# Purpura

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · May 4, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11360381

## Case

- **Full name:** Jeremy Purpura v. Shelbie Smith, Warden, Belmont Correctional Institution
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** May 4, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11360381

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS

JEREMY PURPURA,

Petitioner, : Case No. 2:25-cv-01457
- vs - District Judge Algenon L. Marbley
Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz

SHELBIE SMITH, WARDEN,
Belmont Correctional Institution,

:
Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This habeas corpus case is before the Court for decision on the merits on the Petition (ECF
No. 3), the State Court Record (ECF No. 10), the Return of Writ (ECF No. 11), and Petitioner’s
Reply (ECF No. 14).

Litigation History

On March 11, 2024, the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury handed down an indictment charging
Purpura with one count of pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor in violation of
Ohio Revised Code §2907.322(A)(1)) (Count 1), three counts of illegal use of a minor in nudity-
oriented material or performance in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2907.323(A)(1) (Counts 2-
4), one count of attempted illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or performance in
violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2923.02/2907.323(A)(1) (Count 5) and one count of possessing
criminal tools in violation of Ohio Revised Code §2923.24(A) (Count 6). (Indictment, State Court
Record, ECF No. 10, Ex. 1). Purpura pleaded not guilty to all charges. Upon his waiver, Purpura
was tried by the court without a jury, found him guilty on all counts and sentenced to an aggregate
term of three to four and one-half years.
Purpura appealed with new counsel to the Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals, claiming

the verdicts were against the manifest weight of the evidence and not supported by sufficient
evidence. The conviction was affirmed. State v. Purpura, 2025-Ohio-2527 (Ohio App. 8th Dist.
Jul. 17, 2025). The Ohio Supreme Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over a further appeal.
State v. Purpura, 179 Ohio St. 3d 1680 (2025).
Purpura then filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, pleading the following
grounds for relief:

Ground One:
Supporting Facts: The Amendment 4 and the electronic
communication privacy act was violated when the Law enforcement
officers accessed an online password protected account without a
Search warrant. And, a pond completion of the search warrant, no
evidence was found to prove the events in the search warrant even
existed. The police force failed to uncover any evidence that the file
in question was ever uploaded or even existed on the device in
question.

Ground Two:
Supporting Facts: Assistance of the appellees' lawyers and
prosecutor in the case lose its way and introduced false or
misleading errors the state caused damages to the appellees'
creditability when Pawlowski stated the information from the ICAC
task force interview. Pawlowski stated that Mr. Purpura told them
that he had an addiction and if he deleted the files, the addiction
would get worse. Also said that the files found were old and from a
previous case. When doing this she introduced evidence from
another Previous case. This would be against double jeopardy,
damaged the creditability, and mental status of the appellate.
Christopher and Pawlowski stated they reviewed the files from
previous case and did not show any proof of this. When they did this
the public defender should have confirmed that all files were
included(not just ones directly included in charge) and went through
all the files in questions. The public defender also failed to fallow
the direction of the accused by not reviewing that information by the
defendant. [sic throughout]

Ground Three:
Supporting Facts: USCS Fed Rules Evid R 703. Bases of an
Expert's Opinion Testimony violation; when Pawlowski stated from
her training and experience, regarding certain physical and
developmental characteristics to show that the images relating to the
indicted counts were of minor children. The court errored at trial
because this information was not backed by any reliable scientific,
technical, or other specialized information and the expert's opinion
reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods to the
facts of the case.

Ground Four:
Supporting Facts: USCS Fed Rules Evid R 403 violation; Court
lost their way and became confused on the facts of this At trial, there
was a video of a female disrobing (evidence file lA) but the appeal
court stated it was a video of masturbating in a bathtub. The question
is if an appeal court's judges are shown to be confused about the
case, then how could an average mind be convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt. [sic throughout]

Ground Five:
Supporting Facts: USCS Fed Rules Evid R 403 Ineffective
evidence; The use of Al software by experts, introduce bias into the
case and becoming sworn witness. When Mr. Christopher used
Cellbrite (AI software) to recover files, he introduced bias and then
become a unsworn witness by vouching for information given by
the program without and scientific process taken into account for the
crime. When the program stated "Age difficult" it shows not a match
to the files in its database. But instead, a percentage above 51%
comparison to hashtags in the file in question. Plus, the bias that was
put into the program. There is no way to show that the files in
question were placed on user placement, user reaction with a
program, or a byproduct of a program in use by the user. [sic
throughout]

Ground Six:
Supporting Facts: Due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
to the United State[s] Constitution protect a defendant in a criminal
case against a conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he
is charged The state presented insufficient evidence to sustain Mr.
Purpura's Conviction in count 1, where there was no evidence Mr.
Purpura had reproduced or published the image;

1. The state did not content that Mr. Purpura created, recorded,
photographed, filmed, or developed the material. Or, even prove
that the photo in question showed Mr. Purpura was participating
or engaging in sexual activity, masturbation, or bestiality.
Rather, based on evidence presented, the state appeared to use
theory of the case that Mr. Purpura had reproduced and/or
published the images by downloading them to his phone. Mr.
Christopher determined the image at issue in this count came
from Snapchat. The accessed and modified date for this file was
the same (even though the file in question was in a format that
was unreadable without a special program or the process of
converting it into a readable file). Christopher testified that
Snapchat allows users to send pictures directly to other users. A
user who receives a picture through Snapchat receives a
notification on their phone, and then open the picture in
Snapchat to view it, Christopher was uncertain whether the
picture would still be added to the recipients Snapchat account.
A photo shared with user could potentially appear in a Cellebrite
extraction. Additionally, Mr. Purpura testified he did not
recognize image 1. Based on the testimony at trial, image 1 could
have been sent to Mr. Purpura via Snapchat without him even
accessing or viewing the image. There was no evidence, direct
or circumstantial, to prove that he had in fact accessed or viewed
the image at any point of time. There was therefore insufficient
evidence to allow a fact finder to conclude that he had
affirmatively taken and action listed under R.C. §
2907.322(a)(l). His conviction in count one is therefor against
the sufficiency of the evidence. [sic throughout]

The state presented insufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Purpura's
conviction in count two and three, there was no evidence of a
transfer. Image 12 was a cache file. A Cache file is stored on a
device, so that the file can be opened faster in the future. Christopher
testified at trial a Cache file could be saved on a device based on,
for example, another person sending an image via Snapchat.
Christopher was uncertain whether this could occur without the
recipient actually opening or viewing the file. For.both image 12 and
23, the accessed dates matched the modified dates. When these dates
match for particular files, Christopher testified he could not
determine whether these files were actually opened by the device
oner, or if they were simply sent via Snapchat without being opened.
Based on the testimony, a reasonable factfinder could not find the
state had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Purpura had
transferred these two images. The conviction in count two and three
is against the sufficiency of evidence [sic throughout] 3. The state
presented insufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Purpura's Conviction
in count four, where there was no evidence, he viewed or knowingly
possessed the image; The image at issue in this count was also a
cache file. There was no access or modified dates for the file. As
argued regarding count two and three, it could not determine
whether this file had been open by the user. Christopher explained
the modified date typically means that the user interacted with the
file, in a way that modified it or wrote to the file system. Because,
this file lacked this information there is no proof that the file was
created and/or accessed. There was therefore insufficient evidence
to sustain this conviction. [sic throughout]

4. The state presented insufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Purpura's
conviction in count 5, where there was no evidence of attempted
transfer; In count 5, there was no evidence that the file in question
was ever on Mr. Purpura device to cause the file or any file to be
uploaded to Drop box. This was the reason the ICAC was able to
obtain a search warrant to be able to search Mr. Purpura's devices.
Base on this information, a reasonable fact-finding could not find
the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Purpura had
attempt transferred or even knowingly possessed the files on the
Dropbox after his conviction in 2021. [sic throughout]

5. The State presented insufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Purpura's
conviction in count 6 because there was no evidence he intended to
use his device criminally. Count 6 charged Mr. Purpura with
possessing criminal tool in violation of R.C. § 2923.24 As discussed
above, evidence was not present to show purpose to commit the
charges in the other counts of the indictment, as for the laptop and
watch, there was no evidence it had ever had or used in any of the
counts. There was therefore insufficient evidence to sustain this
conviction.

Ground Seven:
Supporting Facts: Due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
to the United State[s] Constitution; did the courts lose its way in
convicting the appellant? the state witness conceded it was difficult
to determine the age of the individuals in the images at issue. He
testified the files were marked as age difficult. He agreed this label
meant that he could not say for sure if individuals were under 18.
Christopher also explained that modified date typically means that
the user interacted with the file, in a way that modified it or wrote to
the file system. However, failed to explain other ways in which
modified date means. Also in count four, there was no modified or
accessed date which in his wording could mean that there was no
proof that the file in question was even accessed or modified. [sic
throughout]

Given the ambiguousness of this evidence, with the state witness
agreeing the facts of age could not be determined with any certainty
for images in question, the verdict of guilt was against the manifest
weight of the evidence.

(Petition, ECF No. 3).
Analysis
As the reader can see, Purpura has combined his statement of a claim for relief with the
supporting facts he alleges support that Ground. Respondent has labeled Purpura’s claims as
“unstated,1” but the undersigned believes that case can be litigated on the basis of the present
pleadings. Pleadings of pro se litigants are to be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519 (1972); Urbina v. Thoms, 270 F.3d 292, 295 (6th Cir. 2001). Doing so allows the case to be
more expeditiously decided.

Pleaded Claims Which Are Not Cognizable
Federal habeas corpus is available only to correct federal constitutional violations. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(a); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1 (2010); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780
(1990); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982), Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983). “A
petitioner must claim that his custody violates federal law, not state law, not some other source of

1 See, e.g., Return of Writ, ECF No. 11, PageID 463.
law.” Bailey v. Wainwright, 951 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Wilson). "[I]t is not the
province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state law questions.
In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68
(1991); see also Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 160 (1825)(Marshall C. J.);

Bickham v. Winn, 888 F.3d 248 (6th Cir. Apr. 23, 2018)(Thapar, J. concurring).
There is a great deal of federal law which is not constitutional in nature. For example,
there are the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which were adopted by the Supreme Court in 1938
under the Rules Enabling Act which was in turn enacted by Congress. Those Rules govern
procedure in civil cases in the District Courts. Under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the
Constitution, those rules are the “supreme law of the land” for the proceedings to which they apply,
to wit, civil cases filed in or removed to the federal courts. They govern, for example, service of
process issued by a federal district court. But they do not govern service of process issued by a
state court, nor were they ever intended to.

Parallel analysis applies to the Federal Rules of Evidence which were enacted to govern
presentation of evidence in federal courts. They do not and were never intended to govern
presentation of evidence in state courts.
Therefore Petitioner’s Grounds for Relief which complain of violations of Fed. R. Evid.
403 or 703 do not state a claim upon which habeas corpus relief can be granted because Fed. R.
Evid. 403 and 703 do not apply to state court proceedings. Fed. R. Evid. 101(a) specifically says
“[t]hese rules apply to proceedings in United States courts.” The United States Constitution does
not obligate state courts to follow the Federal Rules of Evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 703 on expert
witnesses derives from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), but
Daubert was not a constitutional decision. Although the Ohio Supreme Court followed Daubert
in adopting Ohio R. Evid. 703, it was not under any constitutional obligation to do so.
In Grounds for Relief Three, Four, and Five, Petitioner complains that the State violated
Fed. R. Evid. 403 or 703 in admitting evidence against him. Because those rules are not obligatory
in state court by virtue of the United States Constitution, those Grounds for Relief do not state a

claim under the Constitution and should therefore be dismissed without prejudice for failure to
state a claim upon which habeas corpus relief can be granted.
In his Seventh Ground for Relief, Petitioner asserts his conviction is against the manifest
weight of the evidence presented. A weight of the evidence claim is not a federal constitutional
claim. Johnson v. Havener, 534 F.2d 1232 (6th Cir. 1986). Ground Seven should therefore be
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which habeas corpus relief can be
granted.

Pleaded Claims Which Are Barred by Procedural Default

In his First Ground for Relief, Petitioner claims his rights under the Fourth Amendment
were violated by the seizure and introduction of certain evidence.
Respondent asserts this claim is procedurally defaulted because it was not fairly presented
to either the Common Pleas Court by way of a motion to suppress or the Ohio Court of Appeals
(Return, ECF No. 11, PageID 456). Acknowledging that no motion to suppress was filed, Purpura
blames this on ineffective assistance of trial counsel and claims the relevant information would
have been excluded on a motion to suppress (Reply, ECF No. 14, PageID 482).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals requires a four-part analysis when the State alleges a
habeas claim is precluded by procedural default. Barton v. Warden, S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 786
F.3d 450, 464 (6th Cir. 2015), Guilmette v. Howes, 624 F.3d 286, 290 (6th Cir. 2010)(en banc);
Eley v. Bagley, 604 F.3d 958, 965 (6th Cir. 2010); Reynolds v. Berry, 146 F.3d 345, 347-48 (6th
Cir. 1998), citing Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986); accord Lott v. Coyle, 261
F.3d 594, 601-02 (6th Cir. 2001); Jacobs v. Mohr, 265 F.3d 407, 417 (6th Cir. 2001).

First the court must determine that there is a state procedural rule
that is applicable to the petitioner's claim and that the petitioner
failed to comply with the rule.
. . . .
Second, the court must decide whether the state courts actually
enforced the state procedural sanction, citing County Court of Ulster
County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 149, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777
(1979).

Third, the court must decide whether the state procedural forfeiture
is an "adequate and independent" state ground on which the state
can rely to foreclose review of a federal constitutional claim.

Once the court determines that a state procedural rule was not
complied with and that the rule was an adequate and independent
state ground, then the petitioner must demonstrate under Sykes that
there was "cause" for him to not follow the procedural rule and that
he was actually prejudiced by the alleged constitutional error.

Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986); accord, Hartman v. Bagley, 492 F.3d 347, 357
(6th Cir. 2007), quoting Monzo v. Edwards, 281 F.3d 568, 576 (6th Cir. 2002).
Ohio law provides a mechanism for excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment which is by way of motion to suppress2. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel will
excuse a failure to file a motion to suppress, but the defendant must first litigate the ineffective
assistance claim successfully in the state courts. The absence of a motion to suppress was evident

2 Motions to suppress are heard before trial and out of the presence of the jury. It would likely be futile to hold
suppression hearings in the presence of the jury and then, if the motion was granted, to tell a jury to disregard all they
had heard. The federal practice is the same as Ohio’s.
on the face of the appellate record, but Purpura did not raise that claim on appeal. Alternatively,
a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel which depends on material outside (dehors) the
appellate record can be raised in a petition to set aside the conviction under Ohio Revised Code §
2953.21, but Purpura never filed such an action, much less received a favorable outcome.
Ohio’s rule requiring that Fourth Amendment violations be raised by motion to suppress is

an adequate and independent state ground of decision. Riley v. Gray, 674 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1982).
Aside from being procedurally defaulted, Purpura’s Fourth Amendment claim is barred
from merits consideration by Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
Federal habeas corpus relief is not available to state prisoners who allege they were
convicted on illegally seized evidence if they were given a full and fair opportunity to litigate that
question in the state courts. Stone requires the district court to determine whether state procedure
in the abstract provides full and fair opportunity to litigate, and Ohio procedure does. The district
court must also decide if a Petitioner's presentation of claim was frustrated because of a failure of
the state mechanism. Habeas relief is allowed if an unanticipated and unforeseeable application of
a procedural rule prevents state court consideration of merits. Riley v. Gray, 674 F.2d 522 (6th Cir.

1982). The Riley court, in discussing the concept of a “full and fair opportunity,” held:

The mechanism provided by the State of Ohio for resolution of
Fourth Amendment claims is, in the abstract, clearly adequate. Ohio
R. Crim. P. 12 provides an adequate opportunity to raise Fourth
Amendment claims in the context of a pretrial motion to suppress,
as is evident in the petitioner’s use of that procedure. Further, a
criminal defendant, who has unsuccessfully sought to suppress
evidence, may take a direct appeal of that order, as of right, by filing
a notice of appeal. See Ohio R. App. P. 3(A) and Ohio R. App. P.
5(A). These rules provide an adequate procedural mechanism for the
litigation of Fourth Amendment claims because the state affords a
litigant an opportunity to raise his claims in a fact-finding hearing
and on direct appeal of an unfavorable decision.
Id. at 526. Stone applies to bar consideration of Fourth Amendment claims in § 2255 proceedings.
Ray v. United States, 721 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2013).
In sum, merits consideration of Purpura’s First Ground for Relief is barred by his failure
to fairly present it to the Ohio courts and by the Stone v. Powell doctrine.
In his Second Ground for Relief, Purpura asserts ineffective assistance of trial counsel3 and

prosecutorial misconduct. Respondent asserts this claim also is barred by procedural default
because it could have been litigated on the face of the appellate record but was not pleaded as a
claim on appeal. It is plain that neither one of these claims was raised on direct appeal and they
are therefore barred by procedural default. If Purpura claims that they depend on evidence outside
the appellate record, he faces the parallel difficulty that he has never filed a petition for post-
conviction relief under Ohio Revised Code § 2953.21.

Insufficient Evidence

In his Sixth Ground for Relief, Purpura claims he was convicted on insufficient evidence.
This states a claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). The Ohio Court of Appeals decided this claim on direct appeal. It
first noted the applicability of the Jackson standard as adopted for Ohio law in Jenks:
{¶ 5} When determining whether a conviction is supported by
sufficient evidence, “ ‘[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Wilks, 2018-
Ohio-1562, ¶ 156, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991),
paragraph two of the syllabus. When evaluating the sufficiency of
the evidence, a reviewing court considers “whether the evidence, ‘if

3 Purpura’s use of the word “appellee” is potentially confusing because he has never been an appellee in these
proceedings. Reading the word in context makes it clear he is talking about his own attorneys.
believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Pountney, 2018-Ohio-22, ¶
19, quoting Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus.

 * * *

{¶ 7} As to the offenses involved herein, the relevant statutory
provisions state in pertinent part as follows:

R.C. 2907.322 Pandering sexually oriented matter involving a
minor.
(A) No person, with knowledge of the character of the material or
performance involved, shall ... (1) Create, record, photograph, film,
develop, reproduce, or publish any material that shows a minor or
impaired person participating or engaging in sexual activity,
masturbation, or bestiality ....

R.C. 2907.323 Illegal use of minor in nudity-oriented material
or performance.
(A) No person shall ... (1) Photograph any minor ... in a state of
nudity, or create, direct, produce, or transfer any material or
performance that shows the minor ... in a state of nudity, ... (3)
Possess or view any material or performance that shows a minor ...
in a state of nudity ....

R.C. 2923.24 Possessing criminal tools.
(A) No person shall possess or have under the person's control any
substance, device, instrument, or article, with purpose to use it
criminally.

{¶ 8} The record in this case reflects that in June 2023, the Ohio
Internet Crimes Against Children (“ICAC”) Task Force received a
cyber tip from Dropbox concerning two files involving child
exploitation material that were uploaded to a Dropbox and were
linked to Purpura.

{¶ 9} In September 2023, a search warrant was executed at the home
where Purpura resided, and child exploitation material was found on
his cell phone. Purpura, who was on probation from a previous case,
told members of the ICAC task force that the files were old and that
he forgot to delete them. He also stated that if he deleted files of
child exploitation material, his addiction would get worse. Further,
he stated that it was an old Dropbox account that he never used and
that he did not know where the files came from. However, the
forensic analyst who examined Purpura's phone testified that the
files were not the same as those from the previous case. The forensic
analyst also provided testimony, from her training and experience,
regarding certain physical and/or developmental characteristics to
show that the images relating to the indicted counts were of minor
children. One was a video of a minor in a state of nudity who was
described as masturbating in a bathtub. The other images were each
of a child in a state of nudity.

{¶ 10} The ICAC investigator, who extracted data
from Purpura's phone and prepared an extraction report, noted a
Dropbox account and a Snapchat application that were being used.
He determined that the Dropbox application was installed
on Purpura's phone on June 3, 2023. The ICAC investigator testified
that there were 54 media files found on Purpura's phone that he
marked as “child exploitive” or as “age difficult,” meaning the
individual could be under 18 but the image was marked “age
difficult” to “play it safe.” Some appeared to be duplicate images,
and not all images resulted in charges.

{¶ 11} The ICAC investigator determined that the images were
on Purpura's phone on the day the search warrant was executed. He
testified regarding where files corresponding to the indicted charges
were located on Purpura's phone and to their access dates and
modification dates. The ICAC investigator stated that an “access
date” is “[w]hen the user accesses the file,” and a “modified date”
typically means “when the user interacted with the file ... in a way
that modified it or wrote to the file system.” He further indicated
that modification dates can mean clicking on the picture, opening it,
or viewing it. Though some files had the same access date and
modification date, the ICAC investigator indicated this would have
been the last time the user interacted with the file. Though image 54
did not have a known access or modified date, the ICAC investigator
determined that it was a cache file that appeared to come from the
Google Chrome application and that the image was
on Purpura's phone when the device was taken from Purpura.

{¶ 12} The ICAC investigator explained that a cache file “is just an
easy way to open a file you've already looked at to speed up the
process,” is “generated by user interaction on a device,” and “is
saved to load the image faster when looked at in the application it
was originally opened in.” In terms of Snapchat, the ICAC
investigator stated that the cache file “would be generated by [the
user] opening it.” Although the ICAC investigator was not “100
percent certain” whether it would be enough to just receive a
Snapchat that is stored on the Snapchat account without being
opened, he testified that a cache file “is only created as a result of
user interaction[,]” “[t]hat file isn't generated on its own[,]” and “[i]t
has to be prompted to create a cache file.” He further confirmed “if
somebody sends you something you don't like you can delete it” or
“block” the sender.

{¶ 13} Purpura testified in his defense. He denied downloading any
child pornography since his prior case, he denied having knowledge
of child pornography on his Snapchat account, he claimed he swiped
away images he accidentally clicked on without knowing the
content and tried to erase files, he claimed that he believed the
persons represented in certain photos were 18 to 21 years old, and
he offered other testimony in his defense. On cross-
examination, Purpura conceded that in his prior case, most of the
images he was getting were from Snapchat; and thereafter, he
continued to use Snapchat on his new phone despite knowing child
pornography images were sent to him on Snapchat.

{¶ 14} Other testimony and evidence were provided, and this court
has fully reviewed the record. We limit our review to the arguments
presented.

{¶ 15} Contrary to the arguments presented by appellant, sufficient
evidence was presented to show as applicable that Purpura had
reproduced or published the image to his device (Count 1), to show
that the images were transferred (Counts 2 and 3) or attempted to be
transferred (Count 5), and to show he viewed or possessed the image
(Count 4). There was testimony that Purpura told members of the
ICAC task force that the files were old and that he forgot to delete
them, yet there was testimony that the files were not the same and
multiple files were found on his device. There also was testimony to
modified and access dates associated with the files and to the
modification dates being indicative of the files being opened,
viewed, or clicked on. The trier of fact could reasonably infer from
the testimony and evidence that Purpura had knowledge of the
material in the images; and for Count 4, the State presented
sufficient evidence of recklessness, which is the culpable mental
state to R.C. 2907.323(A)(3). For Count 6, sufficient evidence was
presented for possessing criminal tools in violation of R.C.
2923.24(A). When viewing all the evidence in the record in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of each crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. The evidence is sufficient to support appellant's
conviction on each count, and we are not persuaded by any
of Purpura's arguments otherwise.

{¶ 16} Furthermore, after reviewing the entire record, weighing the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, and considering the
credibility of the witnesses, we do not find the trial court clearly lost
its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that his
convictions must be reversed. Although Purpura challenges the
testimony and evidence that were provided as to the age of the
individuals in the images, this is not the exceptional case in which
the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.

State v. Purpura, supra.

When a state court decides on the merits a federal constitutional claim later presented to a
federal habeas court, the federal court must defer to the state court decision unless that decision is
contrary to or an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established precedent of the
United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100
(2011); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-94 (2002);
Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 379 (2000); Bell v. Howes, 703 F.3d 848 (6th Cir. 2012).
"Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ 'if the state court applies
a rule different from the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases, or if it decides a
case differently than [the Supreme Court has] done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts."'
Lang v. Bobby, 889 F.3d 803, 810 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)).
"Under the 'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state
court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions but
unreasonably applies the law or bases its decision on an unreasonable determination of the facts,
in light of the record before the state court." Lang v. Bobby, 889 F.3d 803, 810 (6th Cir. 2018)
(citing Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13
(2000)).
"A state court decision involves 'an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding' only if it is shown that the state court's presumptively
correct factual findings are rebutted by 'clear and convincing
evidence' and do not have support in the record."
Under this deferential standard, we do not ask “whether the state court’s determination was
incorrect, but rather whether fair-minded jurists could disagree about whether the state court’s
decision conflicts with existing Supreme Court caselaw.” Allen v. Mitchell, 953 F.3d 858 (6th Cir.
2020), quoting Dewald v. Wriggelsworth, 748 F.3d 295, 301 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Harrington v.
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011)).

Purpura’s argument on Ground Six in his Reply is:
Ground 6; The information for this ground should be contained in
the transcript including all parts the sentencing hearing(transcribed
and not transcribed including any proceedings outside the presence
of the Petitioner). The Petitioner would like to request the evidence
of the searches of the snapchat account that show that all users'
searches came back with a negative result for the images. This
includes all information of the Dropbox account including the log of
events that were done on that account. This include all password
changes and logins associated with this account and what
information of account found on phone. This will confirm that the
information on the Dropbox account would differ from the ones on
the phone.

Reply, ECF No. 14, PageID 483.

Thus the Reply seems to ask that the Court obtain additional evidence not in the record and
evaluate the result based on all the evidence, new and old. This misunderstands the scope of habeas
corpus review. A habeas court in deciding whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence
is limited to the record which was before the state courts. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170
(2011). Pinholster bars a federal court “from admitting new evidence upon which to assess the
reasonableness of a state court's constitutional analysis.” Upshaw v. Stephenson, 97 F. 4th 365, 372
(6th Cir. 2024), quoting Mitchell v. Genovese, 974 F.3d 638, 647 (6th Cir. 2020). Petitioner offers
no argument as to why there was insufficient evidence on each element of the charged offenses or
why the Eighth District’s decision to the contrary is an objectively unreasonable application of
Jackson v. Virginia, supra. In contrast, the Magistrate Judge finds the Eighth District’s decision
was an objectively reasonable application of Jackson and is therefore entitled to deference. Ground
Six should therefore be denied on the merits.

Other Portions of Purpura’s Reply
In the course of his Reply, Purpura complains about the content of the Answer:

While each ground was raised the respondent did not properly
summit [sic] the answer by rules stated above [quoted from Habeas
Rule 5]. The answer did not indicate what transcripts and other
records are available, when they can be furnished, and what
proceedings have been recorded but not transcribed. The respondent
must attach to the answer parts of the transcript that the respondent
considers relevant. For this reason the document summited [sic]
should be noted as a waste of time and the previous delay as
unneeded and produced untimely delay.

(Reply, ECF No. 14, PageID 480). To the contrary, the record shows the Respondent filed two
volumes of trial transcript for a total of 291 pages (State Court Record, ECF No. 10). Respondent
reported regarding transcripts:
Pursuant to the Rules Governing §2254 Cases Rule 5, Respondent
has filed the parts of the transcript that are relevant to Purpura’s
claims. Respondent has a copy of the third volume of transcripts but
has not filed it at this time. The third volume of transcripts are
exhibits that include sensitive information from the National Center
for Missing and Exploited Children, the Ohio Internet Crimes
Against Children Task Force, and a psychology report for Purpura.
This volume is available should the Court order it.

(Return, ECF No. 11, PageID 448, n.1). Purpura has not adverted this portion of the trial transcript
nor argued for its inclusion. The Magistrate Judge finds the Respondent’s reservations about filing
volume 3 to be well taken and see no need to have it filed.
In the Reply, Petitioner also seeks discovery. See, e,g.,
The petitioner would like to also request the original information
sent to Icac [Internet Crimes Against Children] from Dropbox
because Mr. Purpura believes there was information that was
improperly summited or strode to allow the courts to grant the search
warrant after the discovery of the Dropbox account.

(Reply, ECF No. 14, PageID 482). Similar requests are made with respect to Grounds Two through
Six. The time for such requests would have been before trial. A habeas corpus court is not a
vehicle for a criminal defendant to pose public records requests.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Magistrate Judge respectfully recommends the
Petition be dismissed with prejudice. Because reasonable jurists would not disagree with this
conclusion, it is also recommended that Petitioner be denied a certificate of appealability and that
the Court certify to the Sixth Circuit that any appeal would be objectively frivolous and should not
be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis.

May 4, 2026.
s/ Michael R. Merz
United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days after being served with this Report
and Recommendations. Because this document is being served by mail, three days are added under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 6, but service is complete when the document is mailed, not when it is received. Such
objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party may respond to another party’s
objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections
in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. #

19

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11360381. Public record. Not legal advice.