# Dorsey

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · May 28, 2026

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11357712

## Case

- **Full name:** Cordarro T. Dorsey v. Gabriel Campos, Carlos Ponce, Anthony Sanchez, Marcus Turner, and City of Chicago
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** May 28, 2026
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11357712

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

CORDARRO T. DORSEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. ) No. 1:25 C 01212
)
GABRIEL CAMPOS, CARLOS PONCE, ) Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer
ANTHONY SANCHEZ, MARCUS TURNER, )
and CITY OF CHICAGO, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case is one of several that Plaintiff Cordarro Dorsey has filed against Chicago police
officer whom he believes have violated his constitutional rights. In the episode at issue here, on
February 13, 2023, Dorsey was pulled over by Chicago police officers who searched his car,
causing damage to the vehicle’s interior. The incident prompted this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. After some procedural twists and turns, Dorsey eventually filed a sprawling Second
Amended Complaint (“SAC”) that asserts claims under federal and state law. In December 2025,
the court issued a lengthy written opinion dismissing the majority of Dorsey’s claims—including
an unlawful seizure claim—but allowing him to proceed on his unlawful search and prolonged
detention claims. See Dorsey v. Ponce (“Dorsey I”), No. 1:25 C 01212, 2025 WL 3484962 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 4, 2025). Dorsey now seeks a re-do: he has filed, without seeking leave of court, a Third
Amended Complaint (“TAC”). The factual allegations in the TAC are materially identical to those
in the SAC, and Dorsey has attempted to resurrect the unlawful seizure claim the court previously
dismissed. Defendants have again moved to dismiss, and as explained below, the court stands
by its prior conclusions. Dorsey’s unlawful seizure claim is dismissed, but he may proceed on
unlawful search and prolonged detention theories.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
The facts laid out below are taken from Dorsey’s Third Amended Complaint [38] (“TAC”),
which the court accepts as true at the pleading stage.1 See Ruiz v. Pritzker, 162 F.4th 886, 889
(7th Cir. 2025).
On February 13, 2023, Dorsey alleges, he was “lawfully operat[ing] a vehicle” when he
stopped at a Citgo gas station to refuel. (TAC [38] ¶ 15.) While he was pumping gas, a CPD
vehicle containing Defendant Officers Ponce and Sanchez arrived on the scene. The officers
noted that Dorsey’s car windows were tinted and that he was missing a front license plate. (Id.
¶ 26.) The officers did not immediately approach Dorsey and did not “advise him of any observed
traffic or equipment concern” while he was at the gas station, instead “circl[ing]” the Citgo until
Dorsey drove away from the gas station before pulling him over. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 25, 27).
The traffic stop did not go smoothly. Officer Ponce approached Dorsey and asked him to
exit his vehicle. Dorsey evidently refused, stating he was a “valid driver,” and demanded to speak
with a CPD sergeant. (Id. ¶ 19.) In response, Ponce “reached inside the plaintiffs [sic] window
and unlocked the driver door, without articulating a reasonable suspicion.” (Id. ¶ 20.) Dorsey
alleges that Ponce then “attempted” to force him out of the vehicle, and that the officers conducted
what Dorsey characterizes as a “nonconsensual VIN inspection” of the vehicle. (Id. ¶ 34.)
Later, Sergeant Campos arrived on the scene, evidently in response to Dorsey’s request.2
Dorsey, who was still in his vehicle, reported to Campos the about “the nature and aggression
within the stop,” but Campos participated with the other officers in ordering Dorsey out of the car.
(Id. ¶ 22.) Dorsey complied. He claims that the officers refused to provide “remedy and reason”

1 Mr. Dorsey erroneously refers to this document as the “Second Amended
Complaint.” Dorsey has filed two prior Amended Complaints [19, 31], so this is his third.

2 Dorsey alleges that, at some point during the stop, Defendant Officer Turner also
arrived at the scene. (TAC [38] ¶ 24.) It is not clear whether, and to what extent, Turner was
involved in the search that Dorsey describes.
for the stop. (Id. ¶ 23.) He alleges, further, that the officers conducted a search of his car. He
does not say whether they found anything during the search, but he asserts that the officers
caused some damage to the interior of the car and that the stop caused “emotional distress,
anxiety, and constitutional injury.” (Id. ¶ 37.)
II. Procedural History
On October 19, 2023, Mr. Dorsey sued the City of Chicago and many individual CPD
officers, alleging that four separate encounters with the police, including this one, violated 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and Illinois state tort law. See Compl. [1] in Dorsey v. City of Chicago, 23 C 15149.
Each of the four encounters was a “separate occurrence[ ] involving different Chicago police
officers,” and the incidents were otherwise “discrete and separate” from one another. See Dorsey
v. City of Chicago, 23 C 15149, 2025 WL 327425, at *6–7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 2025). Accordingly,
on January 28, 2025, the court found that the claims had been misjoined, and directed that
Dorsey's claims be severed and docketed as four separate cases. Id. at *1, *6. This is one of the
resulting cases.
Shortly after severance, Dorsey filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), and
Defendants moved to dismiss. On December 4, 2025, the court issued a lengthy order dismissing
the bulk of Dorsey’s claims, but allowing but him to proceed on three claims: (1) Fourth
Amendment unlawful search, (2) Fourth Amendment prolonged detention, and (3) Illinois law
trespass to chattels. Dorsey I, 2025 WL 3484962. But one week later, on December 11, 2025,
Mr. Dorsey filed—without seeking leave of court—a Third Amended Complaint [38] (“TAC”).3 The
TAC’s factual allegations are essentially identical to those pleaded in the SAC, but the TAC

3 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, pleadings can be amended “once as
a matter of course.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). After that, amended complaints can only be
submitted “with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” The court explicitly
explained this requirement in its prior opinion, Dorsey I, 2025 WL 3484962, at *1 n.2, yet Dorsey
nonetheless preceded to file the TAC, without seeking leave, just one week later. The court has
considered this third amended complaint, but there will be no further amendments.
reasserts the unlawful search claim that was previously dismissed. Defendants moved to dismiss
[45] the TAC in full; a round of briefs followed, and the motion is now fully briefed.
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the
sufficiency of a complaint—not its merits. To survive, a plaintiff must allege “ ‘enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Bowlin v. Bd. of Directors, Judah Christian
Sch., 167 F.4th 469, 474–75 (7th Cir. 2026) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). To meet this standard, the complaint must include sufficient “ ‘factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”
Wickstrom v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 156 F.4th 835, 841–42 (7th Cir. 2025) (quoting Cielak v.
Nicolet Union High Sch. Dist., 112 F.4th 472, 479–80 (7th Cir. 2024)). In assessing the sufficiency
of Dorsey’s complaint, the court assumes the truth of the facts he alleges, and draws all
reasonable inferences in his favor. Gociman v. Loyola Univ. of Chi., 41 F.4th 873, 878 (7th Cir.
2022).
Because Dorsey is a pro se litigant, his filings are construed liberally. Johnson v. Prentice,
29 F.4th 895, 903 (7th Cir. 2022). Still, even pro se pleadings must go beyond mere labels and
conclusions and “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” to survive a motion to dismiss.
Brockett v. Effingham Cnty., 116 F.4th 680, 685 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555). The court need not “imagine every possible argument” in Dorsey's favor simply because
he is pro se. Harris v. United States, 13 F.4th 623, 629 (7th Cir. 2021).
DISCUSSION
I. Fourth Amendment claims
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, applied to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment, protects individuals from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” Dorsey’s TAC
alleges that Defendants violated the Fourth Amendment in three ways—that the officers
conducted of his vehicle without probable cause (TAC [38] ¶¶ 47–50), that the traffic stop itself
was an unlawful seizure (id. ¶¶ 43), and that police officers awfully prolonged the stop. (Id. ¶ 44.)
The court considers each claim in turn.
A. Unreasonable Search
To state a claim of unlawful search, Dorsey must show that a search occurred, and that
the search was unreasonable. Hess v. Garcia, 72 F.4th 753, 756–57 (7th Cir. 2023). A search
occurs “when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes
as reasonable.” United States v. Scott, 731 F.3d 659, 663 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001)). While warrants are typically required for searches, there is an
exception for automobiles; because vehicles are, by their very nature, easy to move from one
place to another, “officers may search an automobile without having obtained a warrant so long
as they have probable cause to do so.” Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. 586, 592 (2018). Probable
cause for a vehicle search exists whenever “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime will be found” inside the car. United States v. Eymann, 962 F.3d 273, 286 (7th Cir.
2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
As the court explained in its earlier order, Dorsey has alleged a plausible claim that officers’
search of his vehicle was unlawful. Dorsey I, 2025 WL 3484962, at *5. Assuming his allegations
are true, officers (1) observed Dorsey driving with tinted windows and without a front license plate;
(2) initiated a traffic stop; and (3) searched his vehicle. Dorsey’s minor traffic infractions provide
adequate justification for the stop, but more was needed before officers could lawfully search his
car; not every traffic stop permits a vehicle search. See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117–18
(1998) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not allow officers to conduct a full search of a
vehicle solely because the driver was pulled over for a traffic infraction). Defendants contend that
Dorsey’s refusal to cooperate during the stop gave the officers probable cause for the search.
Indeed, the evidence might reveal that Dorsey’s interactions with officers, or the surrounding
context, were suggestive of weapons or contraband in the car. See United States v. Radford, 39
F.4th 377, 386 (7th Cir. 2022) (“In the course of a traffic stop, an officer is justified in conducting a
limited search for weapons if the officer reasonably concludes that the person who has been
legitimately stopped might be armed and presently dangerous.”). But such considerations are
premature at this early stage, where the court must take all of Dorsey’s well-pleaded allegations
to be true.4
B. Unlawful Stop
Next, Dorsey claims that the officers’ decision to pull him over constitutes an unreasonable
seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Dorsey also raised this claim in the SAC, but the
court dismissed it, as his pleaded facts unambiguously showed that he was driving without a front
license plate at the time he was pulled over. Dorsey I, 2025 WL 3484962, at *5. Because Illinois
law requires a front plate, 625 ILCS 5/13-413(a), Dorsey’s allegations confirmed that the police
had cause to pull him over.5
In an apparent attempt to resurrect the unlawful stop claim, Dorsey has simply omitted,
from his Third Amended Complaint, the allegations that doomed that claim earlier. (See TAC [38]
¶¶ 1–30 (not mentioning whether Dorsey was driving without a front plate).) In response,
Defendants ask the court to take judicial notice of Cook County court records that show Dorsey

4 The court also declines to address the possibility of qualified immunity, which
shields “government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
231 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). Defendants’ opening brief did not raise the issue, but
Dorsey himself did in his opposition brief, citing cases that he believes establish that the officers’
conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right. The court does not comment on those
cases or the matter of qualified immunity beyond noting that the defense is not ordinarily a basis
for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).

5 Dorsey’s brief in opposition challenges this conclusion, arguing that the fact that
police officers “did not stop Plaintiff while stationary, waited until Plaintiff left, then initiated the
stop” supports an inference that the stop was “pretextual targeting and investigatory policing.”
(Opp’n [48] at 2.) This argument has no merit. “Investigatory policing” does not run afoul of the
Constitution—indeed, it is what police officers do every day. And “pretextual targeting” is also not
necessarily unconstitutional; so long as police officers have cause to pull someone over, the traffic
stop is valid, even if the true motive for the stop was something else. See United States v. Avila,
615 F. Supp. 3d 846, 866 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (“If there was a legitimate basis in fact to pull someone
over, then it makes no difference that the reason in the officer's heart of hearts was something
different.”).
was convicted of driving with a tinted window on February 13, 2023.6 (Mot. [45] at 5; Ex. A,
Certified Statement of Disposition [45-1].) From this, they argue the claim is barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), as an impermissible collateral attack on the factual predicates
of his conviction. (Mot. [45] at 5.) Dorsey does not respond to the Heck argument, see Bonte v.
U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Failure to respond to an argument . . . results
in waiver”), and the conviction means that Dorsey’s allegation in his TAC that “defendants
ultimately issued no citation and recorded no offense” (TAC [38] ¶ 36) is flat-out false. In any
event, Heck aside, Dorsey’s allegations do not support a plausible inference that officers initiated
the traffic stop without having cause to do so. See United States v. Lewis, 920 F.3d 483, 489 (7th
Cir. 2019) (stating that a traffic stop is “reasonable where the police have probable cause to
believe that a traffic violation has occurred”).

C. Prolonged Seizure
Dorsey also argues that the seizure, even if valid on its face, was unlawfully prolonged by
the allegedly unlawful search of his vehicle. In Dorsey I, the court allowed Dorsey to proceed on
this theory, and the court stands by that conclusion today. As Defendants note in response,
Dorsey has alleged no facts suggesting that the traffic stop was temporally prolonged; if anything,
the stop was prolonged due to Dorsey’s own refusal to comply with officers’ orders and his
demand that a CPD sergeant be present on the scene. Defendants are correct that “delay []
attributable to the evasive actions of a suspect” does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. See
Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057, 1063 (7th Cir. 2006). But as the Supreme Court explained in
Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), the police can violate the Fourth Amendment
by prolonging an otherwise completed stop to conduct a search not supported by probable cause.

6 The court may take judicial notice of state court records. See Daniel v. Cook
Cnty., 833 F.3d 728, 742 (7th Cir. 2016).
As Dorsey’s allegations support a plausible inference that an unlawful search occurred, as
explained above, the court declines to dismiss the prolonged seizure claim at this time.
II. Trespass to Chattels
Finally, Dorsey alleges that Defendants damaged his car while searching the vehicle’s
interior, constituting trespass to chattels under Illinois law. Under Illinois law, trespass to chattels
can be committed by “intentionally (a) dispossessing another of the chattel, or (b) using or
intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another.” Kurowski v. Rush Sys. for Health, 683
F. Supp. 3d 836, 850 (N.D. Ill. 2023). A “harm to the personal property or diminution of its quality,
condition, or value as a result of a defendant's use can result in liability.” Smith v. City of Chicago,
143 F. Supp. 3d 741, 761 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (cleaned up) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Defendants ask the court to dismiss this claim because he “does not describe what is
damaged,” but the court declines this invitation. As the court explained in Dorsey I, Dorsey alleges
that Defendants, in executing the search, damaged the interior of his car. While he does not
specifically allege that Defendants “intermeddled” with his use of the vehicle, it is a fair inference
from the allegations that Dorsey has made. This claim may proceed.7
III. Artificial Intelligence and this Court’s Orders
Before closing, the court addresses an important concern. As the court has previously
observed, Mr. Dorsey’s past filings cite cases that do not exist; this is a “hallmark[] of so-called AI
hallucination, a circumstance where an AI large language model generates an output that is

7 The parties’ briefs debate the merits of Dorsey’s municipal liability claim.
Arguments relating to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) are not ripe and will not
be considered at this time. As the court explained in a January 5, 2026 Minute Entry, lengthy
argument on Monell may be unnecessary in light of the City’s indemnification of the involved
officers. If Dorsey prevails in his claims against the involved officers, a showing that the City is
liable will not increase his recovery. Of course, this would change if the court determines that the
officers have qualified immunity from liability, an issue the court declines to address here. See
supra n. 4. Because a grant of immunity does not equate to a failure to prove an underlying
constitutional violation, a Monell claim might succeed even if the involved officers are personally
immune. See Matthews v. City of E. St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 709 (7th Cir. 2012).
fictional, inaccurate, or nonsensical.” See Jones v. Kankakee Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 164 F.4th 967,
969–70 (7th Cir. 2026). Suspecting that Dorsey had used AI to prepare his filings, the court
directed him to “include a traditional reporter or database citation” for all cited case law in future
filings to avoid any confusion. (Order [37] at 5 n.4.) Dorsey did not comply with this order—his
brief in opposition includes numerous citations that lack a reporter or database citation.8 Mr.
Dorsey’s failure to abide by this court’s explicit direction is disappointing—as is his filing of a Third
Amended Complaint without leave of court and, most troubling, his false assertion that the
February 2023 traffic stop did not result in a citation. Mindful that Dorsey is a pro se litigant,9 the
court will not impose sanctions or take any other action at this time, but Dorsey is warned that
compliance with this court’s orders is not optional. Future unreviewed AI use, failure to include
case citations in any future filings, violation of court orders, or false statements in his submissions
will result in dismissal of the case and possible referral to this court’s executive committee for
filing restrictions.

8 Specifically, Dorsey references the cases “Terry v. Ohio,” United States v. Johnson
(7th Cir),” “Whren,” “Arizona v. Gant,” “Knowles v. Iowa,” “United States v. Lopez (7th Cir),” and
“Rodriguez v. United States,” without a database or reporter citation. (See Opp’n [49].)

9 The court directs Mr. Dorsey towards the Seventh Circuit’s recent guidance on this
topic:
As pro se litigants employ AI to assist with court filings, a basic reminder seems
wise. Accuracy and honesty matter. Indeed, the submission of a legal filing
constitutes a representation to a court and, as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
put the point, both attorneys and unrepresented parties are certifying “that to the
best of the person's knowledge, information and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances,” the “factual contentions have evidentiary
support” and the “legal contentions are warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2), (3); see also FED. R. APP. P. 38. Right to it, all
litigants—represented and unrepresented—must read their filings and take
reasonable care to avoid misrepresentations, factual and legal.
Jones, 164 F.4th at 970; see also Turnage v. Associated Bank, N.A., No. 25-3004, 2025 WL
3052638, at *3 (D. Minn. Sept. 12, 2025) (“Every filing in a federal court that contains citations to
phony case law amounts to a violation of Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There
is no pro se exception to Rule 11(b).”).
CONCLUSION
The motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. Dorsey may proceed on his
unlawful search and prolonged detention claims. Future amended complaints will be stricken and
not considered. Defendants are directed to answer Dorsey's complaint within 21 days.

ENTER:

Date: May 28, 2026
REBECCA R. PALLMEYER
United States District Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/11357712. Public record. Not legal advice.