# Dalton

> District Court, M.D. Florida · March 17, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11360882

## Case

- **Full name:** Ariel Dalton v. City of Largo and Officer Stephanie Blitz
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** March 17, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

ARIEL DALTON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:25-cv-1339-KKM-SPF

CITY OF LARGO and
OFFICER STEPHANIE BLITZ,

Defendants.
___________________________________
ORDER
The City of Largo and Officer Stephanie Blitz move to dismiss this
action, which arises from Blitz’s arrest of Ariel Dalton. Mot. to Dismiss (MTD)
(Doc. 19). For the reasons below, I grant the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
On or about November 9, 2024, Dalton was driving to a friend’s house for
dinner and needed to pick up her son from daycare. Am. Compl. (Doc. 18) ¶ 8.
On the way there, Dalton encountered a road blocked by an ambulance. Id. ¶ 9.
After waiting for five to ten minutes, Dalton approached the paramedics at a
nearby house and asked them to move the ambulance. Id. ¶ 10. Dalton stood
at the rear of the house’s carport and did not attempt to enter either the carport
or the ambulance. Id. ¶ 11. The ambulance driver informed Dalton that he
would move the vehicle after loading the patient, so Dalton returned to her
vehicle and waited. Id. ¶¶ 12–13.

After the patient was loaded into the ambulance, Dalton again
approached to request that the vehicle be moved. Id. ¶ 14. About two minutes
later, Officer Blitz appeared on the scene. Id. ¶ 15. After speaking with the
ambulance attendants for about two minutes, Blitz arrested Dalton. Id. ¶¶ 16,

19. “[T]he ambulance attendants falsely told Officer Blitz that [Dalton] had
entered the patient’s home without permission and had attempted to enter the
ambulance by pulling on the door handles.” Id. ¶ 17. Blitz arrested Dalton
without asking Dalton about her version of events or otherwise conducting an

“independent investigation to verify the ambulance attendants’ claims.” Id.
¶ 18. Blitz completed arrest affidavits that contained the “false information
provided by the ambulance attendants, which was used as the basis for formal
charges against” Dalton. See id. ¶ 20; Arrest Affs. (Doc 14-1). On the way to

the Pinellas County Jail, Blitz told Dalton that she arrested her “because
[Dalton] thought [she was] better than [Blitz].” Am. Compl. ¶ 21. Dalton was
charged with burglary of an occupied dwelling, burglary of a conveyance, and
approaching a first responder with specified intent after a warning. Id. ¶ 24;

see (Doc. 1-1). These charges were later dropped. Am. Compl. ¶ 25; (Doc. 1-1).
In the two years preceding Dalton’s arrest, Blitz received three civilian
complaints that alleged that Blitz failed to conduct proper investigations and
made arrests without probable cause. Am. Compl. ¶ 26. These complaints did
not prompt corrective action from the City. Id. ¶ 27.

I granted the defendants’ previous motion to dismiss Dalton’s original
complaint, which failed to state a claim. Order (Doc. 16).
In her amended complaint, Dalton pleads five claims: malicious
prosecution against the City and Blitz under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I); false

imprisonment against the City and Blitz under Section 1983 (Count II); an
unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment against the City
and Blitz (Count III)1; “municipal liability for constitutional violations” under
Section 1983 against the City (Count IV); and negligent supervision against

the City (Count V). Id. ¶¶ 28–70. The defendants move to dismiss. See MTD.
Dalton responds in opposition. See Resp. (Doc. 21). Although the motion could
be treated as unopposed—because Dalton untimely filed her response—I treat
the motion as opposed and consider Dalton’s arguments in response. See Local

Rule 3.01(d) (“If a party fails to timely respond, the motion is subject to
treatment as unopposed.”).

1 As I did in the order granting the defendants’ previous motion to dismiss, and as
the parties have done throughout this litigation, I construe this as a Section 1983
claim for false arrest. See, e.g., MTD at 2, 4, and 17 (construing the claim as a Section
1983 claim for false arrest); Resp. at 7 (calling the claim an “unreasonable seizure
claim,” describing the elements of the claim, which essentially match those of a
Section 1983 false arrest claim, and not contesting the defendants’ construction of the
claim); Resp. at 8 (arguing for municipal liability under Section 1983, including for
the “unreasonable seizure” claim).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This
pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it
demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice
if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
“To survive a motion to dismiss” for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff
must plead sufficient facts to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is plausible on its face when a

“plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
“In analyzing the sufficiency of the complaint,” I may consider “well-
pleaded factual allegations, documents central to or referenced in the

complaint, and matters judicially noticed.” La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc.,
358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Twombly,
550 U.S. 544. The complaint’s factual allegations are accepted “as true” and
construed “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Pielage v. McConnell,
516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008).

III. ANALYSIS
Blitz and the City move to dismiss. I start with the claims against Blitz
and then move to the claims against the City.
A. Dalton’s Claims against Blitz are Dismissed

Dalton pleads malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and false
arrest claims against Blitz. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28–52. Blitz argues that she is
entitled to qualified immunity because there was probable cause or arguable
probable cause to arrest Dalton, thus there was no violation of Dalton’s

constitutional rights and Dalton’s claims must be dismissed. See MTD at 12–
19.
1. Qualified Immunity Standard
“The qualified immunity defense shields ‘government officials

performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Corbitt v. Vickers,
929 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

800, 818 (1982)) (citation modified).
“To receive qualified immunity, [a] public official ‘must first prove that
he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the
allegedly wrongful acts occurred.’ ” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346
(11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002)).

“Once the defendant establishes that he was acting within his discretionary
authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is
not appropriate.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194.
As a threshold matter, “it is undisputed that [Blitz] [was] acting within

the scope of [her] discretionary authority” when she arrested Dalton. Griffin
Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1199 (11th Cir. 2007); see MTD at 13
(claiming that Blitz acted “in her discretionary capacity when she arrested
[Dalton]”); Resp. at 4–6 (raising other arguments regarding qualified

immunity but not disputing that Blitz acted within the scope of her
discretionary authority). Thus, Dalton “bears the burden of overcoming
[Blitz’s] qualified immunity defense.” Irvin, 496 F.3d at 1199.
“To overcome a qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff must make two

showings.” Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1311. The plaintiff must first show “that the
defendant violated a constitutional right.” Irvin, 496 F.3d at 1199. The plaintiff
must then “show that the violation was clearly established.” Id. “A right may
be clearly established for qualified immunity purposes in one of three ways: (1)

case law with indistinguishable facts clearly establishing the constitutional
right; (2) a broad statement of principle within the Constitution, statute, or
case law that clearly establishes a constitutional right; or (3) conduct so
egregious that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the total
absence of case law.” Gilmore v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 144 F.4th 1246, 1258 (11th

Cir. 2025) (en banc) (quoting T.R. by and through Brock v. Lamar Cnty. Bd. of
Ed., 25 F.4th 877, 883 (11th Cir. 2022)). For this second inquiry, the key
question “is whether the state of the law gave the defendants ‘fair warning’
that their alleged conduct was unconstitutional.” Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d

1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).
Ordinarily, “it is proper to grant a motion to dismiss on qualified
immunity grounds when the ‘complaint fails to allege the violation of a clearly
established constitutional right.’ ” Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1311 (quoting St. George

v. Pinellas County, 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002)). “Once an officer has
raised the defense of qualified immunity, the burden of persuasion on that
issue is on the plaintiff.” Id. (quoting St. George, 285 F.3d at 1337).
2. The Arrest Affidavits Were Not Constitutionally Infirm

Dalton was arrested for, and later charged with, burglary of an occupied
dwelling, burglary of a conveyance, and approaching a first responder with
specified intent after a warning. Am. Compl. ¶ 24; see (Doc. 1-1). Blitz argues
that Dalton’s amended complaint shows that the legal process used to seize

Dalton—the arrest affidavits—was not constitutionally infirm because the
affidavits were supported by probable cause, or at least arguable probable
cause. See MTD at 14–19. I agree that the affidavits were not constitutionally
infirm.

As relevant, Florida law defines a “burglary” to mean “[e]ntering a
dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense
therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant
is licensed or invited to enter.” § 810.02(1)(b)(1), Fla. Stat. A person commits a

second-degree felony when “in the course of committing the [burglary], the
offender does not make an assault or battery and is not and does not become
armed with a dangerous weapon or explosive, and the offender enters or
remains in”: (1) a “[d]welling, and there is another person in the dwelling at

the time the offender enters or remains” or (2) a “[c]onveyance, and there is
another person in the conveyance at the time the offender enters or remains.”
Id. § 810.02(3)(a), (d).
With respect to approaching a first responder, a person commits a

second-degree misdemeanor when he, “after receiving a verbal warning not to
approach from a person he or she knows or reasonably should know is a first
responder, who is engaged in the lawful performance of a legal duty,”
“knowingly and willfully” violates this warning and “approach[es] or remain[s]

within 25 feet of the first responder with the intent to”:
1. Impede or interfere with the first responder’s ability
to perform such duty;
2. Threaten the first responder with physical harm; or
3. Harass the first responder.
§ 843.31(2)(a)–(b), Fla. Stat. To “harass” means “to willfully engage in a course
of conduct directed at a first responder which intentionally causes substantial

emotional distress in that first responder and serves no legitimate purpose.”
Id. § 843.31(1)(b).
To succeed on a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must prove both
“(1) the elements of the common-law tort of malicious prosecution and (2) a

violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
seizures.” Blue v. Lopez, 901 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2018).2 Or, as the
Eleventh Circuit recently articulated, a plaintiff must prove: (1) “the legal
process justifying [the plaintiff’s] seizure was constitutionally infirm”; (2) the

“seizure would not otherwise be justified without legal process”; and (3) “the
criminal proceedings against [the plaintiff] terminated in his favor.” Sylvester
v. Fulton Cnty. Jail, 94 F.4th 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2024) (alterations in the
original) (quoting Luke v. Gulley, 975 F.3d 1140, 1144 (11th Cir. 2020)).

A showing of either probable cause or arguable probable cause defeats a
malicious prosecution claim. See id. at 1331. The probable cause inquiry

2 “[T]he constituent elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution
include[]: (1) a criminal prosecution instituted or continued by the present defendant;
(2) with malice and without probable cause; (3) that terminated in the plaintiff
accused’s favor; and (4) caused damage to the plaintiff accused.” Paez v. Mulvey, 915
F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2019) (alterations in the original) (quoting Wood v. Kesler,
323 F.3d 872, 882 (11th Cir. 2003)).
regarding malicious prosecution focuses on “the legal process that justified the
plaintiff’s arrest and the defendant’s role in that process.” Id. at 1330.

Therefore, the proper analysis requires a court to “remove from the affidavit
any false or misleading inculpatory statements, insert any omitted exculpatory
information, and then assess whether the corrected affidavit is still able to
establish at least arguable probable cause.” Id. at 1331. To assess probable

cause, a court must “look to the elements of the underlying crime—and in
particular, in a malicious-prosecution case like this one, to the elements of the
charged crime.” Butler v. Smith, 85 F.4th 1102, 1116 (11th Cir. 2023).
“Probable cause requires facts that allow ‘a person of reasonable caution to

believe’ that ‘there was a substantial chance’ that [the defendant committed
the charged offense].” Sylvester, 94 F.4th at 1331 (quoting Garcia v. Casey, 75
F.4th 1176, 1186 (11th Cir. 2023)). “Arguable probable cause exists . . . if a
‘reasonable officer’ presented with the corrected version of [an] affidavit could

‘reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present’ to suspect
[the defendant].” Id. (quoting Butler, 85 F.4th at 1116).
Dalton fails to plausibly allege malicious prosecution. As Blitz notes, all
that is at issue is the element of constitutional infirmity of the legal process.

MTD at 14. “Legal process is constitutionally infirm if the officer who provided
the probable cause affidavit intentionally or recklessly made misstatements or
omissions necessary to support the warrant.” Sylvester, 94 F.4th at 1329
(citation modified). “The plaintiff must first explain how any inaccuracies were
material, i.e., ‘necessary to support the warrant.’ ” Id. (quoting Luke, 50 F.4th

at 95–96). In other words, “[i]f the affidavit still manages to establish probable
cause for the crime charged even after correcting the defendant’s purported
lies, misleading statements, and omissions, then” the inaccuracies were
immaterial. See id. at 1330. Next, “there must be evidence in the record that

would allow a reasonable jury to find that the inaccuracies in the affidavit did
not result from a ‘reasonable mistake’ but stemmed from intentional or
reckless deception.” Id.
I consider the three arrest affidavits because, although Dalton does not

attach them to her amended complaint, she repeatedly references them in her
complaint, and they are central to her malicious prosecution claim. See Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 20, 30, 32, 36; La Grasta, 358 F.3d at 845. Dalton arguably did not
allege that the inaccuracies were material, but I liberally construe her

allegation that “[t]here was no probable cause for the proceeding because
[Dalton] did not enter the carport or attempt to enter the ambulance, contrary
to what Officer Blitz alleged in the arrest affidavit[s]” as sufficiently alleging
this element.3 See Am. Compl. ¶ 36. And, although neither party discusses it

3 Dalton does not contest that what the ambulance attendants told Blitz was, if true,
sufficient for probable cause. See MTD at 16–17 (arguing that the statements suffice
for probable cause); Resp. at 4 (arguing only that the statements were insufficient
because they were false).
directly in their papers, the alleged inaccuracies in the affidavits are material.
The inaccurate facts make up most of the affidavits and nearly all the

potentially inculpatory facts.4 See Arrest Affs. at 1, 3, 5. Removing those facts
renders the affidavits incapable of establishing probable cause or arguable
probable cause for the burglaries and approaching a first responder with
specified intent after warning.5

It is the second step—that a reasonable jury must be able to find that
the inaccuracies stemmed from intentional or reckless deception rather than
reasonable mistake—where Dalton falters. To begin, the amended complaint

4 The arrest affidavit for the approaching a first responder charge includes one
separate inculpatory fact: that upon Blitz’s arrival, she could see Dalton “actively
blocking the ambulance’s only exit path . . . which prevented them from readily and
speedily responding to the hospital with a patient.” Arrest Affs. at 5. Even still, this
fact alone does not suffice for probable cause because the offense requires the
perpetrator to have first received a verbal warning. See § 843.31(2)(a), Fla. Stat.

5 Despite my raising it sua sponte in the order granting the previous motion to
dismiss, see Order at 14 n.4, both parties again ignore that the approaching a first
responder offense did not take effect until almost two months after Dalton’s arrest,
compare Ch. 2024-85, § 2, Laws of Fla. (“This act shall take effect January 1, 2025.”),
with Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 19 (explaining that Blitz arrested Dalton on November 9,
2024), though it was necessary to support all three charges, see § 810.02(1)(b)(1), Fla.
Stat. (requiring intent to commit a separate offense in the burgled dwelling,
structure, or conveyance as an element of burglary). Had Dalton raised the issue,
Blitz’s apparent belief that the offense, which was duly enacted and approved by the
Governor of Florida on April 12, 2024, was in effect on November 9, 2024, would have
been a reasonable mistake of law. See Mahone v. Georgia, No. 20-14752, 2022 WL
2388426, at *3 (11th Cir. July 1, 2022) (per curiam) (“An officer’s reasonable mistake
of law—that is, when ‘the law turns out to be not what was thought’—can justify
probable cause.” (citing Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 61–64 (2014))); Smith
v. City of Fairburn, 679 F. App’x 916, 923 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“[A]
reasonable mistake of law does not destroy probable cause.”).
does not even allege that Blitz intentionally or recklessly made false
statements or omitted exculpatory information in the arrest affidavit. See Am

Compl. ¶¶ 29–40. Instead, the amended complaint alleges that the ambulance
attendants made false statements, which Blitz relied on and repeated in the
arrest affidavit. See id. ¶¶ 17–20, 28, 36. Rather than allege that Blitz lied or
made misleading statements, Dalton takes issue with Blitz’s failure to

“question [Dalton] about her version of events or conduct any independent
investigation to verify the ambulance attendants’ claims before deciding to
arrest [Dalton].” See id. ¶¶ 18, 28; see, e.g., Resp. at 6 (“Blitz deliberately
ignored available exculpatory evidence and failed to conduct even a minimal

investigation . . . .”). Despite arguing in her response that Blitz ignored
exculpatory evidence “in the form of video recordings,” Resp. at 5, Dalton never
explains what these recordings show, how Blitz was aware of them, or how
Blitz could have accessed them at the scene or at any time before Blitz

completed the arrest affidavits. More to the point, there are no such allegations
in the amended complaint.
To be sure, “[a]n arresting officer is required to conduct a reasonable
investigation to establish probable cause.” Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425,

1435 (11th Cir. 1998). “While an officer is not required to explore and eliminate
every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest, an
officer may not choose to ignore information that has been offered to him or
her.” Washington v. Rivera, 939 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation
modified). That said, “reliance upon eyewitness testimony, including that of a

victim of a crime, is [generally] sufficient to establish probable cause.” Scott v.
City of Miami, 139 F.4th 1267, 1274 (11th Cir. 2025).
Dalton’s allegations show that Blitz did conduct a reasonable
investigation to establish probable cause. Upon arriving at the scene, Blitz

spoke to the ambulance attendants who told her “that [Dalton] had entered the
patient’s home without permission and had attempted to enter the ambulance
by pulling on the door handles.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15–17. Although Blitz could
have conducted a more in-depth investigation, she did not have to. Blitz’s

decision to not investigate further was reasonable, particularly under the
circumstances—the ambulance was loaded with a patient waiting for transport
to a medical facility. See id. ¶ 14.
Contrary to making allegations sufficient for a reasonable jury to find

that the inaccuracies in the affidavit stemmed from intentional or reckless
deception instead of a reasonable mistake, Dalton’s allegations leave
inescapable the conclusion that the inaccuracies were caused by a reasonable
mistake. When Blitz repeated the allegedly inaccurate facts in the arrest

affidavits, she relied on the ambulance attendants’ statements. This was
sufficient to establish probable cause. See Scott, 139 F.4th at 1274; United
States v. Gonzalez, 969 F.2d 999, 1006 (11th Cir. 1992) (“A policeman’s
mistaken belief of fact can properly contribute to a probable cause
determination and can count just as much as a correct belief as long as the

mistaken belief was reasonable in the light of all the circumstances.”). As noted
above, there are no allegations that Blitz ignored exculpatory information
offered to her. Nor does Dalton allege any facts that give rise to an inference
that Blitz should have suspected that the ambulance attendants’ statements

were inaccurate. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1–40. Further, there are no allegations
that Dalton challenged the veracity of the ambulance attendants’ statements
at the scene, at the time of Dalton’s arraignment, or even at any point prior to
filing the amended complaint. See generally id.; see also MTD at 16 (making

this argument); Resp. at 4–7 (failing to dispute the defendants’ argument). In
the light of Dalton’s allegations, it was a reasonable mistake for Blitz to repeat
in the arrest affidavits the ambulance attendants’ inaccurate statements.
Dalton fails to allege facts plausibly showing that the legal process used

to arrest her was constitutionally infirm. That is fatal to her malicious
prosecution claim. Blitz is entitled to qualified immunity as to Count I because
it “fails to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right.”
Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1311 (emphasis added).
3. Probable Cause and Arguable Probable Cause Existed When
Blitz Seized Dalton at the Scene

“To succeed on a false-arrest claim, a plaintiff must establish (1) a lack
of probable cause and (2) an arrest.” Brooks v. Miller, 78 F.4th 1267, 1281 (11th
Cir. 2023). A “false imprisonment claim under § 1983 requires meeting the
common law elements of false imprisonment and establishing that the
imprisonment was a due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Helm v. Rainbow City, 989 F.3d 1265, 1278 (11th Cir. 2021).6
A showing of either probable cause or arguable probable cause can defeat

both. See Edger v. McCabe, 84 F.4th 1230, 1236 (11th Cir. 2023) (false arrest);
Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1138 (11th Cir. 2007) (same); Helm, 989
F.3d at 1278–79 (false imprisonment). As noted above, “[w]hether an officer
possesses probable cause or arguable probable cause depends on the elements

of the alleged crime and the operative fact pattern.” Brown v. City of
Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 735 (11th Cir. 2010). Where a malicious prosecution
claim focuses on the legal process, “[a] ‘false arrest’ claim challenges as
constitutionally deficient an officer’s on-the-spot determination of probable

cause.” Sylvester, 94 F.4th at 1330. A false imprisonment claim shares the
same inquiry. See Helm, 989 F.3d at 1279. When assessing whether an officer

6 “The elements of common law false imprisonment are an intent to confine, an act
resulting in confinement, and the victim’s awareness of confinement.” Campbell v.
Johnson, 586 F.3d 835, 840 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
arrested someone without probable cause, “[w]hat counts . . . is the
information known to the defendant officers or officials at the time of their

conduct.” Wilkerson v. Seymour, 736 F.3d 974, 978 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1283 n.4 (11th Cir. 1999)).
Although the relevant inquiry differs from malicious prosecution, the
result is the same. As explained above, Blitz’s investigation on the scene was

reasonable, and the ambulance attendants’ statements were sufficient to
provide Blitz with “facts and circumstances . . . sufficient to warrant a
reasonable belief that [Dalton] had committed or was committing [the charged]
crime[s].” Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1327 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Gonzalez, 969 F.2d at 1002); see also Scott, 139 F.4th at 1274; Gonzalez, 969
F.2d at 1006. Further, “reasonable officers in the same circumstances and
possessing the same knowledge as [Blitz] could have believed that probable
cause existed to arrest.” Case, 555 F.3d at 1327 (quoting Lee, 284 F.3d at 1195).

Thus, Blitz had probable cause and arguable probable cause when she seized
Dalton at the scene. Dalton’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims
against Blitz fail. Blitz is entitled to qualified immunity regarding Counts II
and III because they, like Count I, also “fail[] to allege the violation of a clearly

established constitutional right.” Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1311 (emphasis added).
B. Dalton’s Claims against the City of Largo are Dismissed
Dalton pleads against the City four claims under Section 1983 and one

state law claim. All five must be dismissed.
Starting with the federal claims, a municipality “does not incur § 1983
liability for injuries caused solely by its employees.” McDowell v. Brown, 392
F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). “Instead, to impose § 1983 liability on a

municipality, a plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional rights were
violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted
deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or
custom caused the violation.” Id.

As a threshold matter, Count IV, which purports to assert a general
claim for municipal liability under Section 1983, is dismissed with prejudice
because it is not a separate cause of action. See Am. Comp. ¶¶ 53–59. Even if
it were a standalone cause of action, the Count fails to allege which of Dalton’s

constitutional rights were violated. See id.; Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1285
(11th Cir. 2019) (“A constitutional claim brought pursuant to § 1983 must
begin with the identification of a specific constitutional right that has allegedly
been infringed.”). I liberally construe the allegations related to municipal

liability as arising under each of Counts I–III, as Dalton appears to have
intended. See Resp. at 2–3, 8 (arguing that the facts alleged across the
complaint suffice for showing municipal liability for each of the claims in
Counts I–III).

The City argues that each of the claims against it fail to state a claim.
MTD at 4. Specifically, although a plaintiff can prove that a municipality has
a custom or policy constituting deliberate indifference to a constitutional right
by showing “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations,” Craig v. Floyd

County, 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Connick v. Thompson,
563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011)), the City argues that Dalton’s allegation of “three
unsubstantiated complaints filed against Officer Blitz” is insufficient to
establish such a pattern, MTD at 8. I need not consider this argument because

there is a more fundamental error—Dalton fails to show that her constitutional
rights were violated. As explained above, Dalton’s claims for malicious
prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment all fail. The first because the
legal process used to seize Dalton was not constitutionally infirm and the latter

two because Blitz had probable cause and arguable probable cause. Without
those underlying violations, there cannot be municipal liability. See, e.g.,
Knight through Kerr v. Miami-Dade County, 856 F.3d 795, 821 (11th Cir. 2017)
(“There can be no policy-based liability or supervisory liability when there is

no underlying constitutional violation.” (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller,
475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)).
Dalton’s negligent supervision claim also fails. Negligent supervision or
retention “occurs when during the course of employment, the employer

becomes aware or should have become aware of problems with an employee
that indicated his unfitness, and the employer fails to take further actions such
as investigation, discharge, or reassignment.” Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Hardy, 907
So. 2d 655, 660 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). “The plaintiff must allege facts sufficient

to show that once an employer received actual or constructive notice of
problems with an employee’s fitness, it was unreasonable for the employer not
to investigate or take corrective action.” Id. Of course, “not only must the
employer owe a duty to the plaintiff, but the breach of that duty must be the

proximate cause of the plaintiff’s harm.” Id. As a result, “[t]here must be a
connection and foreseeability between the employee’s employment history and
the current tort committed by the employee.” Id. at 661. “Under Florida law, a
claim for negligent hiring, retention, or supervision requires that an

employee’s wrongful conduct be committed outside the scope of employment.”
Buckler v. Israel, 680 F. App’x 831, 834 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (first
citing Mallory v. O’Neil, 69 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. 1954); and then citing
Delaurentos v. Peguero, 47 So. 3d 879, 882 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)).

To begin, Dalton does not allege or explain how Blitz acted outside the
scope of her employment. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 60–70; Resp. at 7–8. That alone
is grounds for dismissal. See, e.g., King v. Marceno, No. 2:24-CV-375-KCD-
DNF, 2025 WL 3012682, at *5–6 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 28, 2025) (dismissing
negligent supervision claim in part for failing to allege that the employee’s acts

were outside the scope of employment); Viera v. City of Lake Worth, No. 19-
80158-CIV, 2020 WL 13644556, *5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2020) (same).
Further, “[i]t is necessary that the underlying wrong—the actions of the
employee or servant—be a tort.” Acts Ret.-Life Cmtys. Inc. v. Est. of Zimmer,

206 So. 3d 112, 115 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). Dalton does not clearly identify the
tort or torts on which she bases her negligent supervision claim. See Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 60–70. Her allegations sound in false arrest and false
imprisonment, not malicious prosecution. See id. (complaining of “arrest

without probable cause” and “unlawful arrest[ and] detention” while not
mentioning the affidavits or legal process used to seize her); Resp. at 7–8
(same). “The existence of probable cause constitutes an affirmative defense to
the claims of false arrest and imprisonment under Florida law.” Rankin, 133

F.3d at 1436. As explained above, Blitz had probable cause to arrest Dalton at
the scene. Thus, Dalton’s negligent supervision claim also fails for the same
reason as her Section 1983 claims against the City.
IV. CONCLUSION

Because Blitz is entitled to qualified immunity as to Counts I–III against
her, they are dismissed with prejudice as to Blitz. See Hardy v. Broward Cnty.
Sheriff’s Off., 238 F. App’x 435, 444 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (affirming
grant of a motion to dismiss without leave to amend on qualified immunity
grounds when the plaintiffs “failed to establish that the [defendants] violated

clearly established constitutional law”).
Count IV is dismissed with prejudice because it is not a cause of action
and granting leave to amend would be futile. See Silberman v. Miami Dade
Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1133 (11th Cir. 2019). Counts I–III and V are similarly

dismissed with prejudice as to the City because amendment would be futile
because Blitz had probable cause to arrest Dalton.
Even if all Counts were dismissed merely for failure to state a claim, I
would do so with prejudice because Dalton already had a chance to amend her

complaint to properly state a claim, and Dalton has not requested leave to file
a second amended complaint. See Gurrera v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off.,
657 F. App’x 886, 894 n.5 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (“Our precedent does
not require affording pro se plaintiffs multiple opportunities to amend.”).

Accordingly, the following is ORDERED:
1. The Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 19) is GRANTED.
2. The Amended Complaint (Doc. 18) is DISMISSED with
prejudice.

3. The Clerk is directed to ENTER JUDGMENT, which shall read
“This case is dismissed with prejudice.”
4, The Clerk is further directed to TERMINATE any deadlines and
motions and to CLOSE this case.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on March 17, 2026.

a imball Mizelle
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11360882. Public record. Not legal advice.