# Goods

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · May 12, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11361136

## Case

- **Full name:** Terrill Goods, Sr. v. United States of America, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** May 12, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT CINCINNATI

TERRILL GOODS, SR., : Case No. 1:25-cv-732
:
Plaintiff, :
: District Judge Michael R. Barrett
vs. :
Chief Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman
:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This matter is now before the Court for the initial screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint
(Doc.1) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal
of the Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In addition to other motions that will be addressed in a separate
order, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 14) will be addressed herein.
I.
Plaintiff, a prisoner currently incarcerated at the Greenville Federal Correctional Institution
in Greenville, Illinois, and proceeding pro se, sues Defendants United States of America, Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals Case Manager Roy. G. Ford, his defense appellate attorney Mark Pickrell,
and three Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals Judges—Senior Judge David W. McKeague, Judge Eric
E. Murphy,1 and Judge Rachel S. Bloomekatz under federal law for alleged violations of his civil

1 While the docket reflects a Nurse Murphy as a defendant, Plaintiff’s Complaint indicated Judge Murphy is the
defendant, as Judge Murphy was one of the three judges on the panel presiding over Plaintiff’s appeal at issue in the
case. See (Doc. 1, at PageID 2, 4).
rights under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 408 U.S. 388
(1971).2 (Doc. 1). Plaintiff’s claims arise out of allegedly improper proceedings in the case
management, assistance of counsel, and decision in Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals Case No. 23-
5489, decided March 18, 2024. Id. at 4. His motion to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted
by separate Order. (Doc. 12, at PageID 25).

II.
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower
judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing
so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed
by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous,
malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324
(1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)3 as part of the statute, which
provides in pertinent part:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,
the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . .

2 Although Plaintiff filed his complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), he sued
federal officers and employees, apart from his appellate attorney. Therefore, the Undersigned construes the
complaint as arising under Bivens. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2.
3 Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte
dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or
upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the
basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill

v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule
8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands
on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d
502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).
Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]
pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action,’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of
considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the
defendant's conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court holds
pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Garrett
v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April 1, 2010)
(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits;
“‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen. Motors,
482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.

1989)).
III.
Since Plaintiff’s full statement of his claim consists of a few sentences, a reproduction of
it follows:
Roy G. Ford violated Rule 45 by hiding a detailed letter of [Plaintiff’s] trial
transcripts. This was to be used during [his] appeal. Ford claimed he never
received[.] Mark Pickrell lied during “phone call” about Rule 27(4)[,] but even
worse[,] he formulated [Plaintiff’s] brief [without] consulting with [him] [first],
[e]ven though [his] trial was pro se. See: “Unique Circumstances Doctrine.” [He]
complained in a timely fashion on 2/7/24[,] but the three panel judges on 3/18/24
ignored [his] Sixth Amendment right…. [Plaintiff] believe[s] Mark Pickrell
conspired with others to bury what happened at trial. The brief he filed [without]
[Plaintiff’s] consent skipped the real issue of the AUSA’s and Judge Bunning
violating the work product doctrine by “illegal electronics surveillance.” This was
not done by mistake[;] it was to deter “civil litigation.”

(Doc. 1, at PageID 4). As a result of the above allegations, Plaintiff seeks monetary and
injunctive relief, seeking thirty-five million dollars in damages and unspecified sanctions “[a]fter
being robbed of [his] due process and the blatant disregard for the United States Constitution and
to stop future monopoly of the system.” Id.
IV.
For the reasons set forth below, the Complaint is subject to dismissal without prejudice in
its entirety. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b).
A. The Complaint Cannot be Construed as Seeking a Writ of Habeas Corpus
As an initial matter, a federal prisoner who seeks to collaterally attack the validity of his
conviction or sentence must invoke 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Harrington v. Ormund, 900 F.3d 246, 249
(6th Cir. 2018). Here, Plaintiff did not seek relief under § 2255 and could not do so in this court.
If Plaintiff wishes to seek relief under § 2255, he must do so “in the court which imposed the
sentence,” which would be the District Court of Eastern Kentucky, in Case No. 2-22-cr-17.4 As

Plaintiff’s claims in this case, if found meritorious, would collaterally attack his conviction, the
Undersigned recommends this complaint to be dismissed without prejudice for Plaintiff to pursue
his challenge to his conviction under § 2255 in the proper court.
B. Heck Doctrine Is Applicable
Furthermore, the Court notes that the doctrine announced under Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477 (1994), which holds that a civil rights lawsuit is barred if it would necessarily imply the
invalidity of a plaintiff’s prior criminal conviction or sentence, unless the plaintiff establishes that
the conviction or sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal . . ., or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a

writ of habeas corpus,” id. at 512 U.S.486-87, bars consideration of Plaintiff’s claims at this time.
First, Plaintiff’s conviction of federal drug and firearms offenses and sentence of 420-
months was affirmed on direct appeal; in fact, the judges’ actions in his direct appeal are part of
this case. United States v. Goods, No. 23-5489, 2024 WL 3064538 (6th Cir. Mar. 18, 2024), cert.
denied, 145 S. Ct. 242, 220 L. Ed. 2d 68 (2024); (Doc. 1, at PageID 4). Second, Plaintiff has not
established that the conviction or sentence has been expunged by executive order. Third, this is

4 Plaintiff appears to be attempting to do so in that case. Viewed at https://kyed-ecf.sso.dcn/doc1/08107048035
United States v. Goods et al., Case No. 2-22cr17, Docs. 298, 307 (E.D. Ky. 2022). See Lynch v. Leis, 382 F.3d 642,
648 n.5 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Lyons v. Stovall, 188 F.3d 327, 332 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999)) (courts may take judicial
notice of court records available online to the public); see also Landt v. Farley, 2012 WL 4473209, at *1 (N.D. Ohio
Sept. 26, 2012) (noting that the “court may take judicial notice of matters of public record, including duly recorded
documents, and court records available to the public through the PACER system and via the internet.”) (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
federal case with federal charges, making state tribunal invalidation inapplicable to this case.
Finally, while Plaintiff appears to be trying to file a petition for habeas corpus regarding his
underlying charges in this case, no writ of habeas corpus has been issued.5
C. Plaintiff Has Failed to State a Claim under Bivens, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and § 1985
i. Judicial Immunity Protects Judges McKeague, Murphy, and Bloomekatz

The Court next considers Plaintiff’s claims against Judges McKeague, Murphy, and
Bloomekatz. Plaintiff brings claims against Judges McKeague, Murphy, and Bloomekatz under
42 U.S.C § 19836 for an alleged violation of his Sixth Amendment right by “ignor[ing]” it in their
March 18, 2024 decision, after Plaintiff had submitted a motion to appoint substitute counsel on
February 7, 2024. (Doc. 1, at PageID 4). Judges McKeague, Murphy, and Bloomekatz are entitled
to absolute judicial immunity from these claims.
Judicial immunity shields judges, and other public officers, “from undue interference with
their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 806 (1982). “Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from

suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).
Courts have recognized that absolute judicial immunity applies to claims under Bivens, § 1983,
and, although not specifically raised against Judges McKeague, Murphy, and Bloomekatz, judicial
immunity also applies to claims under § 1985. See, e.g., Newsome v. Merz, 17 F. App'x 343, 345
(6th Cir. 2001) (finding that a federal magistrate judge was “entitled to judicial immunity from
[plaintiff’s] claim for monetary damages because he was performing his judicial functions and
acted within his jurisdiction” and “federal judges are immune from Bivens suits for equitable
relief”), Pickett v. Williams, No. 3:17-CV-557, 2019 WL 3021196, at *7 n.5 (N.D. Tex. June 24,

5 See footnote 4.
6 As the Undersigned noted above, this case should be construed as brought under Bivens.
2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 W 1986 WL 3006985 (N.D. Tex. July 10, 2019)
(“Additionally, any § 1985 claim against the judge is barred by judicial immunity . . . for the same
reasons as the § 1983 claim”).
Judicial immunity is overcome only if the actions taken were not in the judges’ judicial
capacity and if the actions taken were in absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12.

Here, Judges McKeague’s, Murphy’s, and Bloomekatz’s conduct of presiding over Plaintiff’s
direct appeal was indisputably judicial in nature. Furthermore, contrary to Plaintiff’s allegation
that the three-judge panel “ignored [his] Sixth Amendment right” by not addressing his February
7, 2024 motion to appoint substitute counsel, the decision addressed Plaintiff’s motion, albeit by
denying it. (Doc. 1, at PageID 4); contra Goods, 2024 WL 3064538, at *2.
Plaintiff has failed to allege facts overcoming Judges McKeague’s, Murphy’s, and
Bloomekatz’s judicial immunity.7 Plaintiff’s claims against Judges McKeague, Murphy, and
Bloomekatz under Bivens, § 1983, and any claims against them under § 1985, are therefore barred
by judicial immunity and should be dismissed.

ii. Quasi-Judicial Immunity Protects Defendant Ford
Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Ford also are barred by immunity. Although
Plaintiff purports to sue him under § 19838 and potentially under 1985, “[q]uasi-judicial
immunity extends to those persons performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial

7 While there is an exception to judicial immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if a plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive
relief, that does not apply to this case. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984). Plaintiff’s only reference to
injunctive relief is unspecified sanctions, a remedy for his alleged past harm, which would be retrospective relief
that is not excepted from judicial immunity. Williams v. Parikh, 708 F. Supp. 3d 1345, 1362 (S.D. Ohio 2023)
(Cole, D.J.), aff'd, No. 24-3059, 2024 WL 5355086 (6th Cir. Sept. 4, 2024).
8 Because “an action under Bivens is almost identical to an action under 42 U.S.C. §1983, except that the former is
maintained against federal officials while the latter is against state officials,” “the body of caselaw regarding §1983
applies to Bivens actions.” Fuget v. Fed. Pub. Def. E. Dist. of Missouri, 2023 WL 8354805, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 1,
2023) (citing Gordon v. Hansen, 168 F.3d 1109, 1113 (8th Cir. 1999); Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 789 n.7
(8th Cir. 2015)). Thus, even construing Plaintiff’s complaint to be filed under Bivens, the analysis under 42 U.S.C.
§1983 still applies.
process that these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune.” Bush v.
Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994). See, e.g., Wymore v. Green, 245 F. App’x 780, 783
(10th Cir. 2007) (affirming district court’s grant of absolute quasi-judicial immunity to state
clerk of court for performing judicially related duties), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1194 (2008); Ayers
v. Reynolds, No. 94-4124, 1995 WL 386435, at *2 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding a clerk of court to be

entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, noting “[f]iling court orders and preparing and transmitting
the certified record are functions closely associated with the judicial process”); Hargis v. Jones,
986 F.2d 1421, 1993 WL 24146, at *1 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding a clerk of court to be entitled to
quasi-judicial immunity in connection with the alleged loss of state court criminal trial
transcripts and that allegation that defendant “lied to the courts about his trial records”). See also
Lyle v. Jackson, 49 F. App’x 492, 494 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that a claim against court clerks
who failed to provide the plaintiff with copies of previous filings and transcripts properly
dismissed on the basis of quasi-judicial immunity); Bradley v. United States, 84 F. App'x 492,
493 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding a federal district court clerk to have quasi-judicial immunity when

plaintiff claimed the clerk conspired to delay his habeas corpus petition).
Plaintiff has not pled a § 1985 conspiracy claim with the requisite particularity.
“Whether proceeding under § 1983 or § 1985, [a p]laintiff must plead a conspiracy with
particularity and show some evidence of coordinated actions between the alleged conspirators.”
Moore v. Kulkarni, No. 18-12280, 2019 WL 4312135, at *10 (E.D. Mich. May 31, 2019); see
also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 (allegations of conspiracy must be supported by allegations of
fact that support a “plausible suggestion of conspiracy,” not merely a “possible” one); Gutierrez
v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987) (conspiracy claims must be pled with some degree
of specificity; vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts will not be
sufficient to state such a claim under § 1983). The Complaint includes no factual allegations to
plausibly suggest that the named Defendants—the judges, case administrator, and defense
attorney involved in Plaintiff’s direct appeal—shared a conspiratorial objective or otherwise
planned together to deprive him of a constitutionally-protected right. Accordingly, the Complaint
should be dismissed against Defendant Ford.

iii. No Claim Exists against Pickrell under Bivens, § 1983, and § 1985
Likewise, Plaintiff’s §§ 1983 and 1985 claims fail against his defense counsel. First,
Pickrell was not acting under the color of state law within the meaning of § 1983.9 Polk County
v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 320-25 (1981). It is firmly established that a defense attorney,
regardless of whether he is a public defender or a private attorney, is not a state actor for
purposes of § 1983. Id. at 325 (“[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when
performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.”);
Otworth v. Vanderploeg, 61 F. App’x 163, 165 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[A] lawyer representing a client
is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor under color of state law within the

meaning of § 1983.”).
Additionally, while defense counsel are generally not immune from § 1983 liability for
conspiracies to deprive clients of their constitutional rights, see Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914
(1984), as previously noted, Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory allegations of a conspiracy are
insufficient to state a cognizable claim under § 1983. See Gutierrez, 826 F.2d at 1538–39;
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Cf. Horton v. Martin, 137 F. App'x 773, 775–76 (6th Cir. 2005)

9 Additionally, “a court-appointed defense attorney ‘does not act under color of federal law in performing … as a
lawyer to an indigent defendant in a federal proceeding.’” DeLia v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 2021 WL 4258758, at *5
(10th Cir. Sept. 20, 2021) (citing Lay v. Otto, 530 F. App'x 800, 802 n.1 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished)). Thus, even
construing Plaintiff’s complaint to be brought under Bivens, Defendant Pickrell is not a federal actor, and Plaintiff’s
claims fail against him.
(affirming dismissal of § 1983 claim against attorney who represented the plaintiff in a parole
revocation hearing given the lack of any “factual support or evidence upon which a conspiracy
[with state officials] could be based”). Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations under 42 U.S.C. § 1985
are similarly subject to summary dismissal. See Moore v. Kulkarni, No. 1:18-cv-12280, 2019
WL 4312135, at *10 (E.D. Mich. May 31, 2019).

D. Claim under the Unique Circumstances Doctrine Should Be Dismissed
Plaintiff contends that his claim falls under the “unique circumstances doctrine” because
he was pro se at trial and “complained in a timely fashion” about his attorney’s actions in his direct
appeal, but “the 3-panel judges on 3/18/2024 ignored [his] 6th Amendment Right.” (Doc. 1, at
PageID 4). First, to the extent that it would even be applicable to this case, the “unique
circumstances doctrine” of allowing a party to file outside the timeframe of appellate rules if the
party relied on a district court’s ruling permitting them to do so has been overruled and found
illegitimate by the Supreme Court. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007). Furthermore,
the three-judge panel did not solely deny Plaintiff’s motion to appoint substitute counsel on

untimeliness grounds, the basis of the “unique circumstances doctrine”; the panel instead found
that Plaintiff had not shown good cause for the motion, having no “substantial grounds for
dissatisfaction with his current appointed counsel” and no identification of “an issues on which a
different attorney would have a reasonable chance of success.” Goods, 2024 WL 3064538, at *2.
Finally, the “untimeliness” rationale of the three-judge panel would likely not have implicated the
“unique circumstances doctrine” even if it were still valid law—Plaintiff’s motion was not
“untimely” based on appellate rule filing deadlines but rather because it would not “further ‘the
public’s interest in the prompt and efficient administration of justice’” to allow Plaintiff to
substitute his appellate counsel after the “briefing was completed and his appeal was ready for
disposition.” Id. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim under the “unique circumstances doctrine,” even if it were
still permitted, would and should be dismissed.
E. The Undersigned Does Not Reach Additional Grounds for Dismissal
The Undersigned notes that certain claims that Plaintiff asserts against Defendants are
likely to be dismissed as Plaintiff’s claims would not be substantively recognized under Bivens

or the Federal Tort Claim Act. In light of the improper nature of Plaintiff’s suit (a civil rights suit
instead of a § 2255 habeas petition) and in furtherance of the interest in judicial economy,
however, the Undersigned will not address those issues at this time.
V.
Although Plaintiff entitles his motion as “Motion for Request to Add Exhibits and Rule
26(a)(1)(ii),” Plaintiff also moves for summary judgment, asserting that “Rule 56(c) states that
the motion will be granted ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” (Doc. 14,

PageID at 33). The exhibits he attaches to “expedite litigation” include a letter he wrote asserting
the same claims he brings in this suit, a letter from the Federal Bureau of Prisons, a portion of an
order in another of Plaintiff’s federal cases, and the docket in his direct appeal before the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals, both annotated by Plaintiff. (Doc. 14, at PageID 34-35, 37-40).
First, Plaintiff’s “one-page summary judgment motion offers no evidence whatsoever in
support of summary judgment.” J'ttonali One Eye El-Bey v. Wallace, No. 1:21-CV-389, 2022
WL 2208763, at *2 (S.D. Ohio June 21, 2022) (Litkovitz, M.J.), report and recommendation
adopted sub nom. El-Bey v. Wallace, No. 2:21-CV-00389, 2023 WL 1857797 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 9,
2023) (Marbley, D.J.). Second, as defendants have not appeared and no discovery has taken
place, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is premature. Id. Therefore, to the extent
Plaintiff moves for summary judgment in his motion (Doc. 14), it should be DENIED as
premature.
VI.
In sum, the claims in Plaintiff’s Complaint should be DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2). The dismissal of these claims should not be construed as precluding Plaintiff
from pursuing his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas petition challenging his underlying conviction in the
District Court of Eastern Kentucky. See United States v. Goods et al., Case No. 2-22-cr-17, Doc.
298, 307 (E.D. Ky. 2022).
VII.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2).

2. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that for the foregoing reasons
an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in good
faith and therefore deny plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Plaintiff remains free to
apply to proceed in forma pauperis in the Court of Appeals. See Callihan v. Schneider, 178 F.3d
800, 803 (6th Cir. 1999), overruling in part Floyd v. United States Postal Serv., 105 F.3d 274,
277 (6th Cir. 1997).
3. The Court DENY Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 14) as
premature.
May 12, 2026 s/Stephanie K. Bowman
STEPHANIE K. BOWMAN
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that
party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and
Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in
question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District Judge and
waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l Latex
Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the magistrate
judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [the defendant’s] ability to appeal the district
court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that
defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to
the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed,
appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d
981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to
specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .”) (citation
omitted).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11361136. Public record. Not legal advice.