see if it would be easy for it to go off if it were hit with
something, dropped, or anything along those lines.” (Reply, ECF No. 15, PageID 757). Again, in
properly deciding a sufficiency of the evidence claim, an appellate court has no obligation to recite
all of the evidence which it did not find persuasive.
In fact the Tenth District did not ignore Worley’s testimony, but found
Caleb Worley, a forensic scientist for the Columbus Division of
Police Crime Laboratory, testified that the cartridge case was fired
from the firearm found at the scene. Worley further testified that,
while he did not test the degree of force necessary to pull the trigger
of this firearm, he fired this particular weapon and did not observe
any remarkable deviation from the average force needed to pull a
trigger. Relatedly, he noted it is “extremely difficult” for a modern
firearm to fire unless the trigger is pulled.
State v. Jackson, supra, at ¶ 7. Further, in deciding Jackson’s weight of the evidence claim, the
Tenth District held:
{¶ 21} As discussed above, Jackson posits that the firearm
somehow discharged without him pulling the trigger, after he and
Edwards engaged in an altercation arising from her aggressive
reaction to possibly losing custody of another child. He testified that
when he confronted Edwards about another night of her carousing,
she became enraged and retrieved the firearm, which somehow went
off when he struggled with her to get control of it. He argues the
absence of gunshot residue on his hands heavily weighed against a
finding that he pulled the firearm's trigger. But the absence of
gunshot residue on his hands does not necessarily negate the
inference that he pulled the trigger, as that type of residue is easily
removed with water. Further, Jackson's DNA was on the weapon,
and he admitted to immediately placing the firearm in the water tank
behind the toilet. Thus, while there was some conflicting evidence
at trial, the jury was in the best position to evaluate the evidence and
resolve any disputed facts, including the central disputed fact of
whether Jackson pulled the firearm's trigger, killing Edwards.

State v. Jackson, supra.
In sum, Jackson has not established any deficiency in the Tenth District’s fact-finding. He
disagrees with that court’s conclusion about what the jury could properly infer, but he has not
shown there was any material evidence in the record which the Tenth District ignored.
In the second half of his Reply, Jackson focuses on the proof of the “knowingly” element.
In considering this argument it must be noted that there were only two eyewitnesses to the shooting
and one of them was dead by the time of trial1. Thus the only direct evidence the jury heard about
how the shooting happened was from Jackson; the State’s case as to what happened during the
shooting was circumstantial. Jackson argues “regardless of Petitioner's conduct after the accidental
shooting occurred, the evidence didn't clearly support a jury's conclusion that Petitioner knew that

1 A prominent twentieth-century defense attorney was often heard to remark that he preferred to defend murder cases
because there was always one less witness.
physical harm to Edwards was probable.” (Reply, ECF No. 15, PageID 763). It is common
knowledge – so common that the Court could take judicial notice of it under Fed. R. Evid. 201 –
that when you fire a gun into someone’s stomach, serious physical harm is very probable. The
question is not whether serious physical harm was probable from the firing of the weapon, but
whether Jackson fired it. The State presented evidence rebutting Jackson’s claim of accidental

discharge and the jury believed it.
Jackson argues at length that he proved the discharge was accidental (Reply, ECF No. 15,
PageID 764, et seq.). But no such claim was made on direct appeal and Jackson has not cited to
any place in the record where that argument was made to the jury. Jackson cites Jones v. State, 51
Ohio St. 331 (1894), for the proposition that accident negates the mens rea element of an offense.
Ohio homicide law has changed considerably in the last 130 years, but assuming Jones is still good
law, it does stand for that proposition – in a murder case where the required mens rea was that the
offender acted purposely. Jackson was found not guilty of purposeful murder, so the jury
apparently gave some weight to his account of what happened. But accident, even if proved to the

jury’s satisfaction, would not negate the knowingly element.
For the proposition that “[t]he defense of accident serves to negate the element of criminal
culpability in the charged offenses,” Jackson cites State v. O'Dell, 2009-Ohio-1040 ¶13 (Ohio App.
2d Dist. 2009). In that opinion Judge James Brogan wrote for the Second District that there was
no mens rea element in the crime of rape of a child under thirteen and the Due Process Clause did
not require a mens rea element. In the paragraph cited by Jackson, Judge Brogan wrote
“Furthermore, the defense of accident, which Appellant attempted to raise, is not an affirmative
defense in Ohio; it serves only to negate the element of intent in crimes where intent must be
shown. State v. Poole (1973), 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 20, 294 N.E.2d 888). Again, intent is not an
element of the offense of which Jackson was convicted.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Magistrate Judge respectfully recommends that the

Petition herein be dismissed with prejudice. Because reasonable jurists would not disagree with
this conclusion, it is also recommended that Petitioner be denied a certificate of appealability and
that the Court certify to the Sixth Circuit that any appeal would be objectively frivolous and should
not be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis.
May 15, 2026.
s/ Michael R. Merz
United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days after being served with this Report
and Recommendations. Because this document is being served by mail, three days are added under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 6, but service is complete when the document is mailed, not when it is received. Such
objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party may respond to another party’s
objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections
in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11361572. Public record. Not legal advice.