# BRUNSON

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · April 2, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11359263

## Case

- **Full name:** Kharee Brunson v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 2, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KHAREE BRUNSON, :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-6526
:
COMMONWEALTH OF :
PENNSYLVANIA, et al., :
Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

SCHMEHL, J. APRIL 2, 2026
Plaintiff Kharee Brunson, a pretrial detainee who is currently housed at Chester County
Prison, brings this pro se civil action alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Named as
Defendants are the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Valley Township Police Department,
Warden Howard Holland, and Valley Township Police Officer Katelynn Duca. Brunson seeks to
proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Brunson in forma
pauperis status and dismiss his Complaint. He will be given leave to file an amended complaint
if he can cure the deficiencies noted by the Court.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1
The allegations in Brunson’s Complaint are brief. He states that he was arrested by
Officer Duca on January 2, 2025, “pursuant to a felony arrest warrant as stated in Police criminal
complaint #5571 (Exhibit B)” and that “an arrest warrant never existed at the time of [his] arrest
and still does not exist. Magisterial Docket #MJ-15307-CR-0000001-2025 (Exhibit C).”
(Compl. at 3.) He further alleges that the state court docket does not reflect an entry indicating

1 The following allegations are taken from the Complaint. (ECF No. 2.) The Court
adopts the sequential pagination supplied to the Complaint by the CM/ECF docketing system.
an arrest warrant was issued at the time of the arrest, “only a criminal complaint.” (Id.) He
contends that he is being falsely imprisoned by Warden Holland at the Chester County Prison.
(Id.) Brunson avers that he has suffered physically and mentally due to the Defendants’ actions.
(Id.) As relief, he seeks release from custody and monetary damages.2 (Id. at 4.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court will grant Brunson leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that
he does not have the ability to pre-pay the fees to commence this case.3 Accordingly, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim.
Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same
standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to
determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

2 To the extent Brunson seeks release from custody, such relief cannot be granted in a
civil action, such as this, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (when a prisoner “is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical
imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release
or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas
corpus”); see also Jaffery v. Atl. Cnty. Prosecutor’s Office, 695 F. App’x 38, 41-42 (3d Cir.
2017) (per curiam) (“[T]o the extent Jaffery seeks dismissal of the charges against him as a
result of constitutional violations, such relief is only available through a writ of habeas corpus.”);
Duran v. Weeks, 399 F. App’x 756, 759 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“[T]o the extent that Duran
is seeking dismissal of the charges against him as a result of constitutional violations, he is
essentially asking for relief only available through habeas corpus.”). The Court notes that, along
with the papers for this case, Brunson also submitted to the court for filing a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2241, as well as another civil rights complaint pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Brunson v. Hillegas, et al., Civ. A. No. 25-6524 (E.D. Pa.) and Brunson
v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al., Civ. A. No. 25-6525 (E.D. Pa.)

3 However, since Brunson is a prisoner, he will be obligated to pay the filing fee in
installments in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).
(quotations omitted); Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). At the screening
stage, the Court will accept the facts alleged in the pro se Complaint as true, draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and ask only whether that complaint, liberally construed,
contains facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374

(3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th
197 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also
Martinez v. UPMC Susquehanna, 986 F.3d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 2021) (“A plaintiff cannot survive
dismissal just by alleging the conclusion to an ultimate legal issue.”).
As Brunson is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v.
Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239,
244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). The Court will “apply the relevant legal principle even when the
complaint has failed to name it.” Id. However, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts
in their complaints to support a claim.” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F. 3d at 245). An unrepresented
litigant “cannot flout procedural rules — they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other

litigants.” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Brunson seeks damages for alleged violations of his federal constitutional rights pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Compl. at 2.) “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege
the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show
that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Brunson’s Complaint is best construed as alleging violations of
his Fourth Amendment rights.4 For the following reasons, Brunson has failed to allege any
plausible claim.
Brunson asserts that his constitutional rights were violated because he was falsely
arrested in connection with criminal charges filed against him. (Compl. at 2.) The Court

understands Bruson to allege that on January 2, 2025, a criminal complaint was filed in
Commonwealth v. Brunson, MJ-15307-CR-0000001-2025 (Chester), and that he was then
arrested by Officer Duca, but that state court docket does not reflect that an arrest warrant issued
in the case. (Compl. at 3.) A review of Pennsylvania’s publicly available docketing system
reveals that Brunson has an active criminal prosecution that appears to be the basis of his
allegations. See Commonwealth v. Brunson, MJ-15307-CR-0000001-2025 (Chester)5;
Commonwealth v. Brunson, CP-15-CR-0002860-2025 (C.P. Chester); see also Buck v. Hampton
Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) (the Court may take judicial notice of facts
reflected in publicly available state court records). Additionally, Brunson attached to his

4 Although Brunson alleges that his Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights were
violated (see Compl. at 2), only the Fourth Amendment is relevant to his allegations. The Fourth
Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Brunson does not
allege any facts that would invoke the Fifth or Sixth Amendments and passing references to legal
provisions are insufficient to bring a plausible constitutional claim before the Court. See Higgins
v. Bayada Home Health Care Inc., 62 F.4th 755, 763 (3d Cir. 2023) (“A passing reference to an
issue will not suffice to bring that issue before this court.” (cleaned up) (quoting Laborers’ Int’l
Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994))).
Accordingly, any claim based on a violation of the Fifth or Sixth Amendment will be dismissed.

5 As noted supra, Brunson submitted a § 2241 habeas petition simultaneously with this
Complaint in which he challenges three state court criminal prosecutions: (1) MJ-15304-CR-
0000444-2023 (Chester); (2) MJ-25307-CR-000000-1-2025 (Chester); and (3) MJ-15307-CR-
0000023-2024 (Chester). See Brunson v. Hillegas, et al., Civ. A. No. 25-6524 (E.D. Pa.), ECF 2
at 3. Indeed, Brunson attached to the § 2241 petition, inter alia, a portion of the docket in MJ-
15307-CR-0000001-2025 (Chester). See id., ECF 2-1 at 3.
Complaint an “Affidavit of Probable Cause” completed by Duca seeking an arrest warrant for
Brunson in connection with the charges. (ECF No. 2-1.)
Thus, to the extent Brunson seeks to allege a Fourth Amendment claim based on his
arrest in Commonwealth v. Brunson, MJ-15307-CR-0000001-2025 (Chester), because it appears

that Brunson was arrested pursuant to a criminal complaint in that matter, his Fourth Amendment
claim sounds in malicious prosecution. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 390 (2007)
(explaining that the tort of malicious prosecution “remedies detention accompanied, not by
absence of legal process, but by wrongful institution of legal process”); Noviho v. Lancaster Cty.
of Pa., 683 F. App’x 160, 166 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Arrests made pursuant to a ‘validly
issued—if not validly supported—arrest warrant’ generally occur after the institution of
legal process and, thus, sound in malicious prosecution rather than false arrest or imprisonment.”
(quoting Myers v. Koopman, 738 F.3d 1190, 1195 (10th Cir. 2013)). To state a Fourth
Amendment malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that a government
official charged him without probable cause, leading to an unreasonable seizure of his person.

Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio, 602 U.S. 556, 558 (2024) (citing Thompson v. Clark, 596
U. S. 36, 43, and n.2 (2022)). A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 has five elements: (1)
the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in the
plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants
acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff
suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal
proceeding. Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 203 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotations and
citation omitted). “Probable cause exists if there is a fair probability that the person committed
the crime at issue.” Id. at 199 (quotations omitted).6 A “favorable termination” occurs when a
prosecution ends “without a conviction.” Thompson, 596 U.S. at 49 (“In sum, we hold that a
Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for malicious prosecution does not require the plaintiff to
show that the criminal prosecution ended with some affirmative indication of innocence. A

plaintiff need only show that the criminal prosecution ended without a conviction.”).
Of the five elements of a malicious prosecution claim, Brunson’s sparse Complaint
alleges only that a criminal proceeding was initiated against him and that he was detained
pursuant to these charges. He has not alleged that the criminal proceeding ended in his favor, the
proceeding was initiated without probable cause, and that the defendants acted maliciously or for
a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice. Accordingly, the malicious prosecution
claim must be dismissed because it is not plausible as pled. See, e.g., Santiago v. Humes, No.
14-7109, 2015 WL 1422627, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2015) (dismissing false arrest, false
imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims when plaintiffs failed to “affirmatively assert

6 For the “lack of probable cause” element, where an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant
or a previously sworn criminal complaint, a plaintiff must allege plausibly “(1) that the police
officer knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false
statements or omissions that create[d] a falsehood in applying for a warrant; and (2) that such
statements or omissions are material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.” Wilson v.
Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and citation omitted); Pinkney v.
Meadville, Pennsylvania, 95 F.4th 743, 748 (3d Cir. 2024) (same); see also Evans v. Newark
City, 152 F.4th 537, 545-47 (3d Cir. 2025) (discussing “lack of probable cause” element). An
omission is made with reckless disregard if it were something a reasonable person would realize
that the judge would want to know. Wilson, 212 F.3d. at 788. To determine whether an
omission is material, the Court must predict whether a reasonable judge would conclude that a
corrected affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause. Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d
396, 401 (3d Cir. 1997); Pinkney, 95 F.4th at 748-49. The existence of probable cause is
typically a question of fact for a jury, unless the evidence “reasonably would not support a
contrary factual finding,” in which case the court may determine the existence of probable cause
as a matter of law. Basile v. Twp. of Smith, 752 F. Supp. 2d 643, 651 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (granting
Rule 12(b)(6) motion in part and dismissing false arrest claim with leave to amend); see also
Slack v. McHugh, No. 24-2153, 2025 WL 2753671, at *2 (3d Cir. Sept. 29, 2025) (“[A] plaintiff
must adequately allege a lack of probable cause to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.”).
facts to show that the Officer Defendants did not have probable cause” when plaintiffs simply
alleged that all allegations against them in the underlying criminal proceedings were false); see
also Slack, 2025 WL 2753671 at *1-3 (affirming dismissal of malicious prosecution claim
“because there is prima facie evidence of probable cause for [plaintiff’s] arrest and

prosecution”).
There are other problems with Brunson’s claims. Generally, a sub-division of a local
government is not separate from the municipality of which it is a part and, accordingly, is not a
proper defendant in a § 1983 action. See, e.g., Martin v. Red Lion Police Dep’t, 146 F. App’x
558, 562 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“[T]he Red Lion Police Department, as the sub-
division of defendant Red Lion Borough through which the Red Lion Borough fulfills its
policing functions, was not a proper defendant.”); Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20,
25 (3d Cir. 1997) (“As in past cases, we treat the municipality and its police department as a
single entity for purposes of section 1983 liability”) (citing Colburn v. Upper Darby Township,
838 F.2d 663, 671 n.7 (3d Cir. 1988)); Bush v. City of Philadelphia Philadelphia Police Dep’t,

684 F. Supp. 2d 634, 636 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (same). Thus, the Valley Township Police Department
is not a proper defendant in this matter.
Additionally, states are not considered “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See Will v.
Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989). Furthermore, the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania is immune from suit for money damages under the Eleventh Amendment and has
not waived that immunity for lawsuits filed in federal court. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984); Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 309-10
(3d Cir. 2020); see also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 8521-22. Accordingly, the claims for money
damages Brunson seeks to assert against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania may not proceed.
With regard to Warden Holland, Brunson fails to allege factual allegations about his
involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. To the extent that the Warden is named
simply due to his high-ranking position at the Chester County County Prison, this is not
sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Saisi v. Murray, 822 F. App’x 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2020) (per

curiam). In any event, it is not clear how Warden Holland would bear any legal responsibility
for any alleged false arrest or prosecution. Accordingly, any claims against Warden Holland will
be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Brunson leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and will dismiss the claims against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Valley
Township Police Department with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure
to state a claim.
The balance of Brunson’s claims will be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. Brunson will be given an opportunity to

correct the defects in these claims by filing an amended complaint. Any amended complaint
must clearly describe the factual basis for his claims and how each defendant was personally
involved in the alleged violation of his rights.7

7 It bears noting that this Court has an obligation to abstain from considering certain types
of cases pursuant to the principles of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). “To promote
comity between the national and state governments,” the Younger abstention doctrine “requires
federal courts to abstain from deciding cases that would interfere with certain ongoing state
proceedings.” Malhan v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of State, 938 F.3d 453, 461 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing
Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77-78 (2013)). When determining whether
Younger abstention is proper, a court first must examine the underlying state court litigation to
determine whether it falls into one of three categories of cases: (1) criminal prosecutions, (2)
civil enforcement proceedings, and (3) civil proceedings involving orders in furtherance of the
state courts’ judicial function. See PDX N., Inc. v. Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of Labor & Workforce
Dev., 978 F.3d 871, 882 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omitted). Because Brunson has not
An appropriate Order follows, which provides further instruction about amendment.
BY THE COURT:

/s/ Jeffrey L. Schmehl
Jeffrey L. Schmehl, J.

pled any plausible claims, the Court need not address at this time whether Younger abstention
necessitates that any claims be stayed pending resolution of the state criminal proceedings.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11359263. Public record. Not legal advice.