# JONES

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · March 31, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11358648

## Case

- **Full name:** John R. Jones, Jr. v. Bristol Township, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 31, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN R. JONES, JR. CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff,
No. 23-4879-KSM
v.

BRISTOL TOWNSHIP, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM
MARSTON, J. March 31, 2026
Pro se Plaintiff John Jones Jr. brings this action against a litany of public officials and
private citizens alleging constitutional and statutory violations related to his two arrests in
December 2021 and February 2022. (See Doc. No. 60.) Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint
(“TAC”) envisions a grand conspiracy—or as he calls it—a “war”, facilitated by the Wagners,
including Jeffrey Wagner1, Alexus Wagner, Kevin Wagner Sr., Maryanne Wagner2, and Robert
Wagner Jr., a purportedly prominent Bucks County family, to have Plaintiff incarcerated and his
dog killed because of his alleged whistleblowing activities. (Id. at 3, 8.) Plaintiff claims that the
Wagners and other Defendants named in the TAC have “ruined [his] life with a conspiracy
designed to do [him] significant harm.” (Id. at 5.)

1 Plaintiff incorrectly identifies this Defendant as “Jeffery Wagner” in the caption of his
Complaint. (See Doc. No. 60 at 1.)

2 Plaintiff incorrectly identified this Defendant as “Maryann Wanger” in the caption of his
Complaint. (See Doc. No. 60 at 1.)
Presently before the Court are two issues. First, Plaintiff has failed to file proof of proper
service for many of the Defendants3 in this matter despite the Court previously warning him that
his failure to do so would result in dismissal of his claims as to those Defendants. Second, those
Defendants who have been served, or otherwise have received notice of this action, have filed
motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s TAC in its entirety.4 (See Doc. Nos. 66. 68, 69, 70, 82, 84, 86, 94,

98, 99, 104.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s TAC against the
unserved defendants and grant all of the Moving Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s TAC5 consists of 103 pages of repetitive, largely incoherent, and disjointed
allegations which fail to present a clear narrative of the events at issue. Plaintiff himself

3 These Defendants include House Representative Brian Fitzpatrick, Troy Bodolus, Wallace H.
Bateman Jr., Jeffrey L. Finely, Neshaminy School District, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”),
Kevin Burns, and Brian Galloway.

4 These Defendants include PrimeCare Medical, Inc. (Doc. No. 66); Bristol Township (Doc. No.
68); Middletown Township and Officer Jeffrey Wagner (Doc. No. 69); Maryanne Wagner (Doc. No. 70),
Jason Mancuso, Ashley McCabe, Emilyann Maialetti, Robert Coulton, Sean Cosgrove, Randee Elton
(collectively “Individual Bristol Defendants”) (Doc. No. 82), Middletown Township, Joseph Bartorilla,
Michael Lubold, Jeffrey Wagner, Megan Freer, John Beck, Edward DiFrank (collectively, the
“Middletown Defendants”) (Doc. No. 84), Tina Davis (Doc. No. 86), Troy Bodolus and Neshaminy
School District (Doc. Nos. 94, 104), and the Pennsylvania Attorney General (Doc. No. 99) (collectively,
the “Moving Defendants”).

5 Plaintiff has also filed dozens of pages of written and video “exhibits” and letters to the Court
since filing his TAC. (See, e.g., Doc. Nos. 100–06) He also filed a “Motion for Exhibits” on September
27, 2025, which asked the Court to take judicial notice of his submitted exhibits as part of his TAC.
(Doc. No. 98.) “As a general matter, a district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may not consider
matters extraneous to the pleadings.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d
Cir. 1997). An exception to the general rule is that “a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the
complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.”
Peele v. Delaney, No. 12-cv-4877, 2017 WL 467347, at *4 n.4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2017). However,
Plaintiff’s “exhibits” were not attached to his TAC but rather filed on a continuous basis after the Court
deemed his TAC the operative Complaint in this matter on May 16, 2025. (See Doc. No. 63.) And his
specific Motion for Exhibits was filed over four months after his TAC was filed. (See Doc. Nos. 60, 98.)
acknowledges that he has “[l]umped” together issues by Defendants. (Doc. No. 60 at 4.)
Nevertheless, from what the Court can glean from this filing, it appears that the factual
predicates for Plaintiff’s claims are as follows:
At some time in 2021, Plaintiff was stopped on two different occasions by Middletown

Police Officers Megan Logan Freer and Edward DiFrank for walking his service dog, Holly, on
the grounds of Walter Miller Elementary School. (Doc. No. 60 at 18–19.) Officer DiFrank
allegedly issued a citation to Plaintiff and threatened to have Plaintiff’s truck towed. (Doc. No.
60 at 19.)
Some time later, Plaintiff received a letter from the Neshaminy School District Chief of
Security Kevin Burns which stated the following:
It has been brought to my attention that you have been parking your
vehicle on Walter Miller Elementary School Property during school
hours. Please be advised that no one is permitted on the property
except for school business during school hours.

(Id. at 18.)
On December 11, 2021, Plaintiff was again on school property, and again walking his
service dog Holly, when he was encountered by Defendant John Beck, another Middletown

Thus, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion and does not consider these exhibits when ruling on the
Moving Defendants’ motions.

And, to the extent Plaintiff is relying on the exhibits attached to his original Complaint, the Court
will not consider this material because “an amended pleading supersedes the original pleading and renders
the original pleading a nullity.” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019); see also
Argentina v. Gillette, 778 F. App’x 173, 175 n.3 (3d Cir. 2019) (finding that the district court should not
have examined allegations in the original complaint when ruling on a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint and noting that “liberal construction of a pro se amended complaint does not mean
accumulating allegations from superseded pleadings.”). Moreover, the Court has had some difficulty
identifying discrete documents that may support Plaintiff’s claims, and Plaintiff has failed to direct the
Court’s attention to any specific evidence integral to the claims asserted in his TAC. Thus, the Court
finds it would be improper to rely on, and credit Plaintiff’s improper creation of, this voluminous record
in the resolution of the pending motions.
Police Officer. (Id. at 24, 60.) Beck approached Plaintiff and allegedly stated, “It’s my
understanding you’re not allowed on this property,” but he did not issue a citation to Plaintiff.
(Id. at 24.) Fifteen minutes later, Plaintiff encountered Defendants Jeffrey Wagner and Michael
Lubold, who also serve as Middletown Township Police Officers. (Id. at 53, 62.) According to

Plaintiff, Officer Wagner told Plaintiff, “I just read the letter and it says you’re only allowed on
school property if you have school business during school hours, which means you’re not
allowed on the property at all.” (Id. at 28.) Officer Wagner then arrested Plaintiff. (Id. at 54,
62.) Plaintiff asserts that his left shoulder was significantly injured during this arrest, a pocket
knife was seized and stolen from him, and his dog Holly was injured. (Id. at 26–27.) Plaintiff
was charged with defiant trespassing in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3503(B)(1) and released
from police custody later that day.6 (Id. at 3, 7, 9.)
Plaintiff further alleges that a few months later, on January 29, 2022, he was assaulted by
a “Wagner family member” and called 911—but no action was taken. (Doc. No. 60 at 3.) Then,
just a few days later, on February 3, 2022, Plaintiff was arrested for stalking and harassment, due

to “taking photos from the public street of ‘Wagner’ family owned properties.” (Id. at 50.)
Plaintiff alleges that he was ordered to surrender to the Bristol Township Police Department and
Defendant Jason Mancuso, another police officer, told him that he would be home “in a couple
of hours.” (Id. at 73.) He alleges that he complied with this request and “surrendered” on
February 3, 2022. (Id.; see also id. at 58, 72.)
After surrendering, Plaintiff alleges that he was taken to the Bucks County Correctional

6 It appears that Plaintiff was eventually convicted of this charge. See Commonwealth v. Jones,
CP-09-SA-0000444-2022 (Ct. Com. Pl. Bucks Cnty. 2022). The Court may take judicial notice of
Plaintiff’s publicly available criminal docket when reviewing a motion to dismiss. See Buck v. Hampton
Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) (providing that courts can consider “matters of public
record” in reviewing a motion to dismiss).
Facility (“BCCF”)7 where he was incarcerated for 76 days and spent six days in solitary
confinement. (Id. at 20.) On March 22, 2022, Plaintiff states that he was charged with making
“terroristic threats.” (Id. at 4, 7.) Plaintiff claims that his bail was initially posted at $1,000,000
before being lowered to $100,000, which he posted “at great expense and inconvenience.” (Id. at

4.)
Plaintiff alleges that while he was incarcerated, he was denied “medically necessary
medications” for six days, and that he suffered a shoulder injury but did not receive an MRI that
he was allegedly promised. (Id. at 44.) He also asserts that his glasses were stolen at the time of
his intake and that he was threatened by a nurse identified only as “Beth.” (Id. at 42−45.)
Plaintiff describes how he did not see his service dog Holly again once he entered the BCCF
because for the first six days he was prohibited from making a phone call to coordinate care for
Holly. (Id. at 59.) It was not until Plaintiff’s release from the facility on April 20, 2022, that he
learned that Holly had died. (Id. at 4, 34.)
Plaintiff brings this case based on his assertion that the named Defendants “killed [his

dog] Holly and ruined [his] life with a conspiracy designed to do [him] significant harm and thus
far have succeeded.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff asserts that the alleged conspiracy against him is the
“same” as a similar conspiracy that was perpetrated against his late father in 2002. (Id. at 3.)
Plaintiff asserts that the conspiracy was conducted “to injure the Plaintiff in order to save Jeffrey
Wagner’s police career . . . [and] due to [Jeffery (sic) Wagner’s] family’s unbridled,
inappropriate and undue influence in Bristol TWP.” (Id. at 16.)
Plaintiff brings his TAC against 39 Defendants, asserting a myriad of constitutional and
state law claims, which the Court discusses in further detail below. Plaintiff describes his action

7 Plaintiff refers to this entity as the “Bucks County Prison” throughout his TAC. (See generally
Doc. No. 60.)
as a “civil rights action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and punitive damages for
substantial violations of Plaintiff’s protected rights by Defendants.” (Id. at 3.)
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In December 2023, Plaintiff filed his first Complaint and a subsequent Amended

Complaint. (Doc. Nos. 1, 5.) In his 65-page Amended Complaint, he made repetitive, largely
incoherent, and disjointed allegations that similarly failed to present a clear narrative of the
events at issue. (See generally Doc. No. 5.) His Amended Complaint also jumped back and
forth chronologically, which made it difficult for the Court to ascertain to which arrest and set of
charges many of the events in his Amended Complaint were connected. (See generally id.) Nor
did his Amended Complaint identify which claims he brought against each Defendant, what each
Defendant had allegedly done, and when they allegedly engaged in the wrongful action. (See
generally id.)
Given these issues, the Court found that the Amended Complaint failed to satisfy Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8. (Doc. No. 51.) Even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se

litigants, the Court ruled the Amended Complaint failed “to provide fair notice of the grounds
upon which [Plaintiff’s] claims against each Defendant rest, as required by Rule 8.” (Id. (quoting
Hall v. SEPTA, No. 24-cv-1374, 2024 WL 1773369, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 24, 2024)).) So, the
Court dismissed his Amended Complaint without prejudice on January 13, 2025, but granted
Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint except for his claims against “Every Single, All 15 Bucks
County Judges, Including District Justices, Robert Wagner, and Kevin Wagner Sr.”8 (Id. at 1, 3.)

8 The dismissal of these claims was with prejudice because Plaintiff’s claims against the Bucks
County Judges were premised on their decisions regarding recusal, the issuance of fines against Plaintiff
for property violations, and Plaintiff’s bail amount. (See Doc. No. 51 at 3 n.1.) These are judicial acts
taken within the Bucks County Judges’ jurisdiction, and so Plaintiff’s claims were barred by judicial
immunity. Thus, any amendment would have been futile. See Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d
Cir. 2006) (“A judicial officer in the performance of his duties has absolute immunity from suit and will
The Court gave Plaintiff 60 days to file a Second Amended Complaint and encouraged him to
use the template found on the Court’s website. (Id. at 3–4.)
On March 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed 153 pages of documents on the docket, but he did not
file a Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 52.) In those documents, he included a motion for

a continuance, motion for inclusion, and motion to proceed. (Id. at 1, 62–63.) The Court denied
those three motions and ordered Plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint by April 4, 2025.
(Doc. No. 53.)
On April 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 54.) In his
172-page Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff listed 57 Defendants, attempted to incorporate
allegations from his First Amended Complaint, and brought thirteen claims, again without
specifying against whom each claim was brought.9 (Id.) The Court dismissed this Second
Amended Complaint without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. (See Doc. No.
56.) In the Order, the Court explained that Plaintiff could not incorporate all the allegations from
his First Amended Complaint, that he needed to state his claims in numbered paragraphs, and

that he “must specifically allege which Defendants engaged in what wrongful conduct” that
forms the basis of each claim. Falat v. County of Hunterdon, No. 12-cv-6804, 2013 WL
1163751, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2013). Though the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the

not be liable for his judicial acts.”).

9 Though Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint listed 57 Defendants, the list of Defendants was
not sequential, jumped from Defendant 25 to Defendant 19, and identified the same individuals as
Defendants in multiple different places. (See Doc. No. 54 at 2–12.) The Second Amended Complaint
also contained several duplicate pages. (See id. at 13–29.)
Court again allowed Plaintiff the opportunity to amend, directing him to file a TAC by May 2,
2025. (Doc. No. 56 at 5.)
From May 2 to May 5, 2025, Plaintiff filed four different complaints. (See Doc. Nos. 57–
60.) Based on the Court’s review of these filings, it appears that Plaintiff intended for Doc. No.

60 to serve as his TAC. (See Doc. No. 60 at 1 (asking the Court to allow this complaint to
“supersede all others previously submitted”.) On May 16, 2025, the Court accepted Doc. No. 60
as the operative Complaint in this case and named it the TAC. (Doc. No. 63 at 3.) Plaintiff’s
now 103-page TAC is organized by “Counts” where he describes allegations and claims against
each Defendant with varying levels of detail and cohesion.10 The Court provides an overview
below of the Defendants who Plaintiff has dropped from his TAC, previous Defendants who
have not been properly served, newly added Defendants who have also not been properly served,
and the Defendants who have filed motions to dismiss.
A. Dropped Defendants
In the TAC, Plaintiff drops his claims against several Defendants, including Does 1–100

inclusive, Gabriel Escobar, Elizabeth Hughes, and “Philadelphia Enquirer [sic].” (See generally
Doc. No. 60.) “Because an amended complaint supersedes the original, parties voluntarily
dropped from an amended complaint do not remain in the case.” Mullin v. Balicki, 875 F.3d 140,
156 (3d Cir. 2017). On May 16, 2025, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against these
Defendants. (Doc. No. 63.) The Court also dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff’s claims against
Robert Wagner and Kevin Wagner, Sr., because the Court previously dismissed the claims
against these defendants with prejudice. (Id.)

10 As Plaintiff is pro se, the Court has liberally constructed his claims and done its best to capture
the individual claims brought against each Defendant in light of Plaintiff’s lengthy and difficult-to-follow
format.
B. Previous Defendants Not Properly Served
Plaintiff’s TAC brings claims against several Defendants, including Pennsylvania
Governor Josh Shapiro,11 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Bucks County, BCCF, Bucks
County Sheriff’s Office, Bucks County Constables, Falls Township, District Attorney Matthew

Weintraub, and Alexis Wagner, all of whom Plaintiff named in his prior Complaints. (Doc. No.
60 at 2.) Three times, the Court directed Plaintiff to serve these Defendants and warned him that
failure to do so would result in the dismissal of his claims against these Defendants under
Federal Rule Civil Procedure 4(m). (See Doc. No. 37 at 2; Doc. No. 42 at 2; Doc. No. 48 at 2.)
On May 16, 2025, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). (Doc. No. 63.)
C. New Defendants Not Properly Served
Plaintiff’s TAC identifies multiple new Defendants, including Brian Fitzpatrick, Troy
Bodolus, Wallace H. Bateman Jr., Jeffrey L. Finely, Neshaminy School District, FBI, Kevin
Burns, and Brian Galloway. (Id.) Plaintiff was directed to serve process on these new

Defendants by August 4, 2025, and to file the proof of service by August 11, 2025, as required
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). (Id. at 13.) On August 3, Plaintiff filed a proof of
service (Doc. No. 78) and requested time to correct any service-related issues. (Id. at 1.) On
September 10, 2025, the Court issued an Order which described Plaintiff’s service-related issues
and provided detailed instructions on how Plaintiff could correct his service mistakes in a timely
manner. (Doc. No. 90.) The Court warned Plaintiff that failure to serve the new Defendants
would result in the dismissal of his claims against these Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(m). (Id. at 10.) But, as of today, March 31, 2026, Plaintiff has not filed proper

11 Plaintiff incorrectly spelled Governor Shapiro’s name as “Josh Shipiro” in the caption of his
TAC. (See Doc. No 60 at 1.)
proof of service for Defendants Brian Fitzpatrick, Troy Bodolus, Wallace H. Bateman Jr., Jeffrey
L. Finely, Neshaminy School District, the FBI, Kevin Burns, and Brian Galloway. As further
outlined in the Service section above, the Court finds that dismissal of these unserved
Defendants is warranted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).

D. Moving Defendants
That leaves the Moving Defendants, some of whom challenge service and some of whom
do not. The Moving Defendants have all filed motions to dismiss on various dates noted below:
Defendant(s) Motion to Date Filed Plaintiff’s Date Filed
Dismiss Docket Response
Number Docket
Number
PrimeCare Medical Doc. No. 66 May 20, 2025 Doc. No. 93 Sept. 12, 2025
Inc.
Bristol Township Doc. No. 68 May 27, 2025 Doc. No. 93 Sept. 12, 2025

Middletown Doc. No. 69 May 29, 2025 Doc. No. 93 Sept. 12, 2025
Township and
Jeffrey Wagner

Maryanne Wagner Doc. No. 70 May 30, 2025 Doc. No. 93 Sept. 12, 2025

Jason Mancuso, Doc. No. 82 Aug. 7, 2025 Doc. No. 93 Sept. 12, 2025
Ashley McCabe,
Emily Maialetti,
Robert Coulton,
Sean Cosgrove,
Randee Elton
Middletown Doc. No. 84 Aug. 11, 2025 Doc. No. 93 Sept. 12, 2025
Township,
Joseph Bartorilla,
Michael Lubold,
Jeffrey Wagner,
Megan Freer,
John Beck,
Edward DiFrank12

Tina Davis Doc. No. 86 Aug. 11, 2025 Doc. No. 93 Sept. 12, 2025

Neshaminy School Doc. No. 9413, Sept. 12, 2025 Doc. No. 109 Nov. 10, 2025
District, Doc. No. 104 Oct. 20, 2025
Troy Bodolus

Pennsylvania Doc. No. 99 Oct. 2, 2025 Doc. No. 118 Jan. 15, 2026
Attorney General

By way of these motions, Moving Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s TAC in its
entirety. As each motion is fully briefed, they are ripe for resolution. But briefly, the Court turns
to the service of process issues before moving into a discussion of the motions to dismiss.
III. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) provides that if “a defendant is not served within 90
days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—
must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made
within a specified time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). In the Court’s September 10, 2025, Order, the
Court ordered Plaintiff to perfect service on Defendants Brian Fitzpatrick, Troy Bodolus,
Wallace H. Bateman Jr., Jeffrey L. Finely14, Neshaminy School District, and the FBI by October

12 The Middletown Defendants also filed a reply on September 18, 2025. (Doc. No. 95.)

13 Neshaminy School District and Troy Bodolus filed a subsequent motion to dismiss due to their
initial filing being made before Defendants’ saw the Court’s September 10, 2025 Order, which provided
Plaintiff with an extension to serve these Defendants. (Doc. No. 104.) Their motion to dismiss moves to
dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them for improper service of process.

14 On March 24, 2026, Plaintiff filed a “Notice of Sheriff Fee Discrepancy and Resulting Service
6, 2025 and to file proof of proper service by October 13, 2025. (Doc. No. 90 at 9–10.) The
Court also ordered Plaintiff to perfect service on Defendants Kevin Burns and Brian Galloway
by December 12, 2025, and to file proof of service no later than December 19, 2025. (Doc. No.
90 at 6.) In both Orders, the Court warned that failure to do so would result in the dismissal of

his claims against all of these Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). (Id.
at 10 n.9.)
But, as of today, March 31, 2026, Plaintiff has not filed proper proof of service for
Defendants Brian Fitzpatrick, Troy Bodolus15, Wallace H. Bateman Jr., Jeffrey L. Finely,
Neshaminy School District16, the FBI17, Kevin Burns, and Brian Galloway. Thus, the Court

Delay”. (Doc. No. 123.) In this Notice, Plaintiff alleges that he attempted to serve Wallace Batemen Jr.,
Brian Fitzpatrick, and Jeffrey Finely on September 11, 2025, but that a “material discrepancy in the
application of civil service fees by the Bucks County Sherrif’s [sic] Office” that he received on March 12,
2026, rendered his service improper and has impacted his ability to make timely service. (Id. at 1.)
However, it has been six months since Plaintiff attempted to serve these Defendants and Plaintiff never
filed proof of service by the Court’s October 13, 2026, Deadline. (Doc. No. 90.)

15 On November 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed a letter in response to Troy Bodolus and Neshaminy
School District’s motion to dismiss for lack of proper service (Doc. No. 109), arguing that he properly
served these Defendants using the Bucks County Sheriff’s Department and that the Court is in possession
of the Sheriff’s Return of Service. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the Court has not received any proof
of service since the Court’s September 10, 2025 Order (Doc. No. 90) showing that service was properly
effectuated as to these Defendants. However, even if Plaintiff had properly served these Defendants, the
Court would still find that Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants fail for the reasons discussed in
Section IV.

16 See supra n. 14.

17 On September 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed “Return of Service” documentation in an attempt to
show that the FBI was properly served on September 23, 2025. (Doc. No. 97.) However, Plaintiff’s
service attempt on the FBI was improper despite the Court’s detailed instructions on how to properly
serve the FBI in its September 10, 2025, Order. (Doc. No. 90 at 2.) As the Court previously stated, “[t]o
serve a United States agency,” like the FBI, “a party must serve the United States and also send a copy of
finds that dismissal of these unserved Defendants is warranted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(m).
The service issues in this case have been well-documented. The Court has gone above
and beyond to give Plaintiff every possible chance to perfect service on the Defendants in this

case. (See Doc. No. 37 at 2; Doc. No. 42 at 2; Doc. No. 48 at 2; Doc. No. 90 at 10.) In fact, on
two occasions, the Court has given Plaintiff detailed explanations as to why his prior service
efforts were insufficient and called his attention to the rules that governed service. (See Doc.
No. 48 at 2; Doc. No. 90 at 1–10.) In both May 2025 and September 2025, the Court explained
why Plaintiff had failed to properly serve specific Defendants in this case and stressed that he
must make proper service on the newly named Defendants. (Doc. No. 63.) Though Plaintiff is
proceeding pro se, “his failure to follow Rule 4’s service requirement due to a failure to read or

the summons and of the complaint by registered or certified mail to the agency[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(2).
To serve the United States, a party must:

(A) (i) deliver a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the
United States attorney for the district where the action is
brought—or to an assistant United States attorney or clerical
employee whom the United States attorney designates in a writing
filed with the court clerk—or

(ii) send a copy of each by registered or certified mail to the civil-
process clerk at the United States attorney’s office;

(B) send a copy of each by registered or certified mail to the Attorney
General of the United States at Washington, D.C.; and

(C) if the action challenges an order of a nonparty agency or officer of
the United States, send a copy of each by registered or certified mail to the
agency or officer.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1). Here, while Plaintiff may have served his complaint to an employee of the FBI
(see Doc. No. 97 at 2), he did not also deliver a copy of the summons and the complaint to the United
States’ Attorney in Philadelphia and send a copy to the Attorney General of the United States, as required
by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i)(2).
understand Rule 4” does not “provide good cause for lack of proper service.” Dougherty v.
Dupes, No. 17-cv-01541, 2018 WL 1696651, at *13 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 2018). In the Court’s
September 2025 Order, the Court warned Plaintiff that this was his “last opportunity to make
service on the Defendants identified in this Order.” (Doc. No. 90 at 10 n.9.) But, as Plaintiff’s

service-related issues remain uncorrected, the Court dismisses these Defendants from the
instant action.
IV. MOTIONS TO DISMISS
The Court turns now to the Moving Defendants’ motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
A. Legal Standard
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must determine whether
the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
“As a general matter, a district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may not consider
matters extraneous to the pleadings.” In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1426.
“However an exception to the general rule is that a document integral to or explicitly relied upon
in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss into one for
summary judgment.” Id. (quotation marks and alterations omitted). Similarly, the Court “may
consider an undisputably authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion
to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the document.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.
White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
B. Discussion
Plaintiff brings this suit against Moving Defendants pursuant to various state and federal
statutes, and invoking several Amendments to the United States Constitution. Moving
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them in their entirety. First, the Court

addresses Plaintiff’s individual capacity and Monell claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Next, the
Court evaluates whether Plaintiff has stated a claim for conspiracy, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§
1983, 1985, and 1986. Then, the Court evaluates Plaintiff’s state law claims.18 Finally, the
Court addresses Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
1. Section 1983 Claims
Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Bristol Township,
Middletown Township, PrimeCare Medical, Jason Mancuso, Michael Lubold, and Ashley McCabe.
(See Doc. No. 60 at 15–17, 17–30, 42–46, 57–61, 61–64.) He alleges that these Defendants
violated his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth19, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. But before considering whether Plaintiff has stated a claim against these parties, the Court

must determine whether Plaintiff has satisfied the threshold pleading requirements for a civil rights
action. Section 1983 states, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State…, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States…to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law….

18 Plaintiff asserts “the common law causes of actions of abuse of process, malicious prosecution,
false arrest, invasion of privacy, trespass, intentional infliction of emotional distress, mental anguish and
pain and suffering, slander and libel, and conspiracy to effectuate all the same” against all Defendants.
(See generally Doc. No. 60.)

19 There is no private right of action under the Ninth Amendment. As such, Plaintiff cannot
sustain a Ninth Amendment claim against any Defendant in this action.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[T]o state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of
a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and second, that the alleged
deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law.” Jenkins v.
Cordova, No. 22-cv-6482, 2023 WL 3453635 at *4 (D.N.J. May 15, 2023) (citing Harvey v.

Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2011)).
Public officials can be sued in either their individual or their official capacities, but
individual capacity suits “seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions
he [or she] takes under color of state law.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985); Melo
v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 637 (3d Cir. 1990), aff’d, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) (“individual capacity suits
may be brought against government officials who acted under color of state law”). “In such a
case, the plaintiff need only show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the
deprivation of a federal right.” Judge v. Shikellamy Sch. Dist., 135 F. Supp. 3d 284, 300 (M.D.
Pa. 2015), aff’d, 905 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 2018). “When a plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim against a
defendant in his or her individual capacity, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant had

personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be predicated solely on the
operation of respondeat superior.” Byars v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 942 F. Supp. 2d 552, 569 (E.D.
Pa. 2013) (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (internal citation
omitted)). Personal involvement can be demonstrated through “allegations of personal direction
or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Id.
Local governments and municipalities are also considered persons under § 1983 and may
be sued directly under that section when “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional
implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted
and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690
(1978). “[A] government entity may not be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the acts of
its employees under a respondeat superior theory of liability.” Winn & Sons, Inc., 162 F. Supp.
3d at 459 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). “Instead, it is when execution of a government’s
policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be

said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible
under § 1983.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; see also Mulholland v. County of Berks, 706 F.3d 227,
237 (3d Cir. 2013) (“When a suit against a municipality is based on § 1983, the municipality can
only be liable when the alleged constitutional transgression implements or executes a policy,
regulation, or decision officially adopted by the governing body or informally adopted by
custom.” (quotation marks omitted)); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385
(1989) (“[A] municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself
causes the constitutional violation at issue.”).
Courts have recognized two avenues to municipal liability under Monell. “A plaintiff
may put forth that an unconstitutional policy or custom of the municipality led to his or her

injuries, or that they were caused by a failure or inadequacy by the municipality that reflects a
deliberate or conscious choice.” Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019) (citations
omitted); Benson v. Delaware County, No. 21-cv-2854, 2022 WL 784475, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
15, 2022).
With this background in mind, the Court turns to whether Plaintiff has stated any claim
upon which relief can be granted against Defendants Jason Mancuso, Michael Lubold, Ashley
McCabe, Bristol Township, Middletown Township, and PrimeCare Medical under § 1983. For
the reasons explained below, the Court finds he does not.
a. Claims Against Jason Mancuso
Plaintiff has identified Defendant Jason Mancuso in Count Thirteen of his TAC. (Doc.
No. 60 at 57−61.) He alleges that on or about February 3, 2022, Officer Mancuso, whom he
asserts “has close ties and [is] interpersonal with the Wagner family,” contacted Plaintiff by

telephone to inform him that an arrest warrant had been issued for Plaintiff. (Id. at 58.) During
that phone call, Officer Mancuso reportedly told Plaintiff he needed to come to the police station
that day despite Plaintiff asking to voluntarily surrender the following day. (Id. at 57−59.)
Plaintiff also asserts that Officer Mancuso conducted a “sham” investigation as to the stalking
and harassment charges filed against Plaintiff because Officer Mancuso “had a duty to properly
investigate [the arrest against him] and did not.” (Id. at 59.) Specifically, Plaintiff takes issue
with the fact that the investigation purportedly only lasted three days and claims his accusers
were “[i]mproper witnesses” because they were members of the Wagner family. (Id.)
Defendant Mancuso moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims on the grounds that
Plaintiff has not identified a viable constitutional violation against him. (Doc. No. 82.) More

specifically, he argues that his arrest of Plaintiff did not violate the Fourth Amendment because
Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts that demonstrate Defendant Mancuso lacked probable cause to
charge him with stalking and harassment. (See Doc. No. 82-2 at 12, 14.) He further argues that
Plaintiff admits that Officer Mancuso spoke to the purported victims of Plaintiff’s harassment,
which is a sufficient basis for a police officer to form probable cause. (Id; see also Doc. No. 60
at 58.) In Plaintiff’s response, he asserts only that Defendant Mancuso’s probable cause report
“clearly states that Kevin Wagner Sr. (District Justice and father of Officer Jeffrey Wagner), 1 of
4, false arrested my service dog Holly and I 11-Dec-21.” (Doc. No. 93 at 13.)
To maintain a false arrest claim under § 1983 pursuant to the Fourth Amendment,
Plaintiff must show that he was arrested and the arresting officer “lacked probable cause to make
the arrest.” Garcia v. County of Bucks, 155 F. Supp. 2d 259, 265 (E.D. Pa. 2001). Under the
Fourth Amendment, probable cause to arrest or prosecute exists if the facts and circumstances
which are within the knowledge of the police at the time of the arrest, and of which the police

have reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution to
believe that a suspect has committed a crime. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
The Third Circuit has held that information from a single and credible witness is sufficient to
allow a police officer to form probable cause. See, e.g., Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211
F.3d 782, 790 (3d Cir. 2000). Once a police officer has sufficient evidence within his knowledge
to establish probable cause, he is not required to conduct any further investigation. See, e.g.,
Merkle, 211 F.3d at 790 n.8 (stating that a police officer need not undertake “an exhaustive
investigation in order to validate the probable cause that, in his mind, already exists”); Snell,
2004 WL 62711 at *6 (“Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, the law does not require the police to
conduct a ‘thorough’ investigation, leaving no stone unturned. Such a heightened burden would

convert a preliminary investigation into a full-fledged inquisition. Rather, the law commands that
‘once a law enforcement officer has sufficient evidence to establish probable cause, no further
investigation is required.’”). And, “there is no requirement that the police speak to [a criminal
suspect] to get his ‘side of the story’ before arresting him.” See, e.g., Benckini v. Coopersburg
Borough, No. 03-cv-3671, 2004 WL 1686954 at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 2004).
Based upon this legal standard, the Court agrees with Defendant Mancuso that Plaintiff
has not pleaded any facts that demonstrate that Defendant Mancuso lacked probable cause to
charge Plaintiff with stalking and harassment. (Doc. No. 82-2 at 14.) In this specific
circumstance, Defendant Mancuso was not required to conduct a more thorough investigation,
and Plaintiff’s claims that his arrest was not “justified, legal, lawful, and merited” are merely
conclusory allegations. (Doc. No. 60 at 60.) Thus, Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts
against Officer Mancuso to support a Fourth Amendment violation. As such, Plaintiff’s claims
against Defendant Mancuso under § 1983 must be dismissed.20

b. Claims Against Michael Lubold
Plaintiff has identified Defendant Michael Lubold in Count Fourteen of his TAC (Doc.
No. 60 at 61−64.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Lubold “supervised” Plaintiff’s December 11,
2021, arrest for trespassing on public school property. (Id. at 62.) Defendant Lubold argues
Plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed as Plaintiff fails to allege any underlying constitutional
violation that would render Lubold liable pursuant to §1983. (Doc. No. 84 at 11.) Specifically,
Lubold asserts that Plaintiff fails to allege a viable false arrest claim because the December 11,
2021 arrest of Plaintiff was based on probable cause—namely, that Plaintiff was on notice that
he was not allowed on school property. (See Doc. No. 60 at 62 (“No one is permitted on school
property except for school business during school hours.”).) Plaintiff’s response does not further

address his allegations against Defendant Lubold. (See Doc. No. 93.)
The Court agrees with Defendant Lubold that Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts that
suggest Plaintiff’s arrest was not based on probable cause. It is undisputed that Plaintiff
received a letter from the school district informing him that he was not permitted on school
property and subsequently he was arrested while on school property for trespassing. (Id. at 62;
see also Doc. No. 84-1 at 12.) As detailed above, for probable cause to exist, the facts and
circumstances must be “sufficient to justify a prudent officer in believing that the suspect had

20 Plaintiff has not pleaded any additional facts that give rise to a possible constitutional violation
under the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments so the Court does not
address these claims.
committed a crime.” Id. (See Jones v. Middletown Township, 253 F. App’x 184, 188 (3d Cir.
2007)). Here, Defendant Lubold reasonably believed that Plaintiff was trespassing, which is
sufficient to establish probable cause. Id. (See United States v. Glasser, 750 F.2d 1197, 1205
(3d Cir. 1984) (a court will look at the “totality of the circumstances” to determine whether

there is probable cause). The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendant
Lubold.21
c. Claims Against Ashley McCabe
Plaintiff has identified Defendant Ashley McCabe in Count Seventeen of his TAC. (Doc.
No. 60 at 67−69.) Plaintiff asserts that on February 29, 2022, Officer McCabe came to
“Plaintiff’s residence after Plaintiff called 911 after being assaulted by Wagner family members
Bucks County Deputy Constable Andrew Koehonen.” (Doc. No. 60 at 68 ¶ 3.) Plaintiff does
not provide any further details or allegations related to this encounter, and thus, cannot
demonstrate that Defendant McCabe had “personal involvement in the alleged wrongs”
necessary to sustain a § 1983 claim. Byars, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 569. As such, Plaintiff’s § 1983

claims against Defendant McCabe must be dismissed.
d. Claims Against Bristol Township
Plaintiff has identified Defendant Bristol Township in Count Four of his TAC. (Doc. No.
60 at 15−17.) The crux of Plaintiff’s claim against Bristol Township is that Officer Jeffrey
Wagner’s family “dictates” the Bristol Township Police Department’s actions and “the treatment
of Plaintiff.” (Id. at 16.) Plaintiff asserts that there was “an official policy of acquiescence by
the township.” (Id. at 15 ¶ 2.) Plaintiff also claims that Bristol Township participated in a

21 Again, Plaintiff has not pleaded any additional facts that give rise to a possible constitutional
violation under the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
conspiracy22 against Plaintiff to “save” Jeffrey Wagner’s police career which violated his First,
Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and thus he
brings those claims pursuant to § 1983. (Id. at ¶ 5.)
For Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims to succeed, he must assert either a policy or custom that the

Township failed to follow or a failure to train on the part of the Township. Parry, 930 F.3d at
105 (3d Cir. 2019). Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s complaint “fails to adequately [] identify an
official policy, practice, or custom that Bristol was allegedly the ‘moving force behind’ or show
that Bristol acted with ‘deliberate indifference to the rights’” of Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 68 at 11)
(internal citations omitted.) Plaintiff’s response does not identify a policy, practice, or custom,
or provide further analysis describing how Bristol Township acted with deliberate indifference
towards Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 93 at 21.) Instead, Plaintiff restates his arguments that there was no
probable cause to arrest him on December 21, 2022. (Id.)
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Monell claim against Middletown Township, based
on “an official policy of acquiescence by the township” is too vague to survive a motion to

dismiss. (Id. at 15.) Plaintiff fails to “identify the challenged policy, attribute it to the city itself,
and show a causal link between execution of the policy and the injury suffered.” Losch v.
Borough of Parkesburg, 736 F.2d 903, 910 (3d Cir. 1984); Brown, 50 U.S. at 407–08 (explaining
that the policy or custom must be the “moving force” behind the plaintiff’s alleged injury). And
“acquiescence” is not a concrete policy made by “a municipal decision-maker with final
authority [to issue] an official proclamation.” Kean v. Henry, 523 Fed. App’x 879, 881 (3d Cir.
2013) (citing Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 263 (3d Cir. 2010)). As such,
Plaintiff’s Monell claim cannot proceed and must be dismissed. Thomas v. Cumberland County,

22 The Court addresses Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims in Section IV.B.2.
749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).
e. Claims Against Middletown Township
In Count Five, Plaintiff similarly claims that Middleton Township violated his First,
Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and brings claims

pursuant to § 1983. (Id. at 17−30.) Plaintiff alleges that Township officials “were well aware of
the harassment by numerous police officers towards the Plaintiff.” (Id. at 17.) For thirteen
pages, Plaintiff describes numerous encounters with Police Officers related to a 2002 arrest, and
then his 2021 and 2022 arrests. (See id. at 17–30.) He also makes the same blanket assertion
that he brings against Bristol Township—that the Township had a “policy of acquiescence.” (Id.
at 17.)
Middletown Township Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to satisfy either prong of
Monell liability. (Doc. No. 69-1 at 19.) The Court agrees. Like Plaintiff’s claim against Bristol
Township, Plaintiff’s Monell claim against Middletown Township, premised on his assertion that
there was “an official policy of acquiescence by the township,” is too vague to survive a motion

to dismiss. (Id. at 15.) Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Middletown Township is dismissed.
f. Claims Against PrimeCare Medical
In Count Eight, Plaintiff brings claims against PrimeCare Medical pursuant to § 1983
for alleged violations of his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. (Doc. No. 60 at 42−46.) Since PrimeCare Medical is a private corporation
providing medical services to the BCCF, its liability is also analyzed under the Monell standard.
See Henry v. Bushrik, No. 08-cv-1348, 2011 WL 767540 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2011) (citing
Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583−84 (3d Cir. 2003) (“A private
corporation contracted by a prison to provide health care for inmates cannot be held liable on a
respondeat superior theory; rather, it can only be held liable for constitutional violations if it has
a custom or policy exhibiting deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs.”).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a Monell cause of action against
Primecare Medical because he has made no allegations about PrimeCare Medical’s policies and

procedures relative to his provision of medical care at the BCCF. (Doc. No. 66-1 at 12.)
Plaintiff’s opposition does not address his allegations against PrimeCare Medical. (See generally
Doc. No. 93.) And, the Court’s own review of Plaintiff’s claims—which are predicated on
inadequate medical care and “[d]eliberate indifference” to his needs while he was a pretrial
detainee—finds they do not arise from an alleged policy, regulation, or decision by PrimeCare
Medical leadership.23 Mulholland, 706 F.3d at 237 (“When a suit against a municipality is based
on § 1983, the municipality can only be liable when the alleged constitutional transgression
implements or executes a policy, regulation, or decision officially adopted by the governing body
or informally adopted by custom.”) (quotation marks omitted)). As such, Plaintiff’s § 1983
claims against PrimeCare Medical must be dismissed.

2. Conspiracy Claims
Next, the Court turns to Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims. Principally, Plaintiff alleges that
“[the Defendants] killed [his dog] Holly and ruined [his] life with a conspiracy designed to do
[him] significant harm.” (Doc. No. 60 at 5.) Moreover, he claims that his “dog is dead simply to
shut me up and cease my whistle blowing activities against law enforcement and judicial
personnel.” (Id. at 10.) He specifically calls out Defendant Jeffrey Wagner, who he alleges was
“an active participant in the conspiracy with named defendants to discredit, add charges, and

23 A pretrial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment claims of inadequate medical care are evaluated
under the same standard as a convicted prisoner’s claims under the Eighth Amendment. See Thomas v.
Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 223 n.4 (3d Cir. 2014).
incarcerate the Plaintiff for the sole purpose of saving his police career.” (Id. at 27; see also id.
at 16 (Plaintiff asserts that the conspiracy was conducted “to injure the Plaintiff in order to save
Jeffrey Wagner’s police career . . . due to his family’s unbridled, inappropriate and undue
influence in Bristol TWP”).) In addition, Plaintiff asserts that the alleged conspiracy against him

is the “same” as a similar conspiracy that was perpetrated against his late father in 2002. (Id. at
3.)
Liberally construing Plaintiff’s allegations24, he appears to assert claims for conspiracy
under §§ 1983, 198525, and 1986. The Court begins with an overview of each of the legal
standards before analyzing Plaintiff’s claims.
First, to state a claim for civil conspiracy under § 1983, “a plaintiff must establish (1) the
existence of a conspiracy involving state action and (2) a deprivation of civil rights in
furtherance of the conspiracy by a party to the conspiracy.” Gale v. Storti, 608 F. Supp. 2d 629,
635 (E.D. Pa. 2009). To prove the existence of a conspiracy, the plaintiff must plead that there
was “an agreement, understanding, or ‘meeting of the minds’ to violate the plaintiff’s rights.” Id.

(quoting Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 205 (3d Cir. 2008)); Mikhail v. Kahn,
991 F. Supp. 2d 596, 645 (E.D. Pa. 2014), aff’d, 572 F. App’x 68 (3d Cir. 2014) (“A conspiracy
is not parallel conduct by different parties; it must embody, at its heart, ‘an agreement between
the defendants and state officials[.]”). At the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff “must assert

24 Plaintiff only asserts his § 1985 and 1986 claims against Defendants PrimeCare Medical,
Middletown Township, Jason Mancuso, Michael Lubold, and Ashley McCabe explicitly. However, as
the Court must liberally construe Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court analyzes these claims as to all Moving
Defendants.

25 Plaintiff’s TAC does not identify which particular provision of § 1985 upon which Plaintiff
bases his claim. However, it appears that Plaintiff intends to assert a claim pursuant to § 1985(3).
§ 1985(3) provides a private cause of action for damages incurred “[i]f two or more persons . . . conspire
. . . for the purpose of depriving . . . any person of the equal protection of the laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
facts from which a conspiratorial agreement can be inferred.” Mikhail, 991 F. Supp. 2d at 645
(“And the law is clear that the plaintiff must plead more than legal conclusions of a conspiracy or
agreement.”). A civil rights conspiracy under § 1983 also requires “a predicate federal violation”
to “anchor” the claim. Dondero v. Lower Milford Township, 431 F. Supp. 3d 590, 606 (E.D. Pa.

2019), aff’d, 5 F.4th 355 (3d Cir. 2021).
Second, “[s]ection 1985 of the federal civil rights provisions prohibits conspiracies to
deprive a U.S. citizen of his constitutional rights based on invidious class-based discrimination.”
Dixon v. Boscov’s, Inc., No. 02-cv-1222, 2002 WL 1740583 at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2002). “In
order to state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege: (1) a conspiracy; (2) motivated by
a racial or class based discriminatory animus designed to deprive, directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons to the equal protection of the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the
conspiracy; and (4) an injury to person or property or the deprivation of any right or privilege of
a citizen of the United States.” Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Griffin
v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102–03 (1971)).

Third, “[s]ection 1986 provides a cause of action against persons who are aware of a
section 1985 conspiracy, but fail to intervene.” Rosembert v. Borough of E. Lansdowne, 14 F.
Supp. 3d 631, 647 (E.D. Pa. 2014). To properly state a claim under § 1986, a plaintiff must
allege that: “(1) the defendant had actual knowledge of a § 1985 conspiracy, (2) the defendant
had the power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of a § 1985 violation, (3) the
defendant neglected or refused to prevent a § 1985 conspiracy, and (4) a wrongful act was
committed.” Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1295 (3d Cir. 1994). “[T]he success of a section
1986 claim is contingent upon the existence of a viable section 1985 claim.” Murphy v. Yates,
No. 05-cv-2552, 2005 WL 2989630, at *2 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2005) (quoting Moyer v.
Borough of North Wales, No. 00-cv-1092, 2000 WL 875704, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 22, 2000)).
With these standards in mind, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not pleaded any of his
conspiracy claims with sufficient specificity to survive a motion to dismiss. “Labels and
conclusions” are not enough to establish a conspiracy claim. Twombly, 555 U.S. at 556. Most

fatal, Plaintiff does not provide facts sufficient to establish that there was an “agreement”
between the Defendants to “carry out the alleged chain of events” including his arrests and the
death of his dog, Holly. Spencer v. Steinman, 968 F. Supp. 1011, 1020 (E.D. Pa. 1997). “A lack
of agreement is fatal to [] conspiracy claims under section 1983 and section 1985, which, in turn,
prevents Plaintiff from establishing a claim under section 1986.” Rosembert v, 14 F. Supp. 3d at
648. “It is not enough that the end result of the parties’ independent conduct caused plaintiff
harm or even that the alleged perpetrators of the harm acted in conscious parallelism.” Id. And,
Plaintiff has also not established a “deprivation of a constitutional or federal statutory right or
privilege” which is necessary to sustain a § 1983 conspiracy claim. Rink v. Ne. Educ.
Intermediate Unit 19, 717 F. App'x 126, 141 (3d Cir. 2017).

It is evident that Plaintiff is convinced that the Defendants he names in this action wanted
to harm him and conspired to kill his dog, Holly. And, if Holly died because Plaintiff was not
permitted to contact someone to care for her while he was incarcerated, that is tragic. But the
Court must apply the law to the facts alleged and here the allegations are not sufficient to
establish a claim for conspiracy under federal law.
3. State Law Claims

Having dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims, the Court “must decline to decide
[Plaintiff’s] pendant state law claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience,
and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so.” Hedges v. Musco,
204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000). Because no exceptions apply here, the Court will not retain
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims for abuse of process, malicious prosecution,
malicious arrest, false arrest, invasion of privacy, trespass, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, mental anguish and pain and suffering, slander and libel, and common law conspiracy
against all Defendants.26 Thus, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and will

dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims as to all Defendants without prejudice without leave to
amend. However, Plaintiff may pursue these claims in state court if appropriate. See Wilkerson
v. Superintendent Somerset SCI, 574 F. App'x 140 (3d Cir. 2014) (“the District Court correctly
determined that [Plaintiff’s] complaint should be dismissed without leave to amend as none of
the facts alleged in the complaint constituted a viable claim”); Shrieves v. Phila. Facilities Mgmt.
Corp., No. 19-cv-4865, 2020 WL 7240450, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2020) (declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims).
4. Section 1988 Claims
Finally, Plaintiff brings a § 1988 claim against Defendants PrimeCare Medical,

Middletown Township, Jason Mancuso, Michael Lubold, and Ashley McCabe. Section 1988
provides that a prevailing party in certain civil rights actions may recover reasonable attorney
fees as part of the costs. 42 U.S.C. § 1988; see also Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 836 (2011)
(“[T]he relevant purpose of § 1988 is to relieve defendants of the burdens associated with
fending off frivolous litigation.”) Here, because Plaintiff has not prevailed on any of his claims,

26 Plaintiff also brings state law claims for violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution against
Defendants Middletown Township, PrimeCare Medical, Jason Mancuso, Michael Lupbold, and Ashley
McCabe. However, numerous courts have found that there is no single cause of action for an alleged
violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See e.g., Brown v. City of Philadelphia, No. 25-cv-2239, 2025
WL 1933711 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 2025) (“Pennsylvania law does not allow individuals to bring lawsuits
seeking damages for violations of the state constitution.”) (citing Jones v. City of Philadelphia, 890 A.2d
1188, 1208 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006).
he may not recover reasonably attorney fees pursuant to § 1988.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with prejudice,27
except for Plaintiff’s state law claims which are dismissed without prejudice, as the court is not

exercising supplemental jurisdiction over these claims. An appropriate order follows.

27 It is within the district court’s discretion to dismiss with prejudice if amendment would be
inequitable or futile. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Grayson v. Mayview
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d. Cir. 2002) (“Dismissal of a pro se plaintiff’s complaint without leave
to amend is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) only when amendment of the complaint would be
inequitable or futile.”). Here, the Court finds that further leave to amend would be inequitable against
Defendants who have litigated this case since 2023, and defended against four, extremely lengthy
Complaints. See In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing 5 Wright & Miller,
§ 1217 at 178 (“[a] dismissal with prejudice [is] appropriate where [a] party refuses to file an amended
and simplified pleading”)). Despite the Court’s instructions to Plaintiff to use the template found on the
Court’s website (Doc. No. 51 at 3−4), Plaintiff’s TAC remained 103 pages and did not comport with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8; (Doc. No. 60).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11358648. Public record. Not legal advice.