# Blackwell

> District Court, E.D. North Carolina · April 27, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11361006

## Case

- **Full name:** Quarla Nakia Blackwell v. Lenoir Co. Board of Elections and NC State Board of Elections
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. North Carolina
- **Decided:** April 27, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
EASTERN DIVISION
No. 4:26-CV-6-BO
QUARLA NAKIA BLACKWELL,
Plaintiff,
V. ORDER AND
MEMORANDUM AND
LENOIR CO. BOARD OF RECOMMENDATION
ELECTIONS, and NC STATE BOARD
OF ELECTIONS,
Defendants.

This matter is before the court on Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, [DE-
2], and for frivolity review of the complaint, [DE-1], pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Plaintiff has demonstrated sufficient evidence of inability to pay the required court costs and the
application is allowed, and it is recommended that the claims against the NC State Board of
Elections be dismissed and the claims against the Lenoir Co. Board of Elections be allowed to
proceed.
I. Standard of Review
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court shall dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous
or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks money damages
from a defendant immune from such recovery. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(G-iii); see Adams v.
Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining Congress enacted predecessor statute 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d) “to prevent abuse of the judicial system by parties who bear none of the ordinary
financial disincentives to filing meritless claims”). A case is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis
in either law or fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); McLean v. United States,

566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A claim lacks an arguable basis in
fact when it describes “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” /d. at 327—28. In order to state a claim
on which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Factual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ....’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must allege more than
labels and conclusions. Jd.
In the present case, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and pleadings drafted by a pro se litigant
are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The court is charged with liberally construing a pleading filed by a pro se
litigant to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious claim. See id.; Estelle v. Gamble,
429 US. 97, 106 (1976); Noble v. Barnett, 24 F.3d 582, 587 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994). However, the
principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not without limits; the district
courts are not required “to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them.” Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
I. Discussion
Plaintiff Quarla Blackwell brings this action against the Lenoir County Board of Elections
(the “Lenoir County Board’) and the North Carolina State Board of Elections (the “State Board”),
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Due Process, Equal Protection, and First Amendment
violations, as well as state law claims, stemming from her campaign for mayor. Compl. [DE-1-1].
Blackwell alleges she was lawfully registered to vote in November 2024, according to the state’s

records; on or about September 19, 2025, Attorney Sean Keenan filed a protest against Plaintiff
after the statutory 10-day candidate-challenge window had closed; the Lenoir County Board failed
to dismiss the untimely protest as required by law, stayed the protest, and publicized it on the front
page of its website and on the front door of the office, which created the appearance of wrongdoing
during an active campaign and harmed Plaintiff’s reputation and candidacy; during early voting,
the Lenoir County Board’s Director came to Plaintiff’s polling place based on false reports and
threatened to remove Plaintiff for the lawful act of feeding the community; Plaintiff filed three
election protests raising concerns about election integrity, voter-roll accuracy, intimidation, and
procedural irregularities that were dismissed without meaningful review, while other candidates’
minor concerns were allowed to proceed; the Lenoir County Board permitted Attorney Keenan to
influence its actions and caused deviations from mandatory procedures; after Plaintiff filed an
appeal, the State Board prematurely certified the mayoral race while Plaintiff’s judicial review
window remained open, and the State Board declared Plaintiff’s motions moot solely because it
had certified the election early, thereby cutting off Plaintiff’s statutory right to judicial review;
Plaintiff was later charged with two felony counts of perjury and swearing falsely, despite being
listed as an active voter in the state’s own federally mandated database; and Plaintiff was never
notified of any issue with her voter status, eligibility, or registration before being criminally
charged. Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ failure to maintain accurate voter records, combined
with their failure to provide notice or process, directly contributed to the criminal charges,
constitutes retaliation and selective enforcement, and deprived Plaintiff of due process, equal
protection, and rights under state and federal law. Plaintiff claims she suffered emotional distress,
fear for her safety, fear of imprisonment, reputational harm, loss of economic opportunity, and
long-term damage to her stability and livelihood, and requests declaratory judgment, injunctive

relief, correction of the official record, $5,000,000.00 in compensatory damages, punitive
damages, and costs and fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See Compl. [DE-1-1] at 4-6.
a. The State Board
Plaintiff’s claims against the State Board should be dismissed based on immunity. The
Eleventh Amendment limits the authority of the federal courts to hear claims against the States.
U.S. Const. amend. XI. “The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that nonconsenting
States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court.” Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (citation omitted). Likewise, “North Carolina has a well-
established common law doctrine of sovereign immunity which prevents a claim for relief against
the State except where the State has consented or waived its immunity.” DeMurry v. N.C. Dept
of Corr, 195 N.C. App. 485, 492, 673 S.E.2d 374, 380 (2009) (citations omitted). This immunity
from suit applies not only to claims against the State itself, but also to claims against state agencies
and state officials acting in an official capacity. See Myers v. North Carolina, No. 5:12-CV-714-D,
2013 WL 4456848, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 16, 2013) (“State agencies and state officials acting in
their official capacities also are protected against a claim for damages because a suit against a state
office is no different from a suit against the state itself.) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997)). However, sovereign immunity may be waived or abrogated where
the state has waived its immunity or where Congress has overridden that immunity. Philips v. N.
C. State, No. 5:15-CV-95-F, 2015 WL 9462095, at *6 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 28, 2015) (citing Will v,
Mich. Dep t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989)). The State Board is an arm of the state and
entitled to the state’s immunity. See Walker v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, No. 1:17-CV-78, 2017
WL 4477295, at *1 (M.D.N.C. May 15, 2017) (“A suit against the State [Election] Board is [ ]
functionally equivalent to a suit against the state of North Carolina and the State Board is entitled

to the same sovereign [immunity].”). There is nothing in the complaint’s allegations from which
the court could find that the state has waived or that Congress has overridden the state’s immunity.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against the State Board should be dismissed.
b. The Lenoir County Board
Section 1983 imposes liability on anyone who, under the color of state law, deprives a
person “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. However, § 1983 is not a “source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating
federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal
statutes that it describes.” Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 2000) (citations
omitted). Thus, to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts indicating a deprivation
of rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States and that this deprivation
resulted from conduct committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); see Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180
(4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff asserts claims for denial of due process and equal protection, first amendment
retaliation, and state law claims against the Lenoir County Board. To state a procedural due
process claim, a plaintiff must show “(1) a cognizable liberty or property interest; (2) the
deprivation of that interest by some form of state action; and (3) that the procedures employed
were constitutionally inadequate.” Jota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Patterson, 566 F.3d
138, 145 (4th Cir. 2009). “To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first
demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated
and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.”
Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001). To state a claim for First Amendment

retaliation, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that “(1) he engaged in protected First Amendment
activity, (2) the defendant took some action that adversely affected his First Amendment rights,
and (3) there was a causal relationship between his protected activity and the defendant’s conduct.”
Johnson v. Town of Smithfield, No. 5:23-CV-349-D, 2024 WL 1336466, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 28,
2024) (quoting Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 249 (4th Cir. 2017)).
Construing the allegations liberally in Plaintiff’s favor, the court finds that dismissal of the
claims against the Lenoir County Board is not warranted at this time. See Shaw v. Foreman, 59
F.4th 121, 127 (4th Cir. 2023) (“[W]hen an action implicates a civil rights interest, we must be
especially solicitous of the wrongs alleged and must not dismiss the complaint unless it appears to
a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any legal theory which might
plausibly be suggested by the facts alleged.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Any potential pleading deficiencies or defenses are better evaluated with the benefit of full briefing
on a Rule 12 motion. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against the Lenoir County Board should be
allowed to proceed at this time.
Hl. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is
allowed, and it is recommended that the claims against the NC State Board of Elections be
dismissed and the claims against the Lenoir Co. Board of Elections be allowed to proceed.
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on
Plaintiff. You shall have until May 11, 2026, to file written objections to the Memorandum and
Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his or her own review (that is, make
a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which
objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the

Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Local
Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D.N.C.
If you do not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by
the foregoing deadline, you will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and
Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding
district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and
Recommendation without such review. In addition, your failure to file written objections by
the foregoing deadline will bar you from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or
judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation.
See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).
This the 27th day of April, 2026.

United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11361006. Public record. Not legal advice.