# Sheffield

> District Court, M.D. Florida · March 12, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11359364

## Case

- **Full name:** Elliott Demond Sheffield v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Florida
- **Decided:** March 12, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

ELLIOTT DEMOND SHEFFIELD,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 3:23-cv-30-HES-PDB
SECRETARY, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
/
ORDER
I. Status

Petitioner Elliott Demond Sheffield, an inmate of the Florida penal
system, initiated this action by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doc. 1). Sheffield challenges a 2016 state

court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for aggravated assault, G

assault, battery, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He is serving |

a twenty-year term of incarceration. Respondent has submitted a Response
(Response; Dkt. 5) with exhibits (Resp. Exs. 1-27; Docs. 5-1 through 5-27).
Petitioner filed a Reply (Reply; Dkt. 9). This action is ripe for review.
II. Governing Legal Principles
A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
governs a state prisoner’s federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford uv.
Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir.
2016). “The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions

as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,
and not as a means of error correction.” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S.

34, 38 (2011) (quotation marks omitted)). As such, federal habeas review of
final state court decisions is “greatly circumscribed’ and ‘highly deferential.”
Id. (quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation
marks omitted)).
The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court

decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec’y,
Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court need

not issue a written opinion explaining its rationale in order for the state court’s

decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court’s adjudication on the merits is

unaccompanied by an explanation, the United States Supreme Court has
instructed:
[T]he federal court should “look through” the
unexplained decision to the last related state-court
decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It
should then presume that the unexplained decision
adopted the same reasoning.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). The presumption may be
rebutted by showing that the higher state court’s adjudication most likely
relied on different grounds than the lower state court’s reasoned decision, such

as persuasive alternative grounds that were briefed or argued to the higher
court or obvious in the record it reviewed. Id. at 1192, 1196.
If the claim was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, § 2254(d) bars
relitigation of the claim unless the state court’s decision (1) “was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or (2) “was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Richter, 562 U.S. at 97-98.
The Eleventh Circuit describes the limited scope of federal review pursuant to
§ 2254 as follows:
First, § 2254(d)(1) provides for federal review for
claims of state courts’ erroneous legal conclusions. As
explained by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000),
§ 2254(d)(1) consists of two distinct clauses: a
“contrary to” clause and an “unreasonable application”
clause. The “contrary to” clause allows for relief only
“if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to
that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of
law or if the state court decides a case differently than
[the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 413, 120 S. Ct. at 1523
(plurality opinion). The “unreasonable application”
clause allows for relief only “if the state court identifies

the correct governing legal principle from [the
Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies
that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.
Second, § 2254(d)(2) provides for federal review for
claims of state courts’ erroneous factual
determinations. Section 2254(d)(2) allows federal
courts to grant relief only if the state court’s denial of
the petitioner’s claim “was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(2). The Supreme Court has not yet defined §
2254(d)(2)’s “precise relationship” to § 2254(e)(1),
which imposes a burden on the petitioner to rebut the
state court’s factual findings “by clear and convincing
evidence.” See Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ---, ---, 184 8.
Ct. 10, 15, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013); accord Brumfield
v. Cain, 576 U.S. ---, ---, 1385 S. Ct. 2269, 2282, 192
L.Ed.2d 356 (2015). Whatever that “precise
relationship” may be, “a_ state-court factual
determination is not unreasonable merely because the
federal habeas court would have reached a different
conclusion in the first instance.” Titlow, 571 U.S. at --
-, 1348. Ct. at 15 (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290,
301, 130 S. Ct. 841, 849, 175 L.Ed.2d 738 (2010)).
Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016). Also, deferential
review under § 2254(d) generally is limited to the record that was before the

state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Cullen v. Pinholster,
563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011) (stating the language in § 2254(d)(1) “requires an

examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made”).
Thus, “AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for

prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow,
134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013). “Federal courts may grant habeas relief only when a

state court blundered in a manner so ‘well understood and comprehended in
existing law’ and ‘was so lacking in justification’ that ‘there is no possibility
fairminded jurists could disagree.” Tharpe, 834 F.3d at 1338 (quoting Richter,
562 U.S. at 102-03). This standard is “meant to be” a “difficult” one to meet.
Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Thus, to the extent that the petitioner’s claims were
adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, they must be evaluated under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d).
B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default
There are prerequisites to federal habeas review. Before bringing a
§ 2254 habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all state court
remedies that are available for challenging his state conviction. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1)(A). To exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must “fairly
present|]” every issue raised in his federal petition to the state’s highest court,
either on direct appeal or on collateral review. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346,
351 (1989) (emphasis omitted). Thus, to properly exhaust a claim, “state

prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any
constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established
appellate review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).
In addressing exhaustion, the United States Supreme Court explained:
Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state
prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the

“opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged
violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Duncan v.
Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d
865 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404
U.S. 270, 275, 92S. Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971)). To
provide the State with the necessary “opportunity,”
the prisoner must “fairly present” his claim in each
appropriate state court (including a state supreme
court with powers of discretionary review), thereby
alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.
Duncan, supra, at 365-366, 115 S. Ct. 887; O'Sullivan
v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144
L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).
Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004).
A state prisoner’s failure to properly exhaust available state remedies
results in a procedural default that raises a potential bar to federal habeas

review. The United States Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of
procedural default as follows:
Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality
of a state prisoner’s conviction and sentence are guided
by rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments
are accorded the finality and respect necessary to
preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our
system of federalism. These rules include the doctrine
of procedural default, under which a federal court will
not review the merits of claims, including
constitutional claims, that a state court declined to
hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state
procedural rule. See, e.g., Coleman,['] supra, at 747—
748, 111 S. Ct. 2546; Sykes,[?] supra, at 84-85, 97 S.
Ct. 2497. A state court’s invocation of a procedural

1 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
2 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).

rule to deny a prisoner’s claims precludes federal
review of the claims if, among other requisites, the
state procedural rule is a nonfederal ground adequate
to support the judgment and the rule is firmly
established and consistently followed. See, e.g., Walker
v. Martin, 562 U.S. --, --, 1381 S. Ct. 1120, 1127-1128,
179 L.Ed.2d 62 (2011); Beard v. Kindler, 558 US. --, -
-, 1380S. Ct. 612, 617-618, 175 L.Ed.2d 417 (2009). The
doctrine barring procedurally defaulted claims from
being heard is not without exceptions. A prisoner may
obtain federal review of a defaulted claim by showing
cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of
federal law. See Coleman, 501 U.S., at 750, 1118. Ct.
2546.
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2012). Thus, procedural defaults may be
excused under certain circumstances. Notwithstanding that a claim has been
procedurally defaulted, a federal court may still consider the claim if a state

habeas petitioner can show either (1) cause for and actual prejudice from the

default; or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d

1144, 1157 (11th Cir. 2010). In order for a petitioner to establish cause,
the procedural default “must result from some
objective factor external to the defense that prevented
[him] from raising the claim and which cannot be
fairly attributable to his own conduct.” McCoy v.
Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S. Ct. 2639).[3]
Under the prejudice prong, [a petitioner] must show
that “the errors at trial actually and substantially
disadvantaged his defense so that he was denied
fundamental fairness.” Jd. at 1261 (quoting Carrier,
477 US. at 494, 106 S. Ct. 2639).

3 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).

Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 706 (11th Cir. 1999).
In the absence of a showing of cause and prejudice, a petitioner may
receive consideration on the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the
petitioner can establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the
continued incarceration of one who is actually innocent, otherwise would
result. The Eleventh Circuit has explained:
(Iif a petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice,
there remains yet another avenue for him to receive
consideration on the merits of his procedurally
defaulted claim. “[I]n an extraordinary case, where a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal
habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence
of a showing of cause for the procedural default.”
Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S. Ct. at 2649. “This
exception is exceedingly narrow in scope,” however,
and requires proof of actual innocence, not just legal
innocence. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171
(11th Cir. 2001).
Ward, 592 F.3d at 1157. “To meet this standard, a petitioner must ‘show that

it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him’

of the underlying offense.” Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir.
2001) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). Additionally, “‘[t]o be
credible,’ a claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable evidence not
presented at trial.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998) (quoting
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). With the rarity of such evidence, in most cases,

Rg

allegations of actual innocence are ultimately summarily rejected. Schlup, 513
U.S. at 324.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the effective
assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense attorney's
performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby
prejudices the defense.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per curiam)
(citing Wiggins v. Smith, 589 U.S. 510, 521 (2003), and Strickland □□□
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).
To establish deficient performance, a _ person
challenging a conviction must show that “counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” [Strickland,] 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.
Ct. 2052. A court considering a claim of ineffective
assistance must apply a “strong presumption” that
counsel’s representation was within the “wide range”
of reasonable professional assistance. Id., at 689, 104
S. Ct. 2052. The challenger’s burden is to show “that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment.” Id., at 687, 1048. Ct. 2052.
With respect to prejudice, a challenger must
demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Jd., at 694, 1048S. Ct. 2052.
It is not enough “to show that the errors had some
conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.”
Id., at 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052. Counsel’s errors must be
“so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a

trial whose result is reliable.” Id., at 687, 104 S. Ct.
2052.
Richter, 562 U.S. at 104. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized “the absence of

any iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the Strickland test
before the other.” Ward, 592 F.3d at 1163. Since both prongs of the two-part
Strickland test must be satisfied to show a Sixth Amendment violation, “a

court need not address the performance prong if the petitioner cannot meet the
prejudice prong, and vice-versa.” Id. (citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243,
1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As stated in Strickland: “If it is easier to dispose of an
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we

expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

697.
A state court’s adjudication of an ineffectiveness claim is accorded great
deference.
“(T]he standard for judging counsel’s representation is
a most deferential one.” Richter, 562 U.S. at ---, 1315S.
Ct. at 788. But “[e]stablishing that a state court’s
application of Strickland was unreasonable under §
2254(d) is all the more difficult. The standards created
by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly
deferential, and when the two apply in tandem, review
is doubly so.” Jd. (citations and quotation marks
omitted). “The question is not whether a federal court
believes the state court’s determination under the
Strickland standard was incorrect but whether that
determination was unreasonable — a substantially
higher threshold.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S.
111, 123, 129S. Ct. 1411, 1420, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009)

10

(quotation marks omitted). If there is “any reasonable
argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s
deferential standard,” then a federal court may not
disturb a state-court decision denying the claim.
Richter, 562 U.S. at ---, 1381S. Ct. at 788.
Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1248 (11th Cir. 2014); Knowles v.
Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). In other words, “[iJn addition to the
deference to counsel’s performance mandated by Strickland, the AEDPA adds
another layer of deference — this one to a state court’s decision — when we are
considering whether to grant federal habeas relief from a state court's
decision.” Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004). As such,
“(s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v.

Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).
Ill. Relevant Factual and Procedural History
The State of Florida charged Petitioner by Second Amended Information

with second-degree attempted murder (count one), aggravated assault (count
two), shooting or throwing deadly missiles (count three), battery (count four),
and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (count five). Resp. Ex. 5 at 1-

4. Petitioner continued to trial. The trial court, in its order denying Petitioner's
Rule 3.850 motion, summarized the trial testimony:
Joseph Hines, age 42 at the time of the
Defendant’s trial, knew the Defendant since
childhood. From August 2015 until January 2016,
Hines was in a dating relationship with Emalekia
Bradford. Bradford is the mother of the Defendant's

11

two daughters: Emily and Ebony. During Hines and
Bradford’s relationship, Bradford lived in an
apartment in Jacksonville. Hines did not reside at the
apartment full-time, but on occasion, would stay there
overnight with Bradford. (Ex. G at 405-10.)
On September 16, 2015, Hines was at Bradford’s
apartment with Bradford and Emily. He was in the
bedroom when Emily entered to play a voicemail from
the Defendant. In the voicemail, the Defendant said
that he had “been watching” and that “it’s going
down.” The State published the voicemail to the jury.
(Ex. G at 410-19.)
Emily was “nervous” and “kind of scared,” so
Hines and Bradford tried to calm her. As they did so,
Hines heard a “hissing sound” emanating from the
parking lot. Through the window, he saw the
Defendant walking around Bradford’s car. Hines went
outside to confront the Defendant. As Hines
approached, the Defendant brandished a gun and
ordered Hines to “backup.” The Defendant pointed the
gun at Hines’s face, brushed the gun against Hines’
cheek, and threatened to kill Hines. (Ex. G at 411-12,
420-23.)
The Defendant told Hines that he should remove
his belongings from Bradford’s apartment. Hines
walked back to the apartment as the Defendant
continued to hold the gun and make statements about
Hines’ departure. As Hines ascended the stairs to the
apartment, Bradford came outside to ask where the
Defendant was located. The Defendant grabbed
Bradford and pushed her against the wall on the
landing. Bradford begged the Defendant to stop. The
apartment door remained open. As the Defendant and
Bradford struggled, the Defendant’s gun fired, and the
bullet struck the inside ceiling. After the gun
discharged, Hines was able to close the apartment
door and call 911. (Ex. G at 426-30.)

19

After he called 911, Hines told the Defendant
that he was on the phone with police. Hines saw the
Defendant hold Bradford by the throat and place his
gun to her temple. The Defendant stated that he
should kill Bradford because she was in a sexual
relationship with Hines. Once the Defendant heard
Hines say that he called 911, he “[tJook off running
down the steps.” The Defendant left his cell phone at
the scene. At trial, the State published a recording of
Hines’ 911 call. (Ex. G at 480-43.)
Bradford testified that she and the Defendant □
had been in an “off and on” dating relationship for
more than twenty years. Their relationship ended in
April 2015, and she began dating Hines in August
2015. On September 16, 2015, she and Hines were
“dozing off’ in the bedroom when Emily entered acting
“hysterical and scared.” Along with Hines, Bradford
listened to the voicemail that the Defendant left on
Emily’s phone. Braford assured her daughter that the
Defendant was “just talking. (Ex. G at 488-95.)
Thereafter, Bradford heard the hissing sound
from the parking lot. Through the window, she saw the
Defendant walking away from her car (at trial, the
State produced a photograph showing Bradford’s car
with flattened tires). Hines went outside. About five or
ten minutes later, Bradford went outside and asked
Hines where the Defendant was located. Hines
responded that he was “right behind me with a gun on
me.” The Defendant began swearing at Bradford
because of her relationship with Hines. The Defendant
pointed his gun at Bradford’s temple. Bradford was
scared. The Defendant attempted to enter the
apartment, but he was unable to do so. After hearing
the “pop” of the Defendant’s gun discharging, Bradford
warned the Defendant that Hines was calling the
police. The Defendant fled from the scene. (Ex. G at
495-505.)

13

Officer Douglas Hilaman of the Jacksonville
Sheriffs Office responded to the scene at
approximately 1:30 AM. He spoke with Bradford and
Hines, both of whom were upset. Bradford had a
scratch on her neck and her car had slashed tires on
the driver’s side. There was a shell casing on the floor
just inside the apartment, as well as what appeared to
be a bullet hole in the ceiling. Officer Hilaman
obtained and executed a warrant for the Defendant’s
arrest. (Ex. G at 540-53.)
Detective K.L. Bullard collected a cell phone and
case from the scene. He also collected a .38-caliber
casing, took photographs of the apartment, and
swabbed the door handle for fingerprints. (Ex. G at
556-68.) The DNA samples that Detective Bullard
collected at the scene did not yield interpretable
results. (Ex. G at 569-80.)
Resp. Ex. 18 at 3-5.
The jury found Petitioner guilty of aggravated assault, a lesser included

offense on count one; assault, a lesser included offense on count two; not guilty

on count three; guilty on count four; and guilty on count five. Resp. Ex. 15 at

1-7. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to imprisonment for a total term of

twenty years. Resp. Ex. 16 at 1-13.
On appeal, Petitioner, with help from appellate counsel, raised the

following claim as his sole basis for relief:
The jury’s verdict acquitting Mr. Sheffield of shooting
or throwing deadly missiles is inconsistent with the
verdict of aggravated assault with discharge of a
firearm because the acquittal of shooting into a
building negates the element of discharge.

14

Resp. Ex. 7 at 37. The State filed an answer brief. Resp. Ex. 8 at 1-22. The
Florida First District Court of Appeal (First DCA) per curiam affirmed
Petitioner’s conviction and sentence without a written opinion. Resp. Ex. 10 at
1-2.
Petitioner filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Resp. Ex. 11 at 1-9. The trial court
denied the motion. Resp. Ex. 18 at 1-3.
Petitioner also filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief pursuant to
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, raising five claims of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel. Resp. Ex. 12 at 8-35. The postconviction court
denied the Rule 3.850 motion. Resp. Ex. 13 at 1-21. The First DCA per curiam
affirmed the postconviction court’s Rule 3.850 order. Resp. Ex. 27.
IV. The Petition

a. Ground One
Petitioner alleges trial counsel was ineffective for allowing him “to
proceed to trial without admitting evidence of Petitioner’s need for a
psychological evaluation and need for help in mitigation.” Petition at 7.
Petitioner raised this claim in his Rule 3.850 motion. Resp. Ex. 12 at 10—

17. The trial court summarily denied the claim. First, the trial court discussed
the issue of Petitioner’s competency:

15

Before the start of trial, the trial court conducted
a sworn colloquy with the Defendant about Defense
Counsel stipulating to the Defendant's criminal
history. The court also asked the Defendant questions
about his education, past employment, and mental
health history. The Defendant provided a list of his
medications and his schedule for taking those
medications. He stated unequivocally that he was
taking his medications in the manner prescribed and
that he fully understood the court’s questions. He also
affirmed that he would interrupt the court
immediately if at any point he did not understand the
proceedings. (Ex. G at 366-72.)
At a pre-sentencing hearing on the Defendant's
pro se motion to remove Defense Counsel, the trial
court inquired about the competency issue:
THE COURT: [Reading from the Defendant’s motion]
Number 2, he [Defense Counsel] should not have
allowed me to go to trial when I informed him of all the
psychological medication I am on. Let me hear from
the defense on that issue.
MR. BEAUGH [Defense Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.
Throughout the process, before trial I spoke with Mr.
Sheffield, he never exhibited any signs that suggested
there was a competency issue, he has no competency
issues. And as we went through the trial, there was
never any suggestion by Mr. Sheffield that -- there was
no information at all given to me by Mr. Sheffield that
suggested that there would be an issue of either
competency or a possible insanity defense.
THE COURT: And based on your conversations with
him, you had no concerns about his responses, in your
conversations with Mr. Sheffield?
MR. BEAUGH: Yes, Your Honor. There were no times
when I thought there might be issues with his defense
with his ability to, you know, maintain courtroom

: 16

behavior, knowledge of the charges against him,
knowledge of, you know, my role as his attorney, the
State Attorney’s role, the Judge’s role, there were no
concerns of competency.
In addition, I was never given any information that
suggested that at the time of the offense there might
have been issues regarding that.
THE COURT: Okay. Additional record
evidence that I inquired of you, Mr.
Sheffield, about your educational
background and mental health
background, you were able to respond to
my questions, you were placed under oath
and went under oath, you never brought it
to the Court’s attention. When IJ asked you
questions about your mental health and
your medications, you never brought it to
the Court’s attention that you were on
medication that I should have considered,
as well as you never brought up any issue
about Mr. Beaugh not looking into an
insanity defense.
+.)
THE COURT: The record evidence is
clear, there’s no issue of incompetency or
insanity based on your’ [Defense
Counsel’s] communications with Mr.
Sheffield and my communications with
Mr. Sheffield, so I’m not going to delay the
sentencing any further to get a
psychological evaluation.
(Ex. H at 4-5, 7.)
This portion of the record conclusively refutes
any allegation that Defense Counsel was ineffective
for failing to raise a suggestion of the Defendant’s

17

incompetence or develop an insanity defense. See §
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210(b) (to move for a mental
examination of the defendant’s competency, a lawyer
must have a good faith, reasonable belief that the
defendant is not competent); Thomson v. State, 88 So.
3d 312 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (to establish actual
prejudice based on defense counsel’s failure to move
for a competency hearing, a defendant must set forth
“clear and convincing circumstances” that “create a
real, substantial, and legitimate doubt as to the
movant’s competency. Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So. 2d
1009, 1020 (Fla. 1999) (“Counsel cannot be deemed
ineffective for failing to prevail on a meritless issue.”).
Resp. Ex. 13 at 7-9.
Next, the trial court discussed the issue of Petitioner’s mental health

history at sentencing:
The Defendant cannot demonstrate that he
would have received a lesser sentence if only Defense
Counsel had presented the Defendant’s mental health
history at his sentencing hearing. First, as shown by
the portions of the record cited above, the trial court
was already aware of the Defendant’s mental health
history and schedule of medications because the
Defendant furnished that information to the court
before trial. (Ex. G at 366-72.) Thus, presenting the
information to the trial court at the Defendant’s
sentencing hearing would not have given the court any
new information to consider. Second, the lengthiest of
the Defendant’s concurrent prison sentences in this
case--twenty years in Count One--was mandated by
statute. (Ex. B; Ex. C at 4 and 11; Ex. I at 13.) See §
775.087(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015) (when a defendant
discharges a firearm during the commission of
ageravated assault, the court shall sentence the
defendant to a mandatory minimum twenty-year
prison term). Accordingly, there is no possibility that
Defense Counsel could have shortened the duration of

18

the Defendant’s incarceration by presenting mental
health evidence at the sentencing hearing. For these
reasons, the Court denies Ground One of the
Defendant’s motion.
Resp. Ex. 18 at 9.
The Court addresses the claim in accordance with the deferential
standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. Upon thorough
review of the record and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the state
court’s decision to deny Petitioner's claim is neither contrary to, nor an
unreasonable application of, Strickland, and it is not based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented to the state court.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Even assuming arguendo that the state court’s decision was not entitled

to deference, the claim fails because it is without merit. Considering the record
evidence as described previously, see supra, Petitioner fails to demonstrate
that trial counsel was ineffective. Before the start of the trial, the trial court
conducted a sworn colloquy and asked Petitioner questions about his mental
health. In addition, at a pre-sentencing hearing, the trial court inquired about
the competency issue. At sentencing, the trial court was already aware of
Petitioner’s mental health history and schedule of medications. Moreover, as
explained by the trial court, because Petitioner’s lengthiest sentence was
mandated by statute, there was no possibility that his counsel could have

19

shortened the sentence by presenting mental health evidence at the sentencing
hearing. Ground One is denied.
b. Ground Two
Petitioner alleges trial counsel “was ineffective for misadvising [him]
that his testimony was not necessary to support his theory of defense
(discharge was accidental).” Petition at 11.
Petitioner raised this claim in his Rule 3.850 motion. Resp. Ex. 12 at 18—

21. The trial court summarily denied the claim, finding as follows:
In Ground Two, the Defendant argues that
Defense Counsel should have advised him to testify at
trial. As set forth above, the trial court conducted an
extensive sworn colloquy with the Defendant about his
right to testify. (Ex. G at 582-84.) The colloquy shows
that the Defendant made a well-informed and
voluntary decision about whether to testify. Fully
equipped with an understanding of all his rights and
options, and after having adequate time to make an
informed decision, the Defendant decided against
testifying. He may not now undo a decision he
voluntarily made while having a full understanding of
its consequences. To permit the Defendant to do so
would be to ignore his sworn assertions to the trial
court. The Defendant may not obtain postconviction
relief in that manner. See Kelley v. State, 109 So. 3d
811, 812-13 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (‘A rule 3 .850 motion
cannot be used to go behind representations the
defendant made to the trial court, and the court may
summarily deny post-conviction claims that are
refuted by such representations.”); Henry v. State, 920
So. 2d 1245, 1246 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (defendants are
bound by statements they make under oath).
Furthermore, given the State’s evidence, there is no
reasonable probability that the Defendant--a thirteen-

90

time convicted felon even before his trial in this case
(Ex. G at 371-72)--would have changed the result of his
trial if only he took the witness stand. (Ex. G.) For
these reasons, the Court denies Ground Two of the
Defendant’s motion.
Resp. Ex. 13 at 10.
The Court addresses the claim in accordance with the deferential
standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. After a review of
the record and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the state court’s
adjudication of this claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law,
did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,
and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the state court proceedings.
Nevertheless, even if the state court’s adjudication of this claim is not
entitled to deference, Petitioner’s ineffectiveness claim is without merit. The

trial court explained to Petitioner his rights and options and informed him that

“ly]Jou have a constitutional right to remain silent and you do not have to ever

become a witness in your own trial; however, you can make the decision to

waive that right and become a witness.” Resp. Ex. 20 at 231. Petitioner
indicated that he understood his rights and options, that he had discussed the

matter with his attorney, and that he did not wish to testify. Ud. at 231-33.)
In addition, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that, if he had testified, there

971

was a reasonable probability of a different result. Accordingly, Ground Two is
denied.

ec. Ground Three
Petitioner alleges trial counsel “failed to investigate, retrieve, and

present the recordings of visitation and jail calls, where the alleged victim □□□
made exculpatory statements.” Petition at 14.
Petitioner raised this claim in his Rule 3.850 motion. Resp. Ex. 12 at 22—

24. The trial court summarily denied the claim, discussing that a hearing was

held on Petitioner’s “pre-trial Nelson petition,” which included extensive

discussion about the jail records at issue in this claim. Resp. Ex. 13 at 10. The

trial court also found that the issue was revisited with Petitioner’s counsel just
prior to the start of trial. 7d. at 13.) Finally, the trial court indicated that “at

the close of the State’s case-in-chief—which included Bradford’s testimony—
the trial court again inquired about Defense Counsel’s pre-trial investigation.”
(id. at 15.) Consequently, the trial court ruled that
the record shows that Defense Counsel fully
investigated the jail call/visitation issue and did
everything possible to obtain the evidence the
Defendant wanted. See Turner v. State, 91 So. 3d 916,
918 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (“Counsel cannot be ineffective
for failing to do something that counsel actually did.”).
Indeed, the Defendant swore to his satisfaction with
Defense Counsel’s investigation and representation.
See Manning v. State, 305 So. 3d 355, 356-57 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2020).

99

Accordingly, the Court denies Ground Three of
the Defendant’s motion.
Resp. Ex. 13 at 10.
The Court addresses the claim in accordance with the deferential
standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. After a review of
the record and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the state court’s
adjudication of this claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law,
did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,
and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the state court proceedings.
Nevertheless, even if the state court’s adjudication of this claim is not

entitled to deference, Petitioner's ineffectiveness claim is without merit. The

trial court repeatedly addressed this issue. The matter was addressed prior to

jury selection (Resp. Ex. 24 at 4-17), and it was revisited prior to when

testimony began at trial (Resp. Ex. 20 at 4-6). In addition, Petitioner expressed
his satisfaction with counsel’s investigation in the colloquy related to his

decision not to testify. Resp. Ex. 20 at 232-34. Finally, the trial court considered

the issue in denying Petitioner’s pre-sentencing motion to discharge counsel.

Resp. Ex. 22 at 3-4. Ground Three is denied.
d. Ground Four

93

Petitioner alleges trial counsel “failed to file a timely motion for arrest of
judgment based on inconsistent verdicts and motion for new trial.” Petition at
18.
The record reveals that Petitioner's counsel filed a motion for arrest of
judgment, arguing that the jury’s not-guilty verdict for shooting within or into

a building was inconsistent with the finding that, in committing aggravated
assault, Petitioner had discharged a firearm. Resp. Ex. 4 at 2-3. Petitioner's
counsel argued that aggravated assault was an “intent crime”; therefore, the
jury must have concluded that Petitioner intentionally fired the gun in
enhancing the punishment on Count 1, but inconsistently found him not guilty

on Count 3. (d.) The trial court found that the motion was untimely. Resp. Ex.

23 at 5.
Petitioner raised this claim in his Rule 3.850 motion. Resp. Ex. 12 at 24—

26. The trial court summarily denied the claim, Resp. Ex. 13 at 19, finding that
[blecause acquitting the Defendant in Count Three did
not negate an element in Count One, the jury’s
verdicts are not truly inconsistent. See Kelley, 109 So.
3d at 317. And because the jury’s verdicts were not
inconsistent, the trial court would not have granted a
timely motion to arrest judgment. Accordingly, the
Court denies Ground Four of the Defendant’s motion.
Whitted v. State, 992 So. 2d 352, 353 (Fla. 4th DCA
2008) (“Counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a
motion sure to be denied.”).
Ud.)

94

The Court addresses the claim in accordance with the deferential
standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. After a review of
the record and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the state court’s
adjudication of this claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law,
did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,
and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the state court proceedings.
Nevertheless, even if the state court’s adjudication of this claim is not
entitled to deference, Petitioner’s ineffectiveness claim is without merit. Here,
the jury found Petitioner guilty of the lesser offense of aggravated assault with

a firearm as to Count One and not guilty of Count Three (shooting or throwing
deadly missiles). Petitioner argues that the verdict in Count One is

inconsistent with Count Three because, in Count One, the jury made a special
finding that Petitioner discharged the firearm during the commission of the

offense.
The jury was instructed that, to prove aggravated assault, the State was
required to prove that Petitioner “intentionally and unlawfully threatened,
either by word or act, to do violence to” the victim. Resp. Ex. 5 at 17. However,
the same does not apply to the firearm enhancement from Florida’s 10-20-Life

statute, which provided that:

95

2. Any person who is convicted of a felony or an
attempt to commit a felony listed in sub-
subparagraphs (a)l.a.-q., regardless of whether the
use of a weapon is an element of the felony, and during
the course of the commission of the felony such person
discharged a “firearm” or “destructive device” as
defined in s. 790.001 shall be sentenced to a minimum
term of imprisonment of 20 years.
§ 775.087(2)(a)2., Fla. Stat. There was no requirement that the discharge be
intentional. See Wiley v. State, 125 So. 8d 235, 238 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (section
775.085(2)(a) “does not require an intentional or knowing discharge but merely

a ‘discharge’ that resulted in death or great bodily harm to any person.”). Here,
based on the evidence, the jury could have found that Petitioner
unintentionally discharged his firearm at or into the building while assaulting
the victim, even if it was not his conscious decision to do so. Thus, there has

been no showing that counsel acted deficiently or that he sustained prejudice.
Ground Four is denied.
e. Ground Five
Petitioner argues “the cumulative effects of trial counsel’s errors and

omissions constitute ineffective assistance of counsel [because] counsel’s
cumulative errors were so egregious as to render appointment of counsel
meaningless.” Petition at 23. This claim was raised in Petitioner’s Rule 3.850

motion, and the trial court summarily denied the claim, finding that “because
each individual claim of error fails on at least one of these three grounds, the

96

Defendant’s claim of cumulative error does not warrant relief.” Resp. Ex. 13 at
19 (citation and quotation omitted).
Since none of Petitioner’s individual claims warrants relief, there is
nothing to accumulate. See Morris v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 677 F.3d 1117, 1132
(11th Cir. 2012). The alleged errors, neither individually nor cumulatively,
deprived Petitioner of a fair trial or due process. Therefore, the Court finds
that the state court’s decision was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable
application of, federal law and was not based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts given the evidence presented to the state court. See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Ground Five will be denied.
f. Ground Six
Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to

correct an illegal sentence because its “oral pronouncement conflicts with the

written sentence and that the sentence must be imposed pursuant to section

775.082 and not section 775.087, Florida Statutes.” Petition at 24.
Here, Petitioner is challenging the review process afforded him in the

Rule 3.800 proceeding, and this “ground for relief does not state a claim
cognizable on federal habeas. It is well established in the Eleventh Circuit that

a § 2254 court is not an appropriate forum for a prisoner who wishes to

challenge the process afforded him in state collateral proceedings. This is so,
because such a claim represents an attack on a proceeding collateral to the

97

prisoner’s confinement and not the confinement itself.” Garrison v. McCrae,
No. 3:06CV428/RV/EMT, 2009 WL 3055349, at *15 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2009)
(citation omitted); see also Quince v. Crosby, 360 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th Cir.
2004) (‘while habeas relief is available to address defects in a criminal
defendant's conviction and sentence, an alleged defect in a collateral
proceeding does not state a basis for habeas relief.”). Since this claim
challenges only the process afforded Petitioner in the state collateral
proceedings and does not represent a constitutional challenge to his
confinement, Ground Six does not provide a basis for federal habeas relief and
is denied.
g. Ground Seven
Petitioner argues that the trial court erred when it affirmed his

conviction and judgment “where the jury’s verdict acquitting [him] of shooting

or throwing deadly missiles is inconsistent with the verdict of aggravated
assault with discharge of a firearm because the acquittal of shooting into a
building negates the elements of discharge.” Petition at 25. Petitioner raised

this claim in his direct appeal, and the First DCA affirmed. Resp. Ex. 7 at 27-

31, Resp. Ex. 10 at 1.
Although Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal, he did not present
it in terms of the deprivation of a federal constitutional right. See Resp. Ex. 7

at 26-35. Generally, a “federal court may not grant habeas ... relief to a state

298

prisoner who has not exhausted his available state remedies.” Snowden. uv.
Singletary, 185 F.8d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 1998). The “exhaustion of state
remedies requires that [habeas] petitioners fairly present federal claims to the
state courts in order to give the [s]tate the opportunity to pass upon and correct
alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Duncan v. Henry, 513 US.
364, 365 (1995) (quotation omitted). “If state courts are to be given the
opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must
surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the
United States Constitution.” Jd. at 365-66; accord Baldwin v. Reese, 541 US.
27, 29 (2004) (“[T]he prisoner must fairly present his claim in each appropriate
state court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary
review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.”
(quotation omitted)); Snowden, 135 F.3d at 735 (“[T]o exhaust state remedies
fully[,] the petitioner must make the state court aware that the claims asserted

present federal constitutional issues.”).
“IFJederal courts may treat unexhausted claims as procedurally
defaulted, even absent a state court determination to that effect, if it is clear
from state law that any future attempts at exhaustion would be futile.” Bailey
uv. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 1999). “A habeas petitioner can escape
the procedural default doctrine [through either] showing cause for the default
and prejudice or establishing a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 1306

99

(citation and quotation omitted). To overcome procedural default through a
fundamental miscarriage of justice, the petitioner must make “a colorable
showing of actual innocence.” Id.
Because Petitioner did not raise this claim on direct appeal in terms of
the deprivation of a federal constitutional right, Ground Seven has not been
exhausted. Future attempts at exhaustion would be futile, so Ground Seven is
procedurally defaulted and is barred absent the application of an exception.
Because Petitioner has not demonstrated either cause and prejudice or actual
innocence to excuse the default, Ground Seven is procedurally barred from
federal habeas review.
Nevertheless, even assuming arguendo that the federal nature of this
Ground was exhausted and is properly before the Court, Petitioner is still not
entitled to the relief he seeks because it fails on the merits. As discussed with
regard to Ground Four, the verdicts in this case were not inconsistent. Thus,
Ground Seven is denied.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. The Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED, and this case is DISMISSED
with prejudice.
2. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment dismissing this case with
prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.

Qn

3. If Petitioner appeals this dismissal, the Court denies a certificate
of appealability.4 Because this Court has determined that a certificate of
appealability is not warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the pending
motions report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed

in this case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this AC day of
March, 2026.

Hn ki LESIN GER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Elliott Demond Sheffield, # F122773
Counsel of record

4 This Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if a petitioner
makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§2253(c)(2). To make this substantial showing, Petitioner “must demonstrate that
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional
claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were
‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537
U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)).
Upon due consideration, this Court will deny a certificate of appealability.
21

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11359364. Public record. Not legal advice.