# EASLEY

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · March 30, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11358605

## Case

- **Full name:** Warren Easley v. John Wetzel, et al.
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 30, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WARREN EASLEY
CIVIL ACTION
v.
No. 23-1718
JOHN WETZEL, et al.

Henry, J. March 30, 2026
MEMORANDUM
Warren Easley is a state prisoner suing prison officials for several claims relating to his
imprisonment, including both particular incidents and longstanding conditions, which he regards
as cruel and inhumane and imposed without due process. Several of his claims survived a previous
motion to dismiss by the officials, who now bring a motion for summary judgment on much of the
remainder. The defendants’ motion provides indications of its merit but ultimately fails to over-
come Easley’s (likely) denials on most grounds at this level. As discussed below, the Court will
deny most of the motion for summary judgment, referring the parties for a settlement conference.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The Court has previously issued an opinion relating to a previous motion in this case, and
I draw on our previous rendition of the background. Easley is currently incarcerated in the State
Correctional Institution (SCI) Albion, in Albion, Pennsylvania. Easley initiated this action to re-
dress injuries allegedly inflicted by the portion of defendants associated with the Commonwealth1

1 The many defendants in this case come in two groups. The present movants, “Commonwealth
defendants,” are John Wetzel, George Little, Mandy Sipple, Jaime Sorber, Tabb Bickell, Joseph
Terra, David Mascellino, Andrew Reber, Jamie Luquis, Kevin Young, Jonathan Hall, Dion
between 2015 and 2022 while he was an inmate at SCI Phoenix, another Pennsylvania prison.
These claims arise out of beatings, threats, and other violent encounters with corrections officers
Smits, Gonzalez, Kull, Voorhees, Martin, Mateus, Hunter, Brewer, Gilliard, Hamilton, and Thomp-
son, and his alleged outright denial of medical and dental care or receipt of improper medical and
dental care from Defendants Goldberg, Walsh, Annino, Bazel, DiFrangresco, Bianco and Trinh.2

As addressed in the following section, a number of claims and defendants have been dismissed.
Of the remaining allegations, those that fall within the scope of this motion relate to alle-
gations by Easley that he was improperly and cruelly left in an unsafe and disgusting cell on mul-
tiple occasions, that he was threatened and assaulted by correctional officers, and that he was un-
lawfully placed on the Restricted Release List for a period of nearly six years, a kind of solitary
confinement during which his liberty and comfort were even more harshly restricted than his
prison life beforehand. I address each of these in turn.

B. Procedural Posture
Easley filed his complaint on May 3, 2023. Leaving aside the subset of counts that this
Court dismissed previously, the counts that remain relate to, again under the Commonwealth De-
fendants’ summary,
[(1)] Eighth Amendment excessive force causes of action, aris-
ing from seven separate incidents of alleged excessive force, which
apparently occurred on August 24, 2021, September 9, 2021,

Hunter, Matthew Kull, Kysherald Patterson, Ijia Phillips, James Nicholson, Richard Thompson,
George Smits, Joseph Gonzalez, Devon Voorhees, James Martin, Anthony Talarico, Moises Ma-
teus, Tyler Moser, Jeff Brewer, Jamal Gilliard, and Anthony Hamilton. A separate group is the
“medical defendants,” however the Court by previous order dismissed with prejudice the claims
against all but one of these. Order of July 24 (as to motion by medical defendants) (ECF 55).
2 Of these defendants, only Bianco and Trinh are employed by the Commonwealth. Defendants
Bazel, Goldberg, Annino, and DeFrangresco (the “medical defendants”) moved separately for
dismissal or summary judgment. ECF 25.
October 31, 2021, April 20, 2022, April 22, 2022, April 26, 2022,
and May 18, 2022;
(2) Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement causes of ac-
tion, arising from five separate incidents of cell contamination,
which apparently occurred on July 31, 2021, October 31, 2021, Jan-
uary 1, 2022, January 24, 2022, and May 16, 2022;
(3) Eighth Amendment failure to protect cause of action arising
from a single incident which apparently occurred on October 31,
2021;
(4) Eighth Amendment condition of confinement cause of action
arising out of conditions Plaintiff endured while on the Restricted
Release List; and
(5) Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process cause of ac-
tion arising out of Plaintiff’s placement on the Restricted Release
List and confinement in the Intensive Management Unit.
Id. at 3–4 n.1 (new lines inserted).
The Commonwealth Defendants moved on June 2, 2025, for summary judgment on all
remaining counts except the Eighth Amendment excessive force claims relating to August 24,
2021; September 9, 2021; October 31, 2021; and April 20, 2022. That means that the motion relates
to:
(a) Eighth Amendment (“8A”) excessive force violations arising from incidents on April
22, 2022, April 26, 2022, and May 18, 2022;
(b) 8A failure to protect arising from an incident, perhaps October 31, 2021;
(c) 8A conditions of confinement violations, arising from incidents of cell contamination,
i. which “apparently” occurred on July 31, 2021; October 31, 2021; January 1,
2022; January 24, 2022; and May 16, 2022; and
ii. while on the Restricted Release List in general; and
(d) Procedural due process (“PDP”) violations from Easley’s placement on the Restricted
Release List.
See Comm. Defs’ Br. (“Defs’ Br.”) 4. Easley moved for additional time to respond to the motion
for summary judgment, which was granted. Order of July 7, 2025 (ECF 107). Easley ultimately
filed a brief in response postdated on July 22, 2025, which was marked received on July 24, 2025,
but somehow not filed until August 6, 2025, and not entered into the docket until August 11, 2025.
II. FRAMEWORK
It is easy to skim through or past the standards of review, but it is worth taking special care
here. This motion and its opposition require particular attention to the burdens and the border be-
tween a successful summary judgment motion and one that fails to clear its burden.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) permits a party to seek, and a court to enter, summary

judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of
material fact exists only if a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the non-moving party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250–51 (1986) (holding that “this standard mirrors
the standard for a directed verdict” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a), where “there can be but one rea-
sonable conclusion as to the verdict”). The movant can make its showing by “showing that the
materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse
party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B).
Where a motion regards a claim on which the movant does not bear the burden of proof on
an issue at trial, that movant can satisfy the initial burden by “showing—that is, pointing out to the

district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).3 In that situation, the moving party is entitled to sum-
mary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to rebut by making a factual showing “sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.” Id. at 322. This factual showing
must be based on evidence in the factual record and not on conjecture or speculation. Wharton v.
Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 244 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (evidence must be

3 In this and other quotations, the Court in this opinion sometimes omits quotation marks and ci-
tations and alters capitalization without noting the alteration.
admissible to be considered at summary judgment). The Court reviews the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
As the text of Rule 56 makes clear, the movant can also claim not that there is an absence
of evidence with which the nonmovant can prove its case but that the record evidence in sum is

insufficient to show either materiality or genuineness of factual disputes that remain. A dispute is
material if it addresses “facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A factual dispute over a material issue is genuine if “the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.4
This raises the nonmovant’s burden and credibility determinations at the level of summary
judgment. A non-moving party may not “rest upon mere allegations, general denials or . . . vague
statements,” Trap Rock Industries, Inc. v. Local 825, Intern. Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-
CIO, 982 F.2d 884, 890 (3d Cir. 1992), as pleadings are not acceptable evidence, Rule 56(c)(1)(A).
Conclusory statements are not facts and cannot create issues of fact. Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888–889 (1990). Thus, if the non-moving party's evidence “is merely

colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 249–50 (cleaned up). 5 The Court cannot go so far as to “weigh the evidence” or “determine

4 As noted below, the present motion (almost) exclusively concerns genuineness, arguing that no
reasonable jury could sufficiently disbelieve the movants’ attached evidence.
5 The movants also offer the following formulation and authority:
The mere existence of an alternate version is not grounds for denial of summary
judgment. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 212 n.3 (2001), overruled on other
grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (“[d]isputed versions of the
facts alone are not enough to warrant denial of summary judgment.”) (quoting
Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 174 (4th Cir. 1994)).
Defs’ Br. 2. The movants’ direct citation to Saucier notably omits that this is a footnote in Justice
Ginsburg’s concurrence, joined by only two other Justices. Saucier considered the question of
whether the standard for considering qualified immunity at a motion for summary judgment was
the same as that for considering the merits of the asserted excessive force claim. Saucier, 533
the truth of the matter,” id. at 249, taking care to draw inferences (such as credibility) in favor of
the nonmovant.
Finally, courts have frequently held that cases premised on alleged constitutional or civil
rights violations are “unsuitable” for summary judgment where it would be appropriate to decide

the issues only on a fuller record. Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Fed-
eral Practice and Procedure § 2732.2 (hereinafter “Wright & Miller”); id. n.19 (collecting cases
denying summary judgment regarding claims of cruel punishment).
III. DISCUSSION
Before embarking on the substance of the claims, it is worth pausing to consider the evi-
dence on offer, which seriously colors the rest of the discussion.

The movants include in their motion a relatively short deposition of Easley and no other
testimonial evidence, including depositions or affidavits. Among the 23 exhibits that are not Ea-
sley’s deposition, none explains, contextualizes, or even avers the validity of any of the others.
There are certainly many cases in which no testimonial evidence is necessary to demonstrate the
propriety of summary judgment. Here, however, the movants were on clear notice that Easley is
going to refute the truth asserted in these documents, at least through his own testimony. The dep-
osition took place on April 2, 2025, at which time Easley testified that he had still not been able to
review the paper discovery. Deposition of Warren Easley (“Depo.”) 9:8–19. At that point, the

U.S. at 200. Because the officer was entitled to qualified immunity, despite assuming that a mate-
rial issue of fact remained, summary judgment on the merits was not reached. Id. at 202. Row-
land, the source of the quotation by Justice Ginsburg, is another qualified immunity case in
which summary judgment on the cited merits is addressed momentarily and with nearly no anal-
ysis; Rowland cites for this quotation yet another case decided on qualified immunity. See
Gooden v. Howard County, Md., 954 F.2d 960, 965 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (noting that the ap-
pellate panel and district court had believed the genuine issues of material fact sufficient to write,
“if there was ever a case that cried for a trial, this is it.”).
motion to extend discovery deadlines had been twice extended by motion of the Commonwealth
defendants—to April 4, 2025. Order of March 5, 2025 (ECF 83). Easley’s potential issues with
discovery were known to defendants. He had won an order compelling the provision of discovery
months prior. Order of December 18, 2024 (ECF 70). At the deposition, although Easley immedi-

ately said he had not reviewed the discovery, counsel for the movants at no time provided him
documents to review and refute, despite ending the deposition after about two hours. Depo. 80:12
(concluding 2 hours and 17 minutes after it began); id. 41:3 (short recess taken).
Where it is obvious that the plaintiff’s case is going to be made out heavily by his own
testimony, the failure to confront him with defendants’ evidence strongly undercuts the value of
that deposition for summary judgment: How can the movants show that there is no genuine dispute
of material fact if they can show so little about how Easley will rebut their evidence, and the
credibility of that rebuttal?
* * *
I follow the movants’ organization of the claims on which they move for judgment. As the

Court has reviewed in its previous orders on dismissal, most of Easley’s § 1983 claims are prem-
ised on the Eighth Amendment as he complains of cruel punishment, excessive force, failure to
protect him, denial of medical care, deliberate indifference, and the overall conditions of his con-
finement at SCI Phoenix.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of “cruel and unusual punishment.” U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII, manifesting “an intention to limit the power of those entrusted with the crim-
inal-law function of government.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977). “It is obduracy
and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited
by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs in connection with
establishing conditions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official control over
a tumultuous cellblock.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). This prohibition restrains
prison officials and imposes a duty to provide “humane conditions of confinement.” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). “Prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate

food, clothing, shelter and medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety
of inmates.” Id. The Eighth Amendment forbids the deprivation of the “minimal civilized measure
of life's necessities,” although it does not forbid merely “restrictive and even harsh” conditions
that are “part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Rhodes
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).

A. Excessive Force
The Commonwealth defendants first move for summary judgment regarding Easley’s
claims that excessive force was used against him. To determine whether a corrections officer has
used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, “the core judicial inquiry is . . .
whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously
and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992).6 The Court approved
of taking into consideration “the need for the application of force, the relationship between the
need and the amount of force that was used, [] the extent of the injury inflicted,” as well as “the
extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by the responsible
officials . . . and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Albers, 475 U.S.

6 This standard is controversial. See Sharon Dolovich, Excessive Force in Prison, 114 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 415, 463 (2024) (contrasting Eighth Amendment standard with Fourteenth
Amendment standard for pretrial detainees under Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397
(2015), which permits an objective inquiry, and arguing that Albers “confers an extraordinary de-
gree of autonomy and authority on precisely those state actors whose conduct most requires con-
stitutional scrutiny”).
at 321. From these, the factfinder could infer whether “the use of force could plausibly have been
thought necessary, or instead evinced such wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction of
harm as is tantamount to a knowing willingness that it occur.” Id. (citing opinion equating “delib-
erate indifference” standard to criminal recklessness, with quotation thereof).

1. Threat Without Physical Assault or Other Harm
Movants argue that incidents on April 22 and April 26, 2022, both involved mere threats
that are insufficient as a matter of law to state a constitutional violation, unaccompanied by any
physical assault or other harm. Movants cite Brown v. Lewis, 865 F.Supp.2d 642, 649 (E.D. Pa.
2011) (stating that “verbal harassment and threats alone are insufficient to state a constitutional
violation” but denying dismissal where complaint “appears to raise a cognizable claim that Lewis
not only threatened” plaintiff but also transferred him to another prison in retaliation) and Murray
v. Woodburn, 809 F.Supp. 383, 384 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (“Mean harassment . . . is insufficient to state
constitutional deprivation”),7 as well as other authorities that I find weaker. E.g., Fischl v.
Armitage, 128 F.3d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1997) (only restating trial court’s holding that “mere allegations
of verbal abuse, threats or defamations by a correctional officer to a prisoner are not cognizable”

before stating that “[t]his reasoning was flawed,” for at least one other reason).8

7 Movants quote this as “[m]ere harassment” rather than “[m]ean harassment.” West has pub-
lished the latter on its online database, although the formulation is a little unusual. I cannot find it
in any context on Westlaw except the many quotations of Murray. Judge Katz may not have
wanted to suggest that Murray’s treatment in that case was “mere” anything; it came in Murray’s
87th civil rights lawsuit before Judge Katz, who took care to recognize that although most of
Murray’s suits were not legally viable, they did not abuse his right to proceed in forma pauperis.
Murray, 809 F.Supp at 384.
8 Although the proposition has been framed as a matter of law, I do not think it is that strong. In-
deed, I can imagine particularly malicious and needless verbal acts that could state cognizable
claims of excessive force, such as the believable but false reporting to a prisoner of his beloved
child’s violent death when the officer knew it was not true but would emotionally overwhelm the
prisoner. The leap from that act to a threat is not so great: Suppose the officer instead threatened
to terrorize or murder the prisoner’s child while off-duty. These examples are plainly not threats
Easley offers a response to the motion with respect to excessive force claims, but he does
not address the incidents in which no physical force was used. Reviewing the specific threats in
question, I suspect this was intentional, as Easley’s own evidence supports only the mine run of
violent threats and does not indicate any reason why his exposure thereto demands special consid-

eration. There is nothing praiseworthy in a correctional officer telling a prisoner that the officer
will “put stitches in the other side of [his] face” the next time he comes out of his cell, Defs’ Stmt.
of Undisputed Material Facts (“SUMF,” ECF 96-1) ¶ 146 (citing Easley’s grievance and deposi-
tion), or an officer’s screaming at a prisoner and name-calling and stating “that’s why he gave
[him] stitches,” id. at ¶ 149 (same). This Court is nevertheless unable to remedy under the Eighth
Amendment for unprofessionalism this “mean harassment.” Murray, 809 F.Supp. at 384.
2. Physical Force
Defendants next move for summary judgment regarding the allegations that included some
element of physical force, arguing that these are nevertheless insufficient as a matter of law be-
cause they are not “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Albers, 475 U.S. at 327; see Reyes
v. Chinnici, 54 F.Appx. 44, 48–49 (3d Cir. 2002) (“There exists some point at which the degree of

force used is so minor that a court can safely assume that no reasonable person could conclude that
a corrections officer acted maliciously and sadistically.”); see also Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028,
1033 (2d Cir. 1973) (“Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace
of a judge's chambers, violates a prisoner's constitutional rights.”).
Easley stated in a written grievance that on May 18, 2022, during a meeting with the Pro-
gram Review Committee, Young “squeeze[d]” his arm, at which point Easley “fell to the ground”

against the prisoner himself. I do not mean to suggest that those kinds of threats could not rise to
the level of violating the Eighth Amendment, but it is harder to imagine.
and was “dragged” to his cell, when Mateus “kicked [him] in [his] left side” and Easley was
“dragged under the steps by [his] cuffs.” Grievance No. 981720 (Defs’ Ex. 24) at DEF 422. The
grievance paper offers only limited space, which Easley exceeded, but he also elaborated on this
incident in deposition. There, he stated that after Young squeezed his arm, Mateus and an unknown

officer were both kicking and punching him. Depo. 43. Defendants offer evidence that Easley had
been uncooperative during the Program Review Committee, and they demonstrate the lack of ev-
idence as to any actual injury done by the squeezing, dragging, or kicking. Easley responds in his
declaration, now stating that it was Mateus and Young who were assaulting him with closed fists,
kicking and “attempting to pull plaintiff[’]s arms in two different directions although plaintiff was
not resisting.” Decl. of Warren Easley (ECF 110 at 33, “Decl.”) ¶ 20.
It is not for the Court to decide whose case is stronger at this point, based on an incomplete
and cold record. There is no evidence before me as to the injury or pain inflicted. The motion is
sufficient as far as those involved in the May 18, 2022, incident who had no role with the alleged
physical assault, but every factual dispute remains as to the nature and extent of the interaction

between Young, Matteus, and Easley, which are material to considering whether this incident was
an 8A violation.
B. Failure to Protect
Defendants move for summary judgment on Easley’s claim of their failure to protect him
relating to an incident from October 31, 2021, during which Hamilton, Talarico, and Hall were
alleged to have approached Easley in his cell and called him a “rat’ within hearing of neighboring

prisoners. Compl. ¶¶ 136–47. Defendants argue that the incident was already investigated by the
Department of Corrections and found not to have occurred; and that even if it did occur, there is
no evidence suggesting a likelihood that such a comment would cause a risk to Easley’s safety
beyond mere speculation, particularly since no physical harm came to him.
“The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects pris-
oners against the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, . . . impos[ing] a duty upon prison

officials to take reasonable measures to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other pris-
oners.” Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997) (cleaned up). “Being violently as-
saulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses
against society,” but not every injury to one prisoner by another implicates the Eighth Amendment.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833–34 (1994). To make out a failure to protect claim, a plaintiff
in the Third Circuit must show “(1) he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk
of serious harm, (2) the official was deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk to his health
and safety, and (3) the official's deliberate indifference caused him harm.” Bristrain v. Levy, 696
F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in Fisher v. Hollingsworth,
115 F.4th 197, 205 (3d Cir. 2024) (as to Bivens only, inapplicable here). The first element is objec-

tive, based on “society’s view of the risk, i.e., whether it violates contemporary standards of de-
cency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.” Betts v. New Castle Youth Development Center,
621 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2010). The second element is subjective, requiring Easley to show that
defendants were “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
harm exists,” and that they drew that inference. Id. at 259 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
Movants do not seriously address whether the facts on this point are undisputed. They focus
on the fact that their own proposed evidence, a prison investigation upon Easley’s grievance, indi-
cates that Easley’s allegation is false. The grievance response initially found only that “[d]espite
[his] claims, records reflect no evidence was found to support [his] claims.” Grievance No. 952702
Response (ECF 96-19, Ex. 17) DEF 358. When Easley appealed the grievance response, it was
overturned and remanded, but by the time the remand was investigated in April, any surveillance
video had disappeared and the one witness interviewed flatly denied the allegation. Id. DEF 360.
Easley stood by his grievance upon questioning in his deposition, Depo. 68:10–69:19, to which he

was subjected to essentially no follow-up.
On materiality, movants offer Robinson v. Danberg, 673 F.Appx. 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2016)
to support their claim that, even accepting Easley’s telling, officers suggesting to other prisoners
that the plaintiff is an informant is insufficient without a demonstration of actual harm suffered.
As this unreported citation suggests, there is not settled law in the Third Circuit on point. Those
sister circuits who have addressed the issue in reported opinions have held that there is no require-
ment of actual harm for being labeled a snitch. E.g., Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 451 (8th Cir.
2008) (no requirement of actual harm, noting that “[a]fter all, who better knows the opprobrium
and consequent effect thereof that attaches to the label of snitch than those who work daily within
the inmate population.”); Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 2001) (same

holding); Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 1989) (same); Harmon v.
Berry, 728 F.2d 1407, 1409 (11th Cir. 1984) (same); and Gullatte v. Potts, 654 F.2d 1007, 1009–
12 (5th Cir. 1981) (remanding to determine whether defendant should have known that an inmate
labeled a snitch is in danger). Those circuits, including our own, that have held otherwise have
done so in unreported decisions. E.g., Robinson, 673 F.Appx. at 214; Castellano v. Treon, 79
F.Appx. 6, 7 (5th Cir. 2003); Thompson v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., 25 F.Appx. 357, 359 (6th Cir.
2002); Brown v. Ellis, 175 F.3d 1019 (7th Cir. 1999) (unreported). Furthermore, the Third Circuit
has held in a more recent unreported case than Robinson that mere risk of assault is sufficient under
like circumstances, albeit supported by sufficient evidence. Moore v. Mann, 823 F.Appx. 92, 96–
97 (3d Cir. 2020). In lieu of binding authority on the matter, I prefer to follow the reasoning of the
reported appellate authority, and I find it persuasive.
As to a genuine factual dispute, Easley has not submitted a great deal on which to base his
claim. Nonetheless, where the evidence I can review demonstrates that prison officials may be

partially responsible for the inability of Easley to provide more evidence in his own defense
through their failure to timely investigate (and monopoly on resources within the prison), I may
deny the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)(1). Certainly, Easley has provided essentially no evidence,
in his declaration or otherwise, on the facts relating to other prisoners’ dangerousness or likelihood
to come to violence, which would go to the objective element, or on the officials’ knowledge of
the risk that calling him a “rat” would endanger him, to the subjective element. It may be sufficient,
however, to gather indication of these from the Intensive Management Unit and Behavioral Man-
agement Unit handbooks, Defs’ Exs. 2 and 3 (ECF 96-4 and 96-5), each of which indicates that
those units were intended as specialized programs for prisoners who were (presently) unsuitable
for the general population, which might suffice to indicate both the objective and subjective ele-

ments, see Transfer Log, Defs’ Ex. 5 (ECF 96-7) (indicating Easley was housed at “IMU” on Oc-
tober 31, 2021); Depo. 63:9–10 (“IMU” means “Intensive Management Unit”), as well as Easley’s
deposition about the seriousness of the crimes of his fellow IMU inmates, depo. 69:4–13. In com-
bination with Easley’s evidence indicating that the prison officials at times refused to document or
to save documentation that would have served him, I will deny the motion.

C. Conditions of Confinement
Although the Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons,” Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishment to impose upon prison officials the responsibility to “provide
humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate
food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety
of the inmates.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (cleaned up). The Third Circuit has set out two require-
ments for a conditions of confinement case under the Eighth Amendment: First, the deprivation

alleged must be “sufficiently serious” by an objective measure, including where “an inmate is
deprived of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities” Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 138
(3d Cir. 2020). Second, the prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” in-
cluding through “deliberate indifference to the inmate's health or safety or conditions of confine-
ment that violated the inmate's constitutional rights.” Id.
1. Due to Cell Contamination
Defendants move for summary judgment as to each of the five occasions on which Easley
claims he was housed in a contaminated cell that defendants refused to clean.
1. July 30, 2021
Easley alleges that he was confined to a cell without the use of toilet paper from July 30,
2021, to August 2, 2021, and therefore left to smear his own feces on the cell walls and door.
Compl. ¶ 129–31.9 Movants claim that an investigation done after Easley submitted a grievance

9 The movants mischaracterize Easley’s allegations in part. Easley’s complaint includes the fol-
lowing paragraphs, reproduced from his handwriting as I read it:
129. On 7-30-21 plaintiff was placed in a mental health P.O.C. cell due to attempt
of suicide while plaintiff was in the P.O.C. cell under constant watch he was to be
viewed and watched 24-7.
130. Plaintiff continued to have mental health issues and due to refusal of toilet
paper plaintiff covered his whole door with Feces to the point plaintiff could not
be seen in cell.
131. Plaintiff was left in this cell Filled with Feces For over 72 hours From 7-30-
21 to 8-2-21.
Compl. ¶¶ 129–31 (emphasis and capitalization original). The movants’ summary of these para-
graphs is “Plaintiff alleges that, on July 30, 2021, he was refused toilet paper while in his cell
and, as a result, decided to smear his own feces on the door of his cell in order to prevent staff
on this matter shows that this did not happen, since Easley did not mention this while speaking
with a psychology staff member on August 2, 2021, instead saying that he had no issues or con-
cerns to report. Movants also argue that the investigation cleared Patterson, Reber, Nicholson, and
Phillips of having actual knowledge of the issue, in part based on Easley’s allegations of their

knowledge being “refuted by the investigation conducted by the Pennsylvania Department of Cor-
rections, which explain [sic] that no such contamination occurred as described by Plaintiff.” Defs’
Br. 16.
Easley responds by citing Nurse Barbara Herbst’s notes, in which the nurse wrote on Au-
gust 1, 2021, “Has his camera covered - has BM smeared on windows at cell door - Security Aware
- has no reading material order - Inmate can be seen with a flashed [sic] through the side windows
- Lying on his bed face down – movement noted – Continues on a 1:1.” Pl’s Ex. 8, ECF 110 at
190. The same page of notes includes “Subjective: Has no complaints” and “Assessment: In the
POC due to Suicidal Ideation.” Id. Notes from the following day include this update: “Inmate’s
cell door window smeared up with feces, heard inmate yelling something I could not understand.”

Id. at 196.
Movants claim that there is no genuine dispute of the facts because of prison officials’ own
investigation, from which they conclude “Plaintiff was not confined to a contaminated cell.” Defs’
Br. 15–16. This argument is unserious. The prison nurse’s notes themselves, attached to Easley’s
motion but almost certainly received from the defendants in discovery, characterize Easley’s cell
as being unclean with smeared feces. A record in which the nurse wrote “movement noted” can
hardly be taken at face value where it also contends that the prisoner “[h]as no complaints,” id. at

members from looking into the cell.” Defs’ Br. 15 This reading imputes more to Easley’s intent
(and overall mental state) than can be fairly read.
190, and certainly not where the movants know that their documentation, to the extent it can be
believed, indicates at least that the cell was in fact smeared with feces.
As to materiality, movants do not argue that, if the cell were contaminated by feces, they
would nevertheless be cleared of constitutional violations. I therefore deny the motion on this

point.
2. October 31, 2021
Easley alleges that he was left in a cell for fourteen days, starting on October 31, 2021, that
was the contaminated with pepper spray (“oleoresin capsicum spray,” or “o/c”). Compl. ¶¶ 148–
52.10 Movants argue that a department investigation after his grievance “revealed there was a com-
plete absence of evidence substantiating” this grievance. Defs’ Br. 17. Instead, they claim, the
investigation showed that Kull requested on that date that Easley leave his cell to have it decon-
taminated, but Easley refused, and that Easley later failed to make any complaint over the follow-
ing weeks.
Easley responds by reference to his Exhibit 10, although Exhibit 9 is the more likely cita-
tion, reproducing a portion of the movants’ Exhibit 18 (ECF 96-20). It is a grievance slip from the

same date showing Easley’s reporting of the alleged pepper spray conditions. It has a receipt stamp
of “Dec 07 2021,” and it is followed by an order remanding it for further action after an improper
denial, signed once on January 20, 2022, and by the higher-up on March 23, 2022. Pl’s Ex. 9. First,
as the movants’ own evidence shows, the grievance was ultimately upheld in part, albeit somewhat
unclearly, indicating that the reason pepper spray was used was due to Easley’s being uncoopera-
tive and assaulting officers, including by throwing an unknown liquid. Defs’ Ex. 18 at DEF 373.
Of course, again, none of the evidence reviewed by the prison officials is attached or available.

10 October 31, 2021, was also the date of the failure to protect claim discussed supra at § II.B.
As in the previous section, the movants have totally failed to show that there is no genuine
factual dispute, nor have they argued that the facts alleged and supported by the grievance and the
affidavit (and supported partially by the declaration) are immaterial. I therefore deny on this point
as well.

3. January 1, 2022
Easley alleges that on January 1, 2022, he was pepper-sprayed and then left in a cell that
was contaminated by the pepper spray, despite his having written to Sorber and Mascilino. Compl.
¶¶ 153–56. The movants’ arguments echo those in the October 31, 2021, incident, including reli-
ance on the prison’s own conclusory report, although this time with the advantage of a clarification
in the record: “Plaintiff conceded he only remembers allegedly notifying Commonwealth Defend-
ant Sorber, and not Commonwealth Defendant Mascilino.” Defs’ Br. 20 (citing Depo. 59:12-15).
“It logically follows, Plaintiff has not produced any evidence demonstrating Commonwealth De-
fendant Mascilino had ‘actual’ knowledge of said contamination.” Id.
This is the weakest point of the motion. As noted, during Easley’s deposition, he com-
plained that he had not yet received paper discovery, so he was working off his memory of events

that occurred years before. The Court has the advantage of the exhibits. A grievance slip submitted
on January 17, 2022, attached by the movants as Exhibit 19 (ECF 96-21) at DEF 385, helpfully
provides a somewhat contemporaneous record: “I initiate this grievance against superintendent
Sorber, Major Mascilino, . . . I initiated a DC-135 to Sorber and Mascilino (enclosed) which I
received no response which mean they contribute to such civil conditions.” Later in Exhibit 19 is,
even more strikingly, a copy of the letter addressed to “Superintendent Sorber / Major Mascilino”
dated January 1, 2022, in which Easley complains of his contaminated cell. Id. at DEF 392.
In short, movants’ argument as to Mascilino is based on the plaintiff forgetting something
at a deposition years later that is squarely proven by the movants’ own exhibits. This moves the
needle from unserious to frivolous. It also fails for reasons that echo the previous sections, i.e., for
failing to argue why the genuinely disputed facts are immaterial. I therefore deny on this point as
well.
4. January 24, 2022
Easley alleges that on January 24, 2022, he was transferred to a cell that was contaminated

with another prisoner’s blood, feces, and urine, despite Sipple’s awareness of the circumstances.
Compl. ¶¶ 158–61. Movants argue that Easley has the date wrong, and that he was not moved to
the new cell until January 25, 2022. They also again argue that the conclusion of their own inves-
tigation was that Easley’s new cell was not contaminated, and that Easley failed to report any
concerns to staff members during the relevant period.
According to the transfer log attached to the motion, Easley was transferred to a new cell
on January 25, 2022 at 7:53:51 AM. Defs’ Ex. 5 at 4. Because no declarations or even instructions
were submitted with the motion, I do not know whether the timing on the transfer log means the
time that Easley was assigned to the new cell, when he entered the new cell, or perhaps just when
the logging officer remembered there had been a change the night before. During late January, the

sun rises relatively late. For someone who was apparently going through his own mental health
crisis, it seems possible that, while being moved between cells, he might not have processed that
midnight had passed. See Cumulative Adjustment Records, Defs’ Ex. 7 (ECF 96-9) at DEC 260
(noting that Easley had been on a hunger strike for two weeks at the time of this offense).
Beyond the issue of the date, since the motion again relies on the apparently genuinely
contested conclusions of the officials’ own investigation and does not offer any argument as to
why they are immaterial, I deny on this point as well.
5. May 16 to June 3, 2022
Finally, Easley alleges that on May 16, 2022, he was transferred to a cell that lacked a
mattress, sheets, blankets, toilet paper, or food trays, and that Young, Hall, and Luquis encouraged
a neighboring prisoner to flood Easley’s toilet and disrupt his sleep. Compl. ¶¶ 162–66, 169–70.
Movants again claim that there is no evidence of his raising any of these concerns. Easley did

testify on this point to contradict that finding, Depo. 61:17–68:8, and briefly touched on the same
in his declaration, Decl. ¶ 10. Movants’ claim that “[a]s the undisputed material facts show, Plain-
tiff did not report any of the alleged conditions to any staff member,” Defs’ Br. 24, is hard to square
with the deposition, at which Easley accuses the relevant defendants of having been actively par-
ticipating in the deprivations, Depo. 65:2–66:17. If the contention is that Easley did not report and
therefore is not credible, that determination is for a jury to decide. If the contention, however, is
that the prison officials had no subjective knowledge of the alleged abuse, the officials will have
the opportunity at trial to prove that they were unaware of their own actions.
Finally, the movants argue in footnote that the constant illumination of Easley’s cell alone
could not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, citing only Stewart v. Beard, 417 F.

Appx. 117, 119–20 (3d Cir. 2011) (unreported). After noting that “constant illumination can rise
to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation” under other circumstances, at least per the Ninth
Circuit, the court distinguished the matter because the plaintiffs there had access to something with
which to cover their eyes, and they suffered no apparent health issues. Id. at 119–20. First, Easley
does not claim that the constant lighting alone was a violation. Second, Easley has clearly testified
that he had access at this point to nothing, not even toilet paper, with which he could cover his
eyes. Depo. 62:11–21. Third, Easley suggests the effects of the lighting as part of the effects of the
overall conditions, which he declares caused him to “continue[] to struggle and exacerbate” mental
health issues, with both suicidal ideation and attempt. Decl. ¶¶ 13, 16. I deny on this claim.
2. Conditions on the Restricted Release List (8A)
Easley’s final claim under the Eighth Amendment reached by this motion is that for the
several years he was on the Restricted Release List, a particular kind of confinement in the Penn-
sylvania prison system, he was effectively subject to conditions of solitary confinement, such as a
very short period to eat, low quality food, the use of restraints, inability to socialize or join pro-

gramming, lack of physical contact with visitors or anyone else, lack of meaningful interaction
with prison officials and staff, limits to personal property in his cell, only three showers weekly,
and constant artificial lighting. Compl. ¶¶ 257, 265, 267.
Over the course of the nearly six years that Easley has been on the Restricted Release List,
he has been housed in various units and in different facilities, the policies of which are reproduced
in part above. See generally SCI Phoenix Intensive Management Unit Inmate Handbook 2022,
Defs’ Ex. 3 (ECF 96-5); Behavior Management Unit Inmate Handbook SCI Rockview, Defs’ Ex.
4 (ECF 96-6). Movants offer a wide array of privileges to which Easley had access while in what
he refers to as essentially solitary confinement. For instance, while Easley was at SCI Forest and
SCI Houtzdale and on the list, he

held an employment position within the facility, engaged in tele-
phone calls with family, had access to a television and radio, visited
with family and friends, accessed the facility law library, had access
to leisure reading materials, had the opportunity to exercise five
days a week and shower and shave three days a week, and had access
to educational services, commissary, religious guidance, and recre-
ational programs. Additionally, Plaintiff was regularly visited and
personally seen, nearly daily, by corrections counselors and licensed
medical professionals who provided [sic] with mental health assess-
ments.
Defs’ Br. 28 (citing their SUMF ¶¶ 19–20, 51–52, 86–87). Further, while at SCI Phoenix in the
Intensive Management Unit, he was in “Phase Six” and “Phase Five” of the program, in which he
engaged in educational programming, telephone calls with family
and friends, had access to a tablet, television, and radio, had weekly
contact visits with staff members and psychology staff members,
had one video visit a week, had the opportunity to exercise outside
of his cell for two hours a day seven days a week, had the oppor-
tunity to shower three times a week, and had access to commissary,
law library, recreational books, and in-cell games;

and
engaged in out of cell group programming, educational program-
ming, two hours of out of cell exercise a day seven days a week,
showers three times a week, had one video visit a week, in-cell pro-
gramming, telephone calls with family and friends, had access to a
tablet, television, and radio, had weekly contact visits with staff
members and psychology staff members, and had access to commis-
sary, law library, recreational books, and in-cell games;
respectively. Id. at 28–29. Finally, while at SCI Rockview and SCI Frackville, where he was
housed on the Behavioral Management Unit, he “participated in at least twenty hours of out of cell
structured and unstructured activities each week, including watching movies with other inmates
and participating in group activities with other inmates,” and was “regularly visited and personally
seen, nearly daily” by counselors and medical professionals. Id. at 29–30.
The mere fact of being in “administrative custody,” the “restricted release list,” “solitary
confinement” or whatever alternative on offer, is insufficient on its own to demonstrate a violation
of the Eighth Amendment. The Third Circuit has “acknowledged the robust body of legal and
scientific authority recognizing the devastating mental health consequences caused by long-term
isolation” including a “growing consensus that solitary confinement conditions can cause severe
and traumatic psychological damage.” Clark v. Coupe, 55 F.4th 167, 179 (3d Cir. 2022) (cleaned
up). But finding a violation is based not on the name of the housing but on whether facts about the
conditions of custody themselves demonstrate deprivations of “the minimal civilized measure of
life's necessities.” Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1997). Where a plaintiff shows “no
evidence that he was denied basic human needs, such as food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical
care and personal safety,” he cannot succeed in his claim, regardless of his unit’s classification. Id.
Where there is some evidence, the circuit has resisted laying out any “static test” against which
prison conditions can be judged, because “cruel and unusual punishment is measured by the evolv-
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d

361, 359 (3d Cir. 1992) superseded on other grounds as recognized in Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d
65, 71 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2000). Thus, there is no maximum duration for restrictive housing, after which
it may no longer be constitutionally imposed. See Wayne v. Wetzel, No. 21-4209, 2024 WL 3696467
at *8 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2024) (granting summary judgment for officials where plaintiff’s confine-
ment to segregated housing for seven years did not violate Eighth Amendment). Neither is there a
clear minimum period which is always constitutionally permissible. See Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854
F.3d 209, 217 (3d Cir. 2017) (violation where officials put suicidal prisoner into solitary confine-
ment for multiple, discrete 30-day periods).
After laying out this framework of a fact-based determination, movants argue that the priv-
ileges provided to Easley in the units under which he was housed were “privileges which this Court

has deemed not to violate the Eighth Amendment.” Defs’ Br. 27. There are three issues with this
argument: First, as in previous sections, it severely understates a genuine dispute over the facts. In
his deposition, Easley repeatedly could not recall aspects of the conditions in particular programs,
but he flatly denied receiving the kinds of regular psychiatric and social management that the pro-
grams promise, accusing staff of having falsified records to the contrary. Depo. 78:22–79:2.11 The
movants’ assurance in briefing that he was given these privileges is no assurance at this level.

11 Easley responded that he “did not recall” when asked about several provisions of the condi-
tions that were supposed to have been provided to him. It is impossible to be certain from the
deposition text whether he intended that he could not provide any answer for lack of memory,
whether he could not recall a specific instance of the particular provision, or whether he was
Second, the movants’ argument glides past, among other things, the specific instances dis-
cussed in every section above. Put simply, the fact that a prisoner in ABC program is guaranteed
access to daily showers and contact visits is of little moment to the constitutionality of the actual
conditions if the prisoner is also repeatedly returning to a cell that is contaminated with his own

and others’ feces and bodily fluids.
Finally, building off the last point, the movants rely heavily on certain aspects of the con-
ditions of Easley’s confinement taken piecemeal, like the duration of his time on the Restricted
Release List and particular programming that was at least promised during those times. This fails
by neglecting even to make the argument with any citation to authority that the whole constellation
of facts is not unconstitutional as a matter of law. Cf. Local Civ. R. 7.1(c).

unable to remember whether something was provided to him during his time in a specific unit.
This excerpt provides an example:
Q. But while you were in the IMU, did you receive the two hours of yard time
seven days a week?
A. Not that I recall. I don't recall.
Q. The most restricted phase also permits one phone call a week. Do you remem-
ber if you received one phone call a week?
A. I do not recall. I don't recall anything about the phases. They wasn't giving us
anything about the phases. We really never was given nothing about the phases.
And are you asking me for my experience? I just don't recall. So much has hap-
pened since then. I just don't recall nothing about the phone. I don't recall.
Q. Okay. So are you saying -- I would prefer to go through these questions.
There's a few. Just asking about your experience in the IMU, not whether you
were told these things. But whether you --
A. My experience?
Q. Yes.
A. I don't recall about the phone. My experience, I truly do not recall about the
yard. I know we weren't allowed to come out for groups at all. I don't recall any-
thing about the showers. I just know we were given limited property and just sit in
a cell.
Depo. 77:25–78:24.
There is a great deal of evidence in this case that was not presented at the summary judg-
ment stage, if it has been explored at all. I do not have before me depositions or affidavits from
any prison officials or prisoners or other witnesses. Of the documents I have seen, a number are
insufficient (and inadmissible) without a live witness to explain them and undergo cross examina-

tion, particularly in light of Easley’s denials. See supra § III.C.1.a. (regarding the nurse’s notes).
Easley’s declaration leaves much to be desired, but so too does his deposition, and that was not for
any unwillingness on Easley’s part to give responses or any other apparent limitation. In sum, the
movants have failed to show in nearly any aspect thus far that the material facts are sufficiently
undisputed, or that Easley’s disputes are not genuine. For that reason, I again deny summary judg-
ment on this point.

D. Placement on the Restricted Release List (PDP)
Finally, the Commonwealth defendants move for summary judgment on Easley’s claim
that his placement on the Restricted Release List was unlawful under the Due Process Clause of
the United States Constitution. In our previous memorandum considering the Commonwealth de-
fendants’ motion to dismiss, this Court addressed the legal framework for this claim, which re-
quires both a showing of a liberty interest as well as a failure to provide due process. For the liberty
interest, the Third Circuit established a two-factor inquiry: (1) the duration of the challenged con-
ditions, and (2) whether the conditions overall impose a significant hardship in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life. Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2000). Easley’s place-
ment on the restricted release list is approaching the eight-year duration in Shoats. Id.

Whether the conditions of his confinement overall imposed a significant hardship beyond
ordinary prison life is at issue, as are even the facts surrounding the process that Easley was af-
forded in deciding his continued placement. As with previous sections, the movants’ argument is
principally based on the procedures that were supposedly or supposed to be afforded to Easley. No
affidavit or testimony is offered as to whether those procedures were followed or how. A number
of “vote sheets” are attached as exhibits showing evidently the reasoning for Easley’s continued
placement on the restricted release list, but these suffer from the same inability to prove their own
truth in light of Easley’s denials.12 Of course, the movants were aware of the scope and nature of

Easley’s denials from deposing him, or they should have been, see supra note 10, but their motion
nevertheless relies on the Court finding their paperwork credible and not him.13 This is enough to
find that the motion fails to meet its burden on both the conditions and the process supplied, and
therefore I deny on this point as well.

12 The question is not whether these materials are, at this point, inadmissible hearsay. The admis-
sibility of evidence attached to a motion for summary judgment is not the same as the admissibil-
ity of evidence at trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). In any event, this evidence is not being used
for the same purpose now as it might be used later. Whereas at trial these documents might be
entered to demonstrate that the factfinder should not believe Easley has carried his burden of
proving process violations, they are entered here to demonstrate that no genuine issue of material
fact exists. They are far from incontrovertible, and indeed insufficient to “foreclose the possibil-
ity” of Easley’s charges. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Again, a mo-
vant who will not bear the final burden at trial “must show why the opponent's allegations of fact
are insufficient to support the claim for relief as a matter of law or why the court should conclude
that its opponent lacks sufficient evidence.” 10A Wright & Miller § 2727.1.
13 Easley as plaintiff will have the burden of proof at trial. At the summary judgment level, mo-
vants might have argued that Easley simply lacks (admissible) evidence sufficient to prove his
case, but that is not the motion they make here. Cf. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325
(1986) (moving party can prevail by simply showing that nonmovant has insufficient evidence to
win at trial). Indeed, Easley’s attachments to his opposition would not be sufficient to prevail at
trial, and he would have to contend with several serious arguments about his credibility. Yet, alt-
hough this theory of summary judgment is substantially all that the movants’ Standard of Review
section addresses, it is not the substance of any section of the movants’ briefing, which focuses
on the lack of any disputes. Easley would therefore not have been on notice that he had to show
in his opposition that he has sufficient evidence to support his claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, I will issue an order granting in part and denying in part the Com-
monwealth defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11358605. Public record. Not legal advice.