# Felder

> District Court, E.D. New York · May 14, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11361082

## Case

- **Full name:** Kaleel Felder v. Phillip Arena, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** May 14, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------x
KALEEL FELDER,

Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
- against - 2:25-CV-0073 (PKC) (SIL)

PHILLIP ARENA, et al.,

Defendants.
-------------------------------------------------------x
PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:
Pro se Plaintiff Kaleel Felder brings this 28 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Defendants Dr.
Phillip Arena (“Dr. Arena”), RN Johanna Wells (“Nurse Wells”), and John and Jane Doe
Defendants (“Doe Defendants”), alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his medical
needs, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, by prescribing him a medication to which he is
allergic and failing to treat his adverse reaction to the medication. Defendants now move to
dismiss Felder’s Complaint in its entirety. For the following reasons, the Court denies their
Motion.
BACKGROUND1
I. Factual Background
On or about November 19, 2024, Plaintiff, while incarcerated pre-trial at Riverhead County
Jail,2 went to Dr. Arena, a dentist, for gum and tooth pain. (Compl., Dkt. 1, at 4; Pre-Motion

1 The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff’s Complaint and Plaintiff’s verbal
amendment of his Complaint at the December 30, 2025 Pre-Motion Conference.
2 It appears undisputed that Plaintiff “was a pre-trial detainee at the time these events
occurred.” (See Defs.’ Mot. for a Pre-Motion Conference, Dkt. 36, at 2 (stating that, though not
explicitly stated in Plaintiff’s Complaint, “it is believed he was a pre-trial detainee at the time these
events occurred”); Compl., Dkt. 1, at 3, 5 (filing Complaint from Riverhead County Jail); Pre-
Conference Tr. (“Tr.”), Dkt. 46, at 6:8–7:5.) Plaintiff is allergic to penicillin, and this allergy is
noted in his medical records. (See Compl., Dkt. 1, at 4; Tr., Dkt. 46, at 7:22–8:12.) Without
looking up Plaintiff’s records, Dr. Arena prescribed Plaintiff penicillin. (See Compl., Dkt. 1, at 4;
Tr., Dkt. 46, at 9:22–10:7.)

After taking the medication, Plaintiff’s chest began to hurt “exstreamly [sic],” his “heart
began to slow down in beats,” and his throat began to burn “down to [his] stomach.” (Compl.,
Dkt. 1, at 4.) He also felt “tightness around [his] heart . . . like a strain” and “los[t] breath for a
second.” (Tr., Dkt. 46, at 5:8–12.) Plaintiff’s skin became bumpy, and his “whole body began to
itch.” (Compl., Dkt. 1, at 4.) Plaintiff continued to take the medication, but the symptoms kept
getting worse. (Tr., Dkt. 46, at 11:12–21.) Eventually, Plaintiff approached Nurse Wells and
asked why he was having the “itchiness and the tightness in [his] chest.” (Id. at 5:2–5, 12:25–
13:5.) Nurse Wells told him that he “needed to eat with the medication.” (Id. at 5:5–6, 12:2–5.)
Plaintiff informed her that he had already eaten, (id. at 5:6–7, 12:5), and asked, “what are you guys
prescribing me?” (Id. at 11:25.) Nurse Wells informed him the pill was penicillin. (Id. at 11:25–

12:1.) Plaintiff told Nurse Wells that he was allergic to penicillin. (Id. at 12:1–2.) Nonetheless,
Nurse Wells “still gave [the pill] to [him].” (Id. at 12:2, 12:25–13:5.) Plaintiff refused to take the
medication and returned to his cell. (Id. at 12:2–7.)
Shortly after, Plaintiff felt that he could not breathe. (Id. at 12:7–9.) Plaintiff requested
that a corrections officer get the sergeant, and told the sergeant, “my chest is really tight, you know,
I am itching and I can’t breathe. I have a burning sensation.” (Id. at 12:9–13.) The sergeant
brought Plaintiff “down to medical.” (Id. at 12:14–15.) At medical, Plaintiff informed non-

Motion Conference Tr., Dkt. 46, at 8:15–17 (describing recordkeeping practices at Riverhead
County Jail).)
defendant Nurse Luedell Grieger (“Nurse Grieger”)3 of his symptoms, and she prescribed him
another antibiotic, clindamycin. (See id. at 13:7–18.) After taking that pill, Plaintiff stated that he
“still fe[lt] like when [he] took the first pill” of penicillin. (Id. at 13:20–23.) Nurse Grieger told
Plaintiff to “give it a couple of days.” (Id. at 13:25–14:1.) At that point, another nurse came in

and said, “you[] guys are prescribing penicillin, [but] he is allergic to it.” (Id. at 14:1–3.) “And
that’s when [the nurse] gave [him] the look like, . . . they messed up, they gave you something that
they w[eren’t] supposed to.” (Id. at 14:3–5 (emphasis added).)
A few days after taking clindamycin, Plaintiff “kept feeling the same,” and refused all
medications. (Id. at 14:9–16.) Petitioner wrote to the medical unit about his continuing symptoms
but never received a response. (Id. at 16:20–17:5.) A few days later, he was moved to another
facility. (Id. at 17:5–7.)
According to Plaintiff, at Riverhead County Jail, “when you take a medication, they check
a little box, . . . for the days you take it.” (Id. at 8:15–17.) At some point before he was transferred
out of Riverhead County Jail, Petitioner asked a nurse to look at his medical records. (See id. at

8:13–17.) When the nurse looked at the records, Plaintiff recalls, “those checks [for penicillin]
w[ere]n’t there [any] more.” (Id. at 8:17–18.) “So it’s like they kind of took the record and took
that off and then prescribed [him] the new medication and then put that new medication on the
record.” (Id. at 8:18–20.)4

3 Although Plaintiff initially named Nurse Grieger as a defendant, at the Pre-Motion
Conference held in this case on October 27, 2025, Plaintiff dropped his claims against Nurse
Grieger. See discussion infra at 4.
4 Plaintiff also alleges that “one of the letters [he] had got from the Eastern District Court
says that the record was cut, meaning that [Defendants] tried to cover something up. So they took
half of that, whatever they was prescribing [him] off and made it seem like they were giving [him]
[clindamycin].” (Tr., Dkt. 46, at 8:21–25.) However, Defendants clarify that Plaintiff was
II. Procedural Background
On January 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Complaint against John and Jane Doe Defendants,
describing the incident with his medication and requesting compensation for his pain and suffering.
(Dkt. 1.) Plaintiff requested—and was granted—leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Dkts. 6, 7,
9, 12, 13; 03/21/2025 Dkt. Order.) On June 20, 2025, and September 16, 2025, the Defendants

were identified as Dr. Arena, Nurse Grieger, and Nurse Wells. (Dkts. 20, 25.)
On October 27, 2025, Defendants moved for a Pre-Motion Conference (“PMC”) in
anticipation of their motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Dkt. 36.) At the PMC, Plaintiff
verbally amended his Complaint and clarified that he was asserting deliberate indifference claims
against three Defendants: Dr. Arena, Nurse Wells, and the Doe Defendants. (See generally Tr.,
Dkt. 46.) Plaintiff also agreed to drop his claims against Nurse Grieger.5 (Id. at 26:4–12.) With
regard to the remaining Defendants, Plaintiff alleged that: (1) Dr. Arena was deliberately
indifferent for prescribing a medication to which Plaintiff is allergic; (2) Nurse Wells was
deliberately indifferent for instructing Plaintiff to continue taking the medication despite his
allergic reaction to it; and (3) the Doe Defendants were deliberately indifferent for failing to

respond to his medical request despite his allergic reaction. (Id. at 15:15–18:15, 26:12–20.)
On January 28, 2026, Defendants filed their motion to dismiss. (See Defs.’ Mot. to
Dismiss, Dkt. 44; Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. Mot. to Dismiss (“MTD”), Dkt. 44-1.)

referring to “the letter [Defendants] sent to [Magistrate] Judge Locke . . . that just in the scanning
of his medical records, that the left side, left margin, was cut off.” (Id. at 23:14–18.)
5 The Court therefore dismisses Nurse Grieger from this action.
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”)
12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face where it “pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing a complaint for
failure to state a claim, the Court accepts as true all factual allegations and draws from them all
reasonable inferences, while disregarding “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions couched as
factual allegations.” Hamilton v. Westchester Cnty., 3 F.4th 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Dane
v. UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co., 974 F.3d 183, 188 (2d Cir. 2020)). Furthermore, “[i]t is well
established that the submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally,” Triestman v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted), and read to “raise
the strongest arguments they suggest,” McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156
(2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Bertin v. United States, 478 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2007)).

DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff’s Deliberate Indifference Claims
A. Legal Standard
Plaintiff’s claim for inadequate medical treatment is based on the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment because the events occurred while Plaintiff was detained pending
arraignment and trial. Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017) (“A pretrial detainee’s
claims of unconstitutional conditions of confinement are governed by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eight[h]
Amendment.”); Taranto v. Putnam Cnty., No. 21-CV-2455 (KMK), 2023 WL 6318280, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Sep. 28, 2023) (same).6 To state a claim for inadequate medical treatment under the
Due Process Clause, Plaintiff must establish that Defendants were “deliberately indifferent” to his
“serious medical needs.” Charles v. Orange County, 925 F.3d 73, 85 (2d Cir. 2019) (collecting
cases). That requires pleading two elements: that (1) Plaintiff had a sufficiently serious medical

need; and (2) “Defendants acted with deliberate indifference” to that need. See id. at 86 (citing
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976); Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29); see also Mallet v. N.Y. State
Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 126 F.4th 125, 132 (2d Cir. 2025).
1. Serious Medical Need
There is no clear rule delineating when a plaintiff’s medical needs are sufficiently
“serious.” See Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 187 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is difficult to formulate
a precise standard of ‘seriousness’ that is adequately sensitive (in the sense of capturing those
medical conditions properly within the realm of [constitutional] concern) yet appropriately specific
(i.e., excluding those conditions that are not).” (citation modified) (quoting Gutierrez v. Peters,
111 F.3d 1364, 1372 (7th Cir. 1997))). Thus, “the relevant ‘medical need’ can only be identified
in relation to the specific factual context of each case,” and “the severity of the alleged denial of

medical care should be analyzed with regard to all relevant facts and circumstances.” Id. (citing
Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702–03 (2d Cir. 1998)).

6 In contrast, deliberate indifference claims by individuals detained post-conviction are
governed by the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. See Darnell, 849
F.3d at 29. A pre-trial detainee’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are “at least as great as
the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner,” id. (quoting City of Revere
v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)), if not greater, see id. at 35 (explaining that “[a]
pretrial detainee may not be punished at all under the Fourteenth Amendment,” unlike those
detained post-conviction (emphasis added)). While the Court cites to cases from the Eighth
Amendment context throughout this discussion, it does so because those cases set forth a standard
that serves as a floor below which the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment should not fall.
Where a plaintiff alleges deprivation of medical care, only “the severity of the prisoner's
underlying medical condition, considered in the abstract,” is considered. See id. at 185–86. The
Second Circuit has explained that “[t]he serious medical needs standard contemplates a condition
of urgency such as one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.” Charles, 925 F.3d

at 86 (citing Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996)); Mallet, 126 F.4th at 132.
At other times, however, the Second Circuit has made clear that something less than “extreme
pain” or a “degenerative condition” can suffice to meet the legal standard. See Brock v. Wright,
315 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2003) (vacating a district court’s grant of summary judgment on Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference claim because the district court erroneously required plaintiff
to show that his facial scar and keloid7 caused him “extreme pain” or constituted a degenerative
condition, and explaining that “[w]e will no more tolerate prison officials’ deliberate indifference
to the chronic pain of an inmate than we would a sentence that required the inmate to submit to
such pain”); Chance, 143 F.3d at 702 (considering “[t]he existence of an injury that a reasonable
doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a

medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of
chronic and substantial pain” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Laurent v. Edwin, 528 F.
Supp. 3d 69, 86 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (compiling cases).
By comparison, where a plaintiff alleges “inadequacy . . . in the medical treatment given,
the seriousness inquiry is narrower.” Butler v. Furco, 614 F. App’x 21, 22 (2d Cir. 2015)
(summary order) (quoting Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 280 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated on
other grounds by Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111 (2d Cir. 2023)). In these situations, serious

7 A keloid is a painful “abnormal overgrowth[] of fibrous tissue that, when triggered by a
skin injury, typically extend[s] beyond the location of the original wound.” Brock, 315 F.3d at
161.
medical need is assessed by looking to the “particular risk of harm faced by a prisoner due to the
challenged [provision] of care, rather than the severity of the prisoner’s underlying medical
condition, considered in the abstract.” See Smith, 316 F.3d at 186; Butler, 614 F. App’x at 22
(same). Put otherwise, a court determines whether the plaintiff was actually deprived of adequate

medical care, and, if so, whether the inadequacy is sufficiently serious. See Salahuddin, 467 F.3d
at 279–80; Jahad v. Holder, No. 19-CV-4066 (NSR), 2023 WL 1879526, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10,
2023).
2. Deliberate Indifference
The second element of a deliberate indifference claim is essentially a “mens rea,” or mental
state, requirement. Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, this prong requires
showing “either that the defendant[] knew that . . . the complained of medical treatment would
pose a substantial risk to [the plaintiff’s] health or that the defendant[] should have known” it would
pose such a risk. Charles, 925 F.3d at 87; Darby v. Greenman, 14 F.4th 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2021).8
In other words, a pretrial detainee “need not demonstrate subjective awareness on the part of the
[defendant].” Faulk v. Geraci, No. 19-CV-5690 (PKC) (VMS), 2022 WL 900673, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.

Mar. 28, 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting Gleeson v. County of Nassau, No. 15-CV-6487
(AMD) (RL), 2019 WL 4754326, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2019)). But “mere medical
malpractice is not tantamount to deliberate indifference.” Charles, 925 F.3d at 87 (quoting Cuoco
v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2000)). Rather, a pretrial detainee “must prove that an

8 In contrast, deliberate indifference claims under the Eighth Amendment require showing
that the defendant actually knew of and disregarded the risk. See Darby, 14 F.4th at 128
(contrasting standards under Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); Faulk v. Geraci, No. 19-CV-
5690 (PKC) (VMS), 2022 WL 900673, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2022) (“Unlike under the Eighth
Amendment, deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment may be defined objectively,
not only subjectively.”).
official acted intentionally or recklessly, and not merely negligently.” Faulk, 2022 WL 900673,
at *3 (quoting Darnell, 849 F.3d at 36).
Whether a defendant “knew or should have known of the substantial risk of harm . . . is a
question of fact.” Charles, 925 F.3d at 87. Such knowledge can be inferred from circumstantial

evidence. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994) (“Whether a prison official had the
requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual
ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence[] . . . .”); see also Brock, 315 F.3d at 164
(“[E]vidence that the risk was obvious or otherwise must have been known to a defendant is
sufficient to permit a jury to conclude that the defendant was actually aware of it.”).
B. Plaintiff Plausibly Alleges Deliberate Indifference Claims As To All
Defendants
1. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Dr. Arena and Nurse Wells
Liberally construed, Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Arena and Nurse Wells were deliberately
indifferent by providing inadequate care, i.e., prescribing him a medication to which he was
allergic, despite Plaintiff notifying Nurse Wells of this allergy and despite it being documented in
Plaintiff’s prison records. Plaintiff also asserts that Nurse Wells denied him adequate care by
failing to treat his allergic reaction. For the following reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff has
plausibly alleged deliberate indifference against these Defendants.
a. Serious Medical Need

The Court easily concludes that Plaintiff’s allegations—i.e., that Dr. Arena prescribed him
a medication to which he is allergic, and Nurse Wells continued to prescribe that medication—
constituted inadequate medical care. See Donohue v. Manetti, No. 2:15-CV-0636 (PK), 2025 WL
974347, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025) (“Giving Plaintiff an NSAID despite his medical record
reflecting that he was allergic to NSAIDs could constitute a deprivation of adequate medical
care . . . .”). The Court also finds that Plaintiff has alleged that this inadequate treatment was
sufficiently serious. Plaintiff contends that, after taking the penicillin Dr. Arena prescribed, his
chest began to burn and hurt “exstreamly [sic],” (Compl., Dkt. 1, at 4; Tr., Dkt. 46, at 12:12–13),
and his heart strained to the point that he felt he could not breathe, (Tr., Dkt. 46, at 5:4–11).

Plaintiff describes his whole body becoming itchy and his skin becoming bumpy. (Compl., Dkt.
1, at 4; Tr., Dkt. 46, at 11:16–17.) These symptoms continued, even after Nurse Grieger prescribed
Plaintiff clindamycin. (Tr., Dkt. 46, at 12:22–14:17.)
Assuming all facts as true in the Complaint and construing all inferences in Plaintiff’s
favor, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Dr. Arena and Nurse Wells’
inadequate treatment resulted in a condition that caused him extreme pain and placed him in
extreme danger. See Donohue v. Manetti, No. 15-CV-0636 (JFB) (GRB), 2016 WL 740439, at
*2, 8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2016) (finding that plaintiff’s allegations of an allergic reaction, including
swelling of the neck and suffocation feeling, met objective prong); Campbell v. New York City,
No. 12-CV-2179 (CBA) (VMS), 2014 WL 4199717, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2014) (finding

plaintiff plausibly alleged serious medical need where complaint claimed that defendant “refus[ed]
to investigate an identified allergy” and prescribed a “potentially harmful medication,” creating a
significant risk of serious harm), report and recommendation adopted, No. 12-CV-2179 (CBA)
(VMS), 2014 WL 4199722 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2014).9 Accordingly, Plaintiff has sufficiently
alleged the first prong of deliberate indifference with respect to Dr. Arena and Nurse Wells.10
b. Deliberate Indifference

Plaintiff has also sufficiently alleged that Dr. Arena and Nurse Wells acted with the
requisite mens rea. As to Nurse Wells, Plaintiff alleges that she knew that prescribing penicillin
would pose a substantial risk to his health—Plaintiff claims he explicitly told Nurse Wells of his
allergy to penicillin, but she continued to give it to him. See Perez v. Kuehn, No. 3:25-CV-1169
(SRU), 2025 WL 3539139, at *4 (D. Conn. Dec. 10, 2025) (finding plaintiff sufficiently alleged
that the nurse “was aware of, but ignored, [plaintiff’s] serious injury” where plaintiff alerted a
nurse to his pain and clearly observable symptoms and the nurse did not provide him with any
treatment). These allegations are “not a novel factual setting for a deliberate indifference claims.”
See Chibbaro v. Everett, No. 3:20-CV-0663, 2022 WL 3589488, at *11 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 22,
2022) (compiling cases describing defendants’ prescription of a medication to which a plaintiff

was allergic and defendants’ failure to treat the reaction), report and recommendation adopted,
No. 3:20-CV-0663, 2022 WL 4299715 (M.D. Tenn. Sep. 19, 2022). Courts have found similar

9 Yancey v. Robertson, 828 F. App’x 801 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order), which
Defendants cite to for the proposition that Plaintiff’s allergic reaction was not sufficiently serious,
(MTD, Dkt. 44-1, at 5), is a summary judgment case that relied on the record medical evidence to
dismiss a deliberate indifference claim, and therefore does not govern the outcome here. Yancey,
828 F. App’x at 803–04. Moreover, Plaintiff, unlike the plaintiff in Yancey, alleges symptoms
more than a mere “inability to sleep,” such as chest tightness. Compare id. (observing that while
the plaintiff admitted to some breathing problems, “no respiratory distress nor complaints of
respiratory distress are noted in [plaintiff’s] medical records” and plaintiff did not “indicate any
serious harm or risk of harm” from his symptoms “other than an inability to sleep”), with (Tr., Dkt.
46, at 5:3–12 (describing itchiness, tightness around heart, loss of breath)).
10 For this reason, the Court also declines to dismiss the case on the basis of qualified
immunity. (See MTD, Dkt. 44-1, at 5–6 (arguing that qualified immunity is warranted because
Plaintiff did not allege a sufficiently serious condition).)
allegations—a “medical provider’s knowing prescription of a medication to which an incarcerated
patient is allergic”—to state a claim for deliberate indifference, even under the Eighth Amendment.
See Chibbaro, 2022 WL 3589488, at *16 (explaining that a “medical provider’s knowing
prescription of a medication to which an incarcerated patient is allergic can constitute reckless

disregard for an excessive risk of serious harm and, thus, a sufficiently culpable state of mind to
support an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim”); Spann v. Hannah, No. 20-3027,
2020 WL 8020457, at *2 (6th Cir. Sep. 10, 2020) (unpublished) (finding a “sufficiently culpable
state of mind” alleged where plaintiff alleged that “defendants knew that he was allergic to the
medications that were prescribed and administered to him and that they nevertheless proceeded to
prescribe and administer these medications” (citation omitted)); Campbell, 2014 WL 4199717, at
*2, *5–7 (finding plaintiff alleged second prong of deliberate indifference where he informed the
doctor he was allergic to a medication and the doctor responded, “just take it”); Estelle, 429 U.S.
at 104 n.10 (listing, as an example of deliberate indifference, a case in which defendants injected
prisoner with penicillin despite knowledge that prisoner was allergic to it (citing Thomas v. Pate,

493 F.2d 151, 158 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Thomas v. Cannon, 419 U.S. 879 (1974))).
Although Plaintiff does not allege that he explicitly informed Dr. Arena of his allergy to
penicillin, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts that Dr. Arena knew or should have known that
prescribing penicillin would pose a substantial medical risk to Plaintiff. In the more demanding
Eighth Amendment context, evidence that a substantial risk was “well-documented[] or expressly
noted by officials in the past” and “circumstances suggest that the defendant[] . . . had been
exposed to information concerning the risk” could “be sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find
that the defendant-official had actual knowledge of the risk.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842–43; see
also Charles, 925 F.3d at 87 (applying this principle to Fourteenth Amendment deliberate
indifference cases (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842)). Here, Plaintiff alleges that his allergy was
documented in his medical records, (Tr., Dkt. 46, at 7:22–8:1), that his allergy was expressly noted
by a member of the medical team, such as the nurse who interrupted his appointment with Nurse
Grieger, (id. at 5:12–15), and that Dr. Arena had access to this information in a computer, (see

Compl., Dkt. 1, at 4). Based on this information, it can be reasonably inferred that Dr. Arena knew
or should have known of Plaintiff’s penicillin allergy. See Johnson v. Cnty. of Saratoga, No. 9:18-
CV-0096 (DNH) (DEP), 2018 WL 10910777, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2018) (alleging that failure
of defendant to review plaintiff’s medical history before administering injection supported
inference that defendant “knew of should have known of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health or
safety”); Hill v. Okla. Cnty. Crim. Just. Auth., No. CIV-24-1298-D, 2025 WL 2573383, at *3
(W.D. Okla. July 8, 2025) (determining that allegation that penicillin allergy was noted in a
medical file supported inference that the defendant dentist “consciously disregarded the risk” by
prescribing it), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-24-1298-D, 2025 WL 2080616
(W.D. Okla. July 23, 2025); Walthour v. Tennis, No. 3:CV-06-0086, 2008 WL 318386, at *5 (M.D.

Pa. Feb. 4, 2008) (declining to dismiss deliberate indifference claims for similar reasons). Plaintiff
thus has alleged that, by prescribing him with penicillin despite this knowledge, Dr. Arena acted
with deliberate indifference.
In an attempt to distinguish from these cases, Defendants seek to rely on Plaintiff’s
medical records as documents “incorporated by reference” or “integral” to the Complaint;
Defendants claim that these records show that Plaintiff was never prescribed penicillin in
connection with the events alleged in the Complaint, and was only prescribed clindamycin. (MTD,
Dkt. 44-1, at 6–9.) Notably, these medical records do not seem to include the records of Dr. Arena.
Even if the Court were to find that these records are incorporated by reference or integral to the
Complaint, it would have to construe all facts in favor of Plaintiff, who alleges that members of
the medical team knew they “messed up,” (see Tr., Dkt. 46, at 5:12–16), and that his medical
records were altered to remove all references to him being prescribed penicillin, (see id. at 8:17–
20 (alleging that when he asked a nurse “to go look at [his record], those checks [for penicillin]

w[ere]n’t there [any] more” and therefore “they kind of took the record and took [penicillin] off
and then prescribed [him] the new medication and then put that new medication on the record”)).11
Indeed, the alleged inaccuracy in Plaintiff’s medical records, construed in this light, further
supports the inference of Defendants’ improper motive. See Crenshaw v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 24-
CV-439 (SFR), 2025 WL 2776975, at *11 (D. Conn. Sep. 25, 2025) (crediting allegation that
medical records contained omissions, and compiling cases construing “inaccuracy of medical
records, including omissions of significant information from medical records” as supporting “an
inference of improper motive for declining care”). Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims on the basis that he was never prescribed penicillin during the events at issue.
Defendants’ next argument—that Dr. Arena and Nurse Wells did not have the requisite

mens rea because Defendants “put [Plaintiff] on another medication,” clindamycin, after he
complained of his symptoms, (MTD, Dkt. 44-1, at 4)—is also unavailing. Plaintiff does not allege
that Dr. Arena and Nurse Wells had any other involvement in his care apart from providing him
with medication to which he was allergic. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that after returning to his cell,
his chest continued to feel “really tight” and he was “itching and . . . [couldn’t] breathe.” (Tr.,
Dkt. 46, at 12:12–13.) Consequently, he asked a corrections officer to get the sergeant and bring
him “down to medical.” (Id. at 12:9–10.) Plaintiff alleges that Nurse Grieger, not Dr. Arena or

11 This allegation is separate from Plaintiff’s contention that a letter he received related to
this instant suit was cut off. (See Tr., Dkt. 46, at 8:21–23); supra n.2.
Nurse Wells, prescribed clindamycin, and even then, his symptoms continued—and, as noted
infra, were ignored. (Id. at 5:10–6:5, 13:7–14:17.) In short, the actions of others in responding to
Plaintiff’s symptoms cannot eliminate the deliberate indifference of Dr. Arena and Nurse Wells in
administering the medication in the first place. See Jones v. Brunelle, 164 F.3d 618 (2d Cir. 1998)

(summary order) (“The fact that the prisoner eventually received some treatment does not
automatically defeat his claim that prison officials acted, or failed to act, with deliberate
indifference in excessively delaying the provision of care.” (citing Hemmings v. Gorczyk, 134 F.3d
104, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam)); Burris v. Dezelic, No. 14-CV-5540 (PKC) (ARL), 2026
WL 865838, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2026) (same); Ramos v. Artuz, No. 00-CV-0149 (LTS)
(HBP), 2001 WL 840131, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2001) (reaching a similar conclusion by
reasoning that, “there can be no serious dispute that if a prison physician accurately diagnosed an
inmate as suffering from acute appendicitis and treated the condition with nothing but aspirin, the
physician would be guilty of deliberate indifference”).
2. Plaintiff’s Claims Against the Doe Defendants
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged deliberate indifference against the Doe Defendants for

their actions (or inactions) after he was prescribed clindamycin.12 Plaintiff alleges that, after taking
clindamycin, he continued to feel the same symptoms and wrote to the medical unit for treatment.
(See Tr., Dkt. 46, at 16:20–17:4.) But the Doe Defendants never responded. (Id. at 17:5–7.) A
few days later, Plaintiff alleges, he was transferred to another facility. (Id.) The Court finds that,
in light of Plaintiff’s prior treatment for his allergic reaction and documented allergy, Plaintiff’s
Complaint supports the allegation that the Doe Defendants should have been aware of Plaintiff’s

12 Defendants’ motion does not address these allegations—and, indeed, seems to wholly
ignore Plaintiff’s orally-amended Complaint. (See MTD, Dkt. 44-1, at 1–2.)
penicillin allergy and his severe reaction to it during the episode at issue. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’
allegation that the Doe Defendants ignored his medical request for his ongoing symptoms13 for
several days plausibly states a claim for deliberate indifference. See Warren v. City of New York
Dep’t of Corr. Med. Staff, No. 17-CV-1125 (PKC) (LB), 2021 WL 1163105, at *2, *9 (E.D.N.Y.

Mar. 26, 2021) (finding genuine dispute of material fact as to deliberate indifference where doctor
failed to respond to Plaintiff’s reports that his treatment for a severe asthma attack was not working
and that he felt like he was going to die); cf. Martinez v. City of New York, 564 F. Supp. 3d 88,
105 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (“[G]iven Ms. Martinez’s cries of pain, requests for medical treatment, and
visible injuries, [a trier of fact could find] defendants’ delay in providing care amounted to
deliberate indifference.” (citing Warren, 2021 WL 1163105, at *9)).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED, but Defendant
Grieger is dismissed from this case.
SO ORDERED.

/s/ Pamela K. Chen
Pamela K. Chen
United States District Judge
Dated: May 14, 2026
Brooklyn, New York

13 As noted supra, the Court finds these symptoms are sufficiently serious medical needs.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11361082. Public record. Not legal advice.