# Tiquez

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · July 1, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11360722

## Case

- **Full name:** Michael Tiquez & Mara Tiquez v. Carmen Marine Cooperative et al.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** July 1, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Michael Tiquez & )
Mara Tiquez, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
)
v. ) No. 25 C 15775
)
)
Carmen Marine Cooperative )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )

Memorandum Opinion and Order
Plaintiffs Mara and Michael Tiquez are a mother and son. In
response to the deactivation of Mara’s apartment keys by Mara’s
co-op, the Carmen Marine Cooperative (“CMC”), plaintiffs filed
this suit against the City of Chicago, two police officers, and
several private defendants related to CMC, alleging a harms under
constitutional, federal, and state law. Before me are the non-
police-related defendants’ motion to dismiss. For the reasons that
follow, I grant that motion.
1
I.
Michael and Mara are proceeding pro se, and as I work through
their complaint, I am mindful that I must read it generously.
Parker v. Four Seasons Hotels, Ltd., 845 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir.
2017).1

I need to provide some backstory about the Carmen-Marine
apartment complex owned by CMC to lay foundation for some of the
Tiquezes’ arguments, in particular those concerning state action.
In the mid-century, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (“HUD”), through the Federal Housing Administration
(“FHA”), provided loans for the construction of thousands of large
housing projects, including the Carmen-Marine complex.2 In exchange
for those loans, and until they were repaid, building owners were
required to keep rents low and to rent to low-income tenants. The
Carmen-Marine complex was funded by one of these FHA loans. When
repayment periods on many of these projects were ending,

1 For present purposes, I take the facts in the complaint as true.
Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat’l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir.
2010).
2 These details are drawn from a report that plays a role in this
case and of which I take judicial notice. “Carmen-Marine
Apartments, Chicago, IL, Resident Homeownership Program,” HUD
Office of the Inspector General, Audit Report No. 2015-CH-1010
(Sep. 30, 2015) (“OIG Audit Report”),
https://www.hudoig.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-CH-
1010.pdf.
2
threatening to reduce the affordable housing stock in the country,
Congress passed the Low Income Housing Preservation and Resident
Homeownership Act (“LIHPRHA”), 12 U.S.C. §§ 4101 et seq. LIHPRHA

provided incentives for building owners to sell their properties
to non-profit organizations or tenant cooperatives, rather than
removing their low-income tenants and renting at market rates.
In the 1990s, residents at the Carmen-Marine complex formed
the Carmen-Marine Tenants’ Association. The association applied
for, and received, a $23.1 million LIHPRHA grant from HUD which it
used to buy and refurbish the building, eventually turning over
ownership to CMC. Residents in the building could then purchase
memberships in CMC, with each membership corresponding to
occupancy of a unit in the complex. Under the terms of the HUD
grant, LIHPRHA was to administer sales of memberships in a
particular way and to remit particular proceeds from membership

sales to HUD. Per an audit by HUD’s Office of the Inspector
General, CMC has largely failed to abide by the terms of the
grant.3

3 OIG Audit Report, supra n. 2, at 1 (“[CMC] did not ensure that
[any of seven grant criteria were met]. As a result, HUD and the
Cooperative lacked assurance that the project was operated in
accordance with HUD’s requirements and the grant agreement, and
the Cooperative is at risk of having to reimburse HUD nearly
$22.7 million in Program funds.”).
3
At some point, Mara purchased a membership in CMC and became
a resident at the complex. And at some point in 2025—exactly when
is unclear, although it appears to have been around August—Michael

moved into Mara’s unit. Witnesses in certain body-worn camera
videos that the Tiquezes submitted to the court have indicated
that, at the point Michael moved in, Mara was living in a separate
residence outside of the complex. After he moved in, and apparently
as a result of reading the HUD OIG audit mentioned above, Michael
began “investigating the [CMC] Board’s finances,” the results of
which investigation he “reported to HUD OIG.” ECF 24 at 2.
On November 4, 2025, the president of the CMC board of
directors, defendant Stella Popa, directed another board member,
defendant Diana Molina, to deactivate the key fobs that the
Tiquezes used to enter both the building and Mara’s apartment.4
Michael alleges that the deactivation was due to some combination

of discrimination against he and his mother’s Jewish and Latino
heritage and retaliation for the investigation he had been running
into the board.
On November 28, 2025, Michael went to the building and, on
being denied entrance, called the police. Officer Danny Yu and

4 The body-worn camera videos attached to the complaint seem to
indicate that only Michael’s and not Mara’s key fob was
deactivated, but that ends up being immaterial.
4
Sergeant Mandy Tucker—both of the Chicago Police Department, and
both defendants—responded. Michael did not gain entrance or the
reactivation of his fob. On December 1, 2025, Michael again

returned to the complex and again called the police. He did not
gain entrance or reactivation. At each of these visits, Michael
explained his position to the police. Police then heard from CMC
Board members Anca Neciu and Luminita Dragos (both defendants) and
Vanessa Williams, an employee of Forth Group, the Carmen-Marine
complex’s management company (Forth and Williams are also
defendants). These defendants told police, as recorded on the
officers’ body-worn cameras, that they had deactivated Michael’s
fob because: (1) his mother, and not he, was the proper occupant
of the residence; (2) Michael had been acting erratically, as if
he were in mental distress or under the influence of narcotics;
and (3) he had thrown eggs out of the window of the unit at a

maintenance person who was working from a platform suspended high
above the ground.5

5 For better or worse, plaintiff can supplement, and supplant, his
complaint with video footage he provides alongside it. Bogie v.
Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 611 (7th Cir. 2013).
5
On December 1, 2025, Michael filed suit in Cook County Circuit
Court.6 Michael’s complaint petitioned for preliminary injunctive
relief granting him access to the apartment and then pled several

causes of action that resemble those here. It is my understanding
that, whether in the context of that case or one to be filed after
its conclusion, CMC will be attempting to evict the Tiquezes.
Those are the facts on which the Tiquezes have based their
complaint. To recap, the defendants are:
•
Carmen Marine Cooperative, the tenant-run non-
profit which owns the Carmen-Marine complex
o Stella Popa, CMC Board President
o Luminita Dragos, CMC Board Member
o Diana Molina, CMC Board Member
o Anca Neciu, CMC Board Member
•
Forth Group, LLC, the management company for the
Carmen-Marine complex
o Vanessa Williams, a Forth employee
•
The City of Chicago
o Seargeant Mandy Tucker
o Officer Danny Yu

Against all of these, plaintiffs have attempted to make out
sixteen causes of action, eight of which fall under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and eight of which correspond to other federal, state, and

6 Tiquez v. Carmen Marine Cooperative et al., No. 2025-CH-12045
(Ill. Cir. Ct. Dec. 1, 2025).
6
contract provisions. To the best of my understanding, the counts
are as follows:

The 1983 Counts
Count Defendants: Claim:
I All but Deactivation of the key fobs constituted an
Chicago unreasonable seizure of property under the
Fourth Amendment
II All but Deactivation of the key fobs constituted
Chicago retaliation for the exercise of Michael’s
First Amendment right to report the results
of his independent investigation to HUD’s
OIG
III Tucker and Officers’ failure to force CMC and Forth to
Yu reactivate the key fobs constituted an
unreasonable seizure of property under the
Fourth Amendment
IV Tucker and After Michael explained his position to
Yu Tucker and Yu, they told him that further
persistence might result in arrest,
constituting retaliation in violation of his
First Amendment right to call 911.
V Tucker and Tucker and Yu’s negative view of Michael’s
Yu position, when contrasted with other
officers’ apparently-positive view,
constituted a violation of his right to
equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment
VI Chicago The City’s failure to train Tucker and Yu to
treat Michael’s situation more favorably
constituted a violation of Michael’s rights
pursuant to Monell
VII All but Defendants conspired to deprive Michael of
Chicago his constitutional rights in the previous
counts
VIII All Defendants deprived Michael of access to the
apartment by deactivating his fob without an
opportunity to be heard, violating his
rights to due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment
7
The Non-1983 Counts
IX All instant Deactivation of the key fobs constituted
defendants racially discriminatory interference with
contract under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
X All instant Deactivation of the key fobs constituted
defendants racially discriminatory interference with
property under 42 U.S.C. § 1982
XI All instant Deactivation of the key fobs violated CMC’s
defendants use agreement
XII All but Defendants conspired to interfere with
Chicago Michael’s civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3)
XIII Forth, Defendants had knowledge of the conspiracy
Williams, in Count XII but failed to prevent it under
Neciu, 42 U.S.C. § 1986
Dragos
XIV All instant Deactivation of the key fobs violated
defendants plaintiffs’ rights under the Fair Housing
Act
XV Williams, Defendants’ statements to the police about
Popa, Michael’s behavior constituted defamation
Molina, and per se
Neciu
XVI All but Various actions by defendants indicating
Chicago that they would attempt to evict plaintiffs
constituted intimidation under the Fair
Housing Act

The pending motion concerns only the instant defendants,
while Chicago and the officers have not yet been served. The
instant defendants move to dismiss every count which applies to
them: I–II and VII–XVI.
II.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the “sufficiency of the
complaint.” Berger v. Nat. Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 843 F.3d
285, 289 (7th Cir. 2016). A complaint must provide “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
8
to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
The complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’
” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570). “‘A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.’” Boucher v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 880
F.3d 362, 366 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
III.
Plaintiffs have asserted many claims, but they can be grouped
into three tranches, each of which turns on a single issue. I will
deal with one preliminary and then turn to those three groups.
A. Short and Plain Statements
Defendants’ first contention is that I should dismiss the
complaint as simply incomprehensible. Rule 8 requires that

pleadings contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and while pro se
litigants’ filings should be read generously, they must at least
be intelligible. Job v. Illinois Dept. of Human Servs., 2009 WL
255596, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2009). Defendants are right that
the Tiquezes’ complaint is neither short nor plain. But, while it
may resist comprehension, it is not literally incomprehensible.

9
B. State Action
Counts I–VIII all assert claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 “provides a civil remedy against any ‘person’ who
violates a plaintiff’s federal civil rights while acting under
color of state law.” Thomas v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 74 F.4th

521, 523 (7th Cir. 2023). Any claim under Section 1983 requires
that the defendant be, at least in some sense, a state actor, and
the instant defendants insist that, as to Counts I, II, VII, and
VIII, they are not. Their argument is simple: CMC is a private,
non-governmental organization; Forth is a private, non-
governmental organization; and Williams and the board members are
private citizens.
The Tiquezes’ arguments are more complicated. First, they
contend that because CMC’s purchase of the Carmen-Marine complex
was funded by an FHA loan, and because HUD has ongoing oversight
of that loan, CMC and its agent, Forth, are effectively government

actors, meaning that Williams and the CMC board members, as their
agents or employees or representatives, are as well. Second,
plaintiffs seem to be saying that, because officers responded to
the complex on November 28, 2025, and because those officers did
not force CMC to reactivate the key fobs, they “ratifie[d]” the
deactivation so as to retroactively make it state action. ECF 62
at 17. Or, in the alternative, the officers were conspiring with

10
CMC and Forth so closely as to make CMC and Forth (and Williams
and the board members) de facto government actors on those days.
In general:

There are no hard and fast rules for determining the
presence of state action. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
emphasized repeatedly that the state action inquiry must
be made on a case-by-case basis. Despite this emphasis
on individual cases, certain generalizations are still
possible. State action exists: (1) where the state and
the private party or entity maintain a sufficiently
interdependent or symbiotic relationship; (2) where the
state requires, encourages, or is otherwise
significantly involved in nominally private conduct; and
(3) where the private person or entity exercises a
traditional state function.
1 Nahmod, Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Litigation: The Law of
Section 1983 § 2:4. But although extensive state funding or
regulation of a private entity might constitute significant
involvement, regulation and funding are, without more, not enough
to turn private conduct into state action. Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). This is because there must
be some nexus “between the State and the challenged action of the
[private] entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly
treated as that of the State itself.” Id.
In the first place, the instant defendants are correct that
none of them is inherently a state actor. In the second,
plaintiffs’ initial argument fails. CMC was indeed formed through
a $23.1 million LIHPRHA grant from HUD, and CMC is supposed to be
bound by certain terms pursuant to that grant. But HUD clearly
11
does not control CMC, given that HUD’s OIG has repeatedly found
that CMC is not complying with the terms of its LIHPRHA grant.7
More, the complaint does not suggest any nexus, any reason that

CMC’s having received HUD funding would have led to the
deactivation of their key fobs. And in the third place, the
Tiquezes have failed to plead that the officers were involved in
the deactivation in any way.
The Tiquezes’ main citation in this area is Soldal v. Cook
Cnty., Ill., 506 U.S. 56 (1992). There, the owners of a trailer
park decided to illegally evict Soldal, a tenant. Id. at 57–58.
The owners called the Cook County Sheriff’s department “and
requested the presence of sheriff deputies to forestall any
possible resistance.” Id. at 58. Several deputies arrived and
looked on as the owners hooked up a tractor to Soldal’s trailer

7 In addition to the HUD OIG audit cited in note 2, supra, CMC
failed HUD OIG audits in 2016 and 2018, both of which plaintiffs
cited in their complaint.
“Carmen-Marine Apartments, Chicago, IL, Resident Homeownership
Program,” HUD Office of the Inspector General, Audit Report No.
2017-CH-0001 (Oct. 25, 2016),
https://www.hudoig.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2017-CH-
0001.pdf.
“Carmen-Marine Apartments, Chicago, IL, Resident Homeownership
Program,” HUD Office of the Inspector General, Audit Report No.
2018-CG-0001 (Dec. 22, 2017),
https://www.hudoig.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2018-CH-
0001.pdf.
12
and towed it away, destroying it in the process. Id. One of the
deputies explained to Soldal that “he was there to see that Soldal
didn’t interfere with [the owners’] work.” Id. (cleaned up). The

Tiquezes’ argument seems to be that, like the sheriff’s deputies
in Soldal, Officers Yu and Tucker stood by while their property
was seized, thus effectively participating in the seizure, making
it state action.
That is mistaken. First, Soldal is not about state action.
The question presented was whether seizing Soldal’s home—without
violating his privacy by looking inside—implicated the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 61–72. Second, that the state action in Soldal
was so obvious as to be beyond dispute points up how different the
situation there was from the one in this case. In Soldal, the
sheriff’s deputies participated directly, and told Soldal they
were participating directly, in the seizure of his home. Id. at

58. Here, Michael called the police a month after his fob was
deactivated and they, recognizing a civil dispute not within their
province of action, did not act. That does not retroactively
convert the fob deactivation into state action. Likewise, nothing
on the officers’ body-worn camera footage indicates anything to
the contrary, much less that they conspired with any of the instant
defendants to deactivate the fobs.

13
Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim as to Counts I, II,
VII, and VIII.
C. Racially Motivated Interference
In Counts IX and X, plaintiffs allege that the instant

defendants interfered with their contractual and property rights
for racially motivated reasons under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 (contract)
and 1982 (property). In Count XII, plaintiffs have alleged that
the instant defendants, along with Officers Tucker and Yu,
conspired to effect the interference in Counts IX and X under 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3). In Count XIII, they allege that Forth, Williams,
Neciu, and Dragos were aware of the conspiracy and neglected to
prevent it under 42 U.S.C. § 1986. In Count XIV, they allege that
the instant defendants interfered with their rights under the Fair
Housing Act under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) & (f). And in Count XVI,
they allege that the instant defendants, Tucker, and Yu engaged in
intimidation, coercion, and interference prohibited by another

section of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3617.
As best as I can tell, in each count except XVI, the Tiquezes
are referring to the deactivation of the key fobs. In that last
count, they are alleging that certain statements made to Michael
during his visits to the Carmen Marine complex were intimidating
or coercive. And in each count but XIV, they are alleging that
defendants’ actions were motivated by racially discriminatory

14
intent. In that count, they allege discriminatory intent due to a
disability of Mara’s and Mara and Michael’s national origin, rather
than their race.

As defendants have detailed at length, each of these
provisions comes with its own set of elements which plaintiffs
must make out in order to state a claim for the purposes of Rule
12(b)(6). Each share one element though, which is that to state a
claim, a plaintiff must plead facts connecting whatever harm they
have suffered to their race (or, in Count XIV, their disability
and national origin) by way of defendants’ intent to discriminate
on that basis. Black Agents & Brokers Agency, Inc. v. Near N. Ins.
Brokerage, 409 F.3d 833, 837 (7th Cir. 2005) (Section 1981); Shaare
Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 616–17 (1987) (Section
1982); Green v. Benden, 281 F.3d 661, 665 (7th Cir. 2002) (Section
1985(3)); Washington v. Sherwin Real Estate, Inc., 694 F.2d 1081,
1089–1090 (7th Cir. 1982) (42 U.S.C. § 3604(b)); Roseborough v.
Cottonwood Apartments, 1996 WL 490717, at *1–*2 (N.D. Ill. Aug.

26, 1996) (42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)); Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d
771, 781–82 (7th Cir. 2009) (42 U.S.C. § 3617).
The only exception to that rule is Count XIII, which alleges
that some defendants neglected to prevent a conspiracy formed by
other defendants. That count lives or dies with Count XII, which
alleges the conspiracy itself; if there was no conspiracy, then no

15
one can have neglected to prevent it. Grimes v. Smith, 776 F.2d
1359, 1363 n.4 (7th Cir. 1985).
Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts which would, for any of

these counts, connect their alleged harms with defendants’
discriminatory intent. They have pled that they are Jewish and
Latino, but they have not pled that defendants knew of their race
or religion or ever manifested any evidence of discrimination
related to them.8 As for Count XIV, they have pled that Mara had
unspecified health problems, but not a disability, and they have
not pled that defendants were aware of it or failed to accommodate
it. Likewise as to that count, they have not pled a single fact
about their national origin.
Every explicit statement defendants have made in the
documents and body-worn camera footage that plaintiffs have
referenced in and attached to their filings has related not to

plaintiffs’ race, national origin, or disability, but Michael’s

8 The Tiquezes have gestured towards a theory wherein the CMC board
is dominated by people of Eastern European descent and that the
board has delayed renting to people of Eritrean and Latino
descent. See ECF 24 at 8–9. But they failed to connect a theory
about the board’s Eastern European affiliations with the action
specifically at issue, meaning the fob deactivation. And such a
connection is necessary, considering that the board allowed Mara
not just to rent but to buy a membership in CMC and that its
alleged discriminatory feelings did not prompt it to attempt to
remove Mara at any previous point in her occupancy.
16
behavior. Plaintiffs maintain that those statements are all false,
but they have not pled any facts showing that defendants were
motivated by anything else.

Without such facts, plaintiffs have not stated a claim at
Counts IX–X, XII–XIV, or XVI.
D. State Claims
The remaining counts, XI and XV, concern state claims. Count
XI alleges a violation of the Carmen-Marine complex’s Use
Agreement, which lies in contract. And Count XV alleges defamation,
which lies in tort. Given that I am dismissing all federal claims
relating to the instant defendants and given that the state claims
relate only to the instant defendants, I decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over those state claims. Groce v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1999).
VI.
I grant the pending motion and dismiss Counts I–II and VII–

XVI as to the instant defendants. As this is the first dismissal,
it is without prejudice.
If plaintiffs are inclined to ask leave to amend, I would
advise them that the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to pro se as
well as counseled litigants and that when Rule 8 says “short and
plain,” it really does mean both short and plain.

17
ENTER ORDER:

Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge
Dated: July 1, 2026

18

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11360722. Public record. Not legal advice.