# Orner

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · May 26, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11359336

## Case

- **Full name:** Brittni Orner v. Keystone PC Holdings LLC; Smiles for Keeps; Childsmiles PC Holdings NJ PA t/a Smiles 4 Keeps
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** May 26, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BRITTNI ORNER,
Plaintiff, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-cv-2278

V. : (JUDGE MANNION)
KEYSTONE PC HOLDINGS LLC:
tia SMILES FOR KEEPS and
CHILDSMILES PC HOLDINGS NJ :
PA t/a SMILES 4 KEEPS,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Keystone
PC Holdings LLC t/a Smiles for Keeps and Childsmiles PC Holdings NJ PA
t/a Smiles 4 Keeps (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 14). For the reasons
set forth below, Defendants’ motion will be GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. Defendants’ motion will be GRANTED with respect to
Brittni Orner’s (“Plaintiff’) claim that she was passed over for a new position
in violation of Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”)
and DENIED with respect to Plaintiff's claim that she was wrongfully
terminated in violation of Title VII and the PHRA. Thus, Plaintiff's claim for
wrongful termination will proceed to trial.

l. BACKGROUND‘
Plaintiff began her employment with Defendants in June 2022 as a
dental assistant with a pay rate of $23.00 per hour, which was generally
higher than what Defendants’ other dental assistants were making. (Docs.
14-2, 95; 15, 95; 14-6, 910; 14-7 at 62:12-62:23, 109:11-109:24). Plaintiff
had been studying to become a registered dental hygienist (“RDH”), and
Defendants told Plaintiff that they planned to hire her as an RDH once she
successfully passed the required examinations. (Doc. 14-6, 12). Plaintiff
alleged that she was promised a $2.00/hour raise, however, Defendants’
Vice President of HR, Mark Seber (“Seber”), clarified that Plaintiff would
receive a raise only after she became an RDH. (Doc. 14-7 at 94:5-95:20,
125:15-127:23). Nonetheless, Plaintiff received a pay raise to $24.00/hour
for a team lead position, which she briefly held before stepping down. /d. at

' As required by Local Rule 56.1, Defendants have filed a statement of
material facts, and Plaintiff has filed a statement responding to the numbered
paragraphs in Defendants’ statement of material facts. (Docs. 14-2, 15). For
purposes of this motion only, the Court refers to these averments.

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62:24-63:16. Despite stepping down, Plaintiff's pay remained at $24.00/hour.
Id. at 95:14-19.
Plaintiff took her National Board Dental Hygiene Examination
(‘“NBDHE’) test in August 2023, and Defendants paid the $580.00 testing
fee. (Doc. 14-7 at 240:20-241:12). Plaintiff failed the exam five times. /d. at
33:6-33:8. Nonetheless, Seber assured Plaintiff:
Our primary goal is to see you obtain your RDH license and
progress to the next level. RDHs perform very well and it will
be a significant increase for you in terms of income. We
sincerely hope you can attain that license soon.

(Doc. 14-10 at 3). While Plaintiff had still not yet obtained her RDH
certification, she applied for a team lead position within the hygiene
department. (Doc. 14-7 at 130:5-131:6). Defendants filled the open RDH
“team lead” position with another candidate, John Piezer (“Piezer’). (Docs.

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14-6, 915; 14-7 AT 131:14-19). Plaintiff testified that she believes Piezer is
less qualified for the team lead position than she is:
Q. .. . Is your understanding that he was a less qualified
candidate solely based on the fact that he had been at the
company less time than you had been?
A. No, | knew his dental background.
Q. What was his dental background?
A. He worked for an oral surgery office prior and then he was
an EFDA as well, but he didn’t maintain his license.
Q. Okay. So at some point, he had additional certifications
beyond what you had, but it’s your understanding that those
had lapsed?
A. Yes. But it was the hygiene side, so | knew more about the
hygiene because | went to hygiene school and it’s more in-
depth than EFDA school.

Q. So is it your personal belief that a dental assistant assisting
a dental practice on the oral surgery side would have less

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experience as a dental assistant than a dental assistant on the
dental hygienist side?

A. Yes.

(Doc. 14-7 at 132:9-133:20). Yet, Plaintiff agreed that she was not qualified
to fill the team lead position at the time Piezer was hired, given that she had
not yet obtained her RDH certification. /d. at 117:17-119:7.
While Plaintiff was on vacation, she confronted Melissa Wright
(“Wright”), her office manager, about Piezer’s hiring. (Doc. 14-10 at 5-7).
Wright assured Plaintiff: “Brittni this does not change your future with us at
all. We still have the same amount of hygienist[s] with the new hire while we
wait for your test. [W]hen you pass we will be more than happy to consider

you join our team of hygienist[s].” /d.
Plaintiff alleges that she was passed over for the team lead position in
retaliation for a complaint she made to HR regarding alleged race
discrimination. (Doc. 14-6, 420). Specifically, on August 27, 2023, Plaintiff
emailed Seber and two other HR representatives regarding some concerns
she had about the work environment. (Doc. 14-10 at 9-11). Plaintiff's email
begins with general workplace complaints and eventually morphs into a
complaint about racial discrimination. See id. Plaintiff admitted that she,
personally, never felt that she had been discriminated against. (Doc. 14-7 at
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203:15-203:17, 203:24-204:3). Nonetheless, HR performed interviews to
investigate Plaintiffs claims. /d. at 202:10-203:3. At the end of the
investigation, HR wrote Plaintiff, stating: “We have investigated the claims
made before and have acted where needed.” (Doc. 14-10 at 11).
After learning that Defendants hired Piezer for the position, Plaintiff
emailed HR, stating:
Hello, | just wanted to follow up and say | unfortunately wish |
could say that the conversation and email with you did not
affect the decision being made about who would be team lead
in hygiene but | feel as if it did. They announced it to someone
less qualified than me in running the hygiene department.
Those words also came from the person chosen’s mouth
saying I’m not sure how | got it over you because you know
everything here, | have to learn it. It’s definitely because you
made them mad. But it is what it is at this point. | just have to
pass my board and figure out my future and where to go from
there. | wanted to thank you for taking the time out of your
schedule to come and talk with everyone. Have a good day!

(Doc. 14-10 at 2). Jared Cohen (“Cohen”), Director of Operations, stated that
Plaintiff “was not the most qualified person for the job,” noting that she would
have been selected if she had been. (Doc. 14-10 at 1). Subsequently, HR
offered Plaintiff a severance package, allegedly stating, “[w]ell, clearly you’re
miserable here.” /d. at 211:20-211:23. The severance package offered
=~@:

Plaintiff a month of pay, which Plaintiff declined. /d. at 225:7. Plaintiff
responded to the severance package offer py claiming that if she could go
work somewhere else, she would, but family obligations prevented her from
doing so immediately. (Doc. 14-7 at 223:18-224:25).
On September 18, 2023, Cohen and Wright notified Plaintiff that her
employment was terminated. /d. at 226:11. Cohen allegedly stated: “Clearly
you know you've made pretty serious claims against [Wright] . . . We're no
longer wanting you to be employed[.]” /d. at 226:14-226:16. On February 6,
2024, Plaintiff filed an EEOC claim with the PHRC. (Doc. 14-11). On August
13, 2024, Defendants submitted a position statement. (Doc. 14-12). On
October 8, 2024, the EEOC indicated that it would not proceed further with
the investigation, making no determination about whether further
investigation would establish violations of the statute. (Doc. 14-13).
On December 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants.
(Docs. 1, 14-6). Plaintiff's complaint is twofold. Count | alleges that, because
of her complaints to Human Resources (“HR”) about “race discrimination” in
the office, Defendants retaliated against her by: (1) passing over her for a
“team lead” position; and (2) terminating her employment. (Doc. 14-6, ]15-
18, 9723-25). Count Il alleges wrongful discrimination in violation of the
PHRA on the same grounds. (14-6, 26-32). On April 14, 2026, Defendants

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filed the instant motion for summary judgment, concise statement of material
facts, and accompanying brief. (Docs. 14, 14-2, 14-3). Plaintiff filed her

answer to Defendants’ concise statement of material facts, and brief in
opposition. (Docs. 15, 16). Defendants filed their reply to Plaintiff's response
on May 19, 2026. (Doc. 17). This matter is now ripe for disposition.
ll. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery
[including, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file]
and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is [(1)] no
genuine issue as to any material fact and [(2)] that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); see also Turner v. Schering-Plough
Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1990). Material facts are those that “might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and a dispute is
“genuine” “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986).
At the summary judgment stage, “the judge’s function is not himself to
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249: see

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also Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding
that a court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations).
Rather, the court must consider all evidence and inferences drawn therefrom
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Andreoli v. Gates, 482
F.3d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2007).
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must
affirmatively identify those portions of the record which demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24.
The moving party can discharge that burden by showing that “on all the
essential elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial,
no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.” /n re Bressman, 327
F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2003): see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The moving
party’s burden has recently been explained this way:
In interpreting Rule 56, the Supreme Court has outlined two
closely related methods for a movant to succeed at summary
judgment. First, under the standard approach, the moving
party may produce material facts, established as genuinely
undisputed, that entitle it to judgment as a matter of law. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

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477 U.S. 242, 248-52 (1986) (explaining the meaning of the
terms ‘material’ and ‘genuine’). Second, under the Celofex
approach, a moving party may instead demonstrate that the
nonmoving party has not made “a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case ... on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)
(emphasis added).
Mall Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors LLC, 99 F.4th 622 (3d Cir. 2024).
If the moving party meets this initial burden, the non-moving party
“must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as
to material facts,” but must show sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict
in its favor. Boyle v. County of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998)
(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986)). However, if the non-moving party “fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [the non-
movant’s] case, and on which [the non-movant] will bear the burden of proof
at trial,” Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment because such a
failure “necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celofex Corp., 477
U.S. at 322-23; Jakimas v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d
Cir. 2007).

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lll. DISCUSSION
A. Count I: Title VII Retaliation
Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice
by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e—3(a).
Retaliation claims brought under Title VII follow the burden-shifting
framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. Yeager v.
UPMC Horizon, 698 F. Supp. 2d 523, 543 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (citing 411 U.S.
792 (1973)). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, “the
burden shifts to the employer to advance a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason”
for its conduct and if it successfully does, “the tclaintiff must be able to
convince the factfinder both that the employer’s proffered explanation was
false, and that relation was the real reason for the employment action.” /d. at
342 (quoting Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500-01 (3d Cir.
1997). Therefore:
[T]o defeat summary judgment when the defendant answers
the plaintiffs prima facie case with legitimate, non-
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discriminatory reasons for its action, the plaintiff must point to
some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a
factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's
articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious
discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or
determinative cause of the employer's action . . . Thus, if the
plaintiff has pointed to evidence sufficiently to discredit the
defendant's proffered reasons, to survive summary judgment
the plaintiff need not also come forward with additional
evidence of discrimination beyond his or her prima facie case.

Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal citations
omitted).
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff
must tender evidence that: “(1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII;
(2) the employer took an adverse employment action against her; and (3)
there was a causal connection between her participation in the protected
activity and the adverse employment action.” Moore v. Cty. of Philadelphia,
461 F.3d 331, 340 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Ne/son v. Upsala Coll., 51 F.3d
383, 386 (3d Cir. 1995)). If Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material
fact as to any element of her prima facie case, summary judgment is
warranted. Geraci v. Moody-Tottrup, Int'l, Inc., 82 F.3d 578, 580 (3d Cir.
1996). Thus, the Court addresses each element in turn.

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a. Protected Activity
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit defined a
“protected activity:”
With respect to “protected activity,” the anti-
retaliation provision of Title VII protects those who participate
in certain Title VII proceedings (the “participation clause”) and
those who oppose discrimination made — unlawful
by Title VII (the “opposition clause”)... Whether the employee
Opposes, or participates in a proceeding against, the
employer's activity, the employee must hold an objectively
reasonable belief, in good faith, that the activity they oppose is
unlawful under Title VIl . . . Moreover, the employee's
“opposition” to unlawful discrimination must not be equivocal[.]
Moore, 461 F.3d at 431 (internal citations omitted).
In Moore, the Third Circuit held that three white police officers engaged
in a protected activity by notifying a sergeant’s supervisor that the sergeant
was treating black officers less favorably than white officers. 461 F.3d at 343
(citing Curay—Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d
130, 135 (3d Cir. 2006)) (““Opposition’ to discrimination can take the form of
‘informal protests of discriminatory employment practices, including making
complaints to management.’ To determine if retaliation plaintiffs sufficiently
‘opposed’ discrimination, ‘we look to the message being conveyed rather
than the means of conveyance.’’). In that case, the white police officers

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observed the sergeant refer to black officers by using racial slurs. Moore,
461 F.3d at 336.
In the case before us, Plaintiff sent an email to HR on August 27, 2023.
In relevant part, Plaintiff's email stated:
Another thing that needs to be addressed is the infamous
pigeon incident. . . | watched an employee (the one who was
originally blamed for the incident) in my department[, Emily,] in
tears because she believed this was racially motivated and
watched nothing be done about the situation once it was clear
she was not involved. In my opinion it is due to the fact that the
employee that was claiming to be targeted, [Wright] has stated
she’s “scared of”... The next thing that needs to [be] brought
to attention is the employee surveys ... A staff member in one
of the reviews mentioned something about [Wright] saying
racist comments. In an unprofessional manner, [Wright]
spread that anonymous review throughout the office trying to
find out who submitted it. She ended up making an
announcement in huddle about how it is not tolerated in the
office even though we've all heard many racially insensitive
things come out of her mouth. | was made aware about a
conversation had between all the team leads and the office
manager where Sarah (work room team lead) made a
comment about her being “nicer” to black children because
“they are already at a disadvantage.” My jaw literally dropped
that these are the conversations being had on the clock, right

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next to [Wright] and nothing coming of it. Another disgusting
and completely inappropriate incident that happened involved
someone | work close with in the hygiene department... .
[Wright] and Sarah pulled this pergon[,Sehar,] from hygiene
just to ask her why she did not eat pork as someone who is
Muslim. After explaining the beliefs/practices of the religion
she was told it was both “weird” and “stupid” and was laughed
at by both [Wright] and Sarah. That same employee dismissed
herself and came back to the hygiene department visibly upset
and angry, but didn’t know what to do about the situation, since
her own manager was the one to allow/poke fun at the
insensitive comments made . . . What we currently have is
someone that is not qualified in neither dentistry, assisting, or
even hygiene that continues to play favorites and has clear
racial biases.

(Doc. 14-11 at 9-14).
In her deposition, however, Plaintiff testified that Plaintiff's coworker Emily,
not Plaintiff, believed that so-called “pigeon incident” was racially motivated
because it occurred on Juneteenth. The discussion followed:
Q. Is it your belief, then, there wasn’t any type of racial issue
involved in the [“pigeon incident,”] right?
A. Right. Not with the pigeon incident, no. | don’t believe it was
racially motivated.

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Q. So you weren't making—with respect to the pigeon incident,
you weren't making a complaint about there being racial
discrimination, right?
A. Not in this part, no.

(Doc. 14-7 at 160:24-161:7).
With respect to the incident regarding Sarah’s comment about black
children, Plaintiff admitted that she was not present for the alleged comment.
Id. at 172:6-9. Even if she was, Title VII does not protect speech on topics
unrelated to employment discrimination. Slater v. Susquehanna Cnty., 613
F.Supp.2d 653, 663 (M.D.Pa. 2009) (citing Wimmer v. Suffolk Cnty. Police
Dept, 528 U.S. 964 (1999) (plaintiff police officer's report of fellow officer's
discriminatory treatment of minorities not protected under Title VII).
Regarding the incident involving Sehar, which if true, may be protected by
Title VII; Plaintiff admitted that she was not present for the incident itself, but
for Sehar’s emotional response to the incident immediately after it occurred.
Id. at 167:5-168:13. Plaintiff agreed that she was only physically present for
Wright’s statements made to the whole staff, “advising the group at large that
it wasn’t appropriate company policy to make insensitive comments of this
nature[.]” /d. at 170:9-12.
For all the allegations regarding racial discrimination, Plaintiff admitted
that she either was not complaining about racial discrimination or was
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complaining about racial discrimination which she did not observe first-hand.
The question therefore becomes whether an employee reporting alleged
racial discrimination which she did not personally observe constitutes a
“protected activity.” A protected activity includes when employees “oppose
discrimination made unlawful by Title VII.” Moore, 461 F.3d at 431 (internal
citations omitted). Moreover, Plaintiff “must have held an objectively
reasonable, good faith belief that her employer's activity was unlawful under
Title Vil. She need not prove the merits of the underlying discrimination
complaint, but a reasonable person must be able to conclude that there was
discrimination under Title VII.” Gress v. Temple Univ. Health Sys., 784
F.App’x 100, 106 (3d Cir. 2019).
One concern is that some of Plaintiff's allegations are based on
potential hearsay evidence. However, “hearsay statements can be
considered on a motion for summary judgment /f they are capable of being
admissible at trial.” Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 1 v. Cty. of Camden,
842 F.3d 231, 238 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added). Plaintiff has identified the third-party declarants, and there is no
suggestion that any of them are unable to testify at trial, or that hearsay
exceptions or exemptions are inapplicable. Thus, this Court may consider

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these statements for summary judgment purposes. Vermeer v. Univ. of
Delaware, 710 F.Supp.3d 401, n.14 (D.Del. 2024).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to prove she was engaged in a
protected activity, because “any purported race-related concerns were
speculative, secondhand, and not grounded in her own reasonable belief of
unlawful discrimination.” (Doc. 14-3 at 10). While it may be true that Plaintiff
conceded that the so-called “pigeon incident” was not a complaint of race
discrimination by Plaintiffs own admission (Doc. 14-7 at 160:24-161:3),
Defendants fail to address Plaintiff's complaint involving a manager making
fun of a Muslim employee. (Doc. 14-6 at 13). Given the nature of the
allegation and the fact that Plaintiff was allegedly present to observe her
Sehar’s emotional response immediately after that incident, Plaintiff has
satisfied the threshold requirement of making a prima facie showing that she
engaged in a protected activity by emailing HR.
b. Adverse Employment Action
For the second element, Plaintiff must show that a reasonable
employee would have found the alleged retaliafory actions “materially
adverse” in that they “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Moore, 461 F.3d at 431
(internal citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated

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against her when they passed over her for a team lead position, and when
she was ultimately terminated. (Doc. 14-4, 9729-30). Piezer, the individual
who was hired over Plaintiff, allegedly told Plaintiff that she “definitely [had]
a target on [her] back” and was surprised that he was hired over her. (Doc.
14-7 at 210:14-23). Additionally, Plaintiff testified that she had more
experience in the hygiene department than Piezer did, and Piezer “was
shocked he got it[.]” /d. at 133:11-136:3.
Plaintiff was also terminated. In her termination meeting, Cohen
allegedly stated: “Clearly you know you’ve made pretty serious claims
against [Wright]... We’re no longer wanting you to be employed[.]” /d. at
14-226:16. These allegedly retaliatory actions, if true, “well might have
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.” Moore, 461 F.3d at 431 (internal citations omitted).
Therefore, Plaintiff has met her prima facie burden of showing that
Defendants engaged in adverse employment actions by hiring Piezer for the
team lead position and ultimately terminating Plaintiff.
c. Causation
Finally, to establish the third element, “a plaintiff must show a causal
connection between the plaintiffs opposition to, or participation in
proceedings against, unlawful discrimination and an action that might have

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dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.” Moore, 461 F.3d at 431 (internal citations omitted). Here,
Plaintiff alleges that she was passed over for the team lead position almost
immediately after her email complaint. (Doc. 16 at 8). With respect to her
termination, she presented testimony that the reason for her termination was
due to her claims against Wright. (Doc. 14-7 at 226:14-226:16). Plaintiff also
notes that she was offered severance just days after she complained to HR
and before her termination. (Doc. 16 at 8). Therefore, Plaintiff has made a
prima facie showing that her alleged retaliatory acts were causally connected
to her protected activity.
d. Burden-Shifting Analysis
Finding that Plaintiff established a prima facie case for her retaliation
claim, the burden shifts to Defendants to offer “legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for its action.” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764. Indeed, Defendants “need
not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered
reasons.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
Defendants’ burden is a light one. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763.
With respect to Defendants’ decision to hire Piezer over Plaintiff for the
RDH team lead position, Defendants presented evidence that Cohen stated
in an email: “[Plaintiff was not the most qualified person for the job[.]” (Doc.

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14-10 at 2). Additionally, Plaintiff admitted that Piezer had more certifications
than Plaintiff, and that she was otherwise unfamiliar with his educational
background. (Doc. 14-7 at 132:17135:8).
With respect to her termination, Defendants note that Plaintiff stated

on numerous occasions that she no longer wished to work for the company.
(Docs. 14-3 at 14, 14-7 at 223:18-224:5). Defendants also note that Wright
categorized Plaintiff's behavior as “insubordination.” (Doc. 14-10 at 4). Thus,
Defendants have carried their modest burden of articulating legitimate non-
discriminatory reasons for hiring Piezer for the RDH team lead position and
terminating Plaintiff's employment.
The burden therefore shifts back to Plaintiff, who “must point to some
evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably
either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2)
believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a
motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action.” Fuentes, 32
F.3d at 764. While the Court declines to evaluate the merits of Plaintiff's
retaliation claim, it finds that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence such
that a factfinder could reasonably disbelieve Defendants’ nondiscriminatory
reasons for her termination, particularly given Cohen’s stated reasons for her
termination.

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However, Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence such that a
fact finder could either disbelieve or find that a discriminatory reason was
more likely than not a motivating cause of Defendants’ decision to hire Piezer
over Plaintiff for the RDH team lead position. By Plaintiff's own admission,
Piezer had additional certifications which she did not have. Additionally,
when Plaintiff was asked, “So this doesn’t have to do with any type of racial
discrimination. It has to deal with the fact that you felt [Wright] wasn’t
appropriately handling the hygiene role?” she responded, “Correct.” (Doc.
14-7 at 183:12-16). Finally, Plaintiff agreed that she could not fill the RDH
team lead position at the time Piezer was hired, given that she had not yet
obtained her RDH certification. /d. at 118:25-119:7. Plaintiff has failed to
present sufficient evidence such that a fact finder would disbelieve
Defendants’ assertions that Piezer was simply a more qualified candidate
than Plaintiff.
A genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Plaintiff was
wrongfully terminated pursuant to Title VII retaliation. However, there is no
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants retaliated against
Plaintiff by passing over her for the RDH team lead position. Thus,
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED to the extent it

222.

applies to Plaintiff's claim that she was denied a new role and DENIED to
the extent it applies to Plaintiff's claim of wrongful termination.
B. Count Il: Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”)
The Court next considers whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists with respect to Count II of Plaintiffs complaint: discrimination under
the PHRA. The PHRA is generally interpreted in accord with its federal
counterpart, Title VII. Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996)
(citing Gomez v. Allegheny Health Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1079, 1083-84 (3d
Cir. 1995). “In the employment discrimination context, the analysis for
adjudicating claims under the PHRA is identical to a Title VII analysis.”
Larochelle v. Wilmac Corp., 210 F.Supp.3d 658, n.9 (E.D.Pa. 2016) (citing
Sheidemanle v. Slippery Rock Univ., 470 F.3d 535, 539 n.5 (3d Cir. 2006)
(emphasis added).
“In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting analysis applies to discrimination claims brought
under Title VIl and the PHRA.” Donnelly v. Capital Vision Serv., LLC, 644
F.Supp.3d 97, 104 (E.D.Pa. 2022) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792).
Because the Court employed the McDonnell Douglas framework with
respect to Plaintiff's Title VIl claims, supra, the Court renders the same
holding for Plaintiff's PHRA claims.

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IV. CONCLUSION
After viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court
concludes with respect to Plaintiff's retaliation claim that she was wrongfully
terminated, there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether:
Plaintiff engaged in a protected activity; the termination was adverse
employment action; the causation element of her retaliation claim could be
satisfied; and Defendants had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for her
termination. These issues will need to be resolved by a jury. Under these
circumstances, the motion for summary judgment must be denied with
respect to the retaliation claims based upon Plaintiff's termination.

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The Court concludes, however, that Plaintiff did not adduce sufficient
evidence to support her other retaliation claim—that she was passed over
for an RDH team lead position. Summary judgment must be granted in
Defendants’ favor with respect to that claim. For the foregoing reasons,
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. An appropriate order will follow. Additionally, a separate
Order the Court will set a date for the final pretrial conference and trial in this
matter.

United States District Judge
DATE: Sfot/2o
24-2278-01

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11359336. Public record. Not legal advice.