# Siras

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · June 2, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11360173

## Case

- **Full name:** Cyril Andre Marcel Siras v. Idiatou Bah
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** June 2, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CYRIL ANDRE MARCEL SIRAS, No. 3:25-CV-02395

Petitioner, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

IDIATOU BAH,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JUNE 2, 2026
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner Cyril Andre Marcel Siras (“Petitioner”) filed a complaint against
Respondent Idiatou Bah (“Respondent”) and a petition seeking an emergency
temporary restraining order, both resulting out of the wrongful removal of Petitioner
and Respondent’s minor child E.J.K.B. (“E.J.K.B.”) to the United States.1 After the
petition was granted, Petitioner moved for the allocation of fees and costs to
Respondent.2
The fees and costs issue is now ripe for resolution. For the reasons addressed
below, Petitioner’s request for fees and costs is granted in part. Petitioner is entitled
to recover $14,349.93 from Respondent, consistent with the guidance provided
below and in the attached Appendix.

1 Doc. 1 (Compl.).
II. LAW
A. Procedural and Factual Background

Respondent mother and Petitioner father have a child together, E.J.K.B. The
parties had been involved in custody proceedings in France, but in July 2025,
Respondent brought the child to the United States under the guise of a vacation to
visit family.3 Petitioner eventually became concerned when Respondent would not

allow Petitioner to talk with the child over the phone, and discovered that
Respondent had left the child in the United States with family while Respondent
returned to France.4

On December 11, 2025, Petitioner filed a complaint under the Hague
Convention and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”).5
Petitioner sought a temporary restraining order prohibiting the removal of the child

from this jurisdiction, where the child was believed to reside at the time, until the
issue could be resolved by this Court.6
The Court granted Petitioner’s preliminary motion, entering a temporary
restraining order prohibiting the removal of the child from the jurisdiction of the

Court pending a hearing scheduled for December 22, 2025. The Court also ordered
proper service of Respondent, seizure of the child’s passport, and awarded

3 Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 28, 31. This evidence was also presented at the December 22, 2025 hearing.
4 Id. at ¶¶ 37-39.
5 Id
6 Id. at 19.
temporary custody of the child to Petitioner once he arrived in the United States,
given that Petitioner indicated the child was not with Respondent mother at the time.7

Following a hearing, the Court granted Petitioner’s motion and awarded
temporary custody of E.J.K.B. to Petitioner for the limited purpose of traveling with
the child back to all parties’ residence country of France until the imminent custody
hearing there could be completed.8

Afterwards, Petitioner moved for reallocation of costs and fees incurred in this
process to Respondent, citing the ICARA’s provision mandating fee shifting.9 The
Court considered Petitioner’s initial motion and, having found that Petitioner

provided insufficient supporting materials, directed Petitioner to submit additional
information.10
Petitioner has since submitted a revised fee statement addressing some of the
Court’s concerns.11 Respondent has at no point provided a response to Petitioner’s

initial motion for attorney’s fees nor to Petitioner’s revised fee statement; at this

7 Doc. 5 (Ord.).
8 Docs. 16-17.
9 Docs. 18-19.
10 Doc. 20 (Mem. Op. and Ord.) at 5 (requiring Petitioner to submit a revised fee statement
addressing enumerated concerns, including the identity, experience, and rate of each individual
billing time, information and argument as to why those rates were relevant given the vicinage
and type of case, information and argument as to why other claimed fees were reasonable and
necessary, and an explanation of why the award of fees and expenses would not be “clearly
inappropriate” given Respondent’s financial situation).
11 Doc. 21.
point, sufficient time has passed for the Court to presume no response is
forthcoming.

B. Legal Standard
Costs and fees are explicitly provided for under the Hague Convention on
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and its implementing statute,
ICARA.12 ICARA provides, in relevant part, that:

Any court ordering the return of a child pursuant to an
action brought under [ICARA] shall order the respondent
to pay necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf of the
petitioner, including court costs, legal fees, foster home or
other care during the course of the proceedings in the
action, and transportation costs related to the return of the
child, unless the respondent establishes that such order
would be clearly inappropriate.13
Courts have interpreted this as requiring the normal demonstrations for attorney’s
fees, namely the reasonableness and lodestar analysis, with an additional
determination of whether the requested fees and costs were necessary for the return
of the child.14 Once Petitioner establishes necessary costs, then the burden shifts to

12 22 U.S.C. § 9007.
13 Id. at § 9007(b)(3) (emphasis added); Hirts v. Hirts, 152 F. App’x 137, 139-140 (3d Cir. 2005).
14 See, e.g., Aldinger v. Segler, 157 F. App’x 317, 318 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that “the court also
has the obligation to determine whether the requested fees and costs were ‘necessary’ to secure
the children’s return.”); Fuentes-Rangal v. Woodman, 2:14-CV-00005, 2015 WL 12999707,
at *1-2 (N.D. Ga. July 29, 2015); Idkeidek v. Idkeidek, No. 2:25-CV-02903, 2026 WL 893187,
at *1-3 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 1, 2026); Gaston v. Gutierrez, No. 6:24-CV-1411, 2025 WL
2694981, at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. May 5, 2025) (Price, M.J.); Paulus v. Cordero, No. 3:12-CV-986,
2013 WL 432769, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2013) (applying the normal lodestar analysis for
ICARA fees); Whallon v. Lynn, 356 F.3d 138, 140 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that, in ICARA
cases, district courts have “broad discretion” to determine fees).
Respondent to show that an award would be clearly inappropriate, should they raise
such arguments.15

C. Analysis
As the Court previously ordered the child returned pursuant to the Hague
Convention,16 ICARA’s fee shifting provision is applicable here. Petitioner seeks to

recover a variety of costs and fees, including: filing costs, transportation and lodging
fees, private investigator fees, translation fees, and attorney’s fees. Each is addressed
in turn.
1. Filing & Translation Fees

Petitioner seeks to recover $405 for “Federal Filing Fees – Complaint.”17
Petitioner also seeks to recover $200 for the $50/hour translation services of Andrew
Stafford used at trial.18 The Court finds both of these fees to be both reasonable and

necessary, given that the court proceeding was required to effectuate the return of
the child and Petitioner’s native language is French.19 Accordingly, the Court will
award $605 for filing and translation fees.

15 Cillikova v. Cillik, No. 15-2823, 2016 WL 541134, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2016) (Wettre, M.J.).
16 Doc. 16.
17 Doc. 21-4; Doc. 19-2 at 22 (filing fee receipt).
18 Doc. 19-2 at 29 (receipt of Andrew Stafford payment).
19 See Isais v. Araque, No. 23-935, 2023 WL 11228077, at *5 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2023) (Wettre,
M.J.) (finding the reimbursement of filing fee reasonable and necessary); Paulus ex rel. P.F.V.
v. Cordero, No. 3:12-CV-986, 2013 WL 432769, *4-5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2013) (awarding
translation services).

The translation services at trial did not appear to be, in the Court’s view, particularly high-
quality given Petitioner had an abundance of confusion surrounding nearly each interpretation
2. Hotel & Lodging Costs
Petitioner also requests costs associated with travel: Petitioner’s flights to and

from France; the flight back to France for E.J.K.B.; $200 for the “car to Newark
Airport;” one room at the “ESA Suites” from December 17 to 21, 2025; two rooms
at the Residence Inn in Williamsport from December 21 to 22, 2025; one room at

the Hampton Inn in Bethlehem from December 22 to 23, 2025; and $193.60 for
mileage and tolls from Williamsport to Bethlehem. The Court will categorize these
costs as airfare, hotels, and automobile transit.
First, the airfare. Petitioner requests $1,725.00 for flights to and from France

for himself and $1,116 for the flight back to France with the minor child.20 Flight
reimbursements are appropriate here, as the hearing was held in the Court’s
jurisdiction and Petitioner was located in France.21 Additionally, while the flights

are indeed expensive, for a last-minute international flight near the holidays, the cost
is not unreasonably high. The booking is in economy, and done in round trip
pricing.22 Accordingly, the Court will award Petitioner $1,725 and $1,116
respectively for these flights, totaling $2,841 for airfare.

given. However, with the low price of services, this cost is reasonable and appropriate given
the nature of the proceeding. See Cillikova, 2016 WL 541134, at *3 (finding the translation
costs of $383.89 reasonable).
20 Doc. 19-2 at 26 (receipt of the return flight for E.J.K.B.) and 28 (receipt of Petitioner’s flights).
Petitioner’s flights were listed in Euros, but have been converted to USD in Petitioner’s
summary invoice. Doc. 19-2. The Court has finds the conversion reasonable, so will award the
requested converted amount.
21 Distler v. Distler, 26 F. Supp. 2d 723, 728 (D.N.J. 1998) (awarding flights).
22 Doc. 19-2 at 27 (itinerary).
Next, the Court addresses the claimed hotel costs. Hotel costs incurred in
attending the ICARA proceeding, where necessary and appropriate, have been found

awardable.23 Petitioner requests: $365.16 for one room for four nights at ESA Suites
from December 17 to 21, 2025; $378.78 for two rooms at the Residence Inn in
Williamsport from December 21 to 22, 2025; and $176.41 for one room at the

Hampton Inn in Bethlehem from December 22 to 23, 2025.
The hearing was held on December 22, 2025 in Williamsport, Pennsylvania.
Given that this hearing required international and domestic travel, Petitioner’s
request for multiple hotel nights is reasonable in part. However, a hotel stay

beginning the Wednesday before a Monday hearing is not entirely reasonable.24
Given the circumstances of this hearing, the Court views as appropriate and
awardable hotel costs for December 20 to 23, which gives a day for both

23 Neves v. Neves, 637 F. Supp. 2d 322, 344 (W.D. N.C. 2009); Soulier v. Matsumoto, 2022 WL
17250549, No. 20-4720, at *9 (D.N.J. Nov. 28, 2022) (Hammer, M.J.) (on partial
reconsideration at 2023 WL 11987858 lowering the award for failure to consider Respondent’s
poor financial situation); Paulus, 2013 WL 432769, at *3 (reducing lodging expenses from
four to two nights).
24 Petitioner argues that these hotel stays were necessary due to the Court’s order that, once
Petitioner arrived in the area, he should have custody of E.J.K.B. However, as other Courts
have held, “[a]lthough the Court can certainly appreciate Petitioner’s desire to spend time with
his [c]hild[],” visitation costs are not awardable. Soulier v. Matsumoto, 2022 WL 17250549,
at *9; Aldinger v. Segler, 157 F. App’x 317, 318 (1st Cir. 2005). Only those expenses necessary
to the return of the child may be awarded, and it was not necessary for Petitioner to come
several days earlier than the proceeding required. See also Gaston v. Gutierrez, No. 6:24-CV-
1411, 2025 WL 2694981, at *6 (M.D. Fla. May 5, 2025) (Price, M.J.); Escobar Villatoro v.
Figueredo, 8:15-CV-1134, 2015 WL 6150769, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 16, 2015). Indeed, once
Petitioner arrived, he did not receive custody of the child; instead, Respondent brought the
child to the hearing. While Petitioner may have perceived an early arrival as necessary for the
return of the child, his early arrival was not actually necessary for the child’s return.
international arrival and departure as well as domestic travel to and from the
hearing.25 Accordingly, the Court will award the hotel costs requested from

December 20 to 23, 2025.
Additionally, Petitioner requested two rooms, one for him and one for
counsel, at the Residence Inn in Williamsport from December 21 to 22, 2025.

Petitioner explained the need for two rooms in Williamsport the night before the
proceeding was for caution regarding winter weather and due to Petitioner’s
counsel’s medical need to avoid multiple lengthy car drives in one day.26 The Court
finds this request reasonable and necessary for the return of the child.

Examining the receipts, the Court calculates the awardable lodging costs now.
First, the ESA suite receipt for December 20 lists the total room cost as $108.89.27
Petitioner and his counsel then traveled to Williamsport for the hearing on December

22, 2025, submitting two rooms at the Residence Inn from December 21 to 22, 2025
at $165.39 per room per night. In the overall invoice, Petitioner claims this as
$378.78,28 but $165.39 plus $165.39 totals to $330.78. Finally, Petitioner submits
the receipt for one night at the Hampton Inn and Suites in Bethlehem from December

22 to 23, 2025. Petitioner claims this total as $176.41, but the Court notes that $12

25 The Court is awarding extra days for international travel given the distance from the Court to
a major international airport.
26 Doc. 21 at 12-13.
27 Doc. 19-2 at 31.
28 Doc. 21-4.
of this receipt came from charges listed as “Suite Shop.”29 With no explanation for
this $12 charge, which appears to be a charge from the hotel store or minibar, the

Court will not award the $12. Thus, the awardable Hampton Suites cost totals
$164.41. In sum, the awardable lodging costs are $604.08.
Finally, Petitioner requests $200 for “Car to Newark Airport (cash to driver)”

and $193.60 for mileage and tolls for the round trip from Williamsport to Bethlehem,
reimbursing 268 miles at .70 per mile with $6.00 of tolls. The Court finds these costs
to be reasonable and appropriate, particularly in light of Petitioner’s counsel’s
willingness to use her personal vehicle and avoid the costs of a rental car.

Accordingly, Petitioner will be awarded $393.60 for automobile transportation fees.
In total, Petitioner’s awardable transportation and lodging fees are $2,841 for
airfare, $604.08 for lodging, and $393.60 for automobile transportation fees. This

results in $3,838.68 in transportation costs.
3. Private Investigator Fees
Next, Petitioner submits that he should be entitled to $2,925 for “French
Connection Research – Private Investigator.” However, Petitioner has not met his

burden to show that such costs were necessary to the return of the child, so the Court
declines to award expenses related to the Private Investigator.

29 Doc. 19-2 at 34.
Petitioner submits a receipt for this cost with three line-items: “Enquete New
York, communication, rapport,” “Surveillance Pennsylvanie Gregory Myers,” and

“Surveillance Pennsylvanie.”30 Not only are these items in French, but Petitioner
also provides essentially no explanation or argument for the details of these expenses
nor to why these expenses were “necessary” to the return of the child.

Petitioner explained that Petitioner retained the services of a Private
Investigator in New York who “took the lead on locating the child,” and, after
investigation, reported to Petitioner that the child was staying in Monroe County.31
The Private Investigator “attempted to obtain sighting of the child in Monroe

County” but could not.32 It was made immediately clear at the hearing that the child
was not residing in Monroe County, meaning the Private Investigator’s work was
entirely unhelpful to the case. Moreover, the Private Investigator’s “evidence” of the

child’s residing in Monroe County appeared to have been provided by Petitioner
himself, as Petitioner believed the child was staying there because of other
information he possessed.33
Petitioner has established only that the investigator visited Respondent’s

mother’s residence in New York City and was told the child was not present, which

30 Doc. 19-2 at 24.
31 Doc. 21 at ¶¶ 10-13.
32 Id. at ¶ 12.
33 Id. at ¶¶ 11-13 (“Petitioner provided available evidence that the minor child had been in
Monroe County in the fall, only two months before preparing the Hague Convention matter,
and believed that the child was staying there because Second and Third Respondent arranged
for Petitioner to speak with the child apparently in their home in Monroe County.”).
was untrue, and then attempted unsuccessfully to surveil the child in Monroe
County.34 The Court does not see how these unsuccessful surveillance efforts helped

return the child to France in any way. Indeed, it appears that Petitioner was
independently aware of individuals with whom the child may be residing and was
able to contact them without any additional information provided by the Private
Investigator.35 As such, Petitioner has not met its burden to show that the private

investigator fees were necessary to the return of the child.
Additionally, Petitioner has not provided any legal authority for the award of
private investigator fees in such cases, nor has Petitioner explained why such costs

were reasonable. For instance, Petitioner has not provided any information regarding
similar rates of private investigators in the area. Moreover, the line items listed in
the receipt for surveillance36 are akin to impermissible overbroad block billing,37 as

Petitioner has not provided information explaining the factual circumstances for
each of the charges. The Court accordingly declines to award Petitioner the fees

34 Doc. 21 at ¶¶ 11-13. This is despite the Court’s request in the prior Memorandum Opinion and
Order that Petitioner should explain why the investigator fees are reasonable and necessary
“given that the investigator’s research seemingly did not provide the accurate location of the
child based on testimony received at the December 22, 2025 hearing.” Doc. 20 at 5, n.12. The
Court gave Petitioner a second chance to provide the information that would justify an award
of such fees here. Petitioner has not done so.
35 Doc. 21 at ¶¶ 11-13. While Respondent did not tell Petitioner where the child was, neither did
the Private Investigator discover that information.
36 Doc. 19-2 at 24.
37 PHL6 LLC, v. Pennbrook Portfolio CC, LLC, No. 25CV247, 2026 WL 906166, at *7 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 2, 2026) (“Plaintiff has attached only an exhibit listing the total invoice amount and
has not provided billing records, the hours worked, the hourly rates charged, or any affidavit
addressing the reasonableness of the requested fees. On this record, an award of attorneys’ fees
is not warranted, as Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden to justify the fee request.”).
incurred with the hiring of a private investigator service, as Petitioner has not shown
the costs were necessary to the return of the child nor met its prima facie case to

show that the costs were reasonable.
4. Attorney’s Fees
“A party seeking attorney[’s] fees bears the ultimate burden of showing that
its requested hourly rates and the hours it claims are reasonable.”38 “To initially

satisfy this burden, the fee petitioner must submit evidence supporting the hours
worked and rates claimed.”39 Billing records should be sufficiently detailed to allow
the Court to determine if the hours claimed are reasonable for the work performed.40

The Court uses the lodestar method to evaluate such a request for attorney’s
fees, which involves multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by each
attorney by a reasonable hourly billing rate.41 “To inform and assist the court in the

38 Interfaith Comm. Org. v. Honeywell Intern. Inc., 426 F.3d 694, 703 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation and citation omitted). In the revised submission, Petitioner argues that it is
Respondent’s burden to prove the requested rates are unreasonable. Doc. 21-5 at ¶ 31. Not so.
See Carey v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 496 F. App’x 234, 237 (3d Cir. 2012). While true that,
under ICARA, the Respondent has the burden to prove such an award is clearly inappropriate
if they choose to raise as much as an affirmative defense, the Petitioner must always
demonstrate such amount is reasonable. Id. The Court clearly enumerated as much to Petitioner
in the Court’s most recent Memorandum Opinion. Doc. 20 at 2. Instead of submitting such
materials to show that the rate is reasonable, Petitioner continued to argue that it is
Respondent’s burden.
39 Honeywell Intern. Inc., 426 F.3d at 703 n.5 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
40 Gelis v. BMW of North Am., LLC, 49 F. 4th 371, 379-380 (3d Cir. 2022); PHL6 LLC, 2026
WL 906166, at *7 (where an invoice exhibit without billing records was insufficient to justify
an award of fees).
41 Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 551 (2010); Distler v. Distler, 26 F. Supp. 2d
723, 727 (D.N.J. 1998); Fridlund v. Spychaj-Fridlund, 2009 WL 4168192, at *1 (E.D. Ky.
Nov. 23, 2009) (collecting cases).
exercise of its discretion, the burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory
evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits—that the requested rates are

in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of
reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.”42 However, without more,
an attorney’s own affidavits regarding the reasonableness of her rate are insufficient
to independently justify an award of fees.43 Where counsel fails to properly support

the hourly rate requested, reduction is appropriate.44 Should the requesting party fail
to meet the prima facie case of establishing the reasonableness of fees, the district
court “‘has the discretion to determine what award is reasonable.’”45

Additionally, in ICARA cases, only those fees that Petitioner has shown were
necessary to the return of the child may be recovered.46 Hours devoted to matters
regarding the underlying custody case would not be recoverable, unless the
petitioner can prove the work was necessary for returning the child.47 Moreover,

42 Young v. Smith, 269 F. Supp. 3d 251, 267 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (Brann, J.).
43 Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984); Holmes v. Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist, 205 F.3d
583, 595 (3d Cir. 2000) (overruled in part on other grounds).
44 See, e.g., Campana v. Muir, 615 F. Supp. 871, 881 (M.D. Pa. 1985); Drake v. Perrin, 593 F.
Supp. 1176, 1178 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
45 Holmes v. Am. HomePatient, Inc., 2025 WL 321829, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2025) (Brann,
J.) (quoting Carey v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 496 F. App’x 234, 237 (3d Cir. 2012)); Borrell v.
Bloomsburg Univ., 207 F. Supp. 3d 454, 510 (M.D. Pa. 2016).
46 See supra, notes 14-15.
47 See Clark v. Board of Educ. Of Twp. Of Neptune, 907 F. Supp. 826, 830 (D.N.J. 1995) (citing
to Gulfstream III Assocs. Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1993)).
where an attorney’s claimed fees are matters properly tended to by paralegals or
legal assistants, the Court is justified in awarding a lower rate.48

a. Reasonable Rate for Linda Shay Gardner
Petitioner has failed to meet its prima facie case to show that Attorney Linda
Shay Gardner’s requested rate of $450 per hour is reasonable. First, despite the

Court’s instruction to do so, Petitioner has not provided the necessary legal support
for the requested rate. Petitioner has not provided similar cases in similar
jurisdictions awarding a similar rate; instead, Petitioner cites few cases in support of
its claimed fees, but none addressing the pertinent issue.49

Petitioner describes Neves v. Neves, a case decided in the Charlotte Division
of the Western District of North Carolina, as an instance where Attorney Gardner’s
hourly rate of “$325 per hour . . . [was] found reasonable.”50 Quite the contrary. In

Neves, the Court noted that “the Petitioner did not file any affidavits from other
attorneys regarding the prevailing market rates of attorneys in the [area] for similar
cases involving the Hague Convention,” finding “the evidence supplied by the

48 Loughner v. Univ. of Pgh., 260 F.3d 173, 180 (3d Cir. 2001); In re Domus BWW Funding,
LLC, 653 B.R. 745, 764 (E.D. Pa. 2023); Soulier v. Matsumoto, 2022 WL 17250549, at *5.
49 Rath v. Marcoski, 898 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2018) (establishing that the Petitioner must prove
the fees are clearly inappropriate if she so raises the defense, but nowhere addressing the rates
appropriately awarded); Souratgar v. Lee Jen Fair, 818 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2016) (same); Hirts
v. Hirts, 152 F. App’x 137, 139-140 (3d Cir. 2005) (affirming the District Court’s award of
Attorney Gardner’s “full hourly rate of $200.00 for office work and $225.00 for court
appearances.”).
50 Doc. 21-5 at ¶ 28. Note, there are multiple paragraphs labeled as ¶ 28. The Court is referring
to the one on page 7 on Doc. 21-5.
Petitioner’s attorneys . . . inadequate to support the attorney’s fee award sought” and
reducing Attorney Gardner’s rate to $275 per hour.51 The Court is baffled by

Petitioner’s mischaracterization of a case where counsel’s rate was the subject
matter. Similarly, in Hirts v. Hirts, which Petitioner cites in support, the Third
Circuit affirmed in part the District Court’s award of Attorney Gardner’s “full hourly
rate of $200.00 for office work and $225.00 for court appearances.”52 Neither of the

cases provided by Petitioner awarded the claimed $450 an hour.
Moreover, Petitioner has not provided the necessary factual information to
support her rate. Attorney Gardner submitted an affidavit detailing her experience

and her assertions that her rate is reasonable. However, as noted above, an attorney’s
own affidavit regarding the reasonableness of her rate is insufficient to justify a
rate.53 It is ipse dixit. The Court informed Petitioner of this very fact and gave

Petitioner a second chance to correct the deficiencies in Petitioner’s fee
submission.54 Petitioner declined to do so. Instead, Petitioner submits in her affidavit
that she “reached out” to other counsel and details their rates.55 This information
does not describe those attorneys’ backgrounds, experience, and is not submitted in

a separate affidavit from those attorneys. Petitioner also has not shown that those

51 Neves v. Neves, 637 F. Supp. 2d 322, 342 (W.D. N.C. 2009).
52 Hirts, 152 F. App’x at 139-140 (affirming in part In re Application of Hirts, 2004 WL 1588227,
at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 2004)).
53 See supra, note 43.
54 Doc. 20 at 3 n.5.
55 Doc. 21-5 at 5.
attorneys practice in this vicinage; one she describes as practicing in “New York”
and the other in “Maryland.”56 These offhanded references are inadequate to support

counsel’s claimed rate for this type of matter in this vicinage.
As support for her rate, Petitioner submitted the “Fitzpatrick Matrix” and the
“Community Legal Services” range of hours; the former details the rates for complex

federal litigation in the District of Columbia, the latter for Philadelphia law firm
rates.57 Not only was this case far afield from “complex federal litigation,”
Williamsport’s market is different in kind than the rates for the District of Columbia
and Philadelphia. Neither of these submissions provide support for Petitioner’s

claimed rate of $450 per hour in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
As Petitioner has failed to meet the prima facie case to establish a reasonable
rate for this type of case in this type of vicinage, the Court must now independently

determine a reasonable rate for the work performed in this case. For the following
reasons, I find that Attorney Gardner’s rate in this case should be reduced to $300
per hour.
I have previously set the range of reasonable hourly rates in the Williamsport

vicinage, most recently in Holmes v. American HomePatient, Inc.58 In Holmes, I
determined that the range of reasonable hourly rates in Williamsport consisted of

56 Id.
57 Doc. 21-7, Doc. 21-8.
58 2025 WL 321829, at *10.
rates between $230 to $375.59 Other courts have addressed the reasonable rates for
ICARA cases, and while many are outside this vicinage, these cases offer guidance

for this Court’s determination.60
First, there are many factors justifying an award at the higher end of the
Williamsport rate in this case. Attorney Gardner graduated from Temple University

School of Law in 1995 and has been practicing since, totaling over thirty years of
legal experience.61 Moreover, Attorney Gardner specializes in international family
law and ICARA; she has been qualified as an expert on international family law and
child abduction and gives presentations to other lawyers both domestically and

internationally on issues of international family law issues.62 Additionally, the
nature of the case justifies a higher award, as this was an exigent matter requiring
immediate action on several occasions.63

Furthermore, the Court was quite satisfied with Attorney Gardner’s
performance in the case, having observed her presentation firsthand. Attorney

59 Id.
60 See Paulus ex rel. P.F.V. v. Cordero, 2013 WL 432769, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2013) (finding
the hourly rates of $165, $260, and $300 reasonable for varying ranges of experience in
Wilkes-Barre); Best v. Best, 1:15-cv-81, 2016 WL 5402717, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2016)
(finding an hourly rate of $199.72 reasonable); Isais v. Araque, 2023 WL 11228077, at *3-4
(D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2023) (Wettre, M.J.) (finding a $400-$425 hourly rate reasonable for the
district of New Jersey); McElligott v. Mcelligott, No. 23-3175, 2023 WL 6923493, at *3
(D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2023) (accepting a rate of $200 per hour as reasonable); Soulier v. Matsumoto,
2022 WL 17250549, at *3 (finding $300 and $200 per hour reasonable);
61 Doc. 21-6 at 1-3.
62 Id. at 2.
63 For instance, the Court requested immediate submission on the issue of whether the Court
could order passports seized, which was a tight turnaround for counsel.
Gardner received a swift, favorable result for her client. Attorney Gardner’s
declaration indicates several areas where she reduced costs for her client, including

using French-speaking friends to translate conversations and meeting with Petitioner
over meals without billing.64
Yet, there are also several factors justifying a lower hourly rate in this case.65

While exigent, this was a relatively routine ICARA matter. There was only one
hearing in this matter lasting a few hours, and, given Attorney Gardner’s experience
in this area, minimal research should have been necessary for the task. The majority
of hours billed by Attorney Gardner, upon review of Petitioner’s hours log, involve

emails or communications with Petitioner himself. Most of the hours logged were
quasi-administrative or logistical tasks. There was not extensive motion practice in
this case, as Respondent made no motions and gave no responses to Petitioner’s

submissions.
Additionally, as discussed above, Petitioner has not provided any materials to
support the award of fees besides her extensive experience. Petitioner only submitted
Gardner’s own affidavit, and did not provide attestations from local practitioners that

64 Doc. 21 at ¶¶ 27, 31.
65 The Court also notes Respondent’s pro se status, and heard testimony at trial that she does not
have significant resources and struggles to earn income. However, because Respondent has
not placed any materials on the record to indicate that an award would significantly impact her
ability to care for the child, the Court does not take into consideration her perceived financial
situation.
Gardner’s work is standard in the field or that the rate is reasonable.66 The case law
is clear that such a submission is insufficient.67 The only comparable cases Petitioner

submitted resulted in awards of $275 and $225, far below counsel’s claimed rate of
$450. Moreover, the fee submission’s abysmally disorganized nature has required
the Court to recalculate each line submission.68 As noted previously, where award
submissions are insufficiently supported, reduction is appropriate.69

The Court also notes the striking similarity of counsel’s deficiencies in this
case to the very case cited by Petitioner, Neves v. Neves. In Neves, the court explicitly
found that the same deficiencies at issue here, namely counsel’s failure to “file any

affidavits from other attorneys regarding the prevailing market rates of attorneys in
the [area],” rendered counsel’s submissions inadequate to support the fee award
sought.70 Counsel’s disregard of the guidance from both the Western District of

North Carolina in Neves and this Court’s previous Memorandum Opinion suggests

66 These deficiencies are especially frustrating where the Court gave counsel a second chance to
bring the submissions up to par.
67 See supra note 43.
68 When asked to do so, counsel submitted an excel sheet hours log instead of adding the rates
and identities of billing individuals to the existing hours log. Doc. 21-2. This excel sheet
summary successfully added the rates, but excluded the description of why the hours were
incurred. So, the Court had to return to the original chart and recalculate the rates of every line
entry billed to determine who was billing what. The Court cannot overstate the frustration
brought about by this task.
69 See supra, note 44. When a party submits an inadequate fee petition, a district court may reduce
the award or, in some circumstances, outright deny fees. See Bair v. Purcell, No. 1:04-CV-
1357, 2009 WL 77828, at *18 (citing Pawlak v. Greenawalt, 713 F.2d 972, 978 (3d Cir. 1983)).
70 637 F. Supp. 2d at 341-42.
an intentional indifference to the required materials for an award of attorney’s fees,
and weighs against a high rate.

In sum, and considering all the aforementioned factors, the Court finds that a
rate of $300 per hour is reasonable for Attorney Gardner’s work in this case.71 This
rate is appropriate given Attorney Gardner’s experience, her appearance in the

Williamsport vicinage, Petitioner’s deficient fee submission, and the nature of the
case.
b. Reasonable Rate for Attorney Hilary Mack
Next, Petitioner requests the award of fees billed at $300 per hour by the

associate attorney “Hilary Mack.”72 Petitioner’s excel sheet indicates a total of six
such hours, but the hours log only appears to provide 4.5 total hours billed at $300
per hour73 and .4 total hours billed at a rate of $325 per hour.74 Petitioner did not

even identify Mack as a billing individual in the original fee submission, and only

71 Given that ICARA explicitly mandates the shifting of fees, the Court considered but ultimately
declined to hold that Petitioner had waived fees entirely due to the deficiencies in the fee
submission. The Court also considered, and also ultimately declined, to award the same amount
awarded in the comparator cases Petitioner provided.
72 Doc. 21-5 at 4.
73 Doc. 19-2 at 10 (“Invoice 1,” the invoice from January 31, 2026) listing two entries for 1.5
hours at $300 per hour; Doc. 19-2 at 18 (“Invoice 3,” the invoice from December 20, 2025)
listing 1.5 hours at $300 per hour.
74 Doc. 19-2 at 15 (“Invoice 3,” the invoice from December 20, 2025). On the updated excel
sheet, these two entries are attributed to Attorney Gardner’s column, reduced for some reason
unknown to the court to $325 per hour.

The Court must presume that the remaining hours come from fees incurred in developing this
fees litigation. The Court presumes this because no entry log of any additional fees was
submitted. The Court declines to award any fees without proper hours logs, and, as discussed
below, will decline to award fees on fees due to the deficiency of counsel’s submissions.
did so following the Court’s directive. However, Petitioner failed to provide
sufficient information justifying the award of the requested rate for Mack’s work.

The sum total of information Petitioner provided regarding Mack is contained
in one line: “the Associate Attorney, Hilary Mack, has completed work in many
Hague Cases and has at least fifteen years of experience in these cases [and] bills at
$300 per hour.”75 This line provides no information from which the Court can

conclude that an award of fees for Mack’s requested rate is justified. Petitioner did
not submit a resume for Mack and did not provide other cases where Mack’s fees
have been awarded. And, just as Petitioner failed to provide affidavits in support of

reasonable rates for Attorney Gardner, so too does that deficiency weigh against
Mack’s fees.
Due to the patent insufficiency of information supporting an award for Mack’s

fees, and given that the Court has no information as to Mack’s background, the Court
will award the bottom of the range for reasonable Williamsport rates, which I have
previously set at $230 per hour.76 However, the Court will only award the hours
submitted in a billing log with sufficient detail as to justify an award; the additional

75 Doc. 21-5 at ¶ 18(a).
76 Holmes, 2025 WL 321829, at *9.
1.5 hours which has appeared in Petitioner’s second submission without a
supplemental hours log will not be awarded.77

c. Reasonable Rate for the Paralegal
Next, Petitioner requests fees awarded for hours expended by “the paralegal”
at a rate of $150 per hour.78 Petitioner does not provide the identity of the paralegal

and, as with Mack’s fees, Petitioner offers only one line regarding the paralegal’s
experience: “[t]he paralegal, who has worked in the Gardner firm for approximately
seven years, has the skills necessary to manage the technical aspects of filings and
service of process and bills.”79

Similar to the fees requested for Mack, without information regarding the
paralegal’s relevant experience and background to meet Petitioner’s prima facie
case, the Court will award the bottom of the reasonable range for paralegals in the

area. In Holmes, I noted that other cases in this district have established the range
for paralegals as between $75 and $170 per hour.80 Accordingly, I will reduce the
paralegal’s rate in this case to $75 per hour.

77 The Court cannot overemphasize enough that an excel sheet without explanation for each entry
falls far short of a proper fees submission. Only those hours logged with some sort of
explanations will be awarded.
78 Doc. 21-5 at ¶ 18(b).
79 Id.
80 Holmes, 2025 WL 321829, at *10 (collecting cases).
d. Requested Fees for Helene Carvallo
Finally, Petitioner submits one entry for the fees incurred by Helene Carvallo,

Petitioner’s French Counsel. The total of $4,500 is listed on the summary invoice
sheet for Carvallo’s work.81 Despite checking several times, the Court finds no hours
log for Carvallo’s work. The only indication of what Carvallo charged Petitioner is

from one line on the total invoice.
This is an egregious form of block billing. Petitioner has not provided any
indication of the total amount of hours worked, nor what those hours were incurred
for. As the Court held in the previous Memorandum Opinion, by declining to provide

any of the information necessary for the Court to conduct the lodestar method,
Petitioner has waived the right to recover fees incurred by Carvallo.82
The Court finds it appropriate to address another issue here, and will touch on

it again below. Throughout the existing hours log for the Gardner law firm, there are
several instances of reported billing for communications sent to Carvallo.83 For
instance, Petitioner logged hours spent to “communicate with Petitioner’s counsel
in France . . . to provide a copy of the Court’s Order and an explanation of the status

of the return of the Petitioner and minor child to France.” Petitioner has failed to

81 Doc. 21-4 (Exhibit D).
82 Doc. 20 at 4.
83 See, e.g., Doc. 19-2 at 16 (“Email to Helene Carvallo in France re strategy”).
explain why these communications to Carvallo were necessary for the return of the
child, and they will be excised.84

To the extent that the communications to Carvallo were incurred for the
purpose of keeping Carvallo abreast for Petitioner’s French custody case, that case
is separate from the ICARA proceeding, and Petitioner has not shown why work

incurred for the separate proceeding would be necessary for the return of the child.
To the extent that Carvallo was in some way contributing to the instant proceeding,
Petitioner has not met his prima facie case to show that these fees were reasonably
incurred. Petitioner has not provided any information about Carvallo’s background,

experience, education, or what type of work she was performing. Petitioner has not
explained why counsel was communicating with her nor how that furthered the
child’s return.

Additionally, Petitioner has not explained why these communications with
Carvallo would not be redundant to the work of the Garnder firm.85 Awarding fees
for the time spent informing French counsel about the work American counsel was
doing would be excessive and duplicative, particularly where the Court has no

84 Cf Distler, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 728 (where Petitioner explained the specific ways foreign counsel
assisted the litigation which was not redundant to the work performed by domestic counsel,
award of fees was appropriate. However, the Court cut the fees by one third to account for the
work relating to the foreign custody case).
85 McKenna v. City of Phila., 582 F.3d 447, 455 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that courts should
exclude redundant hours); Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Federal Agents, Employees
or Officers, 855 F.2d 1080, 1094 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting that overlapping defenses are not
awardable for duplicative or excessive effort).
information from Petitioner to justify Carvallo’s involvement here. Accordingly, the
Court will excise fees incurred solely in communicating with Carvallo.

e. Reasonable Hours
After calculating the reasonable hourly rates for each billing individual, the
Court will now calculate which hours were reasonably incurred, as it is the fee
petitioners’ duty to establish that the number of hours expended was reasonable.86

There are several categories of claimed fees that will be excised, described broadly
by category below.
The Court also notes that in the revised fee submission, the total amount of

fees sought for the work of the Gardner Law Office increased from the original
invoice without a supplemental description of hours.87 There are also a few hours
logged in March on the excel sheet, while the billing logs provided only run through
January.88 Only those fees logged with entries describing the work performed will

be awarded.89 As the revised fee submission contained no such hours log, only fees
submitted in the original log will be considered.

86 McKenna, 582 F.3d at 455; Rayna P. v. Campus Comm. Sch., 390 F. Supp. 3d 556, 561 (D.
Del. 2019) (“The party seeking attorney’s fees has the burden to prove that its request for
attorney’s fees is reasonable. To meet its burden, the fee petitioner must submit evidence
supporting the hours worked and the rates claimed.”) (internal quotations omitted)).
87 Doc. 21-4 (listing two amounts sought for two different date ranges, one at $21,100 and the
other at $1,907.50).
88 Doc. 21-3.
89 See In re Art Shirt Ltd., Inc., 30 B.R. 318, 320 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (only allowing entries with
sufficient itemization to justify an award).
The Court has created a table, constructed from the invoices / original billing
log provided in Doc. 19-2, to calculate the awardable fees. This table, attached as

Appendix A, depicts the date and description of logged fees, whether the fees are
reduced or excised in total, the reason for the reduction or excision demarcated by a
letter corresponding to a below rationale, the individual billing the hours, the claimed

rate, the ultimately awarded rate, the claimed hours, and the total award for the entry.
As I have previously reduced each of the individuals’ fees to what I have
determined to be a reasonable rate, $300 for Attorney Gardner, $230 for Attorney
Mack, and $75 for the paralegal, such reductions will be listed as “RR,” meaning

reasonable rate, for the rationale. The other excision categories, discussed in length
below, are as follows: A for fees relating to calls with Carvallo, A(1) when reduced
in part; B for fees relating to the private investigator; C for fees on fees; D for travel

fees; and E for fees properly billed at a paralegal rate. These are the categories for
which Petitioner has failed to establish that the hours worked were reasonably
incurred. Additionally, the individuals billing will be demarcated by a “G” for
Gardner, “M” for Mack, and “P” for Paralegal.

i. “A” and “A(1)” – Carvallo Fees
As discussed above, Petitioner has not shown why communications with
French counsel Carvallo were necessary to the return of the child and not redundant

to the work of the Gardner law firm. Accordingly, fees claimed on the hours log
related to communications with Carvallo will be excised, as Petitioner has not met
its burden to prove the hours worked were reasonably incurred. Any such fees will

be marked on the hours log as excised for reason “A.”
Several of the fee entries involving Carvallo have mixed entry motivations;
for example, logging for “Detailed Email to Cyril Siras; Helene Carvallo.”90 For any

mixed entries, the Court sees it appropriate to reduce the entry by 50%. The Court
has no way of parsing which of these entries were motivated primarily by discussion
with Carvallo and which were motivated by other legitimate work. Given that
Petitioner has the burden to show such fees are reasonable and necessary, and that

Petitioner has not done so, the Court views a 50% reduction for such mixed fees as
appropriate. These fees are marked on the table as reduced for reason “A(1).” In
those situations, the reduced hourly rate has been additionally multiplied by .5 to
account for this reduction.91

ii. “B” – Fees Incurred For Work Involving the
Private Investigator

Additionally, Petitioner claims fees for communications with the private
investigator.92 As discussed above, Petitioner has not shown any way in which the
private investigator’s work was necessary for the return of the child, as the Private

90 Doc. 19-2 at 17.
91 For instance, where .2 hours are claimed at a rate of $450 for a mixed entry with Carvallo, the
Court has reduced the rate first to $300 for the reasonable rate and then by half again to $150.
See Distler, 26 F. Supp.2d at 728 (doing similarly).
92 Doc. 19-2 at 15 (“Call with PI in Allentown.”).
Investigator’s attempts to locate the child were unsuccessful. Moreover, Petitioner
has not met his burden to show that fees incurred by the attorneys for communicating

with the private investigator were reasonably incurred; for instance, Petitioner has
not provided other cases where such fees were awarded, nor an indication of how
many hours are typically billed for such communications. Accordingly, these fees

will be marked on the table as excised for reason “B.”
iii. “C” – Fees on Fees
Next, Petitioner has documented some fees incurred in preparing the fee
submission,93 known as “fees on fees.” These fees may be recoverable in certain

cases; in awarding them, courts must consider the reasonableness of such a request
and whether the substance of the work merits an award of fees on fees.94
In this case, Petitioner submitted an original fee petition that was deficient.

When the Court gave Petitioner an opportunity to modify the submission, the new
submission had more deficiencies than the original. Petitioner did not provide
affidavits of counsel in the area with similar rates, affidavits of counsel practicing
similar work, cases finding similar rates awardable, the background of either Mack

or “the paralegal,” nor an accurate billing log. Petitioner’s first billing log described
the date, hours, and work substance, but did not provide the rates billed or the

93 Doc. 19-2 at 10 (“Prepared Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs”).
94 See United States ex rel. Palmer v. C&D Techs. Inc., 897 F.3d 128, 142 (3d Cir. 2018).
identity of the individual billing such hours.95 Petitioner’s second log consists only
of an excel sheet summary of claimed hours, which does provide the rates and

identities of the individuals billing, but which eliminated the descriptions of the work
entirely.96
The Court declines to award fees on fees based on these submissions. The

Court has expended a significant amount of time and resources parsing these
submissions, including conducting extensive research of rates in similar cases and
calculating line-by-line rates for each entry on the hours log. Petitioner’s
submissions are especially disappointing given that the Court laid out the

deficiencies of the first petition and provided Petitioner with a second chance to fix
the submission.97 Moreover, given Neves, it is clear that this is not the first time that
Gardner’s fee submissions have been found to be deficient.98 Accordingly, fees on

fees will be excised from the fee submission, listed as reason “C” in the Appendix.

95 Doc. 19-2 at 10.
96 Doc. 21-2 at 1.
97 Doc. 20 at 3 n.5 (“Petitioner should address the reasonable rate for Williamsport litigation in
this specific practice area, guided by prior cases finding as much”); at 4 n.4 (noting frustration
with the rate submission and indicating that the Court has calculated several different billing
rates from the hours log, such inconsistencies which were not explained in the second
submission); at 5 (instructing counsel to provide “[i]nformation and argument as to why [the
rates sought] and hours are both reasonable and necessary given the vicinage and type of
case”).
98 Neves, 637 F. Supp. 2d at 342.
iv. “D” – Travel Fees
Petitioner has submitted several hours billed for travel time to and from the

hearing.99 “‘[U]nder normal circumstances, a party that hires counsel from outside
of the forum of the litigation may not be compensated for travel time.’”100
“‘However, where forum counsel are unwilling to represent plaintiff, such costs are
compensable.’”101

Here, Petitioner has put nothing in the record to demonstrate that local counsel
was unwilling to represent Petitioner. The Gardner firm is based in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania; while Attorney Gardner makes “occasional appearances in

the Middle District of Pennsylvania,” the firm is not based in the forum.102
Accordingly, the Court will excise hours billed for travel time, listed as reason “D”
in the Appendix.

99 Doc. 19-2 at 12 (billing combined $2,970 for the travel to and from Williamsport).
100 Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. All Shore, Inc., 514 F.3d 300, 311-12 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting
Honeywell, 426 F.3d at 710; United States ex rel. Palmer v. C&D Techs., Inc., 897 F.3d 128,
134 (3d Cir. 2018).
101 Id.
102 See Holmes, 2025 WL 321829, at *13; Spear v. Optimal Strategix Grp., Inc., No. 2:23-CV-
03361, 2025 WL 1139256, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2025) (noting that attorneys from
Pittsburgh were from outside the Eastern District of Pennsylvania forum and their fees were
therefore not compensable); Beard v. Ocwen Loan Servs., LLC, No. 1:14-CV-01162, 2024 WL
100245, *6 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2024).
v. “E” – Fees Billed At Attorney Rate For
Paralegal Work

Finally, in Petitioner’s fee submissions, there are a few instances of hours
logged at attorney rates for work better suited for paralegals or legal assistants.103
The Court will reduce any such instances to the rate determined appropriate for the
paralegal in this case, $75 per hour.104 Such instances will be listed as reason “E” in
the Appendix.
e. Calculation / Summary of Attorney’s Fees

The Court has examined Petitioner’s submissions in detail and conducted a
line-by-line analysis, attached to this Memorandum Opinion as Appendix A. For
each line, the Court has indicated where hours needed to be reduced or excised. The

Court has then multiplied the awarded hours by the awarded rate to receive the total
award for each invoice.
Having conducted this analysis, excising the unnecessary, unreasonable, or
redundant fees for reasons explained above, the Court finds 39.8 hours have been

properly claimed. This is a reasonable amount of hours for the relatively short
lifespan of this case.
The Court has excised all hours claimed in Invoice 1, from January 31, 2026,

resulting in a $0 award for Invoice 1. For Invoice 2, from January 3, 2026, the Court

103 See, e.g., Doc. 19-2 at 15 (billing .3 hours at $450 / hour for “prepare civil cover sheet.”).
104 See Distler, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 728 (reducing hours which could have been performed by a legal
assistant to a corresponding rate).
has reduced or excised many hours, resulting in a $2,902.50 award for Invoice 2. For
Invoice 3, from December 20, 2026, the Court has reduced or excised many hours,

resulting in a $6,633.75 award for Invoice 3. For Invoice 4, the Court has reduced or
excised many hours, resulting in a $370 award for Invoice 4. Adding these together,
the Court finds an award of attorney’s fees totaling $9,906.25 reasonable for this

case.
5. Total Calculation
Having performed a full analysis of the Petitioner’s claimed fees to determine
what Petitioner has shown was necessary to the return of the child, the Court

calculates the ultimate award now.
For filing and translation fees, the Court awards $605. For transportation
costs, the Court awards a total of $3,838.68. For attorney’s fees, the Court awards

$9,906.25. This amounts to a total award of $14,349.93 to Petitioner.
III. CONCLUSION
Petitioner’s motion for attorney’s fees, Doc. 18, is granted in part. Respondent
is ordered to pay the amount of $14,349.93 to Petitioner.

An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11360173. Public record. Not legal advice.